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Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's Security Program, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
The Department of Energy (DOE), overseer of the nation's nuclear weapons program, runs a broad range of plants and laboratories to carry out research, development, and production. Given the potentially devastating consequence of radiological sabotage or terrorism, tight security is a must at these facilities. Accordingly, DOE spends nearly $1 billion annually to protect them. GAO reviewed DOE's practice of granting exceptions to the agency's safeguards and security orders. Approved exceptions have ranged from exceptions to administration requirements, involving, for example, the labeling or marking of classified documents, to more substantive exceptions involving the inventory or storage of special nuclear materials. This report (1) cites the number of exceptions that have been approved, (2) determines whether DOE's written policies and procedures for reviewing and approving exceptions have been followed, and (3) describes the kind of internal control system used for monitoring and following up on individual exceptions.
United States. General Accounting Office
1992-06-29
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S. Hrg. 108-351: U.S. Energy Security: West Africa and Latin America: Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, October 21, 2003
Because U.S. energy independence is not achievable in the near term, America needs a comprehensive energy policy that recognizes the realities of our interconnected world and the linkages between political stability and energy security. Those realities vary from region to region. We cannot take a one-size-fits-all approach to this effort. The first hearing in April of this year on energy security focused on an overview of global energy security issues. The second hearing focused specifically on Russia and the Caspian Sea region. This hearing focuses on the impact of recent developments in West Africa, specifically in Liberia and Nigeria, and in Latin America, especially in Venezuela and Mexico. Witnesses in this hearing also comment on how the oil strikes against President Chavez in Venezuela have affected U.S. energy policy and how the geostrategic implications of continued political volatility in Venezuela could affect our economic and political interest in South America. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John R. Brodman, David L. Goldwyn, Chuck Hagel, Matthew T. McManus, Marina Ottaway, and J. Robinson West.
United States. Government Printing Office
2004
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Roadmap to Secure Energy Delivery Systems
"ile much progress has been made, the public and private partners are keenly aware that there is more work to do with today's rapid pace of change and dynamic energy delivery systems landscape. The Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group (ESCSWG) collaborated with energy sector stakeholders to update the Roadmap in four phases: [1] Over-the-Horizon Analysis: On July 7, 2009, nearly 20 asset owners, government leaders, vendors, and researchers convened to examine the solid foundation of the 2006 Roadmap-the vision and goal areas-and provided recommendations to better align the framework with the wide range of complex energy delivery systems security needs the sector will need to address today and in the future. [2] Roadmap Update Workshop: On September 2-3, 2009, more than 80 asset owners and operators, CIOs, researchers, technology developers, security specialists, and vendors renewed their commitment to the industry's vision and partnership efforts and tackled the most persistent challenges: vulnerability disclosure, technology gaps and advancements, innovative partnerships, and measuring progress. Participants defined the issues and identified a set of prioritized solutions the public-private partnership can act on immediately. [3] Roadmap Technical Review Workshop: On November 18, 2009, 12 subject matter experts convened to clarify the technical challenges and recommend additional milestones to ensure the sector has a clear path to achieving Roadmap goals. [4] Roadmap Review: The Working Group synthesized the results of the above efforts to update the 2006 Roadmap and create a draft Roadmap. [...] The Roadmap to Secure Energy Delivery Systems was created to guide and align public and private efforts to achieve and sustain the energy sector's vision."
United States. Department of Energy
2011-01
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DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, September 12, 2012
This is the September 12, 2012 hearing on "DOE's [Department of Energy] Nuclear Weapons Complex: Challenges to Safety, Security, and Taxpayer Stewardship" held before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. From the opening statement of Cliff Stearns: "Today's Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation will review challenges to safety, security, and taxpayer stewardship in the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon complex. DOE is responsible for securing and maintaining the most dangerous materials on the planet, including nuclear warheads. This is one area that must have effective oversight. This committee, principally through the work of this subcommittee, has a long history of bipartisan scrutiny of the Department of Energy's oversight and management of the contractors that are charged with running DOE's nuclear weapons programs and operations." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Cliff Stearns, Diana DeGette, Joe Barton, Lee Terry, Marsha Blackburn, Henry A. Waxman, Fred Upton, Daniel B. Poneman, Thomas P. D'Agostino, Glenn S. Podonsky, Mark E. Gaffigan, and Gregory H. Friedman.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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Evaluation Report: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Unclassified Cyber Security Program - 2012
"The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is an independent agency within the Department of Energy responsible for, among other things, regulating interstate transmission of the Nation's electricity, natural gas and oil. In addition, the Commission licenses and inspects private, municipal and state hydroelectric projects. To achieve its mission, the Commission relies on a wide range of information technology (IT) resources to help ensure that rates and terms and conditions for the wholesale of electric energy and natural gas are just and reasonable, and promote the development of a safe, reliable and efficient energy infrastructure. As highlighted by recent cyber attacks on Federal entities, the information security threat landscape continues to change, and vulnerable IT resources continue to be exploited. To help protect against continuing cyber security threats, the Commission estimated that it would expend approximately $5.3 million during Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 to secure its IT assets, a 39 percent increase from FY 2011. 'The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002' (FISMA) established requirements for Federal agencies regarding the management and oversight of information security risks and to ensure that IT resources were adequately protected. As directed by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducted an independent evaluation of the Commission's unclassified cyber security program to determine whether it adequately protected data and information systems. This report presents the results of our evaluation for FY 2012."
United States. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General
2012-11
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Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: A Summary of Major Provisions [December 21, 2007]
"The Energy Independence and Security Act (P.L. 110-140, H.R. 6) is an omnibus energy policy law that consists mainly of provisions designed to increase energy efficiency and the availability of renewable energy. This report describes the key provisions of the enacted law, summarizes the legislative action on H.R. 6, and provides a summary of the provisions under each of the titles in the law. The two most controversial provisions of H.R. 6 that were not included in the enacted law were the proposed Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard (RPS) and most of the proposed tax provisions, which included repeal of tax subsidies for oil and gas and new incentives for energy efficiency and renewable energy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sissine, Fred J.
2007-12-21
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Canada's New Role in North American Energy Security
"Energy analysts have given renewed attention to Canada's position in the North American energy market since the September 11th attacks, because of fear that conflict might interrupt the flow of oil from the Middle East...While Canada is already the single major oil exporter to the United States (ahead of both Saudi Arabia and Venezuela), its production could double by 2010. Canada's rapidly increasing energy production has major implications both for hemispheric relations and for the United States' strategic position. In the aftermath of September 11th energy security has become a key concern for the United States. After the attacks many commentators argued that the United States relied too heavily on Middle Eastern sources of supply, and that this factor not only limited U.S. actions, but also obliged the U.S. to engage with regimes that it found to be distasteful if not dangerous. Newspaper columnists decried America's reliance on Saudi Arabia for energy, and some called for the United States to increase its energy self-sufficiency by opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) in Alaska to drilling. Richard Holbrook, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, stated that Americans' "greatest single failure over the last twenty five years was our failure to reduce our dependence on foreign oil . . . which would have reduced the leverage of Saudi Arabia."1 Yet in fact the United States' energy position is now stronger than it appears, and there is reason to believe that it will improve in the future, because of the growing importance of Canada as a source of petroleum." - from Introduction
William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
Smallman, Shawn C.
2003
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Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: NNSA's Reviews of Budget Estimates and Decisions on Resource Trade-offs Need Strengthening, Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate
"NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], a semiautonomous agency within DOE [Department of Energy], is responsible for the nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors programs. Since its inception in 2000, the agency has faced challenges in its ability to accurately identify the costs of major projects. In addition, both the DOE Inspector General, in 2003, and GAO [Government Accountability Office], in 2007, reported concerns with NNSA's PPBE [planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation] process, specifically in how NNSA validates budget estimates and decides on resource allocations or trade-offs. GAO was asked to review how NNSA manages programming and budgeting through its PPBE process. GAO examined (1) the current structure of NNSA's PPBE process, (2) the extent to which NNSA reviews its budget estimates, and (3) how NNSA decides on resource trade-offs in its PPBE process. To carry out its work, GAO reviewed NNSA policies, instructions, guidance, and internal reports documenting the agency's PPBE process and interviewed NNSA, DOE, and M&O [management and operating] contractor officials. GAO recommends that, among other things, DOE update the departmental order for budget reviews, improve the formal process for reviewing budget estimates, and reinstitute an independent analytical capability. The agency agreed in principle with six recommendations but not with one to consolidate various integrated priority lists. GAO continues to believe this recommendation has merit as discussed in the report."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2012-07
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Comprehensive U.S. Planning and Better Foreign Cooperation Needed to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
"In April 2009, President Obama announced an international initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years. Nonproliferation programs administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) are working to secure nuclear materials in Russia and other countries. GAO [Government Accountability Office] assessed (1) U.S. governmentwide efforts to implement the President's 4-year nuclear material security initiative; (2) the status and challenges, if any, of NNSA's nuclear security programs in Russia; and (3) NNSA efforts to secure nuclear materials in countries other than Russia. To address these issues, GAO analyzed U.S. nuclear security strategies and plans and interviewed U.S. and Russian government officials. This report summarizes the findings of GAO's classified report on securing nuclear materials worldwide. [...]. GAO suggests that Congress consider extending the deadline for NNSA to complete Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program activities in Russia. GAO recommends that the Department of Energy (DOE) and NNSA take several actions regarding three nonproliferation program efforts in Russia, such as clarifying the remaining scope and costs of MPC&A work in Russia. GAO also recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) lead interagency development of a more detailed implementation plan for the President's 4-year initiative. DOE and NNSA agreed with the recommendations. NSC did not comment on GAO's recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2010-12-15
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Maritime Security: Coast Guard Should Conduct Required Inspections of Offshore Energy Infrastructure, Report to Congressional Requesters
"Congressional interest in the security of offshore energy infrastructure has increased because of the lives lost and the substantial damages that resulted from the Deepwater Horizon incident in April 2010. The U.S. Coast Guard-a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-is the lead federal agency for maritime security, including the security of offshore energy infrastructure. The Coast Guard oversees two main types of offshore energy infrastructure-facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) and deepwater ports. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to examine (1) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of OCS facilities and what additional actions, if any, are needed; (2) Coast Guard actions to ensure the security of deepwater ports and what additional actions, if any, are needed; and (3) what limitations in oversight authority, if any, the Coast Guard faces in ensuring the security of offshore energy infrastructure. GAO reviewed Coast Guard documents, such as inspection records, and relevant laws and regulations and interviewed Coast Guard inspectors and officials, including those at Coast Guard headquarters and the two Coast Guard districts that oversee all OCS facilities and deepwater ports that are subject to security requirements. GAO recommends that the Coast Guard develop policies or guidance to ensure that (1) annual security inspections are conducted at OCS facilities and (2) information entered into its database for both OCS facilities and deepwater ports is more useful for management. DHS and the Coast Guard concurred with these recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-10-28
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Preemptive Energy Security: An Aggressive Approach to Meeting America's Requirements
"Global competition, declining resources, and domestic demand on resources have placed energy issues at the forefront of daily news. This situation highlights the incredible U.S. appetite for energy and tremendous reliance on foreign energy. The volatile nature of the world oil market not only places the U.S. economy at risk, but also jeopardizes America's security. The War on Terrorism has strained U.S. relations with many oil-producing states. Rapidly increasing crude oil demands by Asia add new competition for this resource. If foreign producers denied the United States oil, the effects could cripple the U.S. economy and would significantly impact security. The 2002 National Security Strategy acknowledges the importance of the nation's economy; however, there is no mention of the linkage of energy security and the economy. Until the United States commits to developing alternative forms of energy to gain independence from foreign oil, the United States remains vulnerable to volatile markets, global politics, and possible interventions of non-state players. Current policy limits U.S. action to diplomatic economic and information efforts to maintain access to oil. This Strategic Research Project analyzes the need to change the National Security Strategy to advocate the use of military force to guarantee access to foreign oil sources."
Army War College (U.S.)
Tewksbury, Dennis D.
2006-03-10
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: IAEA Has Strengthened Its Safeguards and Nuclear Security Programs, but Weaknesses Need to Be Addressed, Report to Congressional Requesters
"The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system has been a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was adopted in 1970. IAEA has strengthened its safeguards system and increased efforts to combat nuclear terrorism by helping countries secure nuclear and radioactive material and facilities. IAEA has taken steps to strengthen safeguards by more aggressively seeking assurances that countries have not engaged in clandestine nuclear activities, but the agency still cannot be certain that countries are not developing secret weapons programs. In a radical departure from the past practice of only verifying the peaceful use of a country's declared nuclear material at declared facilities, IAEA has begun to develop the capability to independently evaluate all aspects of a country's nuclear activities by, among other things, conducting more intrusive inspections and collecting and analyzing environmental samples to detect traces of nuclear material at facilities and other locations. In addition, IAEA is trying to improve the efficiency of its efforts by applying integrated safeguards, which could result in a reduction in the number of inspections in certain countries. This report (1) identifies the steps IAEA has taken to strengthen safeguards, (2) assesses the challenges in implementing strengthened safeguards, (3) identifies U.S. financial support for safeguards, and (4) describes IAEA's efforts to help secure nuclear material and facilities."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2005-10
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Securing U.S. Nuclear Materials: Poor Planning Has Complicated DOE's Plutonium Consolidation Efforts, Statement of Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
"Plutonium is very hazardous to human health and the environment and requires extensive security because of its potential use in a nuclear weapon. The Department of Energy (DOE) stores about 50 metric tons of plutonium that is no longer needed by the United States for nuclear weapons. Some of this plutonium is in the form of contaminated metal, oxides, solutions, and residues remaining from the nuclear weapons production process. To improve security and reduce storage costs, DOE plans to establish enough storage capacity at its Savannah River Site (SRS) in the event it decides to consolidate its plutonium there until it can be permanently disposed of. GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which DOE can consolidate this plutonium at SRS and (2) SRSs capacity to monitor plutonium storage containers."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2005-10-07
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It's Time for a National Energy Security Strategy
"The United States has been unchallenged as the sole economic and military superpower in the world over the last 15 years. However, a near decade long volatility in energy markets has led some Americans to question whether the U.S. can preserve that standing in the world. Colonel Greg Wright argues that what is needed to retain our military and economic superpower advantage is a new, overarching, United States National Energy Security Strategy. This new National Energy Security Strategy should set the strict goal of making the United States energy independent by 2020; its essential components should include diversifying and increasing energy supplies, increasing conservation, decreasing greenhouse gas emissions and modernizing energy distribution and production systems."
Army War College (U.S.)
Wright, George G.
2008-03-15
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Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Green Partnership to Address Energy Security, Climate Change, and Food Security [November 24, 2009]
This factsheet holds information regarding President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Green Partnership, and reaffirms "their countries' strong commitment to [...] combat climate change, ensur[es] their mutual energy security, [and their work] towards global food security, and building a clean energy economy that will drive investment, job creation, and economic growth throughout the 21st century." Prime Minister Singh and President Obama agreed to strengthen U.S.-India cooperation several issues during their meeting including: clean energy, climate change, and food security by launching" several initiatives discussed in this November 24, 2009 press release.
United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary
2009-11-24
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Report on Audit of the Department of Energy's Site Safeguards and Security Plans
"The Department's Safeguards and Security program is designed to provide appropriate, efficient, and effective protection of the Department's nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, facilities, and classified information. Department of Energy [DOE] policy, contained in DOE orders, specifies that Departmental interests shall be protected against a range of threats through the development of Site Safeguards and Security Plans (SSSPs). The SSSP is intended to depict the existing condition of safeguards and security site-wide and by facility, establish improvement priorities, and provide an estimate of the resources required to carry out the necessary improvements. The purpose of the audit was to determine if the Office of Safeguards and Security was using revised SSSP guidance as ldefacton policy to evaluate and approve SSSPs, and to determine if the new requirements established by the guidance were justified. The attached report is being sent to inform you of our findings and recommendations. […] We recommended that the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security discontinue using guidance as policy for evaluation, approval, and concurrence of Site Safeguards and Security Plans until they have been formally coordinated and concurred on by program and field elements. We also recommended that all proposed policy changes and guidance, when used as policy, be coordinated with affected program and field offices through the Departmental Directives System. Although the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security agreed that guidance should not be used as policy, they have not agreed to implement the recommendations and stated that they will continue to use the guides. In addition, they did not agree that the guidance issued by their office established requirements or that the new security requirements were unjustified."
United States. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General
1995-12-01
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Serial No. 107-13: Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure: How Secure are Government Computer Systems? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, April 5, 2001
From the opening statement of James C. Greenwood: "Today, the subcommittee holds a hearing to assess the security of government computer systems. In particular, we will assess how well or how poorly they are protecting our most critical cyberinfrastructures and operations from the threat of disgruntled insiders, hackers, criminals, terrorists, and rogue nation-states. Over the past 2 years this committee has conducted extensive oversight of computer security at particular government agencies, most notably EPA, the Department of Energy, and to a lesser extent, FDA and the Department of Commerce. Our reviews consistently have found poor computer security planning and management and a general lack of compliance with existing requirements of law and policy. We also found that, with few exceptions, the agencies were not testing their own systems to determine whether their security plans and policies were as effective in practice as they looked on paper. And we found that whenever real testing of agency systems was conducted numerous significant and easily exploitable vulnerabilities were almost always discovered. Why is this so important? Because as we will see and hear today, the threats and attacks on government systems are increasing and the technology used to perpetrate such attack is becoming both more sophisticated and more generally available. An expert team from the Department of Energy will demonstrate this morning how such attacks are conducted, using freely available software tools found on the Internet, and they will show us the results from some recent real-world testing the team conducted at several DOE sites." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Robert F. Dacey, Ronald L. Dick, Tom Noonan, Glenn S. Podonsky, Jason Bellone, Karen Matthews, Brent Huston, Brad Peterson, and John S. Tritak, and Jason Kemper, III.
United States. Government Printing Office
2001
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Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices
From the Introduction: "Current cybersecurity challenges for distributed energy resources (DERs) stem from the integration of various systems and the cyber-physical security concerns they bring. Although frameworks exist for industrial control systems and other energy systems, a simple guided tool that can prioritize recommended actions for controls specific to DERs is lacking. Additionally, the novelty of the field has made it difficult to create a standardized procedure for DERs with cybersecurity in mind. In response to this critical need to address cybersecurity risk management, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has developed a framework and accompanying web application known as the Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DERCF). [...] This document provides a guide to cybersecurity best practices identified by technical research and site visits where the framework was used to assess the cybersecurity posture of DER systems."
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (U.S.)
Sanghvi, Anuj; Hauck, Konrad; Powell, Charisa . . .
2020-01
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Energy and National Security
"Phil Sharp, long-time chairman of the House Energy Subcommittee, vigorously argued that the best energy security policy is to have lots of people producing and lots of people distributing the energy that the United States needs. This minimizes the risk of a disruption at any one point in the production/distribution chain. In this context, he said that the one enduring energy security question that requires diplomacy, military presence, and the willingness to use force is the concentration of oil reserves, production, and surge capacity in the Middle East. Backing up Sharp, long-time Amoco vice-president John Lyman argued that U.S. energy security is best maintained by ensuring that the United States is, and is perceived to be, fully supportive of free trade and of the use of market forces on a global scale."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Clawson, Patrick, 1951-
1995-04
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S. Prt. 109-64: Energy Diplomacy and Security: A Compilation of Statements by Witnesses before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, June 2006.
"The Committee on Foreign Relations is continuing to hold a series of hearings examining the geopolitical consequences of global energy imbalances and U.S. dependence on energy imports. Given the growing importance of energy security in our foreign policy today and the prominence of energy in our ongoing policy debates, I believe it is important that these analyses be made available to the entire Senate. The current United States energy portfolio, and in particular our dependence on foreign oil, has widespread and dramatic impacts on our national security. On March 13, 2006, in a speech at the Brookings Institution, I outlined the scope of the challenge before us, including myriad threats to our national security and economic prosperity. Over the past few months, the Committee held several hearings focusing on these threats caused by our current dependence on oil."
United States. Government Printing Office
2006-06
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Valuing Energy Security: Customer Damage Function Methodology and Case Studies at DoD Installations
"This report describes a methodology to value non-energy savings that can be attributed to energy security projects. The methodology is based on: (1) completing a site survey to collect data on two hypothetical outage scenarios lasting for different durations to compute a customer damage function (CDF), which represents interruption costs as a function of the outage duration; (2) characterizing the reliability of the commercial power supply at the site; and (3) estimating the value of electrical energy security (VEES), which is a metric that characterizes on an annual basis the cost of utility outages. The avoided cost of commercial power outages can be used as ancillary non-energy savings to increase the return on investment of energy security projects."
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (U.S.)
Booth, Steven R.; Giraldez, J.; Massey, K.
2012-10
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Energy Security: Getting Above the Funding Cut Line
From the thesis abstract: "Department of Defense (DoD) and Army dependence on energy inhibits performance of weapons systems and places Soldiers at-risk. The Army cannot meet this high demand without fundamentally changing the culture and methods for managing and acquiring energy in both the Operational and Institutional (or Generating) Forces. The Army, through the Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy (AESIS), is well on its way towards integrating energy security in its current operations. There has been more progress within the last two years than in the previous eight years following the first Defense Science Board Report in 2001. The AESIS is a good start, however this paper will provide additional suggestions to the ongoing development of a modeling tool, modifications to acquisition, measures of consumption, innovation, and culture change which are the keys to reducing the demand and expanding the supply. All of these suggestions require Army leaders to prioritize this issue above the funding cut line. Without the required attention and integration into the Army culture, Soldiers will continue to risk their lives securing supply convoys to meet the energy demand of our weapons systems."
Army War College (U.S.)
Kiyokawa, Guy T.
2010-03-19
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Introduction: Special Edition on Energy Security
This Introduction to a special issue on Energy Security describes factors that contribute to the safety and security of the global energy supply. According to the introduction " The international energy market has always rested on the possibility that major market participants might be required to use force to defend or manage its operation. The prospect was made plain even before the end of the Second World War, when Franklin Roosevelt took it upon himself to guarantee the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia, by way of securing its cooperation in the orderly production of oil in line with American requirements. The energy market has never
been immune to political and strategic influence. Oil has been used as a "weapon" in the past, and its price (along with that of natural gas) is reflective of a range of political pressures to which a perfectly efficient, strategically agnostic market would be indifferent. Nevertheless, the uncoerced, non-violent interaction of buyers and sellers has been the primary determinant of how energy resources have been produced and consumed throughout the period when those resources have traded freely in global markets-roughly since the final unraveling of European empires, and the emergence of the United States as a net importer of oil."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Steinhäusler, F. (Friedrich); Russell, James A. (James Avery), 1958-; Moran, Daniel
2008-02
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3050: Enhancing State Energy Security Planning and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2017
"H.R. 3050 would authorize the appropriation of $90 million in each of fiscal years 2018 through 2022 for the Department of Energy (DOE) to provide financial and technical assistance to states for purposes of developing and implementing plans related to energy conservation. The bill would require that states' plans specify strategies for safeguarding energy-related infrastructure from physical and cybersecurity threats, mitigating the risk of disruptions to the supply of energy, and ensuring energy reliability. Assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO [Congressional Budget Office] estimates that implementing H.R. 3050 would cost $302 million over the 2018-2022 period; the remainder would spend in years after 2022. Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do not apply. CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 3050 would not increase net direct spending or on-budget deficits in any of the four consecutive 10-year periods beginning in 2028."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2017-07-17
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Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of Energy and Defense Policies and Oversight Could be Improved, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"In the interest of national security and personal privacy and for other reasons, federal agencies place dissemination restrictions on information that is unclassified yet still sensitive. The Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have both issued policy guidance on how and when to protect sensitive information. DOE marks documents with this information as Official Use Only (OUO) while DOD uses the designation For Official Use Only (FOUO). GAO was asked to (1) identify and assess the policies, procedures, and criteria DOE and DOD employ to manage OUO and FOUO information and (2) determine the extent to which DOEs and DODs training and oversight programs assure that information is identified, marked, and protected according to established criteria."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2006-03
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Serial No. 106-74: Retaliation at the Departments of Defense and Energy: Do Advocates of Tighter Security for U.S. Technology Face Intimidation? Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, June 24, 1999
From the opening Statement of Chairman Dan Burton: "First, there is a long history at the Energy Department of retaliating against whistleblowers by threatening their security clearances. John Dingell, when he was chairman, held a number of hearings on this when he was the chairman of the Commerce Committee. Let me quote you what he said way back in 1984 on this very subject. This is Chairman Dingell speaking. 'This is an insidious time of harassment because it threatens the very livelihood of an employee. It also dampens the will of the employee to be honest with their supervisors and to be honest with the Congress of the United States. It is clear that without a Q clearance, you are out of a job in defense programs at the Department of Energy.' Second, if someone is suspected of revealing classified information, there is a procedure that has to be followed. It must be followed. It is spelled out in great detail in the Code of Federal Regulations. The employee has a right to a hearing. He has a right to a lawyer and to present evidence. The Department would not do this. They broke their own rules, so Colonel McCallum could not get a fair hearing. Third, the first thing the Department is supposed to do is ask the office of Classification to review the material and determine whether it is classified or not. Again, they did not do this. Fourth, we asked the Department of Energy to cooperate with us as we looked into this. They haven't. We asked to meet with the two people who met with Colonel McCallum and put him on administrative leave. The Secretary has refused to let them meet with us. We sent them a subpoena for documents. It was due over a week ago. They have not complied. This is unacceptable. Although the Secretary of Energy is a friend of many of us in Congress, I am seriously considering moving a contempt citation against him if we don't get the documents we asked for and to which we are legally entitled. What we are talking about here is defending ourselves
against Chinese espionage and stopping the transfer of military technology to a Communist regime that is very unpredictable. We don't know what the future holds, so that is why this is important. I won't stand for people being punished and intimidated for coming before the committee and telling us what they know." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Edward McCallum, William L. Bransford, Peter Leitner, Michael Maloof, Jonathan Fox, Curt Weldon, Dan Burton, Stephen Horn, Christopher Shays, Mark E. Souder, and E-mail from Mr. Trulock, Information concerning part of the Cox report.
United States. Government Printing Office
2000
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Finding of No Significant Impact and Notice of Intent to Adopt the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Environmental Assessment for Operations, Upgrades, and Consolidation at the Western Command Site, New Mexico
"The Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to consolidate western command operations into a new complex at the existing Agent Operations Western Command (AOWC) and Training Facility on Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico. The EA resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) signed by DOE on July 10, 2012. The NNSA prepared the EA in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] Section 4321 - 4347), as amended; the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 Code of Federal Regulations [C.F.R] Parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA implementing regulation (10 C.F.R Part 1021). The Air Force is proposing to adopt the NNSA EA for construction and demolition (C&D) activities, which would occur on Kirtland AFB as part of the consolidation of the Western Command Site. The Air force has independently reviewed the document to determine it satisfies their NEPA implementing regulations found at 32 C.F.R Part 989 and the Department of Defense Directive 6050.1."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2014-09
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Rhumb Lines: Energy Security, October 13, 2009
This issue of "Rhumb Lines" discusses the U.S. Navy's Energy Program. From the document: "The Naval Energy Program is focused on enhancing operational capability. Energy security means having an adequate, reliable and sustainable energy supply -- sufficient to meet the demands of the mission. Energy conservation and efficiency enhance our combat capability to fly and sail farther, and longer. Investing in alternative sources and protecting our supply provide resilience against a fragile grid ashore, insulates from volatile energy prices, and ensures we can accomplish our mission at sea." Also included in this issue are sections on "Key Messages" and "Facts & Figures."
United States. Department of the Navy. Office of the Chief of Information
2009-10-13
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Energy Security in South Asia: Can Interdependence Breed Stability?
"South Asia is projected to play a major role in global energy markets over the next several decades, with India alone expected to become the world's third largest importer of petroleum by 2030. Satisfying the region's growing demands will require a heightened degree of energy interdependence among historically antagonistic states. Consequently, like it or not, regional leaders will face a tradeoff between traditional desires for energy self-sufficiency and the ambitious development targets that they have set for themselves. Achieving such growth, therefore, requires that India, Pakistan, and the other countries of South Asia first address the persistent international disputes that hamper cross-border energy trade, establish effective control over presently ungoverned areas, reorient the missions of military forces to some extent, and develop a better understanding of the effects that energy interdependence will have on broader relations with neighbors. From the U.S. point of view, understanding the multifaceted causal connections that exist among economic development, energy supplies, and security and stability, and how these dynamics are likely to affect South Asian states' decisionmaking, may provide points of leverage with which policymakers can shape behavior on a wide range of issues affecting U.S. objectives in the region."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
McMillan, Joseph
2008-09
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Toward a Long-Range Energy Security Policy
"Events in recent decades have produced a broader definition of security. The entry of phrases like 'environmental security,' 'resource conflict,' and 'energy security' into the lexicon of security experts provides examples of this changing dialogue, but these concepts remain on the margins of the discussion for the most part. Where US energy policy is concerned, the debate generally has been limited to arguments that the United States must preserve its access to the oil reserves of the Middle East and Central Asia, and a vague sense that domestic energy supplies would be highly desirable. Cornucopian optimists continue to insist that oil will remain abundant and cheap for the foreseeable future, and indeed more concern is expressed over the unsavory character of governments in major oil-producing states than over the finite nature of the resources themselves. The vagaries of oil politics (and the ecological problems raised by carbon emissions) are indeed serious problems, and they are not entirely separable from the questions this article means to raise, but the focus here will be on the problem of fossil fuel scarcity at the global level. This article seeks to provide an overview of the situation, including the prospects for an economy based on renewable energy, the security problems likely to result from tightening oil supplies, and a possible basis for making the transition to alternatives widely acknowledged as inevitable in the long run."
Army War College (U.S.)
Elhefnawy, Nader
2006
