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Updated NCTC Guidelines - Mission Justification Fact Sheet
"Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the United States Government has made dramatic progress in information sharing -- particularly in sharing information once it is identified as terrorism information. However, the government continues to address the challenge of correlating disparate pieces of information that reside in various agency systems when the relevance of the information to terrorism is not readily apparent. The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is the primary organization for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the government pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, excepting intelligence pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism. To fulfill its statutory terrorism information responsibilities, NCTC must access and review datasets already lawfully collected by other government entities for national security purposes even if those datasets also include non-terrorism information. For example, certain information regarding visa applications, refugees, and international travelers may have potential connections to terrorism that are not readily apparent to the federal agency that maintains the data. It is often only through NCTC's access to terrorism information held by other government agencies that NCTC is able to correlate disparate information and uncover threats to the nation. In March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper, and NCTC Director Matthew G. Olsen signed updated guidelines designed to allow NCTC to more effectively analyze certain data already in the government's possession to better address terrorism-related threats, while at the same time increasing the protections for privacy and civil liberties. These guidelines were updated in response to issues identified by the White House, Congress, and Intelligence Community after the 2009 Fort Hood shooting and the Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt. One such issue was the government's limited ability to query multiple federal datasets residing at different government agencies, and to correlate that information to proactively identify information that might relate to a potential attack. Similarly, the reviews noted that information that is not believed to be relevant could later be recognized as relevant based on subsequent events or information obtained at different points in time."
National Counterterrorism Center (U.S.)
2012?
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Army Reserve, Army National Guard and Air National Guard Readiness, Training and Operations, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, Hearing Held September 21, 2011
From the opening statement of J. Randy Forbes: "Just 10 days ago, we marked the 10th Anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on our homeland. That day, as we all know, literally changed our world, and led us into a long-term global war on terrorism, a fight where our reservists and our National Guard members are full partners. In the intervening 10 years, our Reserve Components have been stretched thin as they have been called upon to provide many of the enabling capabilities for the Active Duty Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn and Operation Enduring Freedom. They provide support, such as intelligence gathering, airlift, close air support and security forces. At the same time, the National Guard still must fulfill their traditional mission of supporting the states during emergencies such as the recent flooding and fires. There is no walking away from either mission. Their significant combat support role in Iraq and Afghanistan makes it clear that we cannot go to the fight without our Reserve Components. According to the Department of Defense's recent study, the 'Future Role of the Reserve Component,' the Reserve Component is an irreplaceable and cost-effective element of overall Department of Defense capability. The report specifically stated, 'Unless we had chosen to dramatically increase the size of the active components, our domestic security and global operations since September 11, 2001 could not have been executed without the activation of hundreds of thousands of trained reserve component personnel.'" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Madeleine Z. Bordallo, J. Randy Forbes, Raymond W. Carpenter, Jack C Stultz,, and Harry M. Wyatt.
United States. Government Printing Office
2012
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Serial No. 112-91: Keeping America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of Threat Detection Technologies, Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, Thursday, July 19, 2012
This is the July 19, 2012 hearing on "Keeping America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of Threat Detection Technologies," held before the U.S. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. From the opening statement of Ralph M. Hall: "The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will come to order, and I say to you, good morning and thank you. Welcome to today's hearing entitled 'Keeping America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of Threat Detection Technologies.' […] The September 11th terrorist attacks forced the American public to confront the daily threat of domestic terrorism, and advancing threat detection technologies, I think, is one of the many ways research and development contributes to keeping our country secure. Recognizing the need to respond quickly when a potential threat is identified and to counter the growing list of threats to our country, the U.S. government and the private sector focused research and development activities on the detection of explosives, firearms, and dangerous materials including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear matter. Scientific research has advanced the development of technologies to protect the Nation, but the rapidly changing threats that we face require continued research and development to ensure that we keep ahead of our enemies. We recognize that the terrorists only need to get it right once to succeed, whereas we need to get it right every time to ensure the protection of our citizens." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ralph M. Hall, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Richard Cavanagh, Huban Gowadia, Anthony Peurrung, Thomas Peterson, and Jerry Costello.
United States. Government Printing Office
2012
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Memorandum of Agreement Between the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence on Guidelines for Access, Retention, Use, and Dissemination by the National Counterterrorism Center of Terrorism Information Contained Within Datasets Identified as Including Non-terrorism Information and Information Pertaining Exclusively to Domestic Terrorism [With 2012 Guidelines Amendments]
This document is referenced in an October 26, 2012 from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) of the U.S. General Services Administration. The document specifically pertains to "program activities under the amended National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) guidelines signed by Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2012" which "authorize collection authorities on a scale not claimed since Congress de-funded the Total Information Awareness program." According to the ACLU letter to the PCLOB, "Under the original 2008 guidelines, NCTC, being an element of the intelligence community, was properly limited in its authority to collect and retain information about United States persons (American citizens and legal residents) who were not suspected of involvement with terrorism. If the NCTC collected information about US persons not related to terrorism, it was treated as a mistake that had to be identified and corrected by purging such information from NCTC databases within 180 days. This requirement served as a check on the NCTC's domestic activities, and a necessary protection of innocent Americans' privacy. Under the 2012 guidelines, however, NC TC can now intentionally collect non-terrorism related US person information , and that information can be 'retained and continually assessed' for five years. NCTC can now target any U.S. government databases for ingestion based simply on the NCTC Director's determination that it contains 'significant terrorism information,' which the guidelines do not define." The referring ACLU letter can be accessed at the following URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=738533
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Attorney General; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2012?
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Morocco: Current Issues [December 20, 2011]
"The United States government views Morocco as an important ally against terrorism and a free trade partner. Congress appropriates foreign assistance funding for Morocco for counterterrorism and socioeconomic development, including funding in support of a five-year, $697.5 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) aid program agreed to in 2007. Congress also reviews and authorizes Moroccan purchases of U.S. defense articles. U.S. officials have expressed support for Morocco's political reform efforts while reiterating strong support for the monarchy. Morocco's comprehensive approach to countering terrorism involves security measures, economic reforms, control of religious outlets, education, and international cooperation. Morocco experienced devastating terrorist attacks in 2003, and Moroccan nationals have been implicated in attacks and plots overseas. In April 2011, after years without a major domestic attack, a bomb exploded at a tourist café in Marrakesh, killing 17 people, mostly Europeans. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered the greatest regional threat, has not mounted a successful attack in Morocco and denied responsibility for the April bombing. However, individual Moroccans have joined AQIM outside of the country and the group has reportedly attempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point for regional smuggling operations. Morocco's human rights record is uneven. A number of abuses have been documented along with constraints on freedom of expression. At the same time, the 2004 Family Code is a significant initiative that could improve the socioeconomic rights of women if fully implemented. The king has also sought to provide a public record of abuses perpetrated before he ascended the throne in 1999 and to enhance the rights of ethnic Berbers (Amazigh/Imazighen), the original inhabitants of the region."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arieff, Alexis
2011-12-20
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Pak-U.S. Alliance in the Fight Against Terrorism: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
From the thesis abstract: "The cost-benefit equation of the Pak-U.S. alliance, in the fight against terrorism, reflects a direct correlation between the fluctuating patterns of U.S. assistance and their direct and indirect implications for Pakistan. While the U.S. strives to achieve a better return on its investment through military-oriented support, Pakistan seeks to adopt an approach that suits both the U.S. and its own domestic and regional interests. This research traces the trend of Pak-U.S. relations, highlights the impact of the fluctuating U.S. aid in shaping perceptions, and provides a game theoretical analysis on the issue. Besides highlighting measures to achieve cost effectiveness through micro alliances, decentralization, accountability, and transparency in fund management, the study supports development of entrepreneurial culture and micro-alliances in Pakistan. More importantly, it provides an in-depth analysis of the military and population-centric approaches and their associated costs and benefits for the two countries. The research concludes by suggesting a more population-centric U.S. approach towards Pakistan to achieve a better return on investment besides laying foundation for a long-term strategic alliance. It suggests future research on the prospects and methodology of achieving a long-term partnership between the two nations."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Irizarry, Jose R. Reyes; Al-Rawashdeh, Khaldon; Khan, Fazal ur Rehman
2011-12
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American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat [November 15, 2011]
"This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. 'Homegrown' and 'domestic' are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term 'jihadist' describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term 'violent jihadist' characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress. There is an 'executive summary' at the beginning that summarizes the report's findings, observations, and policy considerations for Congress."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bjelopera, Jerome P.
2011-11-15
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [October 31, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. A second summit will be held in South Korea in 2012. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking- cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-10-31
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Domestic Threat Intelligence: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred and Twelfth Congress, First Session, October 6, 2011
This testimony compilation is from the October 6, 2011 hearing, "Domestic Threat Intelligence," hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Mike Rogers: "Today the Committee welcomes FBI Director Robert Mueller and National Counterterrorism Center Director Matt Olsen to discuss the state of the terrorism threat against the United States and how the Intelligence Community has changed in the decade since 9/11 to address this threat. In the wake of the takedown of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula leader Anwar al-Aulaqi, who former NCTC Director Mike Leiter called the single greatest terrorism threat to the homeland, we convene to discuss the future of the al-Qa'ida threat against the United States." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mike Rogers; C.A. Ruppersberger; Robert S. Mueller; and Matthew G. Olsen.
United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
2011-10-06
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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Training Guidance & Best Practices
"In recent years, the United States has seen a number of individuals in the U.S. become involved in violent extremist activities, with particular activity by American residents and citizens inspired by al Qaeda and its ideology. We know that violent extremism is not confined to any single ideology, but we also know that the threat posed by al Qaeda and its adherents is the preeminent threat we face in the homeland. It is important for law enforcement personnel to be appropriately trained in understanding and detecting ideologically motivated criminal behavior, and in working with communities and local law enforcement to counter domestic violent extremism. Training must be accurate, based on current intelligence, and must include cultural competency training. The Department of Homeland Security, in partnership with the National Counterterrorism Center, hosts an inter-agency working group to bring together best practices in Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) training. The group has prepared this guidance for federal, state, and local government and law enforcement officials organizing CVE, cultural awareness, or counterterrorism training."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
2011-10
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Criminal Insurgency in the Americas and Beyond
"Transnational crime and criminal networks have grown to such proportions that they have become a global problem. Large-scale crime, terrorism, insurgency, and piracy are blending into transnational criminal networks, capable of holding ground and challenging the power of the state, and threatening the basic fabric of society. Overcoming transnational crime requires the United States to merge domestic and international strategies. Domestically, the U.S. must do more to enable local police to integrate their effort and to develop, analyze, and share intelligence on narco-gangs and the cartels. Other domestic requirements for a successful anticartel strategy include better treatment for drug users, immigration reform, rehabilitation, and an all-out effort to move gangs out of schools. Internationally, the U.S. must adopt a long-range foreign policy strategy to help struggling states to restore the rule of law and civic security. The U.S. should partner with states already engaged in the 'cartel wars.' Colombia and Mexico may be the two Latin states with the best chance of becoming anchors of success in the Western Hemisphere."
National Defense University Press
Killebrew, Robert B., 1943-
2011-09
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Intelligence-sharing Continuum: Next Generation Requirements for U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts
From the thesis abstract: "The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks were a major catalyst for intelligence reform in the United States. Since this date, most government agencies have strived to evolve and advance in this capacity. One such way has been through the development of multi-agency, multi-disciplinary intelligence centers, such as the National Counterterrorism Center, the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, and the 72 state and major urban area fusion centers established throughout the nation. However, despite the changes that have occurred throughout the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities, significant issues still remain that are impeding the creation and flow of actionable intelligence to support domestic counterterrorism efforts. This has been identified from research conducted on numerous sources. Several policy, technological, cultural and political challenges exist, all contributing to the less-than-perfect nature of the United States' existing counterterrorism framework. This thesis aims to identify potential solutions that leverage existing intelligence operations to promote an intelligence-sharing continuum across all tiers of U.S. government. The author provides an analysis of specific, priority issues that require fixing within our nation's counterterrorism system, and provides evidence-based recommendations to improve the capability and value of existing intelligence support structures and further-develop the desired intelligence-sharing continuum."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security; Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Carabin, David
2011-09
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Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security
"The cumulative increase in expenditures on U.S. domestic homeland security over the decade since 9/11 exceeds one trillion dollars. It is clearly time to examine these massive expenditures applying risk assessment and cost-benefit approaches that have been standard for decades. Thus far, officials do not seem to have done so and have engaged in various forms of probability neglect by focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, rather than multiplying, the probabilities; assessing relative, rather than absolute, risk; and inflating terrorist capacities and the importance of potential terrorist targets. We find that enhanced expenditures have been excessive. To be deemed cost-effective in analyses that substantially bias the consideration toward the opposite conclusion, the security measures would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect each year against 1,667 otherwise successful attacks that each inflicted some $100 million in damage (more than four per day) or 167 attacks inflicting $1 billion in damage (nearly one every two days). This is in the range of destruction of what might have happened had the Times-Square bomber of 2010 been successful. Although there are emotional and political pressures on the terrorism issue, this does not relieve politicians and bureaucrats of the fundamental responsibility of informing the public of the limited risk that terrorism presents, of seeking to expend funds wisely, and of bearing in mind opportunity costs. Moreover, political concerns may be overwrought: restrained reaction has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically. And avoiding overreaction is by far the most cost-effective counterterrorism measure."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Mueller, John E.; Stewart, Mark G., 1961-
2011-08
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Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks
"Contractors represent more than half of the U.S. presence in the contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, at times employing more than a quarter-million people. They have performed vital tasks in support of U.S. defense, diplomatic, and development objectives. But the cost has been high. Poor planning, management, and oversight of contracts has led to massive waste and has damaged these objectives. The volume and complexity of contract actions have overwhelmed the ability of government to plan for, manage, and oversee contractors in theater. Contracting decisions made during urgent contingencies have often neglected the need to determine whether host-nation governments can or will sustain the many projects and programs that U.S. contracts have established in their countries. Americans' 'Can do!' response to the challenge of contingency operations is admirable, but human and financial resources have limits, and long-term costs are seldom considered when short-term plans are being framed. Much of the waste, fraud, and abuse revealed in Iraq and Afghanistan stems from trying to do too much, treating contractors as a free resource, and failing to adapt U.S. plans and U.S. agencies' responsibilities to host-nation cultural, political, and economic settings. This final report to Congress summarizes the Commission's work since 2008 and offers 15 strategic recommendations that it believes warrant prompt action. Delay and denial are not good options. There will be a next contingency, whether the crisis takes the form of overseas hostilities or domestic response to a national emergency like a mass-casualty terror attack or natural disaster. Reform will save lives and money, and support U.S. interests. Reform is essential. Now."
Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S.)
2011-08
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Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, Statement of David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, and Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives
From the opening statement of David C. Maurer and Gene Aloise: "We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a 'dirty bomb'). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-07-26
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [July 18, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. […] The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the Administration's goal to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013. The Obama Administration's FY2011 and FY2012 congressional budget request proposed overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-07-18
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Diplomatic Security: Expanded Missions and Inadequate Facilities Pose Critical Challenges to Training Efforts, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
From the Opening statement of Jess T. Ford: "I am pleased to be here to discuss the training efforts of the U.S. Department of State's (State) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (Diplomatic Security). My testimony is based on our report, which is being released today.1 Diplomatic Security is responsible for the protection of people, information, and property at over 400 embassies, consulates, and domestic locations and, as we reported in previous testimony, experienced a large growth in its budget and personnel over the last decade.2 Diplomatic Security trains its workforce and others to address a variety of threats, including crime, espionage, visa and passport fraud, technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism. To meet its training needs, Diplomatic Security relies primarily on its Diplomatic Security Training Center (DSTC), which is an office of Diplomatic Security's Training Directorate and is the primary provider of Diplomatic Security training. Diplomatic Security's training budget grew steadily from fiscal years 2006 to 2010--increasing from approximately $24 million in fiscal year 2006 to nearly $70 million in fiscal year 2010. In fiscal year 2010, DSTC conducted 342 sessions of its 61 courses and trained 4,739 students."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-06-29
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Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations [June 8, 2011]
"Unrest in the Arab world has amplified existing political tension in Yemen. Sustained mass protests and President Ali Abdullah Saleh's attempts to preempt a broad crisis with concessions have concentrated U.S. and international attention on the daunting array of political and development challenges facing Yemen. Congress and U.S. policymakers may be concerned with prospects for stabilizing Yemen and establishing strong bilateral relations with future Yemeni leaders. With limited natural resources, a crippling illiteracy rate, and high population growth, some observers believe Yemen is at risk for becoming a failed state. In 2009, Yemen ranked 140 out of 182 countries on the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index, a score comparable to the poorest sub-Saharan African countries. Over 43% of the population of nearly 24 million people lives below the poverty line, and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is estimated to be between $650 and $800. Yemen is largely dependent on external aid from Persian Gulf countries, Western donors, and international financial institutions, though its per capita share of assistance is below the global average. […] Whether terrorist groups in Yemen, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have a long-term ability to threaten U.S. homeland security may determine the extent of U.S. resources committed to counterterrorism and stabilization efforts there. Some believe these groups lack such capability and fear the United States might overreact; others assert that Yemen is gradually becoming a failed state and safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives and as such should be considered an active theater for U.S. counterterrorism operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sharp, Jeremy Maxwell
2011-06-08
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Terrorist Financing and State Response [Self-Study Course]
This self-study course was developed by the Naval Postgraduate School Center for Homeland Defense and Security. "This course examines exactly how far we have come in our understanding of the ways in which terrorists raise, store, and transfer funds. It also evaluates challenges facing the U.S. government and international community in responding to this problem. In each module, we use a mix of official reports, academic papers, and other works to explore the subject and identify problems with the received wisdom about terrorist financing. Our goal is to develop the knowledge to critically assess claims about terrorist financing and the tools to think seriously about how to combat it. Developing an understanding of how tenuous knowledge about this subject is will make us better consumers of policy recommendations and intelligence reports. More importantly, it will make us better producers of government policy." The course includes the following modules: Module 1: Managing Terrorist Organizations;
Module 2: Historical Overview of Terrorist Financing; Module 3: Mechanisms for Raising, Transfer, and Storage of Terrorist Funds; Module 4: Case Studies in Terrorism Financing; Module 5: Domestic Responses to Terrorism Financing; and Module 6: International Responses to Terrorism Financing.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Shapiro, Jacob
2011-06
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Morocco: Current Issues [May 27, 2011]
"The United States government views Morocco as a moderate Arab regime, an important ally against terrorism, and a free trade partner. Congress is particularly interested in Morocco because it is a recipient of considerable U.S. foreign assistance to help it combat terror and to develop. Morocco is also a significant purchaser of U.S. arms. King Mohammed VI retains supreme political power in Morocco, but has taken some liberalizing steps with uncertain effects. Since 2005, several elections have met international standards. The government has focused on economic reforms that could alleviate poverty as a way to prevent radicalization and terrorism. It also has begun several major renewable energy projects to lessen dependence on foreign sources. Domestic politics are currently focused on a developing rivalry between the Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), established in 2008 by a former classmate of the king, and the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), which previously had been on the rise. The government is greatly concerned about terrorism because, after 9/11, Morocco experienced several devastating terror attacks and Moroccan nationals have been implicated in attacks and plots overseas. Morocco takes a comprehensive approach to countering terror, involving security measures, economic reforms, control of religious outlets, education, and international cooperation. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), considered the greatest threat to the North African region, has not mounted a successful attack in Morocco. However, individual Moroccans have joined AQIM outside of the country and the group has attempted to use Moroccan territory as a transit point for transnational smuggling operations."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Arieff, Alexis
2011-05-27
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [May 27, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. [...] Congress will continue to decide on funding for the U.S. domestic and international programs focused on nuclear material security and nuclear terrorism prevention. Congress is also likely to assess implementation of the Administration's goal to secure nuclear materials by the end of 2013. The Obama Administration's FY2011 and FY2012 congressional budget request proposed overall increases in funding for nuclear security-related accounts, with the stated purpose of ramping up programs to meet the President's four-year goal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-05-27
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Block Designation Notice
"The Department of Homeland Security (the 'Department') has completed its review of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO) GRaDER program as a Block, pursuant to the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 441-444 (the 'SAFETY Act'), and the Regulations Implementing the Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002, 6 C.F.R. Part 25, 71 Fed. Reg. 33147, 33159 (June 8, 2006) (the 'Regulations'). Pursuant to Section 25.3 of the Regulations, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has delegated her responsibilities, powers, and functions under the SAFETY Act, except the authority to declare that an act is an Act of Terrorism for purposes of Section 444(2) of the SAFETY Act, to the 'Under Secretary for Science and Technology of the Department of Homeland Security or the Under Secretary's designees.' The Under Secretary for Science and Technology has designated the Deputy Under Secretary for Science and Technology as another senior official who, in addition to the Under Secretary for Science and Technology, has authority to make SAFETY Act determinations regarding Designations, Certifications, and other matters in accordance with the SAFETY Act and the Regulations."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2011-05-24
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Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary [May 16, 2011]
"This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations. These include high-profile political assassinations earlier in 2011, the Raymond Davis affair involving a CIA operative accused of murder in the city of Lahore, and the May killing of Osama bin Laden in the military cantonment city of Abbottabad, among others. Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events. A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad's policies toward the Afghan insurgency, Pakistan's relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the troubled status of Pakistan's domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns are briefly summarized, and the report closes with discussion of U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. [...] The May 2011 revelation that Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden had enjoyed apparently years-long and relatively comfortable refuge inside Pakistan has led to intensive U.S. government scrutiny of the now deeply troubled bilateral relationship, and has sparked much congressional questioning of the wisdom of existing U.S. foreign assistance programs to a government and nation that may not have the intention and/or capacity to be an effective U.S. partner. Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S. aid both in FY2010 and in the post-9/11 period, having been appropriated more than $20 billion in assistance and military reimbursements since 2001. With anti-American sentiments and xenophobic conspiracy theories remaining rife among ordinary Pakistanis, persistent economic travails and a precarious political setting combine to present serious challenges to U.S. decision makers."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kronstadt, K. Alan
2011-05-16
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Securing Nuclear Materials: The 2010 Summit and Issues for Congress [April 27, 2011]
"In an April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama pledged that his Administration would launch 'a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.' To motivate world leaders to achieve this goal, the President hosted a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, on April 12-13, 2010. Leaders of 47 countries attended the summit, including many heads of state. Attendees represent a wide geographic range of states and nuclear capabilities, and include China, India, Israel, and Pakistan. The summit resulted in a joint statement saying that international cooperative action is necessary to prevent an act of nuclear terrorism. Summit attendees also pledged to improve nuclear security standards, bring international agreements into force, and share best practices. Nuclear security measures refer to a wide range of actions to prevent theft or diversion of nuclear material or sabotage at an installation or in transit. They could include physical protection measures, material control and accounting, personnel reliability screening, and training. A broader understanding of nuclear security also includes measures to prevent and detect illicit trafficking-- cargo inspections, border security, and interdiction measures. The U.S. government has worked for more than a decade both domestically and in partnership with other countries to address this problem through multiple programs at the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and State. The International Atomic Energy Agency has also played a lead role in these efforts, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2011-04-27
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Leadership Selection in the Enterprise of Medical Countermeasure Development
From the thesis abstract: "The threat of domestic terrorism from a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack is a constant risk that must be managed effectively by those entrusted to protect and prepare our nation. Central to our nation's preparedness are the individuals selected to lead the enterprise of medical countermeasure development. Leaders selected to this post must possess the essential background, skills and experience necessary to achieve success. Equally important, these leaders must be retained in their roles for sufficient time to enact the strategy given to them. Within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response [ASPR] was established with a mission that includes managing the advanced research and development of medical countermeasures through its office of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. The U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command [MRMC] manages a similar mission of medical countermeasure development in diverse research laboratories for the Department of Defense. This paper examines the inherent difficulties of managing the unique long-term medical countermeasure programs of the U.S. government by short-term appointed directors in the offices of the ASPR and MRMC."
Army War College (U.S.)
Rietcheck, Randall L.
2011-04-15
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Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat
From the thesis abstract: "Americans readily identify Muslim extremism as a viable threat to America. However, they ignore or remain unaware of Christian extremism in the same context, despite the similarities in ideology that advocate violence against Americans. For example, the motivation behind Eric Rudolph's bombing of the Olympics in Atlanta in 1996 was to 'embarrass and punish the U.S. government' for its pro-abortion stance. This monograph explores what, if any, domestic terror threat Christian extremism poses and follows the Constructivist approach: how ideas define structure, how this structure defines interests, and how actors take action as a result. Initially focusing on the history and core beliefs of the Christian Identity movement and radical fringes of Dominion and Reconstruction theology, this monograph identifies two major underlying themes in Christian extremism. The first is racism through the use of religion as an accelerant to promote violence. The second is religiously motivated terrorism to support what is perceived as God's will and law. In addition, this monograph analyzes federal law enforcement action against Christian extremism through a series of case studies that took place in Mountainhome, Arkansas, Ruby Ridge, Idaho, and Waco, Texas. The analysis of the catastrophic consequences from Ruby Ridge and Waco with the Oklahoma City bombing follows. Concluding this monograph are the lessons learned, comparison of federal law enforcement's action in each case study, and analyzing the tactics and leadership involved. Whereas the FBI's tactics and leadership exercised proved highly successful in Arkansas, they were disastrous in Idaho and Texas. Finally, this monograph provides a domestic terror threat assessment with recommended actions in what is not only a law enforcement issue, but a war of ideology between tolerance and understanding versus hate and bigotry."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Wong, Frederick D.
2011-04-01
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Examination of Terrestrial Nuclear Energy's Relevance to U.S. National Security
This thesis is in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. "This paper is an examination of the relevance that terrestrial nuclear energy has with regard to U.S. national security. Terrestrial nuclear energy is herein defined as energy produced from land-based nuclear reactors. The principal application for terrestrial nuclear reactors is in the generation of electricity. Maritime or space-vehicle propulsion reactors are excluded from this definition, as are nuclear weapons. While the national security implications of thermonuclear warheads and nuclear-powered warships are relatively direct, the national security implications of benign nuclear energy are less so. National security interest areas of energy independence, energy security, climate change, economics, public safety, and nuclear terrorism and proliferation are considered. The paper addresses both domestic nuclear energy and aspects of foreign nuclear energy. Through this examination, terrestrial nuclear energy is found to have both direct and indirect implications to U.S. national security interests."
Army War College (U.S.)
Raftery, Jr, James J.
2011-03-24
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Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations [March 10, 2011]
"Since taking power in 2005, King Abdullah has created greater public space for domestic social reform debates and has promoted the concept of a strong national identity among Saudis in the face of a determined domestic terrorism campaign. He also has codified royal succession rules, begun restructuring the justice system, and taken clear steps to exert stronger government control over religious authorities. Robust oil export revenues have strengthened the kingdom's economic position and provide Saudi leaders with significant financial resources to meet domestic investment needs and provide social benefits. In this context, the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to grapple with a core challenge identified by the 9/11 Commission in its final report: defining a broader bilateral relationship that 'leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend.' The Obama Administration has engaged the Saudi government as a strategic partner in efforts to promote regional stability and to defeat Al Qaeda, and current U.S. policy initiatives seek to help Saudi leaders address key domestic economic and security challenges. It remains to be seen whether these U.S. initiatives and, more importantly, Saudi leaders' own reform efforts will enable the kingdom to meet the energy, education, employment, and security challenges that its citizens face. Shared challenges have long defined U.S.-Saudi relations, but questions about political, economic, and social reform may become more pressing in light of the calls for change that are now swirling around the kingdom."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Blanchard, Christopher M.
2011-03-10
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NNSA Fact Sheet: Securing Domestic Radioactive Material
This document is a National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Fact Sheet. From the document: "In April 2009, President Obama outlined an ambitious agenda to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years, calling the danger of a terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons 'the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.' In this year's State of the Union, he called the threat of nuclear weapons, 'the greatest danger to the American people.' The President's FY 2012 budget request provides the resources required to implement that agenda. It requests $2.5 billion in FY 2012 and $14.2 billion over the next five years to reduce the global nuclear threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing and controlling nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the responsible application of nuclear technology and science. In addition to securing nuclear material around the world, the National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA] plays a key role in the U.S. government's comprehensive effort to secure radiological material here at home. NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) oversees two programs aimed at securing radioactive materials in the United States. NNSA/GTRI's Domestic Material Protection program collaborates with partner sites like hospitals and universities to provide voluntary security enhancements to prevent terrorists from acquiring in----use radiological materials. NNSA/GTRI's Domestic Radiological Material Removal Program removes radiological sources that are no longer being used for disposal or secure storage. Taken together with the President's commitment to partner with the international community to secure vulnerable nuclear and radiological material around the world, these domestic security programs demonstrate this Administration's commitment to protecting the American people from nuclear terrorism."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2011-02-01
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National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) - Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns [February 1, 2011]
"The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate responses could be planned. [...] As a component of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the NCTC is composed of analysts with backgrounds in many government agencies and has access to various agency databases. It prepares studies ranging from strategic assessments of potential terrorist threats to daily briefings and situation reports. It is also responsible, directly to the President, for planning (but not directing) counterterrorism efforts. [...] Although there have been a number of arrests of individuals suspected of planning terrorist attacks in the U.S., two incidents in 2009--the assassination by an Army Major of some 13 individuals at Fort Hood Army Base on November 5, 2009, and the failed attempt to trigger a bomb on an airliner approaching Detroit on December 25, 2009--contributed to increased concern about counterterrorism capabilities domestically and internationally. An Executive Branch assessment of the December 2009 bombing attempt concluded that, whereas information sharing had been adequate, analysts had failed to 'connect the dots' and achieve an understanding of an ongoing plot. [...] A review by the Senate Intelligence Committee released in May 2010 found there were systemic failures across the Intelligence Community and, in particular, that the NCTC was inadequately organized and resourced for its missions. In addition, the committee concluded that intelligence analysts (not only those in NCTC) tended to focus more on threats to U.S. interests in Yemen than on domestic threats."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Best, Richard A.
2011-02-01
