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• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [September 28, 2011]

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  "The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by uncertainty about Iran's intentions for its nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. As of mid-2011, U.S. officials are increasingly critical of what they say is stepped-up Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, who are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. To try to address the threat from Iran, the Obama Administration offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. However, after observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran's agreement to implement an October 2009 tentative nuclear compromise, the Administration worked during 2010 and 2011 to increase economic and political pressure on Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2011-09-28
• Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy [Updated December 6, 2007]

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  "Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have become significant negative factors in Afghanistan's fragile political and economic order over the last 25 years. Afghan, U.S., and coalition efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy cultivation and to disrupt corruption and narco-terrorist linkages succeeded in reducing opium poppy cultivation in some areas during 2004 and 2005. […] In spite of ongoing efforts by the Afghan government, the United States, and their partners, Afghanistan is now the source of 93% of the world's illicit opium. Across Afghanistan, militia commanders, criminal organizations, and corrupt officials have exploited narcotics as a reliable source of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country's fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its embryonic democratic government. U.N. officials estimated that in-country illicit revenue from the 2006 opium poppy crop reached over $3 billion, sustaining fears that Afghanistan's economic recovery continues to be underwritten by drug profits. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan, including the resurgent remnants of the Taliban and some Al Qaeda operatives. […] President Bush […] warned that, 'the Taliban uses drug money to buy weapons ... and they pay Afghans to take up arms against the government.' […] In addition to describing the structure of the Afghan narcotics trade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade's participants, explores narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current policy debates regarding the counternarcotics roles of the U.S. military, poppy eradication, alternative livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2007-12-06
• Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [April 23, 2014]

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  "Since the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian divisions have widened, fueling a revival of a Sunni Muslim insurgent challenge to Iraq's stability. Iraq's Sunni Arab Muslims resent Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination by the government of Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki. Iraq's Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues, particularly their intent to separately export large volumes of oil produced in the Kurdish region. The political rifts produced a significant and sustained uprising in December 2013 led by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq, now also known by the name Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group and its allies still control several cities in Anbar Province, including the key city of Fallujah, and have pockets of control near Baghdad. There are a growing number of reports that some Shiite militias have reactivated to retaliate for violence against Shiites. The sectarian rift and violence, which killed nearly 9,000 Iraqis in 2013 (double the figure for 2012), could affect the legitimacy of national elections for a new parliament and government set for April 30, 2014. Facing divided opponents, Maliki is widely expected to seek to retain his post after that vote, largely on the strength of Shiite voters who see him as standing up to the Sunni challenge."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2014-04-23
• Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [February 5, 2014]

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  "Two years after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian divisions and the Sunni-led uprising in neighboring Syria have fueled a revival of radical Islamist Sunni Muslim insurgent groups that are attempting to undermine Iraq's stability. Iraq's Sunni Arab Muslims resent the Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination by the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Iraq's Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts caused a significant uprising led by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq, now also known by the name Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), that began December 26, 2013. Earlier, unrest delayed some provincial elections during April-June 2013 and the latest uprising could affect the legitimacy of national elections for a new parliament and government set for April 30, 2014. Maliki is widely expected to seek to retain his post after that vote. The latest violence has exposed weaknesses in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the absence of direct U.S. military involvement in Iraq. To date, the 800,000-person ISF has countered the escalating violence without outside assistance. However, violence killed nearly 9,000 Iraqis in 2013--more than double the figure for all of 2012. Informal security structures put in place during the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003-2011 have fractured or faltered in the late 2013-early 2014 ISIS challenge. And there are a growing number of reports that some Shiite militias have reactivated to retaliate for violence against Shiites."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2014-02-05
• Iraq: Politics, Security, and U.S. Policy [June 22, 2015]

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  "Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divisions--muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq--have reemerged to fuel a major challenge to Iraq's stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq's Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite-dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL). Iraq's Kurds have been separately embroiled in political and territorial disputes with Baghdad, although those differences have been downplayed by the common struggle by the Kurds and the central government against the Islamic State. As part of an overarching effort to defeat the Islamic State, the United States is helping the Iraqi government try to recapture territories in Iraq that have fallen under Islamic State control. The United States is conducting airstrikes against the group and has deployed 3,100 U.S. military personnel to advise and training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the 'peshmerga' militia of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Sunni tribal fighters. Partner countries are contributing 1,500 advisers and trainers for these purposes. The United States is also proceeding with pre-existing foreign military sales of combat aircraft, as well as with new sales of tanks and armored vehicles to replenish the equipment lost during the 2014 ISF partial collapse."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2015-06-22
• Iraq: Politics and Governance [September 16, 2015]

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  "Iraq's sectarian and ethnic divisions--muted toward the end of the 2003-2011 U.S. military intervention in Iraq--have reemerged to fuel a major challenge to Iraq's stability and to U.S. policy in Iraq and the broader Middle East region. The resentment of Iraq's Sunni Arabs toward the Shiite-dominated central government facilitated the capture in 2014 of nearly one-third of Iraqi territory by the Sunni Islamist extremist group called the Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL). Iraq's Kurds have been separately embroiled in political and territorial disputes with Baghdad, although those differences have been subordinated at least temporarily to the common struggle against the Islamic State. As part of an overarching effort to defeat the Islamic State, the United States is helping the Iraqi government try to recapture territories in Iraq that have fallen under Islamic State control. The United States is conducting airstrikes against the group and has deployed over 3,500 U.S. military personnel to advise and training the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the 'peshmerga' militia of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and Sunni tribal fighters. Partner countries are contributing 1,500 advisers and trainers for these purposes. The United States is also proceeding with pre-existing foreign military sales of combat aircraft, as well as with new sales of tanks and armored vehicles to replenish the equipment lost during the 2014 ISF partial collapse."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth; Humud, Carla E.

  2015-09-16
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [August 3, 2015]

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  "Libya's post-Qadhafi transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. Since an armed uprising ousted the government of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities have failed to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya in the immediate wake of the 2011 conflict deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. The U.S. State Department describes Libya as a terrorist safe haven, and the U.S. government suspended operations at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli and relocated U.S. personnel out of the country in July 2014."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2015-08-03
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [March 4, 2016]

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  "Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After an armed uprising ended the 40-plus year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly were held and transparently administered from 2012 through 2014, but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition. Insecurity was prevalent in Libya in the immediate wake of the 2011 conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Resulting conflicts involving Libyans in different parts of the country drove the political transition off course. At present, armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. Criminals and violent Islamist extremist organizations have exploited these conditions, and the latter have strengthened their military capabilities and advanced their ideological agendas inside Libya and beyond its borders."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2016-03-04
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [May 13, 2016]

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  This report offers a comprehensive overview of the current U.S. policy with Libya. The report begins by discussing the political and security dynamics and progresses to the current U.S. policy, assistance, and military action in Libya. The report here within also offers figures and table in relation to the topic at hand. The following is an excerpt from the report summary: Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After an armed uprising ended the 40-plus year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. "Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly were held and transparently administered in 2012 and 2014, but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition. Insecurity remained prevalent in Libya following the 2011 conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Resulting conflicts involving Libyans in different parts of the country drove the political transition off course. At present, armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. Criminals and violent Islamist extremists have exploited these conditions, and the latter have strengthened their military capabilities and advanced their agendas inside Libya and beyond its borders."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2016-05-13
• Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy [May 20, 2013]

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  "The United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide during the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, was reduced to a 'pre-surge' level of about 66,000 as of September 20, 2012. An additional 34,000 will leave by February 2014, but the bulk of that drawdown will take place in late 2013- early 2014. The size of the international force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 is to be announced later in May or in June 2013, with options narrowing to 8,000 -- 12,000, of which the majority would be U.S. forces. The primary mission will be to train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF), but some international forces will engage in counter-terrorism missions as well. The U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that is under negotiation. Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power. The Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan. Among efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials are pushing for substantial election reform to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for April 5, 2014, will be devoid of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan's elections in 2009 and 2010. An unexpected potential benefit to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have proceeded sporadically since early 2010, but informal discussions have continued and even evolved into exchanges of specific proposals. Afghanistan's minorities and women's groups fear that a settlement might produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2013-05-20
• Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [January 6, 2014]

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  "Two years after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian divisions and the Sunni-led uprising in neighboring Syria have fueled a revival of radical Islamist Sunni Muslim insurgent groups that are attempting to undermine Iraq's stability. Iraq's Sunni Arab Muslims resent the Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination by the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Iraq's Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts caused a significant uprising led by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq, now also known by the name Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), that began December 26, 2013. Earlier, unrest delayed some provincial elections during April-June 2013 and the latest uprising could affect the legitimacy of national elections for a new parliament and government set for April 30, 2014. Maliki is widely expected to seek to retain his post after that vote. The latest violence has exposed weaknesses in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the absence of direct U.S. military involvement in Iraq. To date, the 800,000-person ISF has countered the escalating violence without outside assistance. However, violence killed nearly 9,000 Iraqis in 2013--more than double the figure for all of 2012. Informal security structures put in place during the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003-2011 have fractured or faltered in the late 2013-early 2014 ISIS challenge. And there are a growing number of reports that some Shiite militias have reactivated to retaliate for violence against Shiites."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2014-01-06
• Burkina Faso [Updated December 10, 2020]

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  From the Document: "Burkina Faso has become a stark symbol of worsening security trends in West Africa's Sahel region. Since 2016, Islamist insurgent groups have asserted control over parts of the country and carried out terrorist attacks in the capital, Ouagadougou. Some have ties to the conflict in neighboring Mali, and to Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. The government has struggled to counter insurgent gains despite international backing and military aid, while state security forces and militia groups have been implicated in severe human rights abuses. The conflict has crippled health and education systems in parts of the country and deepened food insecurity. Over a million Burkinabè were internally displaced as of late 2020, nearly double the number a year earlier, according to U.N. data. The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has also brought new health and economic hardships."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Arieff, Alexis

  2020-12-10
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [October 2, 2017]

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  "Libya's political transition has been disrupted by armed nonstate groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. After an armed uprising ended the 40-plus-year rule of Muammar al Qadhafi in late 2011, interim authorities proved unable to form a stable government, address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. Elections for legislative bodies and a constitutional drafting assembly were held and transparently administered in 2012 and 2014, but were marred by declining rates of participation, threats to candidates and voters, and zero-sum political competition. Insecurity remained prevalent in Libya following the 2011 conflict and deepened in 2014, driven by overlapping ideological, personal, financial, and transnational rivalries. Issues of dispute have included governance, military command, national finances, and control of oil infrastructure. Resulting conflicts involving Libyans in different parts of the country drove the political transition off course. At present, armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. Criminals and violent Islamist extremists have exploited these conditions, and the latter remain active inside Libya and threaten Libya's neighbors. The 2017 U.S. AFRICOM Posture Statement states that 'the instability in Libya and North Africa may be the most significant, near-term threat to U.S. and allies' interests' in Africa."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2017-10-02
• Sudan's Uncertain Transition [June 28, 2019]

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  From the Overview: "Sudan faces an inflection point as elements of deposed President Omar al Bashir's regime struggle to maintain power in the face of a popular uprising and international pressure. Sudan has a long history of rebellion and resistance; mass protests in 1964 and 1985 against military regimes spurred coups that led to brief periods of civilian rule. The current social movement, however, is unprecedented for Sudan in its scope, bringing together professional and labor unions, community groups, civic activists and business leaders, opposition parties, and insurgents in a common call for change. Bashir's security chiefs, who seized power in April, have appeared divided at times on how to proceed. They allowed an initial opening of political space, pledging a transition to civilian government and negotiating with the opposition. But in early June, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) launched a violent crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, killing and arresting protesters, raiding hospitals, blocking the internet, and deploying paramilitary forces across Khartoum and other key cities. The rise within the TMC of a former Darfur militia leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemeti,' whom human rights groups have accused of war crimes, has drawn particular concern. Former U.S. envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios has described the current moment as Sudan's greatest political crisis since independence in 1956."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Lauren Ploch

  2019-06-28
• Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front: Hearing Before the Committee on Environment and Public Works, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, May 18, 2005

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  From the opening statement of James M. Inhofe: "Today, we will hear from Federal law enforcement agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, who will discuss the problem of ELF and ALF and law enforcement's reaction to their dangerous and destructive tactics. It is these tactics, particularly the widespread use of arson, which makes ELF and ALF the No. 1 domestic terror concern over the likes of white supremacists, militias, and anti-abortion groups. […]. As with any other criminal enterprise, we cannot allow individuals and organizations to, in effect, aid and abet criminal behavior or provide comfort and support to them after the fact, just as we cannot allow the individuals and organizations to surf in between the laws of permissible free speech and speech that incites violence, when we know the goal is to inspire people to commit crimes of violence. This hearing will begin the process of scrutinizing criminally based activism, as well as call into question the essential support received from mainstream individuals and organizations." Materials, statements, and letters submitted for the record include those of the following: James M. Inhofe, James M. Jeffords, Frank Lautenberg, Barack Obama, David Vitter, Bradley Campbell, Carson Carroll, John Lewis, David Martosko, Monty McIntyre, David Skorton, Bennie G. Thompson, Jeffrey S. Kerr, Mindy Kursban.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatening by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  "In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2006-11
• Darfur Crisis: Death Estimates Demonstrate Severity of Crisis, but Their Accuracy and Credibility Could Be Enhanced, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  "In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan, broke out between rebel groups and government troops and government-supported Arab militias. While few would dispute that many thousands of Darfur civilians have died, less consensus exists about the total number of deaths attributable to the crisis. Estimates by the Department of State (State) and other parties report death tolls up to about 400,000 for varying populations and periods of time between February 2003 and August 2005. Based on the views of experts convened by GAO and the National Academy of Sciences, interviews with estimate authors, and a review of relevant literature, this report (1) evaluates six Darfur death estimates, (2) identifies general challenges to estimating deaths in such crises, and (3) discusses measures to improve death estimates."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2006-11
• Volunteer Military Organizations: An Overlooked Asset

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  "With the current operations tempo for Federal forces, the availability of manpower for homeland security is a major concern. Today's missions are full spectrum: traditional operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, peacekeeping in the Balkans and the Sinai, and defense support to civil authorities during hurricanes Katrina and Rita. President George W. Bush's National Security Strategy makes it clear that defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. With the gradual reduction in force and increased deployments, however, commanders are asked to do more with less. As troops engage in overseas operations, for example, they are tasked with additional short-notice contingencies that further exacerbate the problem. Given the needs of the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Northern Command, the increased use of National Guard and Reserve units, and the many and varied asymmetrical threats confronting the Nation since 9/11, it is questionable whether sufficient forces will be available. Therefore, a serious study of expanding the use of legitimate volunteer military organizations is long overdue. These groups are not new in America and are divided into state and Federally sponsored organizations. State-sponsored organizations include State Defense Forces (SDFs) and Naval Militias, while elements such as the U.S. Air Force Civil Air Patrol and the Coast Guard Auxiliary are sponsored by the Armed Forces."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Bankus, Brent C.

  2006-01
• Southern Poverty Law Center [website]

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  This is the website of the Southern Poverty Law Center, which runs a Militia Task Force. The SPLC has provided the FBI with intelligence on right-wing extremists, and it has also successfully brought suits against right-wing groups in a variety of states.

  Southern Poverty Law Center
• 'Making Riflemen from Mud': Restoring the Army's Culture of Irregular Warfare

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  "Prior to World War II, the Army had a deeply ingrained facility with and acceptance of what we now term unconventional warfare--raising, training, advising, and cooperating with tribal militias, local paramilitaries, and other nonstate armed groups. This culture of irregular warfare was attributable to nearly 300 years of American military tradition from the colonial period until 1941, including extensive experience in cooperating with Native American tribes and individual scouts during the expansion of the western frontier. These traditions of unconventional war reached maturity in the years of fighting on the western plains after the Civil War, and were given ultimate expression in the creation of the Philippine Scouts at the beginning of the 20th century. Since World War II, the wider military has lost this expertise in and comfortable familiarity with unconventional operations, with the Special Operations community taking on the sole proprietorship of this role. Given the variety of political environments in which today's conventional soldiers may find themselves and the current nature of conflicts ongoing and likely to occur in the world, the Army culture as a whole can and must readapt itself to the new old realities of irregular war."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Campbell, James D.

  2007-10
• U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation: The War on Terrorism and Beyond

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  "In 2007 Pakistan witnessed more than dozen attacks against its military, security forces, government officials, and civilians. A number of unknown terror plots have been disrupted, if not derailed, and raids have been conducted in cities such as Quetta, known for its historic ethnic-nationalist struggle and links to the Taliban. The emphasis on the wave of terror that has reigned in Pakistan by the Urdu press in February 2007 suggests a widening conflict between the Pakistani government and the varied militia groups, as well as the influence of external factors, such as the U.S.-led war in Iraq and Afghanistan, in contributing to the recent violence throughout the country."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict

  Ali, Farhana

  2007-06
• Imposition of Martial Law in the United States

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  Imagine the following frightening scenario: Members of an American militia group enter a major metropolitan airport and attach small aerosol-like devices in several restrooms throughout the concourse. These devices release deadly amounts of smallpox bacteria into the air, infecting hundreds of Americans travelling through the airport. Within days, citizens around the country begin to display the horrific symptoms of smallpox. Soon public health workers determine the nature of the epidemic and release the information to the press. Widespread panic results. Civilian public health agencies attempt to educate the public on how to control the spread of the disease. But despite police efforts to control the populace by establishing quarantine areas, the civilian infrastructure is quickly overwhelmed. Chaos results. Finally, the President declares martial law in an attempt to restore order in the nation.

  Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (United States. Army)

  Davies, Kirk L.

  2000-01-03
• Emotional Reactions to Torture and Organized State Violence

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  This article on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) discusses the disorder in the context of torture and government inflicted violence. From the article: "Torture has been in use for a very long time, but its nature and purpose has changed--probably in the 20th century. In the modern world, torture is typically used covertly and extra-judicially as part of a process of state-sponsored violence against minority ethnic, religious, or other communities. It is a means used systematically by many states to terrorize some of their own people and communities. From a social and cultural perspective, context is as important as the experience itself. States that use torture need to make sure that those at risk (either because of their actions or by virtue of belonging to a particular group) are fully aware of this. On the other hand, the rest of the population needs to be kept in ignorance as much as possible; it is a covert, deniable activity. In addition, the use of soldiers (or paramilitary and non-state militias) to round up people, the enforced displacement of communities (including ethnic cleansing), and policies of detention for particular communities all take on a larger meaning in the context of torture. These broader activities go beyond the UN definition but provide a related backdrop of fear and intimidation. In this article, a broad approach will be adopted to consider torture and other forms of organized state violence."

  National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (U.S.)

  Turner, Stuart, 1952-

  2004
• Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences, Part 2--Negotiating with the Iranians: Missed Opportunities and Paths Forward, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, November 7, 2007

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  From the opening statement of John F. Tierney: "Our relationship with Iran is complex, to say the least, and involves a multitude of security, economic, and diplomatic facets. We have many serious concerns with Iran, including its nuclear enrichment program, its relationship with Hamas and Hezbollah, and it relations with certain Iraqi militia groups. Still, as our witness at a previous related hearing noted, areas of serious concern to the United States such as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, terrorism, and proliferation all are impacted by Iran in one way or another. The question now is now best to go forward. The Administration has put conditions before any broader talks with Iraq can commence. Well hear from our panelist today what the lessons of this recent history tell us about whether this is the best course forward and we'll learn of other possible diplomatic alternatives." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John F. Tierney, James Dobbins, Lawrence J. Haas, Flynt Leverett, Hillary Mann Leverett, and Suzanne Maloney. This hearing represents the second in a series of three on this matter.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2009
• CTC Sentinel [January 2009]

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  This January 2009 issue of the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center CTC Sentinel features an article by The Combating Terrorism Center titled, "Al-Qa'ida's Five Aspects of Power." The article "examines al-Qa'ida across five factors that encompass all aspects of the group's power: 1) the power to destroy; 2) the power to inspire; 3) the power to humiliate; 4) the power to command; and 5) the power to unify." Other reports in this issue include: "A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona," by Fernando Reinares; "A Holisitc Critique of Singapore's Counter-Ideological Program," by Kumar Ramakrishna; "Shifting Trends in Suicide Attacks," by Assaf Moghadam; "The Future of Moqtada al-Sadr's New Jaysh al-Mahdi," by Babak Rahimi; "Reconsidering the Role of Militias in Iraq," by James J. Smith; "The Pakistan Army and it Role in FATA," by Shuja Nawaz; and "Iraq's Border Security: Key to an Iraqi Endstate," by Steven Oluic. This publication concludes with a section highlighting recent terrorist activity.

  Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)

  2009-01
• Regional Security Cooperation in the Maghreb and Sahel: Algeria's Pivotal Ambivalence

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  "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has heightened concerns of instability across the Maghreb and Sahel. In recent years, AQIM militias have conducted operations across wide swaths of northern Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and southern Algeria. Mixing abduction of foreigners, car and cigarette smuggling, drug trafficking, and arms dealing, many consider AQIM's motivations more criminal than political or religious. This view was reinforced by a 'summit' between Colombian drug traffickers and AQIM, represented by Abdelkarim Targui, known as 'the Tuareg,' held in Guinea Bissau in late October 2010. Kidnappings of Westerners are prioritized for the sensational media coverage generated, providing the group more visibility, leverage, and revenue (estimated at $70 million in recent years). In the process, AQIM has reportedly stockpiled significant quantities of arms and cash. High-profile abductions, in turn, threaten vital tourism and economic investments, such as the Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline intended to transport Nigerian gas across Niger and Algeria to Europe by 2015."

  National Defense University. Africa Center for Strategic Studies

  Ammour, Laurence Aïda

  2012-02
• Hezbollah in Transition: Moving from Terrorism to Political Legitimacy

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  From the thesis abstract: "For the last decade the United States has focused on Al Qaeda and a resurgent Taliban while other more powerful and potentially more dangerous actors developed virtually unchecked. Hezbollah in Lebanon is bigger, better organized, more technologically advanced, better funded, better trained, and better armed than Al Qaeda and has the ability to sow far greater instability in the Middle East. Since the 1970s, Hezbollah has transformed itself from a shadowy militant group known primarily for terrorist attacks to the Lebanon's pre-eminent political, social, and military force. Today it has an armed militia more powerful than the Lebanese Army and a far-reaching network that delivers welfare goods and social services to its Shiite constituency throughout Lebanon. Hezbollah's power and influence in the Levant drastically complicate the United States' aspirations to advance peace, security, and opportunity in the Greater Middle East. This paper explores the factors and circumstances that contributed to Hezbollah's ascendancy as a political, social, and paramilitary organization. It further explores the sometimes-counterintuitive manner in which non-state actors not only stress the traditional Westphalian concept of state sovereignty, but can also reaffirm its validity and utility in the modern world."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Trenchard, Terence D.

  2011-03-24
• Serial No. 114-194: Egypt: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, June 15, 2016

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  This is the June 15, 2016 hearing on "Egypt: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Policy" held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. From the opening statement of Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: "The political, economic, and security challenges that Egypt is facing right now, they are numerous, they are interdependent. It is extremely difficult, for example, for President Sisi to make necessary structural reforms to Egypt's economy without potentially undermining the fragile political support he is leaning on to bring much-needed stability to the country. Conversely, if these economic reforms are not made soon, we may see a return of the unrest that we saw on Egyptian streets not too long ago. And it is in this context that Egypt is facing growing security threats from an expanding ISIS and its Sinai Province affiliate, from al-Qaeda-linked groups, from militias, from extremists in Libya, and from particularly violent factions of the Muslim Brotherhood." [...] "Egypt is an important strategic ally that is struggling on a number of fronts, and as we discuss the challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy here today, I continue to believe that the best way to help is through encouragement and assistance as a friend." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mark Green, Mokhtar Awad, Amy Hawthorne.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2016
• Iranian Influence in Iraq and the Case of Camp Liberty, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, October 7, 2015

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  This is a testimony compilation of the October 7, 2015 hearing on "Iranian Influence in Iraq and the Case of Camp Liberty" held before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of John McCain: "As my colleagues know, Camp Liberty is the location in Iraq where more than 2,000 Iranian refugees currently live since they were internally relocated from their previous location at Camp Ashraf. The residents of the camp are dissidents who have long since opposed the regime in Tehran, at one time violently so. When U.S. forces entered Iraq in 2003, the residents of what was then Camp Ashraf renounced violence, gave up their weapons, and agreed to come under U.S. military protection as, quote, 'protected persons' under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions. For several years, the U.S. military provided security for the camp's residents. This responsibility ultimately transferred to the Iraqi government, and things took a turn for the worse, especially in the aftermath of the full withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011. In recent years, the residents of the camp have been the victims of frequent harassment, the decreased quality of life, hindered access to food and medicine, and rocket attacks, and violent raids that have resulted in the deaths of more 100 men, women, and children. Most of these attacks are reportedly the work of radical Iraqi military -- militia groups and agents of the Iranian regime." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: James Jones, Joseph I. Lieberman, and Wesley Martin.

  United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services

  2015-10-07
• CTC Sentinel [February 2013]

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  This February 2013 issue of the U.S. Military Academy's Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) Sentinel features the following articles: "Islamist Militant Groups in Post-Qadhafi Libya" by Alison Pargeter, "Yemen's Use of Militias to Maintain Stability in Abyan Province" by Casey L. Coombs, "Deciphering the Jihadist Presence in Syria: An Analysis of Martyrdom Notices" by Aaron Y. Zelin, "British Fighters Joining the War in Syria" by Raffaello Pantucci, "Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's New Cease-Fire Offer" by Imtiaz Ali, "The Significance of Maulvi Nazir's Death in Pakistan" by Zia Ur Rehman, "Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity," and "CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts."

  Combating Terrorism Center (U.S.)

  2013-02