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• Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping [September 2, 2008]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. It also appends citations to state law in the area and contains a bibliography of legal commentary as well as the text of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given their prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); in civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; in disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and in suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate but comparable protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., e-mail) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Stevens, Gina Marie; Doyle, Charles

  2008-09-02
• Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping [Updated January 13, 2003]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. It also surveys state law in the area and contains a bibliography of legal commentary. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given their prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than 5 years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); in civil liability for damages, attorneys fees and possibly punitive damages; in disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and in suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate but comparable protective schemes for electronic mail (e-mail) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given even more narrowly confined authority to engage in wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping in the name of foreign intelligence gathering in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles; Stevens, Gina Marie

  2003-01-13
• Reform of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC): Selection of Judges [May 7, 2014]

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  "In the past year, the decisions and functions of the courts established under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) have received much public attention. FISA established two courts--the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) and the FISA Court of Review-- which have jurisdiction to review government applications to conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Various proposals have been introduced in Congress to amend the law that authorizes such surveillance and to change the internal practices and procedures of the courts. This report focuses on those proposals that would amend the process for selecting the judges who serve on the FISC and FISA Court of Review. […] To understand the potential legal issues implicated by these proposals, this report first briefly reviews the constitutional method for appointing federal judges. The report also surveys the process of 'designation,' an alternative method used by Congress that allows current federal judges to serve temporarily on another federal court without undergoing a separate constitutional appointment. Lastly, the report explores how a reviewing court might evaluate the constitutionality of these proposals that would shift the authority to select FISA judges away from the Chief Justice alone, and vest it in other officials within the judicial, executive, and legislative branches."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Chu, Vivian S.

  2014-05-07
• National Security Surveillance Act of 2006: S. 3886, Title II (S. 2453 as Reported Out of the Senate Judiciary Committee) [Updated September 15, 2006]

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  "In the wake of disclosures related to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, congressional attention has been focused on issues regarding authorization, review, and oversight of electronic surveillance programs designed to acquire foreign intelligence information or to address international terrorism. S. 3886, the 'Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006,' was introduced by Senator William H. Frist on September 11, 2006. It was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, Calendar No. 605, the following day. Title II of S. 3886, the 'National Security Surveillance Act of 2006,' substantively parallels S. 2453 as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee. S. 2453 was introduced by Senator Arlen Specter on March 16, 2006, and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Committee hearings were held on the latter measure on July 26, 2006, and August 2, 2006. Committee consideration and markup of S. 2453 took place on April 27, August 3, and September 7, 2006. The Committee reported S. 2453 out with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on September 13, 2006, without a written report, and the bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders, Calendar No. 609, that day. This report summarizes Title II of S. 3886/S. 2453, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and compares its language with the existing provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2006-09-15
• Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Activities Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act of 2008, September 2012, Re-released with Some Previously Redacted Information Unredacted

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) was signed into law on July 10, 2008. [...] The FAA followed earlier efforts to enhance the nation's ability to gather signals intelligence in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In October 2001, the President authorized a highly classified program, known as the President's Surveillance Program, to conduct electronic surveillance of certain communications into and out of the United States without seeking orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court).

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General

  2016-01
• Memorandum for the Attorney General: Re: Review of the Legality of the [President's Surveillance] Program [May 6, 2004]

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  "You have asked this Office to undertake a thorough reexamination of the [President's Surveillance] program as it is currently operated to confirm that the actions that the President has directed the Department of Defense to undertake through the National Security Agency (NSA) are lawful. [The President's Surveillance Program] is a highly classified and strictly compartmented program of electronic surveillance within the United States that President Bush directed the Department of Defense to undertake on October 4, 2001 in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. Specifically, the program is designed to counter the threat of further terrorist attacks on the territorial United States by detecting communications that will disclose terrorist operatives, terrorist plans, or other information that can enable the disruption of such attacks, particularly the identification of al Qaeda operatives within the United States. The President's initial directive to the Secretary of Defense authorized the [President's Surveillance] program for 30 days. Since then, the President has periodically (roughly every 30 to 45 days) reauthorized the program."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel

  Goldsmith, Jack L.

  2004-05-06
• Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, Air and Land Forces Subcommittee Hearing on Budget Request on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Capabilities, Hearing Held April 19, 2007

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  From the opening statement of Neil Abercrombie: "The Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense (DOD) witnesses regarding intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs and policies, ISR, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance programs. They include the spectrum of manned and unmanned vehicles, from very small unmanned vehicles that weigh less than a pound, to a variety of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and manned aircraft programs, to multi-billion-dollar, highly classified, satellites. Some ISR programs, like the satellite programs and the U--2 aircraft, fall within the jurisdiction of other subcommittees. ISR program systems incorporate various sensor payloads, including electro-optical, radar, electronic and infrared, as well as ground stations, data links and users that include the immediate needs of the warfighter to intelligence analysts." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Neil Abercrombie, Jim Saxton, Rndolph D. Alles, Bruce W. Clingan, Davi M. D'Agostino, Sharon L. Pickup, Michael J. Sullivan, Walt Davis, David A. Deptula, John R. Landon, and Jeffery A. Sorenson.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2009
• National Security Surveillance Act of 2006: S. 3886, Title II (S. 2453 as Reported Out of the Senate Judiciary Committee) [Updated January 18, 2007]

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  "In the wake of disclosures related to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, congressional attention has been focused on issues regarding authorization, review, and oversight of electronic surveillance programs designed to acquire foreign intelligence information or to address international terrorism. A number of legislative approaches were considered in the 109th Congress, and three related bills have been introduced in the 110th Congress: H.R. 11, S. 187, and S. 139. In a January 17, 2007, letter to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General Gonzales advised them that, on January 10, 2007, a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) judge "issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization." In light of these orders, which "will allow the necessary speed and agility," he stated that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the FISC. He indicated further that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2007-01-18
• Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Set to Expire in 2009 [January 6, 2009]

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  This report discusses the impending expiration of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the expected consequences on the law following its expiration. "Several recent amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will sunset on December 31, 2009. Section 6001(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA), also known as the 'lone wolf' provision, changed the rules regarding the types of individuals that could be targets of FISA-authorized searches. It permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism, without requiring evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization. Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended FISA to permit multipoint, or 'roving,' wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT enlarged the scope of documents that could be sought under FISA, and lowered the standard required before a court order could be issued compelling the production of documents. While these provisions will cease to be prospectively effective on December 31, 2009, a grandfather clause permits them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Liu, Edward C.

  2009-01-06
• Socioeconomic Bias in Influenza Surveillance

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  From the Abstract: "Individuals in low socioeconomic brackets are considered at-risk for developing influenza-related complications and often exhibit higher than average influenza-related hospitalization rates. This disparity has been attributed to various factors, including restricted access to preventative and therapeutic health care, limited sick leave, and household structure. Adequate influenza surveillance in these at-risk populations is a critical precursor to accurate risk assessments and effective intervention. However, the United States of America's primary national influenza surveillance system (ILINet) monitors outpatient healthcare providers, which may be largely inaccessible to lower socioeconomic populations. Recent initiatives to incorporate Internet-source and hospital electronic medical records data into surveillance systems seek to improve the timeliness, coverage, and accuracy of outbreak detection and situational awareness. Here, we use a flexible statistical framework for integrating multiple surveillance data sources to evaluate the adequacy of traditional (ILINet) and next generation (BioSense 2.0 and Google Flu Trends) data for situational awareness of influenza across poverty levels. We find that ZIP Codes in the highest poverty quartile are a critical vulnerability for ILINet that the integration of next generation data fails to ameliorate."

  PLOS Computational Biology

  Scarpino, Samuel V.; Scott, James G.; Eggo, Rosalind M. . . .

  2020-07-09
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of Selected Issues [Updated July 7, 2008]

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  This CRS report discusses the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. "The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under FISA has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need identified by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Admiral Mike McConnell, for the Intelligence Community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate - the Fourth and First Amendments."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2008-07-07
• How Can Unmanned Aerial Vehicles be Best Integrated into Homeland Security?

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  "Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are evolving into a preferred method of accomplishing overhead military intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Capable of carrying a variety of sensors and electronic tools, they can provide real-time still and video imagery, collect signal intelligence, support communications links, conduct electronic jamming, and even deliver munitions on targets. Their long loiter time, low detectability, relative inexpensiveness, and low-risk due to their unmanned nature have caused a revolution in battlefield surveillance. There is little wonder that they are now gaining attention in the nation's rush to increase homeland security and defense. Decision makers see them as force multipliers and perfect for patrolling borders, coasts, ports and critical infrastructure. As UAV technology continues to evolve, the types and capabilities of these vehicles will proliferate to meet individual customer requirements. Without an integration plan, applications across the homeland security and defense community will be pursued individually by each of the agencies involved. Each will have to grow its own UAV expertise and, in their rush to acquire this technology, will likely end up with incompatible systems, further complicating integrated homeland security and defense command and control. This very scenario played-out in the DoD as the services rushed UAVs still in development into the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq. In April 2005, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force commented that the U.S. military is now operating 750 UAVs in Iraq, jamming each other's radio frequencies and confusing command and control. There have been two mid-air collisions between UAVs and other airplanes in theater. This same scenario should not be allowed to evolve in the crowded skies over North America. The thesis of this paper is that the most efficient process for integrating UAVs into homeland security operations is to centralize responsibility under NORTHCOM."

  Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department

  Myers, Michael K.

  2005-05-17
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: A Sketch of Selected Issues [Updated July 7, 2008]

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  "The current legislative and oversight activity with respect to electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has drawn national attention to several overarching issues. This report briefly outlines three such issues and touches upon some of the perspectives reflected in the ongoing debate. These issues include the inherent and often dynamic tension between national security and civil liberties, particularly rights of privacy and free speech; the need for the intelligence community to be able to efficiently and effectively collect foreign intelligence information from the communications of foreign persons located outside the United States in a changing, fast-paced, and technologically sophisticated international environment or from United States persons abroad, and the differing approaches suggested to meet this need; and limitations of liability for those electronic communication service providers who furnish aid to the federal government in its foreign intelligence collection. Two constitutional provisions, in particular, are implicated in this debate - the Fourth and First Amendments. This report briefly examines these issues and sets them in context. The 110th Congress has been very active in developing."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  2008-07-07
• Ask CALEA: Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act [website]

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  From the website: "In October 1994, Congress took action to protect public safety and ensure national security by enacting the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA ), Pub. L. [Public Law] No. 103-414, 108 Stat. [Statute] 4279. The law further defines the existing statutory obligation of telecommunications carriers to assist law enforcement in executing electronic surveillance pursuant to court order or other lawful authorization. The objective of CALEA implementation is to preserve law enforcement's ability to conduct lawfully-authorized electronic surveillance while preserving public safety, the public's right to privacy, and the telecommunications industry's competitiveness."

  United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
• Governmental Tracking of Cell Phones and Vehicles: The Confluence of Privacy, Technology, and Law [December 1, 2011]

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  "Technology has advanced considerably since the framers established the constitutional parameters for searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment. What were ink quills and parchment are now cell phones and the Internet. It is undeniable that these advances in technology threaten to diminish privacy. Law enforcement's use of cell phones and GPS [Global Positioning System] devices to track an individual's movements brings into sharp relief the challenge of reconciling technology, privacy, and law. [...] Legislation has been introduced in the 112th Congress that proposes to update, clarify, or, in some instances, strengthen the privacy interests protected under the law and give law enforcement a clearer framework for obtaining crucial crime-fighting information. [...] Congress is not the only branch confronting this tension between technology and privacy--the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in 'United States v. Jones', 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011), to determine whether the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures precludes the police from placing a GPS device on a person's vehicle without a warrant. Though the Court has dealt with similar issues in 'United States v. Knotts', 460 U.S. 276 (1983), and 'United States v. Karo', 468 U.S. 705 (1984), in 'Jones', the Court has been asked to determine what effect the prolonged, warrantless use of a tracking device has on a person's privacy interest. This report will briefly survey Fourth Amendment law as it pertains to the government's tracking programs. It will then summarize federal electronic surveillance statutes and the case law surrounding cell phone location tracking. Next, the report will describe the GPS-vehicle tracking cases and review the pending Supreme Court GPS tracking case, 'United States v. Jones'. Finally, the report will summarize the geolocation and electronic surveillance legislation introduced in the 112th Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Thompson, Richard M., II

  2011-12-01
• Government Collection of Private Information: Background and Issues Related to the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization [December 9, 2009]

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  "Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The most controversial sections of the Act facilitate the federal government's collection of more information, from a greater number of sources, than had previously been authorized in criminal or foreign intelligence investigations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), and the national security letter (NSL) statutes were all bolstered. With the changes came greater access to records showing an individual's spending and communication patterns as well as increased authority to intercept e-mail and telephone conversations and to search homes and businesses. In some cases, evidentiary standards required to obtain court approval for the collection of information were lowered. Other approaches included expanding the scope of information subject to search, adding flexibility to the methods by which information could be collected, and broadening the purposes for which information may be sought. Some perceived the changes as necessary to unearth terrorist cells and update investigative authorities to respond to the new technologies and characteristics of ever-shifting threats. Others argued that authorities granted by the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent measures could unnecessarily undermine constitutional rights over time. […]. In addition to the expiring provisions, pending bills address a range of issues, including national security letters, minimization requirements, nondisclosure requirements (gag orders), interception of international communications, and retroactive repeal of communication provider immunity for Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) assistance. This report surveys the legal environment in which the legislative proposals arise."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.; Doyle, Charles; Henning, Anna C.

  2009-12-09
• ITL Bulletin: Making Email Trustworthy (October 2016)

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  "Email is a core application of computer networking and has been since the early days of Internet development. In those early days, networking was a collegial, research-oriented enterprise. Security was not a consideration. The past forty years have seen diversity in applications deployed on the Internet, and worldwide adoption of email by research organizations, governments, militaries, businesses, and individuals. At the same time, there has been an associated increase in Internet-based criminal and nuisance threats. The Internet's underlying core email protocol, Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP), was adopted in 1982 and is still deployed and operated today. However, this protocol is susceptible to a wide range of attacks, including man-in-the-middle content modification and content surveillance. The basic standards have been modified and augmented over the years with adaptations that mitigate some of these threats. With spoofing protection, integrity protection, encryption and authentication, properly implemented email systems can be regarded as sufficiently secure for government, financial, and medical communications. […] The major goal of the document is to provide guidelines on how to combat possible threats before a user opens an email. This guidance applies to federal IT [information technology] systems and will also be useful for other organizations, including small and medium-sized businesses."

  National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.); Information Technology Laboratory (National Institute of Standards and Technology). Computer Security Division

  Rose, Scott; Feldman, Larry; Witte, Greg

  2016-10
• Maintaining the Information Flow: Signal Corps Manpower and Personnel Requirements for the Battlefield

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  From the Abstract: "Army transformation depends heavily upon superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to provide a force multiplier. C4ISR requirements also bring electronic systems and technologies to the battlefield in quantities never before used by the Army. In order to function and serve the soldiers, these systems require support personnel predominantly from the unit's Signal Company. To determine if identified signal manpower levels would adequately support a C4ISR function for the new Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), an assessment of signal support was conducted. The assessment methodologies were (1) a comparison of the Stryker signal personnel with signal personnel of current units, (2) a comparison of electronic equipment per repairer levels in the SBCT and current units, (3) an analysis of the C4ISR maintenance backlog during an operational exercise, and (4) an analysis of signal personnel questionnaires. Results indicated that the signal personnel assigned to the SBCT may not be sufficient. Manpower for some of the Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) needs to be increased, specifically the information systems personnel (MOS 74B) and various electronics repair personnel. If the C4ISR is not sufficiently maintained, it will degrade and not provide the expected force multiplier needed by the warfighter."

  Command and Control Research Program (U.S.)

  Anderson, B. Wayne; Garfinkel, Gerald S.

  2004
• Maintaining the Information Flow: Signal Corps Manpower and Personnel Requirements for the Battlefield [Presentation]

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  This presentation supplements a paper addressing signal corps manpower and personnel requirements for the battlefield. "Army transformation depends heavily upon superior Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to provide a force multiplier. C4ISR requirements also bring electronic systems and technologies to the battlefield in quantities never before used by the Army. In order to function and serve the soldiers, these systems require support personnel predominantly from the unit's Signal Company. To determine if identified signal manpower levels would adequately support a C4ISR function for the new Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), an assessment of signal support was conducted. The assessment methodologies were (1) a comparison of the Stryker signal personnel with signal personnel of current units, (2) a comparison of electronic equipment per repairer levels in the SBCT and current units, (3) an analysis of the C4ISR maintenance backlog during an operational exercise, and (4) an analysis of signal personnel questionnaires. Results indicated that the signal personnel assigned to the SBCT may not be sufficient. Manpower for some of the Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) needs to be increased, specifically the information systems personnel (MOS 74B) and various electronics repair personnel. If the C4ISR is not sufficiently maintained, it will degrade and not provide the expected force multiplier needed by the warfighter."

  Command and Control Research Program (U.S.)

  Anderson, B. Wayne; Garfinkel, Gerald S.

  2004
• ECPA Part 1: Lawful Access to Stored Content: Hearing Before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 19, 2013

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  This testimony compilation is from the March 19, 2013 hearing, "ECPA Part 1: Lawful Access to Stored Content," before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations. From the opening statement of Bob Goodlatte: "The dawn of the digital age and the explosive development of communication methods has brought with it faster ways to compile, transmit and store information. These developments have produced faster and more efficient ways to do everything from conducting commerce to connecting with friends. Unfortunately, criminals have found ways to convert the benefits offered by new technology into new ways to commit crimes. At the intersection of these activities are the privacy rights of the public, society's interest in encouraging and expanding commerce, the investigative needs of law enforcement professionals, and the demands of the Constitution. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) was designed to provide rules for government surveillance in the modern age. The technology of 1986 now seems ancient in comparison to today's. The interactive nature of the Internet, now including elements such as home banking and telecommuting, has produced an environment in which many people may spend hours each day 'on-line.' In this context, a person's electronic communications encompass much more today than they did in 1986. Indeed in 2013, a person's electronic communications encompass much more than they did in 2000, when Congress acknowledged that much had changed since the original ECPA of 1986. ECPA reform must be undertaken so that despite the evolution of technology and its use in the world, the constitutional protections reinforced by ECPA will endure." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bob Goodlatte, Elana Tyrangiel, Richard Littlehale, Orin Kerr, and Richard P. Salgado.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary

  2013-03-19
• Modernization of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, May 1, 2007

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  From the opening statement of John D. Rockefeller, IV: "The Select Committee on Intelligence meets today in open session, something we don't often do, to consider whether the scope and application regarding the Surveillance Act needs to change to reflect the evolving needs for the timely collection of foreign intelligence. An extraordinarily complicated subject, this is. At the Committee's request, the Administration has undertaken a comprehensive review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, commonly referred to as FISA. Out of this review, the Administration proposed what it believes would modernize the laws governing the way in which we gather foreign intelligence with the use of electronic surveillance. Our consideration of the Administration's proposal and alternatives will be rooted in the Intelligence Committee's 30-year experience with our Nation's long and delicate effort to strike that elusive right balance between effective intelligence collection for our national security and the constitutional rights and privacy interests of Americans." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John D. Rockefeller, Christopher S. Bond, Russell D. Feingold, J. Michael McConnell, Kenneth L. Wainstein, Kevin S. Bankston, James X. Dempsey, Bruce Fein, Caroline Frederickson, David S. Kris, Kate Martin, Suzanne E. Spaulding, and K.A. Taipale.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2008
• NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background and Issues for Congress [July 2, 2013]

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  "Recent media stories about National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance address unauthorized disclosures of two different intelligence collection programs. These programs arise from provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). However, they rely on separate authorities, collect different types of information, and raise different policy questions. As such, where possible, the information contained in this report distinguishes between the two. For both programs, there is a tension between the speed and convenience with which the government can access data of possible intelligence value and the mechanisms intended to safeguard civil liberties. The first program collects and stores in bulk domestic phone records that some argue could be gathered to equal effect through more focused records requests. The second program targets the electronic communications of non-U.S. citizens but may incidentally collect information about Americans. The following sections address (1) what information is being collected; (2) the legal basis for the collection; (3) existing oversight mechanisms; and (4) arguments for and against the two programs. The last section of this report discusses legislation that has been proposed in response to information disclosed about NSA surveillance. Because documents leaked to the news media may be classified, CRS [Congressional Research Service] is precluded from providing a detailed analysis of the content of those documents. The information in this report is based largely on public comments from intelligence officials and Members of Congress."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Erwin, Marshall Curtis; Liu, Edward C.

  2013-07-02
• S. Rept. 110-258: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, mendments Act of 2007, Report together with Additional and Minority Views to Accompany S. 2248, January 22, 2008

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2007, S. 2248, would create additional procedures for targeting communications of persons outside the United States that would significantly enhance the Government's surveillance authority. It moderates the new authorities that Congress granted on a short-term basis in the Protect America Act (PAA), but the bill as reported by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would go further than the PAA by providing retroactive immunity for civil lawsuits against electronic communication service providers that were alleged to have cooperated with the Government in surveilling Americans' communications between 2001 and 2007, contrary to law."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2008-01-22
• (U) Report on the President's Surveillance Program

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  "In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on 4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a Top Secret authorization to the Secretary of Defense directing that the signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) be used to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. The Presidential Authorization stated that an extraordinary emergency existed permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the.United States for counterterrorism purposes, without a court order, under certain circumstances. For more than five years, the Presidential Authorization was renewed at 30- to 60-day intervals to authorize the highly classified NSA surveillance program, which is referred to throughout this report as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP)"

  United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General . . .

  2009-07-10
• Proposed Change to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) under S.113 [Updated August 9, 2004]

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  "In order to facilitate the surveillance of possible 'lone wolf' terrorists, whose links to an international terrorist organization may be difficult to ascertain, several bills have been introduced to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ('FISA'). The Senate passed S. 113, a bill to extend the coverage of FISA to non-U.S. persons who engage in international terrorism or activities in preparation for terrorist acts, without a showing of membership in or affiliation with an international terrorist group. While the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) does not call for such a measure, the Bush Administration has indicated its support. FISA provides the government authority to conduct electronic surveillance (wiretap) and other searches with respect to a foreign power or its agents to obtain intelligence related to espionage, terrorism, or other matters involving national security. Related proposals include H.R. 3179, 304 of S. 2386, H.R. 3552, and S. 123."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Elsea, Jennifer

  2004-08-09
• Legal Barriers to Information Sharing: The Erection of a Wall between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Investigations

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  "As the threat of terrorism from radical Islamic groups developed, the FBI had both law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities in response to the threat. And it had different tools to use depending on whether its investigation was designated as an intelligence matter or a criminal matter. For criminal matters it could apply for and use traditional criminal warrants. For intelligence matters it could apply to a special court, known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), for warrants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. This law governs electronic surveillance and physical searches of foreign powers and their agents within the United States. This divergence in purposes for the respective types of investigations and concerns about using intelligence techniques to advance law enforcement interests led to information sharing barriers being erected between the investigations. This paper will describe the history and development of the various barriers and their impact on the 9/11 story."

  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

  Grewe, Barbara A.

  2004-08-20
• Applicability of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's Notification Provision to Security Clearance Adjudications by the Department of Justice Access Review Committee, Memorandum Opinion for the Chair and Members of the Access Review Committee [June 3, 2011]

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  "The notification requirement in section 106(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act generally applies when the Department of Justice intends to use information obtained from electronic surveillance against an aggrieved person in an adjudication before the Access Review Committee concerning the Department's revocation of an employee's security clearance. Compliance with the notification requirement in section 106(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in particular Access Review Committee adjudications could raise as-applied constitutional questions if such notice would require disclosure of sensitive national security information protected by executive privilege."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel

  2011-06-03
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court [website]

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  "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court was established by Congress in 1978 when Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). [...] The Court entertains applications made by the United States Government for approval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and certain other forms of investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes." The website includes sections on public findings, rules of procedure and judges.

  United States. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
• Wiretap Report 1999

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  "The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 1999, and December 31, 1999, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. From 1998 to 1999, the total number of intercepts authorized by federal and state courts increased 2 percent to 1,350, reflecting continued growth in applications involving the surveillance of drug offense operations (up 2 percent). Following a decrease of one half of one percent in 1998, the number of applications for orders by federal authorities rose 6 percent in 1999. The number of applications reported by state prosecuting officials dropped 2 percent in 1999, with fewer jurisdictions providing reports than in 1998. The number of federal intercept applications authorized has grown over the last 10 years, increasing 94 percent from 1989 to 1999, while state applications have risen 65 percent since 1989. The number of intercepts employed in drug-related investigations also has experienced significant growth. Drug offenders were targeted in 978 of the interceptions concluded in 1999, compared to 471 in 1989, a 108% increase."

  United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts

  2000-04
• Wiretap Report 1998

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  "The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) to report to Congress the number and nature of federal and state applications for orders authorizing or approving the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications. The statute requires that specific information be provided to the AO, including the offense(s) under investigation, the location of the intercept, the cost of the surveillance, and the number of arrests, trials, and convictions that directly result from the surveillance. This report covers intercepts concluded between January 1, 1998, and December 31, 1998, and provides supplementary information on arrests and convictions resulting from intercepts concluded in prior years. From 1997 to 1998, the total number of intercepts authorized by federal and state courts increased 12 percent to 1,329, reflecting continued growth in applications involving the surveillance of narcotics operations (up 10 percent). Following a 2 percent decrease in 1997, the number of applications for orders by federal authorities remained essentially stable in 1998, dropping one half of one percent. The number of applications reported by state prosecuting officials increased 24 percent over last year, with more jurisdictions providing reports than in prior years. The number of federal intercept applications authorized has grown over the last 10 years, increasing 93 percent from 1988 to 1998, while state applications have increased 71 percent since 1988. The number of intercepts employed in drug-related investigations also has experienced significant growth. Drug offenders were targeted in 955 of the interceptions concluded in 1998, compared to 435 in 1988, a 120% increase."

  United States. Administrative Office of the United States Courts

  1999-04