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• Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border [September 21, 2009]

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  "U.S. firearms laws currently govern the possession and transfer of firearms and provide penalties for the violation of such laws. 'Gun trafficking,' although not defined by statute, essentially includes the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. This report includes legal analyses of three ATF-investigated, Southwest border gun trafficking cases to illustrate the federal statutes that are typically violated as part of wider gun trafficking schemes. The report also examines anti-gun trafficking proposals introduced in the 110th Congress. So far, no similar proposals have been introduced in the 111th Congress. The report concludes with possible policy questions for Congress regarding the magnitude of Southwest border gun trafficking, the use and significance of ATF crime gun trace data, the possible ratification of an Inter-American Gun Trafficking Convention (CIFTA), and the adequacy of the federal statutes designed to deter and reduce illegal gun trafficking."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Krouse, William J.; Chu, Vivian S.

  2009-09-21
• Gun Trafficking and the Southwest Border [July 29, 2009]

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  "U.S. firearms laws currently govern the possession and transfer of firearms and provide penalties for the violation of such laws. 'Gun trafficking,' although not defined by statute, essentially includes the movement or diversion of firearms from legal to illegal markets. This report includes legal analyses of three ATF-investigated, Southwest border gun trafficking cases to illustrate the federal statutes that are typically violated as part of wider gun trafficking schemes. The report also examines anti-gun trafficking proposals introduced in the 110th Congress. So far, no similar proposals have been introduced in the 111th Congress. The report concludes with possible policy questions for Congress regarding the magnitude of Southwest border gun trafficking, the use and significance of ATF crime gun trace data, the possible ratification of an Inter-American Gun Trafficking Convention (CIFTA), and the adequacy of the federal statutes designed to deter and reduce illegal gun trafficking."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Krouse, William J.; Chu, Vivian S.

  2009-07-29
• Secretary Napolitano Issues Immigration and Border Security Action Directive [January 30, 2009]

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  This press releases provides details on an immigration and border security action directive issued by DHS Secretary Napolitano on January 30, 2009. "The directive requires specific department offices and components to work together and with state and local partners to review and assess the plans and policies to address: criminal and fugitive aliens; legal immigration benefit backlogs; southbound gun smuggling; cooperation with the National Guard; widows and widowers of U.S. citizens; immigration detention centers; and electronic employee verification."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2009-01-30
• Serial No. 110-182: U.S. Assistance to South Asia: Is There a Strategy to Go with All That Money? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, May 14, 2008

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  From the opening statement of Gary L. Ackerman: "Last week I suggested that the major elements of U.S. foreign assistance consisted, metaphorically speaking, of sending lawyers, guns and money, that promoting democracy, free markets, civil society and the rule of law strengthens our partners in the international community, that supporting our allies with appropriate arms and training is morally and smart policy and that using our wealth and access to our economy to friendly nations to grow their economies and develop their governance capacity is a smart use of our taxpayers' money. In essence, lawyers, guns and money are the key pillars supporting American foreign policy. Each element has its limit as well. In South Asia, all three components are necessary but are not by themselves sufficient. Pillars are just that, pillars. They are not the whole structure. They are tools and tactics to help us achieve our policy goals. In South Asia, they are often tactics in search of a strategy. South Asia is arguably the place from which America faces the greatest terrorist threat. It was in Afghanistan that al-Qaeda plotted and carried out the attacks of September 11. […] With regard to Afghanistan, the Atlantic Council states: Make no mistake, NATO is not winning in Afghanistan. The Center for the Study of the Presidency's Afghanistan Study Group concludes: The mission to stabilize Afghanistan is faltering. The International Crisis Group maintains: Afghanistan is not lost but the signs are not good." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Richard A. Boucher, Mark Ward, and Gary L. Ackerman.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2008
• Serial No. 110-173: U.S. Assistance to the Middle East: Old Tools for New Tasks? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, May 8, 2008

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  From the opening statement of Gary L. Ackerman: "At the top of the list of problems in the Middle East is the question of governance and freedoms, from which many of the region's troubling phenomena flow. The U.N.'s Arab Human Development reports, which describe in painful detail the extent to which the Middle East has fallen behind other regions in terms of education, health, technology and other significant measures of quality of life, has cited the lack of freedom as the key factor in these deficits. Over the long term it is hard to see how the Middle East can thrive without a substantial evolution in governance. It is neither the right, nor the duty, of the United States to pick the form of government for any people but ourselves. But that does not mean that we have to watch impassively as people in the region struggle for their liberty, and demand respect for their civil and human rights. Neither are we bound to watch in silence as governments with which we cooperate endanger themselves, and by extension our common policy goals, by alienating their own populations. […] Some of our partners in the region face challenges that are more direct and brutal. […] They need arms and, often, the proper training to deploy them. But they are ready and willing to defend themselves. Helping them to do so is not only morally right, but is prudent policy. [...] Wise investments by ourselves and increased access to the U.S. economy can make a big difference in helping our friends in the region to grow and to thrive. Very simply, we need to send more lawyers, guns and money, but we need to know which to send where." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Gary L. Ackerman, C. David Welch, and George A. Laudato.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2008
• Global Progress on Biosecurity: U.S. Vision and International Efforts

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  Dr. Marc L. Ostfield, Senior Advisor of Bioterrorism, Biodefense, and Health Security, remarks to the Partnership for Global Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, March 9, 2007: "It's probably worth beginning with a brief mention of terminology - and some of the concerns about the term 'biosecurity' that bring us together today. As many know, this term often translates very poorly into other languages; in Spanish, French, Arabic, and Mandarin, for example, the terms 'biosecurity' and 'biosafety' (and their shades of meaning) conflate into only one word in translation. To add another level of complexity to the linguistic confusion, 'biosecurity' has many different meanings in different areas of specialization. For instance, to an agricultural specialist, biosecurity could mean measures to reduce transmission of disease among animals. For some scientists, biosecurity could refer to the challenge of 'dual use' technology or research. In the corporate world, biosecurity can mean prevention of intellectual property theft. In other contexts, some define it broadly to refer to any measures taken to prevent the malicious use of pathogens against humans, animals, and plants. And for others, the term biosecurity is a specific reference to pathogen security, attempts to keep dangerous pathogens out of terrorist hands. Pathogen security is a part of U.S. and international efforts in this arena and has been useful in opening dialogues with other governments and the scientific community regarding the importance of working together to counter bioterrorism. However, pathogen security is sometimes seen as the only strategy needed to combat bioterrorism. Asserting that materials, technologies, and expertise for bioterrorism are available worldwide, and that terrorist groups are increasingly able to obtain and disseminate infectious disease agents, pathogen security advocates contend that such systems and practices (often "guns, guards, and gates" - typically derived from several decades of work as part of nuclear nonproliferation strategies) are central to reducing bioterrorism's threat. Despite the ability to accomplish enhanced security for particular pathogen facilities and stimulate international engagement, there are also limits because virtually all pathogens exist in nature, technology is readily accessible, and scientific expertise is broadly distributed. As such, effective international policy strategies to combat bioterrorism must be substantially broader, comprehensive, and multi-sectoral - with pathogen security as one of many components which I shall now describe."

  United States. Department of State

  Ostfield, Marc

  2007-03-09
• Lethal Loopholes; Deficiencies in State and Federal Gun Purchase Laws: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, May 10, 2007

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  From the opening statement of Dennis Kucinich: "This hearing will focus on lethal loopholes and deficiencies in laws designed to prevent high-risk individuals from buying firearms. There are other important reasons why America has such a high rate of gun violence -- gang activity, inadequate provision of mental health services, and cultural attitudes toward violence. But those are issues for another day. There are many federal and state laws that have been on the books--- some for decades- aimed at preventing certain categories of people from purchasing guns. The problem is that they do not function properly or are not properly enforced. In 1968 when Congress passed the Gun Control Act, it made a judgment that certain categories of individuals- termed 'prohibited persons'- should not be allowed to purchase or possess handguns or long guns because of the high risk that they would later use these firearms to commit crimes. Prohibited persons included convicted felons, illegal aliens, and individuals with serious mental health issues. The problem was that it was difficult to determine which individuals fell into these categories when they walked into a gun dealer to buy a gun." Statement, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Rachel L. Brand, Susan B. Sorenson, Robyn Thomas, Dan Burton, Elijah E. Cummings, Danny K. Davis, John Feinblatt, Paul Helmke, Ronald S. Honberg, and Daniel W. Webster.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Gun Legislation in the 109th Congress [Updated September 15, 2006]

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  "Congress continues to debate the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and ammunition. It is a contentious debate, with strong advocates for and against the further federal regulation of firearms. Gun control advocates argue that federal regulation of firearms curbs access by criminals, juveniles, and other 'high-risk' individuals. They contend that only federal measures can successfully reduce the availability of guns throughout the nation. Some seek broad policy changes such as near-prohibition of non-police handgun ownership or the registration of all firearms or firearm owners. They assert that there is no constitutional barrier to such measures and no significant social costs. Others advocate fewer comprehensive policies that they maintain would not impede ownership and legitimate firearm transfers. Gun control opponents deny that federal policies keep firearms out of the hands of high-risk persons; rather, they argue, controls often create burdens for law-abiding citizens and infringe upon constitutional rights provided by the Second Amendment. Some argue further that widespread gun ownership is one of the best deterrents to crime as well as to potential tyranny, whether by gangs or by government. They may also criticize the notion of enhancing federal, as opposed to state, police powers. Additional firearm-related issues that may receive consideration include (1) retaining Brady background check records for approved firearm transactions to enhance terrorist screening, (2) more strictly regulating certain long-range fifty caliber rifles, (3) further regulating certain firearms previously defined in statute as 'assault weapons,' and (4) requiring background checks for private firearm transfers at gun shows."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  2006-09-15
• U.S. Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons

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  "This article reviews the development of U.S. policy on controlling the proliferation of small arms before, during, and after the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. It chronicles the policy's evolution from the formulations of the William J. Clinton administration to those of its successor. It argues that despite this changing of the guard, the main tenets of the policy have remained largely unchanged, and that the United States has failed to take leadership on this issue, adopting instead a minimalist approach--and correspondingly small expenditures. […] This discussion also assesses how the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks largely stalled, rather than stimulated, global progress and suggests that the connection between small arms proliferation and transnational threats, such as terrorism, has not been properly addressed. The article then turns to areas in which active U.S. involvement has, in contrast, proved fertile and yielded concrete results, including proposals aimed at fostering effective and enduring change--measures that, if properly developed and expanded, may offer a viable blueprint for a 2006 UN Review Conference on this issue. The article goes on to weigh the role and resonance of American domestic policies on gun control and to examine how the new national security doctrine is affecting, and will likely affect, the international debate on small arms. Finally, it looks at how the influence of American interest groups and policy circles has shaped and may continue to underpin U.S. perspective and interaction at the multilateral and bilateral levels."

  Naval War College (U.S.). Press

  Bondi, Loretta

  2006
• Gun Legislation in the 109th Congress [Updated May 6, 2005]

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  "Gun control advocates argue that federal regulation of firearms curbs access by criminals, juveniles, and other 'high-risk' individuals. They contend that only federal measures can successfully reduce the availability of guns throughout the nation. Some seek broad policy changes such as near-prohibition of non-police handgun ownership or the registration of all firearms or firearm owners. They assert that there is no constitutional barrier to such measures and no significant social costs. Others advocate less comprehensive policies that they maintain would not impede ownership and legitimate firearm transfers."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Krouse, William J.

  2005-05-06
• NNSA Monthly News [February 2005]

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  "In this issue: U.S. and U.K. Cooperate on Ridding Russian of Weapons Grade Plutonium; Samuel Bodman Becomes New DOE Secretary; Y-12 Lends Equipment to South Carolina State's Nuclear Engineering Program; Dan Glenn Enjoys Leading Pantex Site Office; 2004 A Banner Year for the Jasper Gun; Pantex Exceeds 2004 FIRP [Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program] Goals; Virtual Reality Lets Engineers Go Inside Designs; Sandia, NYU Co-Host First-Ever 'Big Picture Summit'; Highly Enriched Uranium Repatriated from Czech Republic; Conference on Security of Radioactive Sources; Livermore, Sandia Team for Math, Science Program; DOE Extends Acceptance Policy for Spent Nuclear Fuel; Los Alamos Wizardry to Aid New Mars Science Lab; and LANL [Los Alamos National Laboratory] Camera Will Probe Edge of Solar System."

  United States. National Nuclear Security Administration

  2005-02
• Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy

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  "In the realm of todays inter-linkages, democracy and national security are closely interconnected. Democracy strengthens the societal foundation of national security. It energized both state and non-state actors to shape the construction of national security. It also promotes security with human faces that goes beyond gun powder. Foreign policy is a tool that could be used to promote democracy as a strategy for national and international security. While democracy is unfolding, foreign policy making becomes democratic in the sense that it includes the participation of civil society groups. This condition could help build foreign policy consensus. There is a sense of obligation that democracies should help other democracies or other emerging democracies in a just and equal way. Foreign policy could be functioned for that purpose."

  National Defense University

  Widjojo, Agus

  2005
• Meeting to Approve New Electronic Communications Policy: Meeting before the Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, September 5, 2003

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  The changing state of communication, particularly in the realm of electronic correspondence and e-mail, has urged new legislation from Washington and posed the question as to the legal boundaries of such items. To understand the rationale for the proposed change it is important to understand the history behind our current policy. Public Law 97-69, which passed in the 97th Congress, contained a provision prohibiting unsolicited mass mailings which are defined by the franking guidelines as mass mailings containing 500 or more pieces of substantially identical contents. If one receives a thousand letters in for guns or against guns, whatever the issue is, those would be recognized as solicited mailings, but the 500 or more pieces of substantially identical content are mailings that are sent out, and it is unsolicited. There is no doubt that web pages and e-mails have greatly enhanced the ability of people in this country and around the world to communicate their points of view, but it also raises a issues begging the question of how these new mediums should be regulated.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2003-09-05
• Gun Control Legislation in the 108th Congress [Updated January 27, 2003]

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  Congress continues to debate the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and ammunition. Since 1934, various federal laws have been enacted to promote such regulation. The two most significant federal statutes controlling firearms held by civilians are the National Firearms Act of 1934 and the Gun Control Act of 1968. The 1934 Act established strict registration requirements and a transfer tax on machine guns and short-barreled long guns. The 1968 Act prohibits mail-order and interstate sales of firearms, prohibits transfers to minors and other prohibited persons, and sets forth penalties and licensing requirements for manufacturers, importers, and dealers. Gun control advocates argue that federal regulation of firearms curbs access by criminals, juveniles, and other "high-risk" individuals. Some seek broad policy changes such as near-prohibition of non-police handgun ownership or the registration of all firearm owners or firearms. Others advocate less comprehensive policies that they maintain would not impede ownership and legitimate firearm transfers. Opposition to federal controls is strong. While several dozen gun control-related proposals are likely to be introduced in the 108th Congress that represent a variety of positions on federal regulation of firearms, legislative debate and action may develop in the following issue areas: (1) extending, making permanent, or allowing to expire, the semiautomatic assault weapons ban, which sunsets on September 13, 2004; (2) expanding electronic access to disqualifying records under the Brady criminal background check system; (3) expanding federally-supported ballistic imaging to enhance law enforcement efforts; and (4) further regulating firearm transfers at gun shows.

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Krouse, William J.

  2003-01-27
• Gun Control: Potential Effects of Next-Day Destruction of NICS Background Check Records

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  While routine system audits may not be adversely affected by DOJ's proposed requirement for next-day destruction of records, other current uses of NICS records would be affected, with consequences for public safety and NICS operations. The FBI has drafted plans that would address most potential effects of the proposed policy for next-day destruction of records. NICS officials told us, however, that the FBI would not lose any routine audit capabilities under the proposed policy for next-day destruction of records. Specifically, under current DOJ policy, if a law enforcement agency has information that indicates that an individual is prohibited from purchasing firearms under federal law, the agency may request that the FBI check whether the name appears in NICS records of allowed transfers. The FBI is considering actions that could partially mitigate the adverse effects of a next-day destruction policy on NICS operations. Finally, ATF headquarters officials told us that a next-day destruction policy would not affect ATF's ability to inspect gun dealer records. For example, under the proposed next-day destruction policy, NICS records of allowed firearms transfers would no longer be available for a detailed comparison with dealer records of the purportedly same transactions.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-07
• Serial No. 107-94: The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session on H.R. 2037, April 18, 2002

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  On April 18, 2002, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the Committee on Energy and Commerce convenes to discuss and hear testimony on the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act. Testifying are David Pasternak on behalf of the American Bar Association, Michael Barnes of the Brady Center, Elisa Barnes, Sterling Burnett of the National Center for Policy Analysis, Lawrence Keane of National Shooting Sports Foundation, Kristin Rand of the Violence Policy Center, and Jeff Reh of the Beretta USA Corporation. Chairman Stearns explains that "the bill addresses the growing problem of nuisance lawsuits filed with the intention of driving the firearms industry out of business by attempting to hold manufacturers and dealers liable for the criminal acts of third-parties who are totally beyond their control." He contends that "what these suits represent are blatant attempts to regulate an industry". Congressman Towns, however, disagrees and argues that gun dealers should share liability in gun-related incidents. David Pasternak testifies that "the American Bar Association opposes federal, state or territorial legislation to create special legal immunity for the firearms industry from civil tort liability." Michael Barnes agrees, stating that "this bill is a misguided, unjust attempt to provide special legal protection for the gun industry at the expense of innocent Americans who have been harmed by the dangerous and irresponsible actions of firearm manufacturers and sellers." Industry representative hold differing views, arguing that "If the tactic of these lawsuits is allowed to succeed, recourse to the courts can make the legislature superfluous."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002-05-25
• Destroying Excess Small Arms: U.S. Policy and Programs

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  "While robust export controls and enforcement are critical elements in the effort to curb illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), the simplest and most reliable way to prevent proliferation of illicit arms is through proper stockpile management and expeditious destruction of excess," says C. Edward Peartree, Policy Officer, Office of Policy, Plans & Analysis, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State. "Taking up this global problem, the State Department, working with the Department of Defense, has dedicated funding and expertise to assisting countries in improving stockpile management practices and destroying excess SA/LW." The principal source of destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) in many regions of the world is not new production but re-circulated stocks of surplus military weapons. Cold War stocks the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, often poorly secured and susceptible to theft or illegal transfer, have been a source of arms for regional criminal organizations and violent terrorist groups. Ex-Warsaw Pact militaries eager to upgrade to NATO standards have dumped large numbers of infantry rifles, machine guns, and light weapons such as rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) onto the global market. Sales of surplus arms, often to undesirable end-users such as insurgent groups or warring governments under international embargo, have proven a ready source of revenue for cash-poor developing countries. The United States continues to expand its small arms destruction program. Projects are currently under discussion in the Balkans, Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. In addition to an ongoing partnership with Norway and Germany in Albania, the United States seeks joint ventures with other interested donor countries and organizations. U.S. support for destruction of surplus and illicit small arms and light weapons are intended to promote regional security, peace, and reconciliation in regions of conflict. The unchecked proliferation of these arms threatens civilians, peacekeepers, and law enforcement officials, and complicates the work of rebuilding war torn societies and regions. Given that destruction is relatively inexpensive (costing generally between $1-5 per weapon destroyed) and can generally be accomplished using locally available infrastructure (a variety of cheap methods are viable) and personnel, the program offers large dividends in threat reduction for a modest initial investment.

  United States. Department of State

  Peartree, C. Edward

  2001-06
• U.S. Policy Need Not Be Silent on Small Arms

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  "The spread and misuse of small arms cause, prolong, and exacerbate humanitarian crises around the world. In the last few years, a growing international consensus has emerged that steps must be taken to avoid a world awash in small arms," says Rachel Stohl, a senior analyst at the Center for Defense Information, and chair of the U.S. Small Arms Working Group. She urges governments to "look to multilateralize' best practices and develop standards and norms to counter small arms proliferation and misuse." U.S. leadership on small arms issues is vital now more than ever. In the U.S. political sphere, however, small arms trafficking has not been a high priority. Often, policymakers are loathe to get involved in the issue of small arms proliferation because they regard it as an attempt to introduce domestic gun control, or they think the issue is too controversial. Others believe that there are other, more important issues to deal with. Policy options on small arms are abundant and can be implemented with relatively little cost while achieving large and tangible results. First, the United States should lead a moratorium on arms sales to all regions of conflict -- especially ongoing conflicts -- and work with other states to adopt similar moratoria. Second, a criterion outlined in the European Union (EU) Code of Conduct and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms should be rigorously applied to international small arms exports. Third, the United States as well as other exporting nations should set an example by adopting a policy of export restraint that is designed to prevent diversion and dangerous weapons buildups, based on the existing U.S. policy to "audit, and if necessary, cut off " exports to a state if arms export license applications "exceed the normal, reasonable, domestic needs of a given importing country or show other abnormalities." Fourth, the State Department should ask for, and Congress should grant, continued and increased funding for small arms destruction programs and continued cooperation on weapons destruction and stockpile management, in order to help destroy surplus weapons that would otherwise cascade to regions of conflict. Fifth, the State Department should develop an information-sharing mechanism on United Nations arms embargoes, either within the United Nations or in regional fora. Sixth, the State Department should advocate immediate Senate ratification of the Organization of American States (OAS) convention on small arms trafficking. All of these steps will lead to progress on the issue, but the U.S. government cannot do the work to counter small arms proliferation and misuse alone.

  United States. Department of State

  Stohl, Rachel J.

  2001-06
• Small Arms Use and Proliferation: Strategies for a Global Dilemma

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  Small arms proliferation is a symptom of increased intrastate conflicts and is "a problem that is not amenable to simple or quick solution and will be with us for the long term," says Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. "The United States and the international community must therefore address the root causes of intrastate conflict and, at the same time, try to stem the supply of these weapons and contain the devastation that they cause." While most arms control efforts focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and heavy conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons designed for military use are responsible for most of the killing and injuries, especially of civilians, in the increasing number of intrastate conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. These weapons include assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and individually portable mortars and missiles. The focus of U.S. policy is to achieve agreement by next year on a Protocol on Illicit Firearms and Ammunition Trafficking to the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention. This protocol is modeled on the InterAmerican Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials initiated by the OAS. Seven OAS member states have ratified the convention (Mexico, Belize, Bahamas, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, and Ecuador), and all but four OAS members have signed it. In June 1998 the President transmitted the convention to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. In a larger sense, small arms proliferation is one of many symptoms of increased intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The proliferation and use of these weapons in such conflicts is a problem that is not amenable to simple or quick solution, and it will be with us for the long term. The United States and the international community must therefore address the root causes of intrastate conflict and, at the same time, try to stem the supply of these weapons and contain the devastation that they cause. This will require us to begin to integrate small arms concerns into the fabric of our diplomatic relations, as we now do with democracy and human rights. Without sustained, creative attention to both aspects of the problem of intrastate conflict, many of the other problems that we strive to mitigate will become worse.

  United States. Department of State

  Newsom, Eric David

  1999-09
• Juvenile Justice Reform Initiatives in the States: 1994-1996

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  This report "identifies and analyzes issues and trends associated with state juvenile justice reform initiatives that took place between 1994 and 1996; issues examined include juvenile violence, street gangs, delinquency prevention, boot camps, and juvenile transfer. [...] [This report] is designed to provide timely information to policymakers on the mechanisms that States are using to respond to increased youth violence and delinquency. The report is broken down into four chapters that discuss in detail the juvenile crime and delinquency problem and highlight State responses to that challenge. Chapter I provides an overview of the incidence of youth crime in the Nation, discusses trends in violent juvenile crimes, considers how and why youth crimes are being committed, and gives a prognosis for the future. [...] Chapter II highlights major issues and trends associated with recent State responses to youth crime in this country. This chapter addresses the following policy initiatives: crime prevention; curfews; parental responsibility; gang activities, including drug trafficking; graduated sanctions; juvenile boot camps; youth and guns; juvenile records; juvenile waivers; and expanded sentencing authority. Chapter III discusses in depth the reform initiatives in four States--Colorado, Connecticut, Ohio, and Oregon. [...] Finally, chapter IV summarizes in general terms the juvenile justice reform trends that have been taking place around the country and includes observations and recommendations based on the experiences of States undertaking both single-issue and comprehensive juvenile justice reform."

  United States. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention

  National Criminal Justice Association

  1997-10
• Authority of the President to Restrict Munitions Imports Under the Arms Export Control Act: Memorandum Opinion for the Special Assistant to the President and Legal Advisor to the National Security Council [February 9, 1996]

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  "This letter addresses and explains the basis for the oral advice that we provided in early April 1995 regarding the President's authority under the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2, ('AECA') to restrict the import of certain munitions from the Russian Federation in furtherance of United States foreign policy. The question arises in connection with the Administration's plan, as part of a general program of eliminating Cold War restrictions on trade and economic cooperation with Russia, to take steps to remove Russia from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations ('ITAR') list, which provides that it is the policy of the United States to deny licenses for the import of defense articles originating in certain countries, including Russia. […] Russia's presence on the ITAR list means American businesses are not granted licenses necessary to import Russian munitions. Once Russia is off the ITAR list, there would be no general prohibition on gun imports from Russia. We understand that the issue concerns the negotiation of voluntary export restraints with Russia to ensure that, once Russia is removed from the ITAR list, munitions imports from Russia would not jeopardize public safety. The question has been raised whether the President possesses authority under the AECA to limit the import of munitions from Russia. We have concluded that restricting the import of Russian munitions to certain classes of firearms and ammunition is a legitimate use of the President's authority under the AECA to restrict the import of munitions in furtherance of United States foreign policy."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel

  1996-02-09