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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [October 31, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. A second summit will be held in South Korea in 2012. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking- cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-10-31
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Domestic Threat Intelligence: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred and Twelfth Congress, First Session, October 6, 2011
This testimony compilation is from the October 6, 2011 hearing, "Domestic Threat Intelligence," hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Mike Rogers: "Today the Committee welcomes FBI Director Robert Mueller and National Counterterrorism Center Director Matt Olsen to discuss the state of the terrorism threat against the United States and how the Intelligence Community has changed in the decade since 9/11 to address this threat. In the wake of the takedown of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula leader Anwar al-Aulaqi, who former NCTC Director Mike Leiter called the single greatest terrorism threat to the homeland, we convene to discuss the future of the al-Qa'ida threat against the United States." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mike Rogers; C.A. Ruppersberger; Robert S. Mueller; and Matthew G. Olsen.
United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
2011-10-06
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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Training Guidance & Best Practices
"In recent years, the United States has seen a number of individuals in the U.S. become involved in violent extremist activities, with particular activity by American residents and citizens inspired by al Qaeda and its ideology. We know that violent extremism is not confined to any single ideology, but we also know that the threat posed by al Qaeda and its adherents is the preeminent threat we face in the homeland. It is important for law enforcement personnel to be appropriately trained in understanding and detecting ideologically motivated criminal behavior, and in working with communities and local law enforcement to counter domestic violent extremism. Training must be accurate, based on current intelligence, and must include cultural competency training. The Department of Homeland Security, in partnership with the National Counterterrorism Center, hosts an inter-agency working group to bring together best practices in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training. The group has prepared this guidance for federal, state, and local government and law enforcement officials organizing CVE, cultural awareness, or counterterrorism training."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
2011-10
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Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond
"Transnational crime and criminal networks have grown to such proportions that they have become a global problem. Large-scale crime, terrorism, insurgency, and piracy are blending into transnational criminal networks, capable of holding ground and challenging the power of the state, and threatening the basic fabric of society. Overcoming transnational crime requires the United States to merge domestic and international strategies. Domestically, the U.S. must do more to enable local police to integrate their effort and to develop, analyze, and share intelligence on narco-gangs and the cartels. Other domestic requirements for a successful anticartel strategy include better treatment for drug users, immigration reform, rehabilitation, and an all-out effort to move gangs out of schools. Internationally, the U.S. must adopt a long-range foreign policy strategy to help struggling states to restore the rule of law and civic security. The U.S. should partner with states already engaged in the 'cartel wars.' Colombia and Mexico may be the two Latin states with the best chance of becoming anchors of success in the Western Hemisphere."
National Defense University Press
Killebrew, Robert B., 1943-
2011-09
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Intelligence-sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts
From the thesis abstract: "The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a major catalyst for intelligence reform in the United States. Since this date, most government agencies have strived to evolve and advance in this capacity. One such way has been through the development of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary intelligence centers, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the 72 state and major urban area fusion centers established throughout the nation. However, despite the changes that have occurred throughout the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, significant issues still remain that are impeding the creation and flow of actionable intelligence to support domestic counterterrorism efforts. This has been identified from research conducted on numerous sources. Several policy, technological, cultural and political challenges exist, all contributing to the less-than-perfect nature of the United States' existing counterterrorism framework. This thesis aims to identify potential solutions that leverage existing intelligence operations to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum across all tiers of U.S. government. The author provides an analysis of specific, priority issues that require fixing within our nation's counterterrorism system, and provides evidence-based recommendations to improve the capability and value of existing intelligence support structures and further-develop the desired intelligence-sharing continuum."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Carabin, David
2011-09
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Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security
"The cumulative increase in expenditures on U.S. domestic homeland security over the decade since 9/11 exceeds one trillion dollars. It is clearly time to examine these massive expenditures applying risk assessment and cost-benefit approaches that have been standard for decades. Thus far, officials do not seem to have done so and have engaged in various forms of probability neglect by focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, rather than multiplying, the probabilities; assessing relative, rather than absolute, risk; and inflating terrorist capacities and the importance of potential terrorist targets. We find that enhanced expenditures have been excessive. To be deemed cost-effective in analyses that substantially bias the consideration toward the opposite conclusion, the security measures would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect each year against 1,667 otherwise successful attacks that each inflicted some $100 million in damage (more than four per day) or 167 attacks inflicting $1 billion in damage (nearly one every two days). This is in the range of destruction of what might have happened had the Times-Square bomber of 2010 been successful. Although there are emotional and political pressures on the terrorism issue, this does not relieve politicians and bureaucrats of the fundamental responsibility of informing the public of the limited risk that terrorism presents, of seeking to expend funds wisely, and of bearing in mind opportunity costs. Moreover, political concerns may be overwrought: restrained reaction has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically. And avoiding overreaction is by far the most cost-effective counterterrorism measure."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Mueller, John E.; Stewart, Mark G., 1961-
2011-08
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Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks
"Contractors represent more than half of the U.S. presence in the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, at times employing more than a quarter-million people. They have performed vital tasks in support of U.S. defense, diplomatic, and development objectives. But the cost has been high. Poor planning, management, and oversight of contracts has led to massive waste and has damaged these objectives. The volume and complexity of contract actions have overwhelmed the ability of government to plan for, manage, and oversee contractors in theater. Contracting decisions made during urgent contingencies have often neglected the need to determine whether host-nation governments can or will sustain the many projects and programs that U.S. contracts have established in their countries. Americans' 'Can do!' response to the challenge of contingency operations is admirable, but human and financial resources have limits, and long-term costs are seldom considered when short-term plans are being framed. Much of the waste, fraud, and abuse revealed in Iraq and Afghanistan stems from trying to do too much, treating contractors as a free resource, and failing to adapt U.S. plans and U.S. agencies' responsibilities to host-nation cultural, political, and economic settings. This final report to Congress summarizes the Commission's work since 2008 and offers 15 strategic recommendations that it believes warrant prompt action. Delay and denial are not good options. There will be a next contingency, whether the crisis takes the form of overseas hostilities or domestic response to a national emergency like a mass-casualty terror attack or natural disaster. Reform will save lives and money, and support U.S. interests. Reform is essential. Now."
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S.)
2011-08
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Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, Statement of David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, and Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives
From the opening statement of David C. Maurer and Gene Aloise: "We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a 'dirty bomb'). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-07-26
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [July 18, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. […] The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the Administration's goal to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013. The Obama Administration's FY2011 and FY2012 congressional budget request proposed overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-07-18
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Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
From the Opening statement of Jess T. Ford: "I am pleased to be here to discuss the training efforts of the U.S. Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security). My testimony is based on our report, which is being released today.1 Diplomatic Security is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 embassies, consulates, and domestic locations and, as we reported in previous testimony, experienced a large growth in its budget and personnel over the last decade.2 Diplomatic Security trains its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs, Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC), which is an office of Diplomatic Security's Training Directorate and is the primary provider of Diplomatic Security training. Diplomatic Security's training budget grew steadily from fiscal years 2006 to 2010--increasing from approximately $24 million in fiscal year 2006 to nearly $70 million in fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year 2010, DSTC conducted 342 sessions of its 61 courses and trained 4,739 students."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-06-29
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Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [June 8, 2011]
"Unrest in the Arab world has amplified existing political tension in Yemen. Sustained mass protests and President Ali Abdullah Saleh's attempts to preempt a broad crisis with concessions have concentrated U.S. and international attention on the daunting array of political and development challenges facing Yemen. Congress and U.S. policymakers may be concerned with prospects for stabilizing Yemen and establishing strong bilateral relations with future Yemeni leaders. With limited natural resources, a crippling illiteracy rate, and high population growth, some observers believe Yemen is at risk for becoming a failed state. In 2009, Yemen ranked 140 out of 182 countries on the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index, a score comparable to the poorest sub-Saharan African countries. Over 43% of the population of nearly 24 million people lives below the poverty line, and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to be between $650 and $800. Yemen is largely dependent on external aid from Persian Gulf countries, Western donors, and international financial institutions, though its per capita share of assistance is below the global average. […] Whether terrorist groups in Yemen, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have a long-term ability to threaten U.S. homeland security may determine the extent of U.S. resources committed to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Some believe these groups lack such capability and fear the United States might overreact; others assert that Yemen is gradually becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sharp, Jeremy Maxwell
2011-06-08
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Terrorist Financing and State Response [Self-Study Course]
This self-study course was developed by the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security. "This course examines exactly how far we have come in our understanding of the ways in which terrorists raise, store, and transfer funds. It also evaluates challenges facing the U.S. government and international community in responding to this problem. In each module, we use a mix of official reports, academic papers, and other works to explore the subject and identify problems with the received wisdom about terrorist financing. Our goal is to develop the knowledge to critically assess claims about terrorist financing and the tools to think seriously about how to combat it. Developing an understanding of how tenuous knowledge about this subject is will make us better consumers of policy recommendations and intelligence reports. More importantly, it will make us better producers of government policy." The course includes the following modules: Module 1: Managing Terrorist Organizations;
Module 2: Historical Overview of Terrorist Financing; Module 3: Mechanisms for Raising, Transfer, and Storage of Terrorist Funds; Module 4: Case Studies in Terrorism Financing; Module 5: Domestic Responses to Terrorism Financing; and Module 6: International Responses to Terrorism Financing.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Shapiro, Jacob
2011-06
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [May 27, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. [...] Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the Administration's goal to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013. The Obama Administration's FY2011 and FY2012 congressional budget request proposed overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-05-27
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Morocco: Current Issues [May 27, 2011]
"The United States government views Morocco as a moderate Arab regime, an important ally against terrorism, and a free trade partner. Congress is particularly interested in Morocco because it is a recipient of considerable U.S. foreign assistance to help it combat terror and to develop. Morocco is also a significant purchaser of U.S. arms. King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but has taken some liberalizing steps with uncertain effects. Since 2005, several elections have met international standards. The government has focused on economic reforms that could alleviate poverty as a way to prevent radicalization and terrorism. It also has begun several major renewable energy projects to lessen dependence on foreign sources. Domestic politics are currently focused on a developing rivalry between the Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), established in 2008 by a former classmate of the king, and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), which previously had been on the rise. The government is greatly concerned about terrorism because, after 9/11, Morocco experienced several devastating terror attacks and Moroccan nationals have been implicated in attacks and plots overseas. Morocco takes a comprehensive approach to countering terror, involving security measures, economic reforms, control of religious outlets, education, and international cooperation. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered the greatest threat to the North African region, has not mounted a successful attack in Morocco. However, individual Moroccans have joined AQIM outside of the country and the group has attempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point for transnational smuggling operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arieff, Alexis
2011-05-27
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Block Designation Notice
"The Department of Homeland Security (the 'Department') has completed its review of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO) GRaDER program as a Block, pursuant to the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441-444 (the 'SAFETY Act'), and the Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 C.F.R. Part 25, 71 Fed. Reg. 33147, 33159 (June 8, 2006) (the 'Regulations'). Pursuant to Section 25.3 of the Regulations, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has delegated her responsibilities, powers, and functions under the SAFETY Act, except the authority to declare that an act is an Act of Terrorism for purposes of Section 444(2) of the SAFETY Act, to the 'Under Secretary for Science and Technology of the Department of Homeland Security or the Under Secretary's designees.' The Under Secretary for Science and Technology has designated the Deputy Under Secretary for Science and Technology as another senior official who, in addition to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, has authority to make SAFETY Act determinations regarding Designations, Certifications, and other matters in accordance with the SAFETY Act and the Regulations."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2011-05-24
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Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary [May 16, 2011]
"This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations. These include high-profile political assassinations earlier in 2011, the Raymond Davis affair involving a CIA operative accused of murder in the city of Lahore, and the May killing of Osama bin Laden in the military cantonment city of Abbottabad, among others. Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events. A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad's policies toward the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan's relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the troubled status of Pakistan's domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns are briefly summarized, and the report closes with discussion of U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. [...] The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan has led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and has sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2010 and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated more than $20 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remaining rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kronstadt, K. Alan
2011-05-16
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [April 27, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking-- cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-04-27
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Leadership Selection in the Enterprise of Medical Countermeasure Development
From the thesis abstract: "The threat of domestic terrorism from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack is a constant risk that must be managed effectively by those entrusted to protect and prepare our nation. Central to our nation's preparedness are the individuals selected to lead the enterprise of medical countermeasure development. Leaders selected to this post must possess the essential background, skills and experience necessary to achieve success. Equally important, these leaders must be retained in their roles for sufficient time to enact the strategy given to them. Within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response [ASPR] was established with a mission that includes managing the advanced research and development of medical countermeasures through its office of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command [MRMC] manages a similar mission of medical countermeasure development in diverse research laboratories for the Department of Defense. This paper examines the inherent difficulties of managing the unique long-term medical countermeasure programs of the U.S. government by short-term appointed directors in the offices of the ASPR and MRMC."
Army War College (U.S.)
Rietcheck, Randall L.
2011-04-15
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Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat
From the thesis abstract: "Americans readily identify Muslim extremism as a viable threat to America. However, they ignore or remain unaware of Christian extremism in the same context, despite the similarities in ideology that advocate violence against Americans. For example, the motivation behind Eric Rudolph's bombing of the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 was to 'embarrass and punish the U.S. government' for its pro-abortion stance. This monograph explores what, if any, domestic terror threat Christian extremism poses and follows the Constructivist approach: how ideas define structure, how this structure defines interests, and how actors take action as a result. Initially focusing on the history and core beliefs of the Christian Identity movement and radical fringes of Dominion and Reconstruction theology, this monograph identifies two major underlying themes in Christian extremism. The first is racism through the use of religion as an accelerant to promote violence. The second is religiously motivated terrorism to support what is perceived as God's will and law. In addition, this monograph analyzes federal law enforcement action against Christian extremism through a series of case studies that took place in Mountainhome, Arkansas, Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. The analysis of the catastrophic consequences from Ruby Ridge and Waco with the Oklahoma City bombing follows. Concluding this monograph are the lessons learned, comparison of federal law enforcement's action in each case study, and analyzing the tactics and leadership involved. Whereas the FBI's tactics and leadership exercised proved highly successful in Arkansas, they were disastrous in Idaho and Texas. Finally, this monograph provides a domestic terror threat assessment with recommended actions in what is not only a law enforcement issue, but a war of ideology between tolerance and understanding versus hate and bigotry."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wong, Frederick D.
2011-04-01
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Examination of Terrestrial Nuclear Energy's Relevance to U.S. National Security
This thesis is in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. "This paper is an examination of the relevance that terrestrial nuclear energy has with regard to U.S. national security. Terrestrial nuclear energy is herein defined as energy produced from land-based nuclear reactors. The principal application for terrestrial nuclear reactors is in the generation of electricity. Maritime or space-vehicle propulsion reactors are excluded from this definition, as are nuclear weapons. While the national security implications of thermonuclear warheads and nuclear-powered warships are relatively direct, the national security implications of benign nuclear energy are less so. National security interest areas of energy independence, energy security, climate change, economics, public safety, and nuclear terrorism and proliferation are considered. The paper addresses both domestic nuclear energy and aspects of foreign nuclear energy. Through this examination, terrestrial nuclear energy is found to have both direct and indirect implications to U.S. national security interests."
Army War College (U.S.)
Raftery, Jr, James J.
2011-03-24
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations [March 10, 2011]
"Since taking power in 2005, King Abdullah has created greater public space for domestic social reform debates and has promoted the concept of a strong national identity among Saudis in the face of a determined domestic terrorism campaign. He also has codified royal succession rules, begun restructuring the justice system, and taken clear steps to exert stronger government control over religious authorities. Robust oil export revenues have strengthened the kingdom's economic position and provide Saudi leaders with significant financial resources to meet domestic investment needs and provide social benefits. In this context, the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to grapple with a core challenge identified by the 9/11 Commission in its final report: defining a broader bilateral relationship that 'leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend.' The Obama Administration has engaged the Saudi government as a strategic partner in efforts to promote regional stability and to defeat Al Qaeda, and current U.S. policy initiatives seek to help Saudi leaders address key domestic economic and security challenges. It remains to be seen whether these U.S. initiatives and, more importantly, Saudi leaders' own reform efforts will enable the kingdom to meet the energy, education, employment, and security challenges that its citizens face. Shared challenges have long defined U.S.-Saudi relations, but questions about political, economic, and social reform may become more pressing in light of the calls for change that are now swirling around the kingdom."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.
2011-03-10
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National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) - Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns [February 1, 2011]
"The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. [...] As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessments of potential terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. [...] Although there have been a number of arrests of individuals suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the U.S., two incidents in 2009--the assassination by an Army Major of some 13 individuals at Fort Hood Army Base on November 5, 2009, and the failed attempt to trigger a bomb on an airliner approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009--contributed to increased concern about counterterrorism capabilities domestically and internationally. An Executive Branch assessment of the December 2009 bombing attempt concluded that, whereas information sharing had been adequate, analysts had failed to 'connect the dots' and achieve an understanding of an ongoing plot. [...] A review by the Senate Intelligence Committee released in May 2010 found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community and, in particular, that the NCTC was inadequately organized and resourced for its missions. In addition, the committee concluded that intelligence analysts (not only those in NCTC) tended to focus more on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen than on domestic threats."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.
2011-02-01
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NNSA Fact Sheet: Securing Domestic Radioactive Material
This document is a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Fact Sheet. From the document: "In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons 'the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.' In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, 'the greatest danger to the American people.' The President's FY 2012 budget request provides the resources required to implement that agenda. It requests $2.5 billion in FY 2012 and $14.2 billion over the next five years to reduce the global nuclear threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing and controlling nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the responsible application of nuclear technology and science. In addition to securing nuclear material around the world, the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] plays a key role in the U.S. government's comprehensive effort to secure radiological material here at home. NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) oversees two programs aimed at securing radioactive materials in the United States. NNSA/GTRI's Domestic Material Protection program collaborates with partner sites like hospitals and universities to provide voluntary security enhancements to prevent terrorists from acquiring in----use radiological materials. NNSA/GTRI's Domestic Radiological Material Removal Program removes radiological sources that are no longer being used for disposal or secure storage. Taken together with the President's commitment to partner with the international community to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological material around the world, these domestic security programs demonstrate this Administration's commitment to protecting the American people from nuclear terrorism."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2011-02-01
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Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy [January 4, 2011]
"As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States holds what should be a winning hand of a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. The nation's security should be secure. Yet the debate over national security seems to be both intensifying and broadening. The problem appears not only in the difficulty of finding a winning strategy in the long war against acts of terrorism but having to face economic constraints that loom large in the public debate. In addition, the global financial crisis and recession have highlighted the trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and spending to provide jobs and income for citizens at home. The United States has long been accustomed to pursuing a 'rich man's' approach to national security. The country could field an overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation's security. The economy has always been there both to provide the funds and materiel for defense and to provide economic security for most households. Policies for economic growth and issues such as unemployment have been viewed as domestic problems largely separate from considerations of national security."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki
2011-01-04
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Influencing Violent Extremist Organizations Pilot Effort: Focus on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
"In 2010 the Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment (SMA) office saw a need to bring academics, practitioners, and individuals from all branches of the United States government together to discuss the current research and debate issues surrounding extremist violence: Defining a Strategic Campaign for Working with Partners to Counter and Delegitimize Violent Extremism (CVE) and the Neurobiology of Political Violence. The findings from the two conferences clearly indicated that a detailed examination of a violent extremist organization from a multi-method approach was required in order to begin down the path of understanding. The CVE workshop was held from 19-20 May 2010 at Gallup World Headquarters in Washington, DC. The workshop focused on strategic communications and violent extremism and was designed to inform decision makers and was not intended as a forum for policy discussion. The workshop emerged from an SMA- and AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory]- sponsored white paper entitled [sic] 'Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement.' The key insights and findings of the CVE workshop are as follows: 1. Violent extremism cannot be reduced to one singular or simple cause [;] 2. The difficulties of pursuing deradicalization and delegitimization are numerous. The question to ask is if this is an appropriate or attainable goal [;] 3. Multi-perspective, tailored approaches are key to effective counter-terror strategic communications [;] 4. The ways the US uses vocabulary and themes is critical to success of its strategic communications[.]"
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense
Adelman, Janice; Chapman, Abigail
2011
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Nuclear Terrorism: Strengthening Our Domestic Defenses, Hearings Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, Part I and Part II, June 30 and September 15, 2010
From the opening statement of Joseph I. Lieberman: "This is the eighth in a series of hearings our Committee has held since 2007 to discuss how our Nation is confronting the real and dire threats posed by nuclear terrorism. And I must say that today it seems to me, as I look back and look at where we are now, that the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States is growing faster than our ability to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack on our homeland, and obviously as the Homeland Security Committee this is of great and growing concern to us. […] The International Atomic Energy Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database, which tracks all reported cases of smuggling, theft, unexplained losses, or black market sales of nuclear materials, reports there have been 1,340 confirmed incidents of smuggling since 2007 that involve materials that could at least be used to make a so-called dirty bomb. And of those cases, 18 involved the smuggling of highly enriched uranium or plutonium--the material that is critical to the making of an actual atomic weapon. In 2008, our Committee held hearings to examine the office created in our government to counter this threat--the little-known Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). […] Though most Americans have never heard of DNDO, its mission is clearly vital to our homeland security in the world in which we live in today." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Joseph I. Lieberman, Susan M. Collins, Daniel K. Akaka, Eugene E. Aloise, Micah D. Lowenthal, Dana A. Shea, Jane Holl Lute, and Warren M. Stern.
United States. Government Printing Office
2011
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Don't Celebrate Just Yet
"For Americans, the death of Osama Bin Laden was a satisfying emotional end to the story of the 21st century's most famous terrorist leader, but it has not made the United States safer in the short run or the long run. Bin Laden's death is an accomplishment to be celebrated, but in the short-term it has not ended the two wars America still fights, it has not destroyed the international terrorist networks that Bin Laden supported, and it has not reduced the threat of extremist terrorism that faces Americans at home and abroad. Bin Laden's death, rather, demonstrates America's prioritization of domestic security goals over international norms and laws, weakening its security in the long run. And the anger and political turmoil that now embroils Pakistan, along with the concurrent weakening of US-Pakistan relations, does little to help United States security."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict
Guo, Jerry M.
2011
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Combating WMD Journal [Issue 7 Spring/Summer 2011]
This issue of the Combating WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] Journal contains several articles: "Service-Level CWMD [Conventional CWMD] Framework" by Steven Rollins; "The Department of the Army's Role in Response to a Domestic Bioterror Attack" by Mitchell L. Wise; "Decon Emitting Neutralizer of Improvised Explosive Devices (DENIED) Service-Level CWMD Framework" by Christopher Rivers et. al.; "The Spore Wall as Defense for the Biological Agent Bacillus anthracis" by Jon J. Calomiris; "Pentomic Soldiers" by Daniel P. Bolger; "Enhancing Visualization of HPAC [Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability] Scenarios using Google Earth" by Mathew Jackson; "Exercise 'Poets Corner' a Multinational Effort to Prevent CBRNE [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons] Terrorism" by Michael S. Quinn and Vasilli 'Bill' Karatzas; "U.S. - Russian Partnership and the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement" by Kevin J. Owens; "From the Director" by Peter Bechtel; "Do You Know... Japan had an atomic bomb (genzai bakuden) program in WWII?" by Mr. Robert Pfeffer; and "Combating WMD Resources".
United States. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
2011
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Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress [December 22, 2010]
"On the national security front, experts and policymakers have expressed concern over a possible nexus between organized crime and terrorism. Despite the difference in motivation for organized crime (profit) and terrorism (ideology), the linking element for the two is money. Terrorists may potentially obtain funding for their operations from partnering directly with organized crime groups or modeling their profitable criminal acts. Even if organized crime groups and terrorist organizations do not form long-term alliances, the possibility of short-term business alliances may be of concern to policymakers. In light of these developments, several possible issues for Congress arise. One issue centers on whether the evolving nature of organized crime requires new enforcement tools. Some policymakers have suggested that current laws may not be effective at countering present threats from organized crime. As organized criminals threaten American society from both within and outside U.S. borders, should Congress expand law enforcement's extraterritorial jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute these criminals, and to what extent should Congress encourage multilateral--both domestic and international--crime fighting efforts? Another possible issue for Congress concerns whether the resources that the federal government allocates to organized crime matters are adequate and appropriately allocated to counter the threats organized crime poses. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, national priorities and federal resources shifted away from more traditional crime fighting--including that of organized crime--toward counterterrorism and counterintelligence. For instance, the number of federal agents actually working on organized crime matters and the number of organized crime cases opened in FY2004 decreased relative to levels before September 11, 2001."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Finklea, Kristin M.
2010-12-22
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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat [December 7, 2010]
"This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. 'Homegrown' and 'domestic' are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term 'jihadist' describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term 'violent jihadist' characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bjelopera, Jerome P.; Randol, Mark A.
2010-12-07
