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• Serial No. 109-131: Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session on H.R. 5825, September 12, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "Yesterday marked the fifth anniversary of the terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 Americans. As we remember the loss of our fellow citizens, a recurring question is raised regarding whether America is safer today than it was on September 11, 2001. […] Safer does not mean that there is any room for complacency as the events in Bali, Madrid, Oman others, including London on 7/ 7, indicate we are still at war with an enemy that is fully devoted to one thing; that is the murder of innocent people. In this regard, it is a primary responsibility of Government to protect its citizens from violence. Understanding this, Congress must ensure that the law enforcement and the intelligence communities are equipped with the proper tools to fight a 21st century war against an enemy which operates by stealth and surreptitious means. This Congress has already acted to provide law enforcement and intelligence officers with enhanced capability through the enactment of important legislation like the USA PATRIOT Act, Homeland Security Act and Intelligence Reform Act. Now we need to streamline the FISA process and make it technology neutral. These are the express goals of H.R. 5852, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act. Today we will hear testimony on the bill and suggestions for possible improvements to the legislation in order to achieve these goals." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Robert C. Scott, John Eisenberg, Vito Potenza, Kate Martin, Bruce Fein, and John Conyers,

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2006
• Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs, January 17, 2014

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  This is from the remarks of President Barack Obama titled, "Remarks on United States Signals Intelligence and Electronic Surveillance Programs." From the remarks of President Barack Obama on January 17, 2014: "Throughout American history, intelligence has helped secure our country and our freedoms. […] And so, in the early days of the Cold War, President Truman created the National Security Agency, or NSA, to give us insights into the Soviet bloc and provide our leaders with information they needed to confront aggression and avert catastrophe. […] The horror of September 11 brought all these issues to the fore. Across the political spectrum, Americans recognized that we had to adapt to a world in which a bomb could be built in a basement and our electric grid could be shut down by operators an ocean away. We were shaken by the signs we had missed leading up to the attacks: how the hijackers had made phone calls to known extremists and traveled to suspicious places. So we demanded that our intelligence community improve its capabilities and that law enforcement change practices to focus more on preventing attacks before they happen than prosecuting terrorists after an attack. It is hard to overstate the transformation America's intelligence community had to go through after 9/11. Our agencies suddenly needed to do far more than the traditional mission of monitoring hostile powers and gathering information for policymakers. Instead, they were now asked to identify and target plotters in some of the most remote parts of the world and to anticipate the actions of networks that, by their very nature, cannot be easily penetrated with spies or informants. […] And yet, in our rush to respond to a very real and novel set of threats, the risk of Government overreach--the possibility that we lose some of our core liberties in pursuit of security--also became more pronounced. We saw, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, our Government engaged in enhanced interrogation techniques that contradicted our values."

  United States. Office of the Federal Register

  Obama, Barack

  2014-01-17
• Electronic Surveillance Within the United States for Foreign Intelligence Purposes, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session on S. 3197, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, June 29, July 1, August 6, 10 and 24, 1976

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  From the opening statement of Birch Bayh: "This morning marks the first meeting of the Subcommittee on Rights of Americans of the Select Committee on Intelligence. With this meeting we are beginning what I am sure will be a long, difficult and ultimately a very important task. In the months ahead, it will be this subcommittee's particular responsibility to see that the needs of our Government for intelligence information are met efficiently and effectively and in a manner that is consistent with the fundamental rights of American citizens. In my opinion, the weight of our responsibility cannot be overstated. Allegations of widespread abuse of rights by the intelligence community led to the previous select committee's 15-month investigation of intelligence activities. The committee's finding that abuses had been even more serious and more frequent than most of us had imagined led to the bipartisan call for a permanent congressional committee on intelligence oversight. This subcommittee has now been charged by the Intelligence Committee's distinguished chairman, Senator Inouye, with accomplishing a large part of what so many have advocated. All of us are aware of the important role of the intelligence community in protecting the safety and welfare of our country and all of our citizens, but it is our duty as members of this Committee to keep a vigilant watch on the intelligence community and to insure that Americans are protected from the invasion of their rights while the intelligence community is fulfilling its responsibility." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Edward M. Kennedy, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Walter F. Mondale, John V. Tunney, Edward H. Levi, Doug Marvin, Robert F. Drinan, Aryeh Neier, Hope Eastman, Philip Heymann, Herman Schwartz, Birch Bayh, Gaylord Nelson, Daniel K. Inouye, Women's Strike for Peace, Philip A. Lacovara, Charles Scheiner, Dorothy R. Steffens, Raymond S. Calamaro, National Council of Jewish Women, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and David Cohen.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1976
• Communicable Disease Surveillance Systems - Approach for Developing a State-level National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS) Strategic Technology Plan

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  NEDSS is not only a technology integration plan it is a vision. A vision that represents a roadmap for public health agencies to facilitate their collection, storage, management, reporting, integration sharing and use of public health data. Use of this data to monitor, detect and become proactive in addressing public health problems and policy. In order for a state to implement a population based NEDSS environment it is essential that a detailed assessment and plan be developed. The following paragraphs outline the approach and expected deliverables. This approach should result in a plan to address the major components of a NEDSS implementation and the many issues.

  Scientific Technologies Corporation

  Popovich, Michael

  2000-07
• Serial No. J-99-72; S. Hrg. 99-1006: Electronic Communication Privacy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session on S. 1667, A Bill to Amend Title 18, United States Code, With Respect to the Interception of Certain Communications, Other Forms of Surveillance, and for Other Purposes, Wednesday, November 18, 1985

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  From the opening statement of Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.: "Today, for the first time in the 99th Congress, the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks holds a hearing in the exercise of its jurisdiction over privacy legislation. Our topic is S. 1667, the Electronic and Communications Privacy Act of 1985. This bill, which Senator Leahy and I introduced on September 19, seeks to bring our laws up to date with the new challenges to privacy posed by modern communications technology. Just a few years ago, our nation's communications networks, while extensive, were relatively simple in form. The nails, the telegraph system, the telephone, and radio communications each played a role; but those roles were distinct from one another, and not too hard to understand. Those simple days are gone forever. Today's systems of electronic communication envelop our society in an invisible web, complex in structure and pervasive in scope. We entrust, each day, to that network of electrons a wide spectrum of information, from the latest stock quotations to our most personal revelations. But the uneasy realization is growing that someone else may be listening. Modern technology, which has given us these dazzling new means of communications, has also opened up opportunities for new and more intrusive forms of snooping." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Patrick J. Leahy, Robert W. Kastenmeier, James Knapp, Philip M. Walker, Jerry J. Berman, Lynn W. Ellis, Frederick Hess, Carlos J. Moorhead, P. Michael Nugent, and John Stanton."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  1987
• Electronic Surveillance

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  "Monitoring and/or recording of telephone, verbal, or nonverbal communications, with or without the use of electronic or mechanical devices, fall into two principal categories: interceptions which are accomplished with the approval of a court (judicial). and those for which court approval is not required (nonjudicial). The purpose of either type of interception is to monitor the contents of the communication for criminal significance. Wiretaps and other means of intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications are governed by 18 U.S.C. sections 2510-2520 (Public Law 99-508--commonly referred to as title III), enacted October 21, 1986. Essentially, the law provides that, with judicial approval in the form of a court order. telephone and other verbal and electronic communications may be monitored and recorded--even when no party to the communication has given prior consent. (Chapters C and D set forth procedures that must be followed with regard to court-ordered interceptions and pen register devices/trap and trace services.) [...] The fact that nonjudicial-type interceptions are outside the prohibitions of title III does not mean that such interceptions are free from restrictions. To the contrary. the Federal Communications Act and the fourth and sixth amendments to the Constitution are pertinent and present problems which, in some areas (including the use of electronic or mechanical trailing/tracking devices), are not fully resolved. The propriety and law concerning certain other nonjudicial interceptions and related disclosures require that guidance be sought on a case-by-case basis from ATF [Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] counsel and/or the U.S. attorney, as to whether such interception should be made and the level of approval necessary."

  United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

  1989-07-17
• S. Hrg. 106-1057: The 'Carnivore' Controversy: Electronic Surveillance and Privacy in the Digital Age: Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, September 6, 2000

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  From the opening statement of Orrin G. Hatch: "The purpose of our hearing today is to examine the effect that new surveillance technologies, such as the FBI's now too famous Carnivore, is having on the important public policy balance between personal privacy rights and law enforcement in the digital age." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Orrin G. Hatch, Patrick J. Leahy, and Donald M. Kerr.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001
• 'So Judge, How Do I Get That FISA Warrant?': The Policy and Procedure for Conducting Electronic Surveillance

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  "It's another slow Friday afternoon in the staff judge advocate's (SJA) office. Those individuals not out doing extended PT are enjoying another challenging game of solitaire. Things don't get much better for the new deputy SJA. Then the phone rings. The director of information management is talking in a muted voice. 'Judge, I think I've got a problem with one of my system administrators. He has access to plenty of classified information on Army aircraft and ongoing operations. He hasn't been acting right since his car got repossessed last week. Plenty of hush-hush personal calls. And now I found out he's secretly copying files and taking documents home that are outside his area of responsibility. I know that he is very sympathetic to some of the foreign governments who are trying to upgrade their aviation assets. I think he may try to sell this information to a foreign power. Boy, that would cause some damage! During the SOLO course, I heard something about the requirements of FISA. So Judge, how do I get that FISA warrant?' This hypothetical scenario is not all that unlikely. Army judge advocates confront intelligence law issues on a daily basis. The Army is a major collector, producer, and consumer of intelligence and is one of thirteen agencies that comprise the Intelligence Community (IC). The extensive statutory and regulatory framework governing intelligence activities demands constant and proactive legal involvement. One of the most complex aspects of the framework is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This article reviews the FISA and its implementing mechanism, which is contained in procedure 5 of 'Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5240.1-R'. At the operational level, judge advocates need to have a clear understanding of when FISA authorization is necessary and what information is required by statute to obtain authorization. This article describes the step-by-step process for getting FISA authorization when required."

  Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School (United States. Army)

  Newton, Michael A.; Chiarella, Louis A.

  1997-10
• Review of FBI Electronic Surveillance and Records Management Programs in Response to a Referral by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel

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  "On behalf of Director Robert S. Mueller, III, the Inspection Division (INSD) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigated allegations made by Scott A. MacDonald, a former Supervisory Management and Program Analyst (SMAPA) with the FBI's Records Management Division (RMD). On February 18, 2012, Mr. MacDonald advised the U.S. Office of Special Counsel COSe) of perceived violations of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, gross waste of funds, and abuse of authority within the RMD. In accordance with Section 1213(c) of Title 5, United States Code, the appropriate agency head is required to conduct an investigation and prepare a report for submission to OSC. The Attorney General delegated the authority to investigate and compile a report to the FBI. Inspector Deirdre L. Fike directed the investigation for INSD."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Attorney General; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation

  2013-01-29
• Sharing Title III Electronic Surveillance Material with the Intelligence Community, Memorandum for the Counsel, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review [October 17, 2000]

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  "Under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, law enforcement officials may share with the intelligence community information obtained through surveillance authorized by courts pursuant to Title III where it is done to obtain assistance in preventing, investigating, or prosecuting a crime. Law enforcement may also share with the intelligence community information obtained through surveillance authorized by the court pursuant to Title III where the information is of overriding importance to national security or foreign relations and disclosure is necessary for the President to discharge his constitutional responsibilities over these matters."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel

  2000-10-17
• Rapid Deployment of an Electronic Disease Surveillance System in the State of Utah for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games

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  "The key to minimizing the effects of an intentionally caused disease outbreak is early detection of the attack and rapid identification of the affected individuals. The spirit of collaboration and unity inspired by the events of 9-11 and the 2002 Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City provided the opportunity to demonstrate how a prototypic biosurveillance system could be rapidly deployed. In seven weeks we were able to implement an automated, real-time disease outbreak detection system in the State of Utah and monitored 80,684 acute care visits occurring during a 28-day period spanning the Olympics. No trends of immediate public health concern were identified."

  University of Pittsburgh

  Wagner, Michael M.; Chapman, Wendy Webber; Gesteland, Per

  2002
• Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006: S.3931 and Title II of S.3929, the Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006 [Updated September 25, 2006]

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  "This report considers S. 3931, the 'Terrorist Surveillance Act of 2006,' and S. 3929, the 'Terrorist Tracking, Identification, and Prosecution Act of 2006,' Title II of which parallels S. 3931. The bills would create a new Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq., to address electronic surveillance programs. In addition, the measures would amend other provisions of FISA dealing with electronic surveillance without a warrant pursuant to an Attorney General certification, applications for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders authorizing electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes, the contents of such orders, emergency electronic surveillance under FISA, limitations on liability for those who aid the federal government in connection with electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, and applicable congressional oversight. The bills would repeal the current wartime authorities for electronic surveillance without a warrant following a congressional declaration of war. Changes would be made to the FISA definitions of 'electronic surveillance' and 'agent of a foreign power,' among others. Other provisions would modify the criminal provisions of FISA and the exclusivity clause 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f). Still other provisions amend FISA to address those who engage in the development or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to accommodate the international movements of targets of electronic surveillance under FISA. This report discusses the provisions of S. 3931 and Title II of S. 3929, and notes the changes to existing law that these measures would make if enacted."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2006-09-25
• Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act

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  "In the early 1990s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) asked Congress for legislation to assist law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance. The FBI argued that advances in the telecommunications industry such as cellular telephones, call forwarding, and speed dialing challenged the ability of law enforcement agencies to fully perform electronic surveillance. In response, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994 to enable law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance despite the deployment of new technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. In short, CALEA requires telecommunications carriers (carriers) to modify the design of their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that law enforcement can perform electronic surveillance (for purposes of this report, the term electronic surveillance is used only in the sense of the real-time interception of information). To facilitate CALEA implementation, Congress appropriated $500 million to reimburse carriers for the direct costs of modifying systems installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995. Effective implementation of CALEA relies heavily on the shared responsibilities of the FBI, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), telecommunications carriers, and telecommunications equipment manufacturers. CALEA also required the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to conduct biennial audits of the progress of CALEA implementation. The OIG initiated this audit to: (1) review CALEA implementation costs and progress; (2) review the impediments to CALEA implementation, including the effects of emerging technologies; and (3) determine how the implementation of CALEA, or lack thereof, impacts federal, state, and local law enforcement in its ability to conduct electronic surveillance."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General

  2006-03
• Implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act by the Federal Bureau of Investigation

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  "Criminal organizations and individuals frequently use the telecommunication systems of the United States to further serious crimes, including terrorism, kidnapping, extortion, organized crime, drug trafficking, and public corruption. One of the most effective tools law enforcement agencies use to acquire evidence of these crimes is electronic surveillance techniques. However, continuing advances in telecommunication technology have impaired and in some instances prevented law enforcement from conducting some types of authorized electronic surveillance. With advances in telecommunication technologies and law enforcement's growing concern about the ability to conduct authorized electronic surveillance, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) in 1994. The purpose of CALEA was to enable law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance despite the deployment of new technologies and wireless services that have altered the character of electronic surveillance. To facilitate CALEA implementation, Congress appropriated nearly $500 million to the Telecommunications Carrier Compliance Fund (TCCF). The Attorney General was designated to reimburse telecommunication carriers for the cost of modifying equipment, facilities, or services installed or deployed on or before January 1, 1995, to assist law enforcement authorities in carrying out its surveillance activities. In February 1995, the Attorney General delegated CALEA management to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General

  2008-03
• P.L. 110-55, the Protect America Act of 2007: Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act [August 23, 2007]

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  "On August 5, 2007, P.L. 110-55, the Protect America Act of 2007, was signed into law by President Bush, after having been passed by the Senate on August 3 and the House of Representatives on August 4. The measure, introduced by Senator McConnell as S. 1927 on August 1, makes a number of additions and modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq., adds additional reporting requirements, and sunsets in 180 days. This report describes the provisions of P.L. 110-55, discusses its possible impact on and parallels to existing law, and summarizes the legislative activity with respect to S. 1927, H.R. 3356, and S. 2011. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was enacted in response both to the Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee) revelations with regard to past abuses of electronic surveillance for national security purposes and to the somewhat uncertain state of the law on the subject. In creating a statutory framework for the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, the Congress sought to strike a balance between national security interests and civil liberties. Critical to an understanding of the FISA structure are its definitions of terms such as 'electronic surveillance' and 'foreign intelligence information.' P.L. 110-55 limits the construction of the term 'electronic surveillance' so that it does not cover surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2007-08-23
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 2453: National Security Surveillance Act of 2006

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  "S. 2453 would modify the rules and procedures the government must follow to use electronic surveillance programs in the investigation of international terrorism. The legislation would amend the definition of electronic surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to remove the current distinction between treatment of wire and radio communications, and to focus FISA protections on domestic communications. The legislation also would expand the ability of the government to conduct electronic surveillance without a warrant in certain cases where the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power…CBO has no basis for predicting how the volume or type of surveillance would be changed if S. 2453 were enacted. Furthermore, information regarding surveillance techniques and their associated costs are classified. For these reasons, CBO cannot estimate the impact on the federal budget of implementing S. 2453."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2006-09-13
• Privacy: An Overview of Federal Statutes Governing Wiretapping and Electronic Eavesdropping [December 3, 2009]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. It also appends citations to state law in the area and contains a bibliography of legal commentary as well as the text of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). [...]Congress has created separate but comparable protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., e-mail) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Two FISA provisions, born in the USA PATRIOT Act and dealing with roving wiretaps (section 206) and business records (section 215), are scheduled to expire on December 31, 2009. This report includes a brief summary of the expired Protect America Act, P.L. 110-55 and of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-261 (H.R. 6304)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles; Stevens, Gina Marie

  2009-12-03
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3773: RESTORE Act of 2007

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  "H.R. 3773 would modify a number of rules and procedures the government must follow when conducting electronic surveillance. In particular, the bill would amend several sections added to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) by the Protect America Act of 2007. Under H.R. 3773, the government would have to apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for authorization to conduct electronic surveillance on non-U.S. persons (individuals who are neither U.S. citizens nor permanent residents) outside the United States in instances when such surveillance could result in the government also obtaining the communications of individuals in the United States. Several sections of the bill would, if implemented, increase discretionary costs. However, CBO does not have access to the information necessary to estimate the impact on the budget of implementing H.R. 3773. Any changes in federal spending under the bill would be subject to the appropriation of the necessary funds. Enacting H.R. 3773 would not affect direct spending or revenues. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) excludes from the application of that act any legislative provisions that are necessary for national security. CBO has determined that section 4 of H.R. 3773, which would authorize certain electronic surveillance without a court order in an emergency situation, falls under that exclusion and has not reviewed it for intergovernmental or private-sector mandates. Other provisions of H.R. 3773 contain intergovernmental mandates as defined in UMRA, but CBO estimates that any costs to state and local governments would fall well below the annual threshold established in that act […]."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2007-10-12
• Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Comparison of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773 and the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3773 [June 12, 2008]

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  This CRS report discusses the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA.) "During the 110th Congress, several House and Senate committees have engaged in oversight activities, including hearings and requests for expeditious production of documents and information regarding the Administration's warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance programs, as possible changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended, (FISA) were explored. [...] Both the House amendment and the Senate amendment include significant changes to FISA, including provisions on the acquisition of communications of non-U.S. persons and of U.S. persons abroad. The two bills take different approaches to some issues that have played a significant role in the ongoing debate. For example, the Senate amendment would provide retroactive immunity for electronic communications service providers who assisted the government in intelligence activities between September 11, 2001 and January 17, 2007. The House amendment would provide for presentation to a court, with certain safeguards, of evidence and arguments with respect to which state secrets privilege has been asserted in covered civil actions against such electronic communications service providers and other persons who furnished such aid to the government. The House bill also provides for an audit of the Terrorist Surveillance Program and any other wireless electronic surveillance programs, with reporting requirements, while the Senate bill does not. This report provides an overview, a review of legislative activity, and a detailed side-by-side comparison of the provisions of these two bills."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bazan, Elizabeth B.

  2008-06-12
• S. Rept. 110-209: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2007, Report together with Additional and Minority Views to Accompany S. 2248, October 26, 2007

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  "The Select Committee on Intelligence, having considered an original bill (S. 2248) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, to modernize and streamline the provisions of that Act and for other purposes, reports favorably thereon and recommends that the bill do pass. The Committee, since its inception in 1976, has exercised sustained oversight of the Executive branch's use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. A central focus of that oversight has been the implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ('FISA') by the Executive branch and by the special court established by Congress to provide judicial oversight of FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ('FISA Court'). Since the President's acknowledgement of the existence of a presidential program on December 17, 2005, which has been publicly described as the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the Committee has sought to inquire vigorously into the President's authorization for the National Security Agency ('NSA') to conduct electronic surveillance within the United States without FISA court orders. In the past year, the ability of the full Committee to perform the Committee's oversight responsibilities has been significantly augmented by improved access to information about the program, as well as information about the shift of activities under that presidential authorization to activities in accordance with orders of the FISA Court."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007-10-26
• Background Paper on Title VII of FISA Prepared by the Department of Justice and the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)

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  "This paper describes the provisions of Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) that were added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). Title VII has proven to be an extremely valuable authority in protecting our nation from terrorism and other national security threats. Title VII is set to expire at the end of this year, and its reauthorization is the top legislative priority of the Intelligence Community. The FAA added a new section 702 to FISA, permitting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to approve surveillance of terrorist suspects and other foreign intelligence targets who are 'non-U.S. persons outside the United States', without the need for individualized court orders. Section 702 includes a series of protections and oversight measures to safeguard the privacy and civil liberties interests of U.S. persons. FISA continues to include its original electronic surveillance provisions, meaning that, in most cases, an individualized court order, based on probable cause that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, is still required to conduct electronic surveillance of targets inside the United States. Indeed, other provisions of Title VII extend these protections to U.S. persons overseas. The extensive oversight measures used to implement these authorities demonstrate that the Government has used this capability in the manner contemplated by Congress, taking great care to protect privacy and civil liberties interests. This paper begins by describing how section 702 works, its importance to the Intelligence Community, and its extensive oversight provisions. Next, it turns briefly to the other changes made to FISA by the FAA, including section 704, which requires an order from the FISC before the Government may engage in surveillance targeted at U.S. persons overseas. Third, this paper describes the reporting to Congress that the Executive Branch has done under Title VII of FISA. Finally, this paper explains why the Administration believes it is essential that Congress reauthorize Title VII."

  United States. Department of Justice; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
• Retrospective Comparison of Military Health Surveillance Systems: An Example of Respiratory Illness at Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD), San Diego

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  "Primary goals of health surveillance in the military include monitoring the health status of military personnel, and detecting outbreaks of naturally occurring and bioterrorism-related epidemics. Two near real-time automated surveillance systems currently in use by the Department of Defense are the Medical Data Surveillance System (MDSS) and the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE). Both prototype systems are passive surveillance systems, using already collected diagnostic data reported as primary ICD-9 codes on automated medical encounter records. Although MDSS and ESSENCE use the same data source (i.e., ICD-9 codes entered into the Ambulatory Data System), their assignment of ICD-9 codes into disease/syndrome categories differs, and each system uses a different outbreak detection algorithm. The purpose of this retrospective research was to compare the two systems surveillance trends and potential outbreak detection of respiratory illness at the Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, over the 64 weeks of July 29, 2002, to October 19, 2003. For additional comparison, data from traditional active surveillance of febrile respiratory illness (FRI) conducted on-site at MCRD are also included. Results of the present study describe counts of respiratory illness captured by MDSS and ESSENCE and active FRI surveillance, as well as each systems outbreak detection performance."

  Naval Health Research Center (U.S.)

  Woodruff, Susan I.; Kleiner, Hillary; Murphy, Brian P.

  2005-05-04
• United States Attorneys' Bulletin: Electronic Investigative Techniques I, Volume 45 Number 5, September 1997

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  This edition of the United States Attorneys' Bulletin covers electronic investigative techniques; this is part 1 of a two part series. The following articles are included: "Interview with Director Frederick D. Hess, Office of Enforcement Operations, Criminal Division"; "OEO's Role in Electronic Surveillance"; "Electronic Surveillance Guide"; "Defending Wiretaps"; Interview--A DEA Agent's Perspective"; "Electronic Surveillance: Does it Bug You?"; "New Guidance on Parallel Proceedings"; "Release of Health Care Fraud Report."

  Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys

  1997-09
• Tapping into the Wiretap Debate

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  From the thesis abstract: "The use of electronic surveillance by federal intelligence agencies has historically been a contested topic. After a series of missteps by the intelligence community, Congress enacted the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and Court to define and oversee electronic collection and surveillance in order to better protect civil liberties. In the twenty years that followed, the world would undergo an evolution in communication technologies, creating vulnerabilities for U.S. intelligence agencies under the law. In the aftermath of 9/11, both Congress and the Executive Office enhanced electronic surveillance measures to combat terrorism. Critics of the new laws and secret executive program argue infringements of civil liberties under the fourth Amendment. Advocates claim an essential need for national security. This paper will examine several related issues. What is the historical rationale behind the laws? How and why have they been adapted over time? Are they currently sufficient to provide intelligence agencies with the tools necessary to protect America while also providing adequate assurances to the American people of their right to privacy? And what further measures can be taken to improve the current system?"

  Army War College (U.S.)

  May, David W.

  2012-02-02
• Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [March 30, 2011]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); in civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; in disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and in suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2011-03-30
• Privacy: An Abridged Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [October 9, 2012]

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  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2012-10-09
• Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act [October 9, 2012]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This report provides an overview of federal law governing wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It also appends citations to state law in the area and the text of ECPA. It is a federal crime to wiretap or to use a machine to capture the communications of others without court approval, unless one of the parties has given his prior consent. It is likewise a federal crime to use or disclose any information acquired by illegal wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Violations can result in imprisonment for not more than five years; fines up to $250,000 (up to $500,000 for organizations); civil liability for damages, attorneys' fees and possibly punitive damages; disciplinary action against any attorneys involved; and suppression of any derivative evidence. Congress has created separate, but comparable, protective schemes for electronic communications (e.g., email) and against the surreptitious use of telephone call monitoring practices such as pen registers and trap and trace devices. Each of these protective schemes comes with a procedural mechanism to afford limited law enforcement access to private communications and communications records under conditions consistent with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. The government has been given narrowly confined authority to engage in electronic surveillance, conduct physical searches, and install and use pen registers and trap and trace devices for law enforcement purposes under ECPA and for purposes of foreign intelligence gathering under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2012-10-09
• Viral Hepatitis Surveillance - United States, 2013

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  "As part of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 's ( CDC) National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS), viral hepatitis case-reports are received electronically from state and territorial health departments via CDC's National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS), a computerized public health surveillance system that provides CDC with data on cases of nationally notifiable diseases on a weekly basis. Although the surveillance infrastructure is in place for reporting of both acute and chronic infections, case-reports of chronic hepatitis B virus (HBV) and past or present hepatitis C virus (HCV) infections, which account for the greatest burden of disease, were submitted by 41 states and 37 states, respectively, in 2013. As noted in a report from the Institute of Medicine, surveillance capacity to monitor viral hepatitis is limited at the state and local level, resulting in under-reporting and variable data quality. The NNDSS data in this report should be interpreted with the understanding that reported cases of viral hepatitis represent only those infected persons who were detected, diagnosed, met a stringent case definition, and eventually reported to CDC in 2013. Because many infections are not reported, this Summary is most useful in detecting trends over time in newly reported cases of hepatitis A virus (HAV), HBV, and HCV infections."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)

  2013
• Viral Hepatitis Surveillance - United States, 2012

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  "As part of CDC's [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), viral hepatitis case-reports are received electronically from state health departments via CDC's National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS), a computerize d public health surveillance system that provides CDC with data regarding cases of nationally notifiable diseases on a weekly basis. Although surveillance infrastructure is in place for reporting of acute infection, reports of chronic hepatitis B and C, which account for the greatest burden of disease, are not submitted by all states. As noted in a report from the Institute of Medicine, surveillance capacity to monitor both acute and chronic viral hepatitis is limited at the state and local levels, resulting in underreporting and variable data quality. Data in this report should be interpreted with the consideration that reported cases of acute or chronic viral hepatitis represent only those relatively few infected persons who were detected, diagnosed, met a stringent case definition, and eventually reported to CDC in 2012. Because most acute and chronic infections are not reported, this Summary is mainly useful in detecting major trends in viral hepatitis A (HAV), B (HBV) and C (HCV)."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (U.S.)

  2012
• Viral Hepatitis Surveillance - United States, 2010

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  "As part of CDC's [Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] National Notifiable Disease Surveillance System (NNDSS), viral hepatitis case-reports are received electronically from state health departments via CDC's National Electronic Telecommunications System for Surveillance (NETSS), a computerized public health surveillance system that provides CDC with data regarding cases of nationally notifiable diseases on a weekly basis. Although surveillance infrastructure is in place for reporting of acute infection, reports of chronic hepatitis B and C, which account for the greatest burden of disease, are not submitted by most states. As noted in the 2010 report from the Institute of Medicine (IOM), surveillance capacity to monitor both acute and chronic viral hepatitis is limited at the state and local levels, resulting in incomplete and variable data."

  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.); National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (U.S.)

  2010