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• Lebanese Hezbollah [Updated February 1, 2021]

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  From the Overview: "Hezbollah ('Party of God') is an Iran-backed Lebanese Shi'a militia and U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Formed in 1982, in the wake of the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, the group has described itself as the leader of Islamic resistance to Israel and has conducted numerous attacks against Israeli and Western targets. Hezbollah currently operates regionally as a militia force, while also playing a powerful role as a Lebanese political party and provider of social services."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Humud, Carla E.

  2021-02-01
• Problems of Mobilization and the Analysis of Armed Groups

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  "The first step in knowing your enemy is deciding what to call him. When dealing with non-state, armed groups, there is a set list of categories which are used for classification. These categories include insurgent, guerilla, warlord, terrorist, and militia. From this initial classification we tend to apply a set of assumptions about the groups for our analysis and response. For instance, if we believe we are fighting a guerilla insurgency, we ask where the popular support is coming from; or if it is a terrorist group, we apply counter-terror tactics. The danger in this approach is that poor classification and analysis may lead to an improper response. At best, this may be ineffective; at worst, it can be catastrophic. For instance, the Ugandan government began by treating the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) as a guerilla insurgency, and this led to standard strategies such as creating protected hamlets in order to distance the group from local support. However, the LRA had never had much local support, nor did it really need it. Thus, the protected hamlet strategy has not reduced the LRA's ability to continue the conflict and has served only to further alienate the affected population from the Ugandan government. If the LRA was better classified and analyzed, the Ugandan army's response might have been more effective."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Vinci, Anthony

  2006
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated April 25, 2007]

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  "According to the Administration's "National Security Strategy" document released on March 16, 2006, the United States "may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran." That perception, generated primarily by Iran's developing nuclear program, has been intensified by Iran's assistance to Shiite armed groups in Iraq and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration is pursuing several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the Administration's focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough - as well as on stabilizing Iraq - has brought multilateral diplomatic strategy to the forefront. Since August 2006, Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines to cease uranium enrichment, resulting in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) to date that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. Other Iranian policies, particularly its material support to groups that use violence to prevent Israeli-Arab peace or undermine pro-U.S. governments, are attracting growing U.S. concern. These groups include Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some U.S. officials also believe that Iran is purposefully harboring several senior Al Qaeda activists, although Iran claims they are "in custody." U.S. officials accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq and causing the deaths of U.S. troops by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq's Sunnis."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-04-25
• Armed Conflict in Syria: U.S. and International Response [December 20, 2012]

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  "Syria is mired in an armed conflict between forces loyal to President Bashar al Asad and rebel fighters opposed to his rule. The conflict is creating a regional humanitarian emergency as well as risks of violent spillover that appear to be growing as the fighting intensifies. Various reports suggest that as many as 50,000 Syrians have been killed since major political unrest began in March 2011, including more than 10,000 security personnel. As of December 19, more than 533,000 refugees had fled the country, over 300,000 of them since September 2012. According to the Syrian Red Crescent, as many as 2.5 million Syrians may be internally displaced, and the United Nations (U.N.) is seeking $1.5 billion to aid Syrians in need of assistance. […] After over 18 months of unrest and violence, dilemmas and contradictions characterize Syria's crisis. A menu of imperfect choices confronts U.S. policymakers, amid fears of continued violence, evidence of a widening humanitarian crisis, and regional instability. The potential spillover effects of continued fighting raise questions with regard to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel. Signs of sectarian and ethnic conflict are emerging in Syria, and the unrest also is creating new opportunities for Al Qaeda and other violent extremist groups to operate there. The security of Syrian conventional and chemical weapons stockpiles has become a regional security concern that will grow if a security vacuum emerges. Many observers worry that a further escalation in fighting or swift regime change could jeopardize weapons security, generate new pressures on minority groups, or lead to wider civil or regional conflict. A sudden departure by Asad and key allies would do little to guarantee security or stability in Syria. United Nations and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi warned in November 2012 of the danger of 'Somalisation' of Syria--'the collapse of the state and the emergence of warlords, militias and fighting groups.' Determining the threshold for such a collapse may prove difficult. Members of Congress and Obama Administration officials are weighing these issues as they debate U.S. policy and the Syrian crisis."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.; Sharp, Jeremy Maxwell

  2012-12-20
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated September 11, 2006]

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  "According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That perception intensified following the military confrontation between Iranian-armed and assisted Lebanese Hezbollah and Israel in July-August 2006. To date, the Bush Administration has pursued several avenues to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, including supporting a long term policy of changing Iran's regime. However, the Administration focus on preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons breakthrough has brought diplomatic strategy to the forefront of U.S. policy...Iran's nuclear program is not the only major U.S. concern on Iran. Successive administrations have pointed to the threat posed by Iran's policy in the Near East region, particularly material support to groups that use violence to prevent or complicate Israeli-Arab peace. Such groups have long included Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Although there is no evidence of an operational relationship with Al Qaeda, some senior Al Qaeda activists are believed to be in Iran, although Iran claims they are 'in custody.' U.S. officials also accuse Iran of attempting to exert influence in Iraq by providing arms and other material assistance to Shiite Islamist militias, some of which are participating in escalating sectarian violence against Iraq's Sunnis there."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2006-09-11
• Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security [Updated December 28, 2006]

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  "Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe has grown into a civil war. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs - without clear signs of security progress - have intensified a debate within the United States over the wisdom of the invasion and whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. U.S. Defense Department reports are expressing more pessimism about security in Iraq and they, as well as Bush Administration officials, are expressing some frustration at the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to disband sectarian militias that are committing violence against civilians of rival sects. U.S. difficulties in Iraq are reflected in reported Administration memos by outgoing Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, and in the December 6, 2006, report of the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former House International Relations Committee chair Lee Hamilton. Some in Congress - as well as the Iraq Study Group - believe that major new initiatives are required. The Study Group recommendations focus on intensified regional diplomacy to enlist help from neighboring states to calm their protégé factions in Iraq. Others believe that U.S. counter-insurgent operations are hampered by insufficient U.S. troop levels, but several Members and outside experts maintain that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of civil war and that setting a timetable for withdrawal, or otherwise reducing U.S. support for the Baghdad government, might force compromise among Iraqi factions. Still others maintain that the U.S. approach should focus not on counter-insurgent combat but on reconstruction and policing of towns and cities cleared of insurgents, including neighborhoods of Baghdad."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2006-12-28
• Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security [Updated January 17, 2007]

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  "Operation Iraqi Freedom overthrew Saddam Hussein's regime, but Iraq remains unstable because of Sunni Arab resentment and a related insurgency, compounded by Sunni-Shiite violence that some believe is now a civil war. Mounting U.S. casualties and financial costs - without clear signs of security progress - have intensified a debate within the United States over whether to wind down U.S. involvement without completely accomplishing initial U.S. goals. U.S. Defense Department reports are expressing more pessimism about security in Iraq and they, as well as Bush Administration officials, are expressing some frustration at the unwillingness of the Iraqi government to disband sectarian militias that are committing violence against civilians of rival sects. U.S. difficulties in Iraq are discussed in the December 6, 2006, report of the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by former Secretary of State James Baker and former House International Relations Committee chair Lee Hamilton, which called the Iraq situation "grave and deteriorating." Some in Congress - as well as the Iraq Study Group - believe that major new initiatives are required that do not involve additional U.S. forces. The Study Group recommendations focus on intensified regional diplomacy to enlist help from neighboring states to calm their protege factions in Iraq. Others believe that sectarian violence is placing U.S. forces in the middle of civil war and that setting a timetable for withdrawal, or otherwise reducing U.S. support for the Baghdad government, might force compromise among Iraqi factions."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-01-17
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [May 8, 2014]

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  "Libya's post-conflict transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. To date, the elected General National Congress (GNC) and the interim executive authorities that it has endorsed have failed to address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya in the wake of the 2011 conflict has deepened, and armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. At present, potentially divisive political, economic, and social issues are being debated by rival groups in the absence of credible state security guarantees. These issues include the proposed decentralization of some national administrative authority, competing fiscal priorities, the provision of local and national security, the proper role for Islam in political and social life, and concerns about the ongoing exploitation of Libyan territory by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminal networks. The U.S. State Department now describes Libya as a 'terrorist safe haven,' and U.S. military and intelligence officials have warned about threats to U.S. interests emanating from Libya in recent statements and congressional testimony."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2014-05-08
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [May 22, 2014]

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  "Libya's post-conflict transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. To date, the elected General National Congress (GNC) and the interim executive authorities that it has endorsed have failed to address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for postconflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya in the wake of the 2011 conflict has deepened, and armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. At present, potentially divisive political, economic, and social issues are being debated by rival groups in the absence of credible state security guarantees. These issues include the proposed decentralization of some national administrative authority, competing fiscal priorities, the provision of local and national security, the proper role for Islam in political and social life, and concerns about the ongoing exploitation of Libyan territory by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminal networks. The U.S. State Department now describes Libya as a 'terrorist safe haven,' and U.S. military and intelligence officials have warned about threats to U.S. interests emanating from Libya in recent statements and congressional testimony."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2014-05-22
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [May 19, 2014]

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  "Libya's post-conflict transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. To date, the elected General National Congress (GNC) and the interim executive authorities that it has endorsed have failed to address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya in the wake of the 2011 conflict has deepened, and armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. At present, potentially divisive political, economic, and social issues are being debated by rival groups in the absence of credible state security guarantees. These issues include the proposed decentralization of some national administrative authority, competing fiscal priorities, the provision of local and national security, the proper role for Islam in political and social life, and concerns about the ongoing exploitation of Libyan territory by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminal networks. The U.S. State Department now describes Libya as a 'terrorist safe haven,' and U.S. military and intelligence officials have warned about threats to U.S. interests emanating from Libya in recent statements and congressional testimony."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2014-05-19
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [May 29, 2014]

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  "Libya's post-conflict transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. To date, the elected General National Congress (GNC) and the interim executive authorities that it has endorsed have failed to address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for post-conflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya in the wake of the 2011 conflict has deepened, and armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. At present, potentially divisive political, economic, and social issues are being debated by rival groups in the absence of credible state security guarantees. These issues include the proposed decentralization of some national administrative authority, competing fiscal priorities, the provision of local and national security, the political future of Qadhafi-era officials, the proper role for Islam in political and social life, and concerns about the ongoing exploitation of Libyan territory by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminals. The U.S. State Department now describes Libya as a 'terrorist safe haven,' and U.S. military and intelligence officials have warned about threats to U.S. interests emanating from Libya in recent statements and congressional testimony."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2014-05-29
• Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy [June 11, 2014]

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  "Libya's post-conflict transition has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. To date, the elected General National Congress (GNC) and the interim executive authorities that it has endorsed have failed to address pressing security issues, reshape the country's public finances, or create a viable framework for postconflict justice and reconciliation. The insecurity that was prevalent in Libya in the wake of the 2011 conflict has deepened, and armed militia groups and locally organized political leaders remain the most powerful arbiters of public affairs. At present, potentially divisive political, economic, and social issues are being debated by rival groups in the absence of credible state security guarantees. These issues include the proposed decentralization of some national administrative authority, competing fiscal priorities, the provision of local and national security, the political future of Qadhafi-era officials, the proper role for Islam in political and social life, and concerns about the ongoing exploitation of Libyan territory by terrorists, arms traffickers, and criminals. The U.S. State Department now describes Libya as a 'terrorist safe haven,' and U.S. military and intelligence officials have warned about threats to U.S. interests emanating from Libya in recent statements and congressional testimony."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2014-06-11
• Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [December 17, 2013]

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  "Two years after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian divisions and the Sunni-led uprising in neighboring Syria have fueled a revival of radical Islamist Sunni Muslim insurgent groups that are attempting to undermine Iraq's stability. Iraq's Sunni Arab Muslims increasingly resent the Shiite political domination and perceived discrimination by the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. Iraq's Kurds are embroiled in separate political disputes with the Baghdad government over territorial, political, and economic issues. The rifts delayed some provincial elections during April-June 2013 and could affect the timing and viability of national elections for a new parliament and government set for April 30, 2014. Maliki is widely expected to seek to retain his post after that vote. The violent component of Sunni unrest is spearheaded by the Sunni insurgent group Al Qaeda in Iraq, now also known by the name Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group is conducting attacks against Shiite neighborhoods, Iraqi Security Force (ISF) members, and Sunni supporters of Maliki with increasing frequency and lethality. It also reportedly is increasingly in control of territory in remote areas of overwhelmingly Sunni-inhabited provinces. To date, the 800,000- person ISF has countered the escalating violence without outside assistance. However, the violence has killed nearly 8,000 Iraqis in 2013--more than double the figure for all of 2012. And there are a growing number of reports that some Shiite militias have reactivated to retaliate for violence against Shiites."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2013-12-17
• Conflict in Mali [Updated August 16, 2019]

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  From the Document: "Mali faces intertwined security and governance challenges. The government signed a peace accord with northern separatist rebels in 2015, but key provisions remain unimplemented. Signatory armed groups continue to assert territorial control in much of the vast desert north. At the same time, Islamist insurgent groups have expanded from the north into previously stable central Mali, leveraging (and fomenting) interethnic violence and local resentment toward state actors to recruit supporters. Islamist extremists have also carried out attacks in and near the capital, Bamako. In the center and northeast, civilian massacres by ethnic militias--some of which appear to have the tacit backing of state actors--have contributed to worsening insecurity. Rebel, terrorist, communal, and criminal armed networks are fluid and shifting, complicating conflict resolution. Some Malians have proposed peace talks with jihadist groups, but the idea remains controversial."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Arieff, Alexis

  2019-08-16
• Weaponry: .50 Caliber Rifle Crime

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  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on how .50 caliber semiautomatic rifles have been used in domestic and international criminal activity. GAO noted that: (1) GAO's investigation revealed that .50 caliber semiautomatic rifles have been linked to domestic and international criminal activity; (2) GAO has established a nexus to terrorist groups, outlaw motorcycle gangs, international drug cartels, domestic drug dealers, religious cults, militia groups, potential assassins, and violent criminals; (3) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) routinely conducts gun traces for law enforcement agencies; (4) the fact that a trace has been conducted does not necessarily mean that the firearm was involved in criminal activity; (5) ATF provided GAO with a list of 30 firearm trace requests generated between November 1992 and March 1999 concerning .50 caliber rifles; (6) however, 2 of the requests were duplicates, leaving 28 separate weapons on which traces were conducted; (7) all of the traces involved Barrett .50 caliber rifles, of which 27 were the semiautomatic model 82A1; (8) one trace request appeared to involve a Barrett model 90, but efforts to develop additional information on this trace were unsuccessful; (9) of the 27 traces involving Barrett semiautomatic model 82A1 rifles, GAO found that 18 were associated with criminal activity and 3 were not associated with criminal activity; (10) no determination could be made regarding 6 traces; (11) in some cases, GAO found that although the criminal activity involved more than one .50 caliber semiautomatic rifle, the law enforcement agency had initiated a trace on only one firearm; (12) GAO also developed information on two criminal cases involving .50 caliber semiautomatic rifles not reported in the ATF tracing information; and (13) the Barrett model 82A1 was the weapon identified in both cases.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  1999-08-04
• In Support of the Civil Authorities

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  Military assistance to civilian authorities is not a new concept. From before the birth of this nation, the military, whether militia or regular or both, has habitually supported local, state, and federal civilian authorities in times of manmade or natural disaster, civil unrest, or other situations. This support was very often questionable in legality and usefulness. Over time, though, numerous laws and directives have transformed this supporting relationship into an institutionalized interdepartmental and interagency coordination and planning process. The changing nature of threats, however, has expanded the scope of the military's responsibilities in support of civilian authorities. This old mission now involves an ever-widening array of diverse military and Department of Defense (DoD) organizations and agencies equipped with new terminology and new, evolving concepts. The United States faces myriad threats today besides those caused by natural phenomenon. Groups opposed to the thrust of the U.S. post-Cold war policies have multiplied in recent years. The openness of the U.S. society provides an opportunity for our enemies to operate with more freedom than they would have in more restrictive venues. Also exacerbating the threats is the global proliferation of cheap Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Threats can be defined broadly as international or domestic in nature. International threats fall into one of three separate categories: international terrorism, transnational threats, and conventional attacks. Domestic terrorism stems from domestic groups who are based and operate entirely within the United States, its territories, or possessions, and whose activities are directed at elements of the federal, local, or state governments or the U.S. civilian population.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Haus, Donald A.

  2000-10
• Right-Wing Group Characteristics and Ideology

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  "In the post 9-11 world, terrorism has been primarily associated with the external threat from radical Islamic extremists. Prior to September 11, 2001 the single most destructive weapon of mass destruction in the United States was the Ryder truck bomb built by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols. Both McVeigh and Nichols harbored extreme right-wing anti-government beliefs they felt justified the bombing. A high level of anti-American government sentiment was a common element shared by McVeigh, Nichols, and the al Qaeda terrorists on the 9-11 aircraft. This article asks if the threat of violence by right-wing extremists, including their possible deployment of weapons of mass destruction, has been neutralized. Information to better understand the level of threat posed by right-wing groups includes the need to understand their ideology and history, along with a review of past and present individuals who influenced the growth and development of the radical right, including the following groups: Christian Identity; militias; Sovereign Citizens, Freemen, and Common Law Courts; Ku Klux Klan; neo-Nazis; and Skinheads."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

  Baysinger, Timothy G.

  2006-07
• Combating the Influence of Non-State Organizations' Deep Reach: Understanding the Expanded Influence of Non-State Actors and the Methodologies Required to Counter Their Future Growth

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  From the thesis abstract: "Over the years, organizations such as the Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) have provided examples of successful frameworks for the development of violent non-state actors that have the ability to influence populations inside a nation-state. In many instances, these organizations are complex and sometimes maintain state sponsorship links outside of the nation-state itself. Furthermore, well-equipped militias and quasi-governmental frameworks provide services to the local populace in order to broaden the violent non-state organization's political influence in the area. In fact, some incidents indicate that the populace often depends solely upon these organizations for their fundamental needs to include food, water, sanitation, and security. Understanding this evolving process, however, and the mechanisms that lead to the existence of these groups is critical in formulating adequate responses and effectively countering the influential growth of these organizations. [...] These new solutions, in turn, facilitate relevant actions in each unique context that enable governments to effectively counter violent non-state organizations by isolating and delinking their activity from the population. Once the activities of these groups are effectively isolated and the organization collapses an environment ensues that is suitable for future peaceful development in the region."

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies

  Sundquist, Victor H.

  2013
• Viewpoint: Serious or Not on Iraq War?

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  "The midterm elections were only the latest occasion for Americans to listen to shop-worn variants of the 'cut and run' or 'stay the course' sound bites describing our choices in Iraq. All such characterizations are wrong. The real choice facing us is to decide how seriously we take the war. Most observers would rightly conclude that up until now the United States remains uncommitted to the fight. Less than 13 percent of our 1.4 million active-duty military are deployed in Iraq. Fewer than 15,000 of the 150,000 troops in Iraq today are actually engaged in combat operations. The insurgents and the death-squad militias in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan have figured this out. While not 10-feet tall, this loose collection of groups is resilient, adaptive and tenacious, and the insurgents are fighting on their home turf. If we want to rescue any favorable outcome in Iraq, the nation must decide whether or not to commit itself to the fight. This should be the starting point for the Baker Commission and the other groups examining courses of action in Iraq. Being at war and committing the nation to achieving its objectives in Iraq means shared sacrifice and service, and may mean higher taxes. It means getting serious about the nonsensical way our military is organized and funded, wrenching these hidebound bureaucracies away from their Cold War mentality. Perhaps most importantly, it means engaging the American people in a national debate about the real human and monetary costs that are entailed in rescuing success in Iraq."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict

  Russell, James

  2007-01
• Rethinking Insurgency

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  "The September 11, 2001, attacks and Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM revived the idea that insurgency is a significant threat to the United States. In response, the American military and defense communities began to rethink insurgency. Much of this valuable work, though, viewed contemporary insurgency as more closely related to Cold War era insurgencies than to the complex conflicts which characterized the post-Cold War period. This suggests that the most basic way that the military and defense communities think about insurgency must be rethought. Contemporary insurgency has a different strategic context, structure, and dynamics than its forebears. Insurgencies tend to be nested in complex conflicts which involve what can be called third forces (armed groups which affect the outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), as well as the insurgents and the regime. Because of globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Metz, Steven, 1956-

  2007-06
• Watch Out: Sovereign Citizen Scams

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  "Sovereign citizen groups are loose associations of antigovernment extremists who do not recognize the Federal Government. They believe they are separate or sovereign from the United States and are exempt from Federal, State, and local laws and tax systems. They believe the county sheriff is the supreme law enforcement officer in the land and county clerks or registrars are the only legitimate elected officials. They subscribe to a belief in 'common law' and their right to arrest or sue employees of the 'illegitimate government.' They are known for filing nuisance lawsuits or liens against individuals who try to stop their schemes, which have involved in lender, credit card, tax, and loan frauds. They make their own driver's licenses and license plates and sometimes attempt to form their own parallel institutions of government. Sovereign citizen encounters with law enforcement and government personnel frequently become confrontational and sometimes turn violent. The most extreme example of sovereign citizen violence was exhibited by Terry Nichols, coconspirator in the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building bombing in 1995. The 2014 standoff between the Federal Government and a cattle rancher in Nevada also involved sovereign citizens and even more radical militia groups. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and HUD OIG [U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Office of the Inspector General] have noticed a resurgence of sovereign citizen fraud in HUD program."

  United States. Department of Housing and Urban Development

  2015
• Analysis of Sunni-Based Opposition in Iraq

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  "The Coalition characterization of the opposition in Iraq has evolved slowly over the life of the conflict. Originally, U.S. senior leaders and military officials identified the opposition as dead-enders or foreign terrorists. As the outline of the opposition became somewhat clearer, this characterization began to change. Today, the opposition is generalized into three groups: Sunni, Shia militias in the form of the Sadr II movement, and foreign terrorists. While this generalization is not perfect, it is the characterization that I will use to examine Iraqi opposition to U.S. forces, specifically focusing on the creation and growth of forces in Sunni areas opposing the Coalition in Iraq. Using social movement theory as a framework for analysis, [the author] will examine opposition groups in the context of political opportunity, organization, and the framing used to mobilize support. Analysis of the opposition will focus on the Sunni-based insurgents, examining their growth since the fall of Saddam Hussein, as well as draw conclusions on current trends the new Iraqi government, Iraqi Security forces, and Coalition forces are capitalizing upon to weaken the Sunni-based opposition."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict

  Haugh, Timothy

  2005-05
• Iran: Reality, Options, and Consequences. Part 3--Regional and Global Consequences of U.S. Military Action in Iran, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, November 14, 2007

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  From the opening statement of John F. Tierney: "Today is the third hearing in a series that the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs has undertaken to examine U.S. foreign policy toward Iran. In our first hearing, we heard experts describe the current conditions, the make-up, and the complexity of Iranian society, including the largely positive public opinion there toward the United States. In our second hearing, we heard insider accounts from former senior diplomats and intelligence officials about missed negotiating opportunities with the Iranians over the past few years. Today, we are extremely fortunate to have before us a group of top military, diplomatic and intelligence experts who will provide the subcommittee with what the public and the Congress have needed for quite some time, an unvarnished discussion of what could happen should this administration, before exhausting all diplomatic avenues, act to commit American forces in war against Iran. [...] We heard at our second hearing the positive efforts Iran played in helping to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan. We have also heard repeatedly about Iran's involvement with the Shi'a militia groups in Iran. If the United States attacks Iran, how will Iran and its allies retaliate? And what impact will this have on the safety of our troops and the future stability of both Iraq and Afghanistan? [...] I ask the simple question: have we learned any lessons? If nothing else, I hope we have learned the importance of having our eyes wide open as we contemplate the possible paths forward, especially when one of those paths has such pervasive consequences as war. That is what our hearing today is all about." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John F. Tierney, Ilan Berman, Samuel B. Gardiner, Paul Pillar, Paul K. Van Riper, and Lawrence B. Wilkerson.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2009
• Serial No. 115-59: State Sponsors of Terrorism: An Examination of Iran's Global Terrorism Network, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, April 17, 2018

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  This is the April 17, 2018 hearing "State Sponsors of Terrorism: An Examination of Iran's Global Terrorism Network," held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the statement of Peter T. King: "The Iranian revolution, which started in 1979, has been disastrous for the region, for the world, and particularly a significant threat to the United States. Since 1984 the government of Iran has been designated by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iranian external operations, including support for proxy terrorists and Shia militia groups have played a central role in sup-porting this designation. These groups have destabilized other countries, directly threatened Israel, undermined democracy, and escalated tensions through campaigns of terror." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Emanuele Ottolenghi, Michael Pregent, Nader Uskowi, and Brian Katulis.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2018
• Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress [January 3, 2011]

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  "Lebanon's Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist militia, political party, social welfare organization, and U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization. Its armed element receives support from Iran and Syria and possesses significant paramilitary and unconventional warfare capabilities. In the wake of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah and an armed domestic confrontation between Hezbollah and rival Lebanese groups in May 2008, Lebanon's political process is now intensely focused on Hezbollah's future role in the country. Lebanese factions are working to define Hezbollah's role through a series of 'National Dialogue' discussions. Hezbollah and other Lebanese political parties have long emphasized the need to assert control over remaining disputed areas with Israel. However, current Hezbollah policy statements suggest that, even if disputed areas were secured, the group would seek to maintain a role for 'the resistance' in providing for Lebanon's national defense and would resist any Lebanese or international efforts to disarm it. Hezbollah continues to define itself primarily as a resistance movement and remains viscerally opposed to what it views as illegitimate U.S. and Israeli intervention in Lebanese and regional affairs. It categorically refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist and opposes all concluded and pending efforts to negotiate resolutions to Arab-Israeli disputes on the basis of mutual recognition, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Addis, Casey L.; Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2011-01-03
• Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress [October 8, 2010]

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  "Lebanon's Hezbollah is a Shiite Islamist militia, political party, social welfare organization, and U.S. State Department-designated terrorist organization. Its armed element receives support from Iran and Syria and possesses significant paramilitary and unconventional warfare capabilities. In the wake of the summer 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah and an armed domestic confrontation between Hezbollah and rival Lebanese groups in May 2008, Lebanon's political process is now intensely focused on Hezbollah's future role in the country. Lebanese factions are working to define Hezbollah's role through a series of 'National Dialogue' discussions. [...] Hezbollah continues to define itself primarily as a resistance movement and remains viscerally opposed to what it views as illegitimate U.S. and Israeli intervention in Lebanese and regional affairs. It categorically refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist and opposes all concluded and pending efforts to negotiate resolutions to Arab-Israeli disputes on the basis of mutual recognition, including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given these positions, most observers believe that prospects for accommodation and engagement between the United States and Hezbollah are slim, even as the group's close relationships with Syria and Iran, its pivotal role in Lebanese politics, and reinvigorated U.S. engagement in regional peace efforts increase Hezbollah's potential influence over stated U.S. national security objectives."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.; Addis, Casey L.

  2010-10-08
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated August 27, 2004]

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  "Iran's alleged efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery means, coupled with its support of terrorist groups, have long been key U.S. concerns. However, these long-standing concerns have been heightened over the past three years by reported major strides in Iran's nuclear program and halting and incomplete cooperation with a strict program of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and safeguards. Another major U.S. concern has been Iran's active opposition to the U.S.-led Middle East peace process, including material support to Hizballah in Lebanon and such Palestinian groups as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Some senior Al Qaeda activists are in Iran as well, although Iran claims they are 'in custody' and will be tried, and the 9/11 Commission has found that some officials in Iran might have facilitated or at least tolerated travel through Iran by Al Qaeda operatives. Iran was quietly helpful in the U.S. effort to oust Iraq's Saddam Hussein, a longtime Tehran adversary, although Iran reportedly is supporting Shiite Islamic factions there that do not espouse most Western values. There are some indications that Iran might be shifting some of its support to radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al Sadr, whose Mahdi militia has challenged U.S. forces and the Iraqi government since April 2004. This report will be updated as warranted by developments."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2004-08-27
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [September 2, 2011]

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  "The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by uncertainty about Iran's intentions for its nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. U.S. officials are highly critical of what they say is stepped up Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, who are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria's leadership use force and other methods to try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. […] In 2011, in the context of the popular uprisings throughout the Middle East, and perhaps addressing criticism that it did not sufficiently support the popular uprising in Iran in 2009, the Administration has increased its public support of the Iranian opposition 'Green Movement.' Some in the 112th Congress believe the United States should become more vocal in supporting the democracy movement in Iran, and perhaps even provide material support to Iranian activists, but there are no indications the Administration plans to do so. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, 'Iran Sanctions'; and CRS Report RL34544, 'Iran's Nuclear Program: Status.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2011-09-02
• Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy [Updated December 10, 2006]

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  "Across Afghanistan, regional militia commanders, criminal organizations, and corrupt government officials have exploited opium production and drug trafficking as reliable sources of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to the country's fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its embryonic democratic government. The trafficking of Afghan drugs also appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan, including the resurgent remnants of the Taliban and some Al Qaeda operatives. Although coalition forces may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security support, many observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected Afghan officials may create new political obstacles to further progress. […] Afghan president Hamid Karzai has identified the opium economy as 'the single greatest challenge to the long- term security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan.' […] However, escalating violence in Afghanistan's southern provinces, particularly in Helmand, and widespread corruption fueled a surge in cultivation over the last year, pushing opium output to an all-time high of 6100 metric tons. In response, Members may be asked to consider options for strengthening counternarcotics efforts during the first session of the 110th Congress. In addition to describing the structure and development of the Afghan narcotics trade, this report provides current statistical information, profiles the trade's various participants, explores alleged narco-terrorist linkages, and reviews U.S. and international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers current policy debates regarding the role of the U.S. military in counternarcotics operations, opium poppy eradication, alternative livelihood development, and funding issues for Congress. The report will be updated to reflect major developments. For more information on Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Christopher M.

  2006-12-10
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [August 8, 2011]

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  "The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by uncertainty about Iran's intentions for its nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. As of mid-2011, U.S. officials are increasingly critical of what they say is stepped-up Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, who are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. To try to address the threat from Iran, the Obama Administration offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. However, after observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran's agreement to implement an October 2009 tentative nuclear compromise, the Administration worked during 2010 and 2011 to increase economic and political pressure on Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2011-08-08