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• Strategies for the Integration of Medical and Health Representation within Law Enforcement Intelligence Fusion Centers

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  From the thesis abstract: "Terrorism-related intelligence gathering, analysis and information dissemination would be improved and enhanced by including a medical and health element in law enforcement intelligence fusion centers. The lack of medical representation and participation in intelligence analysis and information dissemination has been an obstacle to effective terrorism prevention, preparedness and response. Terrorist acts, including weapons of mass destruction, would have a significant and profound impact on the medical and health community. The medical and health community should work more closely with the intelligence community and be privy to terrorism-related information and alerts. The three areas of implementation to be examined include the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, state level fusion centers and local (city, county, regional) terrorism early-warning groups. The Terrorism Liaison Officer Program will be examined as an option for medical personnel to become involved in anti-terrorism efforts. Literature on the subject shows overwhelming support for the involvement of non-law enforcement public safety representation, including the medical and health communities, in intelligence fusion centers."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Morrissey, James F.

  2007-03
• Proliferation Complexity: The Intersection of Policy, Operations, Media, Intelligence, and Science

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  "From 7-9 July 2009, government officials, civilian analysts, military officers, academics, and security experts gathered at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School for the sixth annual Monterey Proliferation Seminar. The seminar addressed the topic of 'Proliferation Complexity: The Intersection of Policy, Operations, Media, Intelligence, and Science.' The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (DTRA-ASCO) sponsored the event, which was hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) in cooperation with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). This report is intended to serve as an aide memoir for participants of the conference, and presents the range of issues discussed and the nature of those discussions. The conference was held under the 'Chatham House Rule,' meaning that individuals spoke on a not-for-attribution basis, in order to encourage lively discussion and debate. The report therefore does not include all presentations, particularly those that contained classified material. Panel summaries are intended to provide an overall sense of the discussion topics, but do not comprehensively address the topics discussed or indicate agreement on the listed topics amongst conference participants. Two graduate students from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Daniel Cunningham and Daniel Johnson, were the rapporteurs for the conference and compiled this report." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.

  United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

  2009
• Military Technology: New Challenges for US National Security Strategy

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  "As demonstrated during the Gulf War, advanced military technology plays an important role in both our strategy and current force structure. The war also underscored the need to address the growing proliferation of weapons technology in the Third World. In March 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney highlighted the technology issue in stating 'we are on the verge of a revolutionary period in military technology, with leading nations achieving major breakthroughs and smaller nations gathering access to weapons of mass destruction.' This paper will focus on the current role of technology in US strategy, technology issues from the Gulf War, and future military technology challenges for the United States."

  National War College (U.S.)

  Elliott, Carol

  1992-04
• Serial No. 109-90: Evolving Counterterrorism Strategy: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, September 29, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Edward R. Royce: "Today we will hear about the quickly evolving terrorist threat. The 9/11 Commission usefully observed that our enemy is twofold, the embattled al-Qaeda network and those who have embraced al-Qaeda's message. The first enemy is weakened, as they say, but continues to pose a grave threat. The second enemy is gathering and will menace Americans and American interests long after Osama bin Laden and his cohorts are killed or captured. This is a war on many fronts. Some fronts can be pointed to on a map of Africa with its vast ungoverned areas to Western Europe with its disaffected Muslim youth. This is an informational technology front where the enemy has excelled, rallying troops and winning converts to their cause...We should not be afraid to listen either, as we plan on doing today, because no one has all of the answers. However, given the proliferation of WMD technology, coupled with terrorists desire to kill, the window for developing and executing the right counterterrorism strategy may be closing, requiring urgent efforts on all our parts." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Edward R. Royce, Tim Roemer, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Bruce Hoffman, B. Phil, D. Phil, and Dana Dillon.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2005
• U.S. Department of Energy Inspection Report: Alleged Violations of Executive Order 12333, U.S. Intelligence Activities - Improper Retention and Dissemination of Information on U.S. Persons

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  "The collection, retention and dissemination of intelligence data involving U.S. Persons is generally governed by Presidential Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, July 2008, as amended. U.S. Persons include United States citizens, aliens known to be permanent resident aliens, or companies incorporated in the United States. The E.O., which emphasizes protecting the legal rights of all U.S. Persons, authorizes Federal entities to collect information to protect the Nation against threats of espionage, terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Within the Department of Energy, the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (CI) is responsible for collecting, reviewing, analyzing, investigating and acting on concerns ranging from foreign intelligence to potential and actual terrorist activities. As part of its process, CI established what it termed 'SPOT Reports' as an urgent communications system to capture intelligence data of national-level significance (emphasis supplied). The stated purpose was to: (1) improve the sharing of such information; and, (2) enhance incident awareness. The Department's procedures regarding treatment of information it collects on U.S. Persons require that unless a foreign nexus can be established, such information is not to be retained beyond established timeframes. The Office of Inspector General received an allegation that the rights of U.S. Persons had been violated during the course of current Department intelligence gathering efforts. In response, we initiated a review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegation."

  United States. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General

  2011-07
• Serial No. 113-43: TSA's Spot Program and Initial Lessons from the LAX Shooting, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, November 14, 2013

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  This is the November 14, 2013 hearing on "TSA's SPOT Program" held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Richard Hudson: "In light of the recent tragedy that occurred at LAX [Los Angeles International Airport], it is critical, now more than ever, for TSA [Transportation Security Administration] to work with stakeholders to conduct a comprehensive review of security programs, to ensure that resources are being used in the most effective and efficient manner, and that coordination and communication with local law enforcement is seamless. The area prior to screening at an airport is a 'soft target' where masses of people gather, much like a shopping mall or a train station. This leaves airports open to virtually anyone who wants to enter, including someone with malicious intent. While it is the airport's responsibility to provide security and law enforcement, we all know that there are unavoidable risks of being in public spaces, and incidents like this one, albeit tragic, are not always preventable. What is important now is to identify whether there were any unnecessary vulnerabilities that we can learn from. Did TSA and airport police have seamless communication? Are there resources that could be shifted around to create a more robust, layered security posture? I don't expect our witnesses to have all the answers yet. But I do believe this hearing is a timely opportunity to examine one program that has been heavily criticized by both the Government Accounting Office and the DHS Office of Inspector General." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John S. Pistole, Daniel M. Gerstein, Stephen M. Lord, and Charles K. Edwards.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2014
• The Exchange, Issue 3, 2016

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  "The third issue of the ASPR TRACIE [Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange] newsletter, The Exchange, focuses on healthcare facility preparedness for--and response to--no-notice events. Active shooter rumors and actual mass shootings have increased in frequency (e.g., at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, a county facility in San Bernardino, and during a protest in Dallas) and have emphasized the need for healthcare facilities to make no-notice events a substantive part of their all-hazards planning. ASPR TRACIE had the honor of working closely with subject matter experts to gather the most current information on this critical topic."

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response

  2016
• Nonresidential Building Fires (2014-2016)

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  "Each year, from 2014 to 2016, fire departments responded to an estimated 100,300 fires in nonresidential buildings across the nation. These fires resulted in an annual average of 90 deaths; 1,350 injuries; and $2.4 billion in property losses. Although national estimates for 2014 to 2016 show that nonresidential building fires represented only 8 percent of all fires, 3 percent of fire deaths and 9 percent of fire injuries, they accounted for 20 percent of the total dollar loss from all fires. Nonresidential building fires can also have a significant economic impact on a community as they may lead to lost jobs and closed businesses. In addition, because many nonresidential buildings are places where a large number of people gather, they hold the greatest potential for a mass casualty incident to occur."

  United States Fire Administration; United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2018-07
• Nonresidential Building Fires (2009-2011)

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  "From 2009 to 2011, fire departments responded to an estimated 86,500 fires in nonresidential buildings each year across the nation. These fires resulted in an annual average of 85 deaths, 1,325 injuries, and $2.6 billion in property losses. Although national estimates for 2009 to 2011 show that nonresidential building fires represented only 6 percent of all reported fires, 3 percent of fire deaths and 8 percent of fire injuries, they accounted for 22 percent of the total dollar loss from all fires. Nonresidential building fires can also have a significant economic impact on a community as they may lead to lost jobs and closed businesses. In addition, because many nonresidential buildings are places where a large number of people gather, they hold the greatest potential for a mass casualty incident to occur. 'Nonresidential buildings,' a subset of nonresidential structures, includes enclosed structures and fixed portable or mobile structures. The majority of nonresidential fires, deaths and injuries occur in buildings, and that is where prevention efforts are most often targeted. Specifically, nonresidential buildings include assembly places; eating and drinking establishments; educational and institutional facilities; stores and offices; detached garages; basic industry facilities; manufacturing facilities; storage facilities; as well as outside and other miscellaneous nonresidential buildings. They also include institutions such as prisons, nursing homes, juvenile care facilities and hospitals, though many people may temporarily reside there for short (or long) periods of time."

  United States Fire Administration; United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2013-06
• Information Management and the Biological Warfare Threat

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  This thesis explores the implications of information management of government-funded projects on national security objectives. A case study of the Human Genome Project is used to illustrate the risk of information transfer between government sources and private industry and the implications posed to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The issue of risk in information management is approached by developing three theoretical paradigms: the scientific paradigm, the business paradigm and the security paradigm. The findings of this thesis demonstrate an information sharing paradigm favoring full and open access to scientific data currently being practiced by the U.S. Human Genome Project. The information gathered was acquired via open source information pertaining to the Human Genome Project and related initiatives. The purpose of this thesis was to raise awareness of the dangers in distributing information, funded and supplied by the United States. In addition, recommendations were made to increase the involvement of medical professionals and scientists in the non-proliferation efforts the U.S. is currently involved in.

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Martinez, II, Antonio

  2002-03
• Best Practices in Anti-Terrorism Security (BPATS) for Sports and Entertainment Venues

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  From the Document: "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is continuing its efforts to develop knowledge products that will help security professionals implement security programs designed to prevent and defend against acts of terrorism at mass gathering venues. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the private sector expressed considerable reluctance to deploy security technologies and services in civilian settings due to the enormous potential liability risks in the event those deployments were impacted by an act of terrorism. As the private sector owns and operates most of the Nation's critical infrastructure, this reluctance created the potential for under-investment in and under-deployment of necessary security technologies and capabilities."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2018-09
• Condition of Our Nation's Infrastructure and Proposals for Needed Improvements, Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress,Second Session on Additional Investment Programs that are Designed to Leverage Public and Private Investment in Infrastructure, Tuesday, March 11, 2008

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  From the opening statement of Christopher J. Dodd: "We gather here this morning to examine the issue of paramount importance: the condition of our Nation's infrastructure and proposals for needed improvements to it. I believe this is an urgent priority for our Nation for two fundamental reasons: first, because the safety and health of all Americans is directly and adversely affected by the deterioration of our roads, bridges, mass transit, drinking water, wastewater removal, and other vital components of our national structure. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports that approximately 14,000 Americans die each year at least in part because our roads and bridges are crumbling before our very eyes. Congestion on our roads causes tons of carbon dioxide and other pollutants to be pumped into the atmosphere day after day. These emissions compromise the health of children and adults and contribute to global warming, which poses immense risks to the future of all humans." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Christopher J. Dodd, Richard Shelby, Robert Menendez, Chuck Hagel, Thomas R. Carper, Bob Corker, David G. Mongan, Tim Johnson, Mike Crapo, Felix G. Rohatyn, Tracy Wolstencroft, Ron Blackwell, anet F. Kavinoky, and Marc H. Morial.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2010
• S. Rept. 106-3: Committee Activities, Special Report, February 3, 1999

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  "The Committee took a number of important steps to improve the country's ability to collect, analyze, and produce intelligence about America's adversaries. The Committee achieved strong consensus that timely intelligence is essential for sound policy and military success. Legislation reported by the Committee stressed the intelligence targets that threaten America today and tomorrow, setting guideposts toward future technologies for collecting and processing intelligence. Funds were authorized above the President's budget request because the Committee believes there are areas where additional resources are needed in this post-Cold War period of uncertainty. While the mission of U.S. intelligence gathering organizations has not changed, the areas on which they must focus have become more diverse and challenging. For that reason, the Committee concentrated additional resources in the five areas of counternarcotics, counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation, counter-intelligence, and effective covert action. The Committee also focused on a series of critical challenges facing the Intelligence Community, including faulty analysis that led to a failure to forecast India's nuclear tests, an aging U.S. signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection system, the requirement for more effective tools for countering terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, and the Clandestine Service's eroding technical competence."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1999-02-03
• Gathering Biological Warfare Storm -- Chapter 10: A Biological Warfare Wake-Up Call: Prevalent Myths and Likely Scenarios

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  Chapter 10 in the collection of essays entitled "The Gathering Bioligical Warfare Storm" addresses the myths and scenarios associated with biological warfare: "The likelihood that biological weapons will be used against our nation continues to rise. Many in the recent past have considered the talk of such horrific weapons as only hype to justify funding for certain programs for DOD, other governmental agencies, or government contractors. The stark reality of September 11, 2001 when hijacked airliners were used as missiles, and the anthrax attacks that followed, have changed that perception for many. However, since we have not yet suffered a mass casualty biological warfare (BW) event there are others that still dismiss the scenario as highly unlikely. If this view is persuasive to U.S. decision-makers it will impede the nation's ability to prepare for or prevent such an event. Until very recently, the lack of focus on this subject had resulted in a lack of appropriate funding and accountability. There are six important myths that have caused some senior military and other government leaders to develop an inappropriate view of this threat. It would be valuable to those that recognize the nation's vulnerability to BW to know the most likely scenarios we should expect to encounter. Such informed speculations and visualization allows us to prepare before the event or possibly even to prevent it. This chapter describes six common myths about BW and three of the most likely future BW scenarios we may face."

  USAF Counterproliferation Center

  Ainscough, Michael J.

  2002-03
• U.S. National Intelligence: An Overview 2013

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  "According to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the terms 'National Intelligence' and 'intelligence related to national security' refer to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which it is derived and including information gathered within or outside the United States, 1) That pertains, as determined to be consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one U.S. Government agency; and 2) That involves: a) Threats to the U.S., its people, property, or interests; b) The development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or c) Any other matter bearing on U.S. national or homeland security. The U.S. Government uses intelligence to improve and more fully understand the consequences of its national security decisions. Intelligence informs policy decisions, military actions, international negotiations, and interactions with working-level contacts in foreign countries. In some circumstances, intelligence can also aid the efforts of homeland security providers and first responders."

  United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence

  2013
• Today's FBI Facts & Figures 2013-2014

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  From the text: "The FBI today is considered one of the world's premier security and crime-fighting forces. Reporting to both the attorney general and director of national intelligence, the Bureau has dual responsibilities as a law enforcement and intelligence agency. It gathers evidence and solves cases using cutting edge and time-tested investigative techniques. At the same time, it collects, analyzes, synthesizes, and shares vital information and intelligence with everyone from national policy makers to local partners in order to counter threats and foil crimes and attacks. With a foot in the realms of both law enforcement and intelligence, the FBI is able to get its arms around emerging threats and neutralize them through arrests and targeted, often multi-agency operations. The FBI's investigative responsibilities are both considerable and far-reaching. A key part of our country's national security team, the Bureau addresses the most significant threats facing the U.S.--terrorism, espionage, weapons of mass destruction, and cyber crime. At the same time, it plays an essential role in protecting local communities, from rescuing kidnapped children to dismantling street gangs, from catching murderers and serial killers to stopping scams that raid the pocketbooks of the American people. On any given day, the FBI is rooting out public corruption, recovering stolen art, protecting corporate trade secrets, taking down organized crime networks, and much more."

  United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation

  2013
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Efforts to Assess Chemical Security Risk and Gather Feedback on Facility Outreach Can be Strengthened, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  "Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS [Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards] program to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD [Infrastructure Security Compliance Division], which manages the program, places high risk facilities in risk-based tiers and is to conduct inspections after it approves facility security plans. A November 2011 ISCD internal memorandum raised concerns about ISCD's ability to fulfill its mission. GAO [Government Accountability Office] assessed the extent to which DHS has (1) assigned chemical facilities to tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, (2) revised its process to review facility security plans, and (3) communicated and worked with owners and operators to improve security. GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on risk assessments, security plan reviews, and facility outreach and interviewed DHS officials. GAO also received input from 11 trade associations representing chemical facilities, about ISCD outreach. The results of this input are not generalizable but provide insights. […] GAO recommends that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review after doing so, and explore opportunities to gather systematic feedback on facility outreach. DHS concurred with the recommendations."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2013-04
• Oversight Hearing - National Science Foundation and Youth Violence Research: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 19, 2013

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  This testimony compilation is from the March 19, 2013 hearing, "Oversight Hearing - National Science Foundation and Youth Violence Research," before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies. From the opening statement of Brad J. Bushman: "Chairman Wolf, Ranking Member Fattah, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Brad J. Bushman. I am a professor of communication, a professor of psychology, and the endowed chair of mass communication at The Ohio State University. In the summer, I am a professor of communication science at the Vrije Universiteit (Free University), Amsterdam, the Netherlands. I have been doing research on the causes of aggressive and violent behavior for almost 30 years. I have published over 130 articles in peer-reviewed journals, including in the top scientific journals such as Science and Nature. I have conducted over 50 studies on violent media effects. In the wake of the Newtown shooting, Chairman Wolf asked the National Science Foundation (NSF) to find out what researchers know and don't know about the connection between exposure to media violence and youth violence, and other factors that contribute to these devastating event s. NSF approached Katherine Newman, Dean of the Arts and Sciences at Johns Hopkins and an expert in rampage shootings, and I to assemble a committee with relevant expertise (e.g., communication, law, sociology, computer science, adolescent development, natural language analysis, gun policy, data analysis) to address this urgent and important topic. The committee gathered at NSF headquarters on February 1st and 2nd to write a report titled 'Youth violence: What we need to know.' My purpose today is to summarize the results from that report." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Subra Suresh and Brad J. Bushman.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations

  2013-03-19
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Improve Its Risk Assessments and Outreach for Chemical Facilities, Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

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  "Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations that establish standards for the security of high-risk chemical facilities. DHS established the CFATS [Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards] program to assess the risk posed by these facilities and inspect them to ensure compliance with DHS standards. ISCD [Infrastructure Security Compliance Division], which manages the program, places high risk facilities in risk-based tiers and is to conduct inspections after it approves facility security plans. This statement summarizes the results of GAO's [Government Accountability Office] April 2013 report on the extent to which DHS (1) assigned chemical facilities to tiers and assessed its approach for doing so, (2) revised its process to review facility security plans, and (3) communicated and worked with owners and operators to improve security. GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on risk assessments, security plan reviews, and facility outreach and interviewed DHS officials. GAO also received input from 11 trade associations representing chemical facilities, about ISCD outreach. The results of this input are not generalizable but provide insights. […] In its April 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review after doing so, and explore opportunities to gather systematic feedback on facility outreach. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has actions underway to address them."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2013-08-01
• Averting the Prevalence and Consequences of Mass Shooting and Urban Gun Violence

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  "America has reached a watershed moment, a crucial dividing point to define a strategy that will reduce the risks of gun violence. No one who has heard of the massacre at Sandy Hook Elementary School, and no one who is aware of the daily murder statistics in cities such as New Orleans or Chicago, can ignore the chokehold that murder, often committed with assault weapons, has on American society. People in schools, streets, political gatherings and cinema have been gunned down with weapons spewing more than 600 rounds a minute. While the problem we are facing is clear, the solutions are complicated. The recommendations we will discuss here address the problems we face and the solutions we need to be a life-loving and safe society. […] We recommend enactment of the Youth Prison Reduction through Opportunities, Mentoring, Intervention, Support and Education Act (Youth PROMISE Act). The Youth PROMISE Act provides resources to state and local governments for comprehensive, evidenced-based strategies and programs to prevent juvenile crime. It is designed to measurably reduce the incidence of mass shootings and urban gun violence. […] The Youth PROMISE Act addresses both forms of violence by defining broad objectives in four distinct areas: 1. Enable communities to save lives, increase safety, and save money through broad public health efforts to reduce the risk of violence in all forms. 2. Enable communities to respond to youth who present the highest potential risk. 3. Enable communities to respond to the aftermath of gun violence incidents. 4. Establish quantifiable performance measures for the Youth PROMISE Act. Objectives to be measured will include: [a] Increase resources available to communities to prevent and reduce gun violence. [b] Decrease injuries and deaths caused by gun violence. [c] Decrease the direct and collateral costs of gun violence. [d] Analyze cost saving associated with violence prevention efforts."

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary

  Scharf, Peter, 1945-; Calderon-Abbo, Jose; Gordon, James S. (James Samuel) . . .

  2013-01-22
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on DHS Efforts to Implement and Manage its Chemical Security Program, Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

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  "Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations establishing standards for the security of these facilities. DHS established the CFATS [Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards] program to assess risk at facilities covered by the regulations and inspect them to ensure compliance. This statement provides observations on DHS efforts related to the CFATS program. It is based on the results of previous GAO [Government Accountability Office] reports issued in July 2012 and April 2013 and a testimony issued in February 2014. In conducting the earlier work, GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on the program and interviewed DHS officials. […] In a July 2012 report, GAO recommended that DHS measure its performance implementing actions to improve its management of CFATS. In an April 2013 report, GAO recommended that DHS enhance its risk assessment approach to incorporate all elements of risk, conduct a peer review, and gather feedback on its outreach to facilities. DHS concurred and has taken actions or has actions underway to address them."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2014-05-14
• Presidential Decision Directive 62: Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas

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  "In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated United States counterterrorism policy in PDD-39. [Presidential Decision Directive] That policy directive remains valid. Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations, are increasingly likely to attack us in unconventional ways. Adversaries will be tempted to exploit vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government operations, use weapons of mass destruction against civilians in our cities, disrupt our transportation systems, attack us when we gather as a community at special events, and prey on our citizens overseas. As this cluster of threats matures in the coming century, I am determined that we will be prepared to deter them, prevent them, or, if necessary, limit the damage they can inflict. Success requires that we recognize the common nature of these threats, the need for an integrated response, and, in the case of critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a public-private partnership."

  United States. White House Office

  1998-05-22
• EMR-ISAC: InfoGram 17-12 [April 25, 2012]

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  This edition provides articles with links on the following topics: "Critical Drug Shortage Affects EMS [Emergency Medical Services] and Public Health," "Wildland Fire Incident Staff Rides," "Type 3 All Hazards Incident Management Teams (AHIMT)," and "New Mass Gathering Resources for Emergency Responders."

  Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)

  2012-04-25
• Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Cargo Containers, Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety, and Security, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, June 12, 2008

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  "U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is responsible for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States in cargo containers that are shipped from more than 700 foreign seaports. The Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act calls for testing the feasibility of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers, and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act (9/11 Act) requires scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound cargo containers by 2012. To fulfill these requirements, CBP created the Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) and has initiated a pilot program at seven seaports. This testimony discusses challenges related to the SFI pilot program and implementation of the requirement to scan 100 percent of U.S.-bound container cargo. This testimony is based on GAO products issued from July 2003 through April 2008 and ongoing work. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed reports from CBP and international partners on SFI and other container security programs, and interviewed CBP and foreign customs officials. GAO recommended in prior reports that DHS develop human capital plans, enhance performance measures, and gather information on the efficacy of host government systems. DHS generally concurred with our recommendations and is taking steps to address them."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  Caldwell, Stephen L.

  2008-06-12
• LLIS.gov Newsletter [February 2009]

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  This monthly newsletter covers documents related to mass gatherings, highlights a new FEMA-commissioned survey report, reminds users to sign up for external email notifications, lists original posted since the previous newsletter, and covers upcoming outreach events.

  Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS); United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency

  2009-02
• Assessment of the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) Pandemic on Selected Countries in the Southern Hemisphere: Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and Uruguay

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  "On August 9, 2009, the White House charged the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in coordination with the Office of the Director for National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Department of State (DoS) to study characteristics and impact of the 2009 Influenza A (H1N1) (refer to as 2009 H1N1) outbreak in the Southern Hemisphere. This assessment explores the characteristics and impact of the disease in select southern hemisphere countries that have been experiencing the 2009 H1N1 outbreak in May to August, coincidently with their normal influenza season. Countries assessed include Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay as they more closely resemble the U.S. with respect to demographics and economic development. The information in this report comes mainly from reports of the Ministries of Health of the selected countries, press releases, government publications, and U.S. embassies abroad covering the period from May 1 to August 24, 2009. From this assessment, it was possible to make the following general observations: All countries report that after mid July, disease activity in most parts of the country decreased. [...]. Virologic data indicates that the H1N1 virus strains currently circulating in the Southern Hemisphere are similar to those detected in the U.S. [...]. The most at-risk populations in the Southern Hemisphere are similar to those observed in the U.S. [...]. Commonly used community mitigation measures included school closures, cancellation of mass gatherings, isolation and quarantine, and other social distancing measures. [...]. Health care systems experienced stress, but it was generally geographically isolated and relatively short lived.

  United States. Department of Health and Human Services

  2009-08-26
• What is Really New About Venezuela's Bolivarian Foreign Policy?

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  "The most recent Summit of the Americas, held in Argentina in November 2005, bringing together the leaders of the Western Hemisphere, provided the latest opportunity for President Hugo Chavez's efforts to put forward an alternative project for Latin America. Upsetting the agenda of the Summit, Chavez was successful in transforming the event into a referendum on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). As he has long argued, Chavez denounced the FTAA as an effort by the wealthier states in the hemisphere to exploit the poor, and he has instead proposed ALBA (Alternativa Bolivariana de las Americas) as a pact that would exclude the United States. By the end of the event, only Venezuela and the four members of Mercosur, an alternative regional integration effort, opposed the proposed summit communiqué and the FTAA. However, Chavez played skillfully to the numerous Latin American journalists in attendance and the masses of anti-Bush demonstrators that had gathered near the Summit venue.[2] Sentiments among the leaders after the Summit ran high, with a public rebuke by Mexico's President Fox leading to a verbal counterpunch by Hugo Chavez and a mutual withdrawal of ambassadors between Mexico and Venezuela."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict

  Trinkunas, Harold A.

  2006-02
• MMWR: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, January 27, 2006

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  The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). [It] is the agency's primary vehicle for scientific publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information and recommendations. This issue of MMWR contains the following: "Orf Virus Infection in Humans -- New York, Illinois, California, and Tennessee, 2004-2005"; "Rates of Cesarean Delivery Among Puerto Rican Women -- Puerto Rico and the U.S. Mainland, 1992-2002"; "Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering -- Virginia, 2005"; "Update: Influenza Activity -- United States, January 8-14, 2006"; "Notice to Readers: 2006 Annual Conference on Antimicrobial Resistance, June 26-28, 2006"; "QuickStats: Percentage of Persons Aged >18 Years Reporting Severe Headache or Migraine During the Preceding 3 Months, by Sex and Age Group -- United States, 2004"; and "Erratum: Vol. 55, No. 2". Notifiable Diseases and Mortality Tables from this issue can be accessed at the following link [http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index2006.htm]"

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2006-01-27
• Fire as a Weapon: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places

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  From the Document: "The use of fire as a weapon is consistently reflected in terrorist propaganda. The use of fire does not require sophisticated planning or capability by an attacker which makes this an attractive method to cause harm to people and property. Violent extremists may use fire or arson-style tactics against critical infrastructure or to augment a complex coordinated attack at a mass gathering event, which could hamper the efforts of first responders due to poor visibility, high heat, deadly smoke, and explosions."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Measurement Techniques for Data Recording and High Temperature Measurement

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  "The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) performs a wide variety of High Explosive (HE) blast events, supporting the War Fighter, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) mitigation, characterization, international anti-terrorism mitigation, force protection, and agent defeat. United States Government agencies rely on these tests to gather useful data in the field and for laboratory use. The paper presented here addresses: (1) instrumentation design and, (2) high temperature data acquisition. The Instrumentation design includes cable planning and layout, sensor selection (pressure, thermal response, acceleration, velocity, displacement, strain, and force), sensor calibration and fielding, data acquisition, long range transmission and storage of data signals, and high speed optical data. DTRA has also internally developed two fast response high temperature measurement systems that can sustain a harsh environment of up to 500 psi, and both with the capability of measuring temperatures in excess of 3000 Kelvin with a response time of 300 MicroSec. The first system is a Near Infra Red (NIR) ratio pyrometry four color system which is completely self contained (detectors, conditioning electronics in same unit), and the second system is also a NIR low cost ratio pyrometry system that uses an expendable front end mounting configuration that secures fiber optic cables (each of which are assigned a specific narrowband IR center wavelength) in a specific measurement location. These fiber optic cables convey the infrared data produced by the fireball or other thermal event to a separate array of physically protected NIR photo detectors whose data signals are then conditioned, recorded and, processed to provide fireball or other thermal event temperatures."

  United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency

  Shah, Kiran; Ross, Howard

  2010-10