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• GTRI's Convert Program: Minimizing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium [May 29, 2014]

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  This document is a Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) Fact Sheet. From the document: "In 2004 NNSA [National Nuclear Security Initiative] established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to, as quickly as possible, identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community. GTRI's mission is to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide. GTRI achieves its mission via three initiatives which provide a comprehensive approach to preventing terrorists' access to nuclear and radiological materials. As part of its mission, GTRI's Convert Program, working domestically and internationally, implements the long-standing U.S policy to minimize and eliminate the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications by working to convert research and test reactors and isotope production facilities to the use of low enriched uranium (LEU). Taken together with NNSA's work to prevent proliferation and secure nuclear material, the Convert Program demonstrates GTRI's commitment to protecting the American people and the rest of the world from nuclear and radiological terrorism."

  United States. National Nuclear Security Administration

  2014-05-29
• Offensive Use of Chemical Technologies by US Special Operations Forces in the Global War on Terrorism: The Nonlethal Option

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  "The possible use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations is drawing much attention in the ongoing global war on terrorism. The examination of their use comes at a time when the United Nations Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits their application in any type of armed conflict. International law governing the use of new developments in antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies has recently been the subject of intense public debate, resulting in congressional hearings questioning the ratification enforcement protocols to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Although the exercise of nonlethal chemical technologies is not prohibited in domestic law enforcement applications, US special operations counterterrorist forces encounter situations where military combat and law enforcement tactics, techniques, and procedures amalgamate into an overarching methodology. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars sparked controversy as to the possible application of nonlethal riot control and calmative-type agents against insurgents who are entrenched physically within the geographical commons. The decision to apply nonlethal technologies requires an understanding of their overall effects, both tactically and strategically. This paper provides background information on both antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies; their applications within the special operations forces (SOF) counterterrorist environment; and their operational applications during armed conflict, combat search and rescue, and hostage rescue. Comparisons of technologies are made, their differences highlighted, and recommendations for use offered. While it may appear that nonlethal chemical technologies are new, their path to development has been navigated with forethought and discretion."

  Air University (U.S.). Press

  Whitbred, George N. T.

  2006-07
• Closing the Capability Gap: Developing New Solutions to Counter Maritime Threats

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  "America is engaged in a fight against violent extremism, an asymmetric war that differs from any other war our nation has fought. The nature of the enemy has changed dramatically during the past two decades, compelling leaders to reexamine our nation's vulnerabilities in the air, land, and maritime domains. Significant strides have been made nationally to protect the air and land domains against enemy attacks; nonetheless, this article argues, efforts to secure the maritime domain--although improving--are inadequate, and we need to sharpen our focus on maritime threats, domestically and internationally. This article draws from the perspective of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), whose mission is to anticipate and conduct homeland defense and civil support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect, and secure the United States and its interests. The article will summarize national-level maritime doctrine, examine the current maritime threat, and introduce new capabilities being developed to counter terrorism on the maritime front--an enduring national security challenge gaining increased attention at all levels."

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Renuart, Victor; Egli, Dane S.

  2008
• Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain, Statement of David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, and Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives

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  From the opening statement of David C. Maurer and Gene Aloise: "We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device (also called a 'dirty bomb'). The detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism. The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other federal agencies. Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2011-07-26
• Don't Celebrate Just Yet

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  "For Americans, the death of Osama Bin Laden was a satisfying emotional end to the story of the 21st century's most famous terrorist leader, but it has not made the United States safer in the short run or the long run. Bin Laden's death is an accomplishment to be celebrated, but in the short-term it has not ended the two wars America still fights, it has not destroyed the international terrorist networks that Bin Laden supported, and it has not reduced the threat of extremist terrorism that faces Americans at home and abroad. Bin Laden's death, rather, demonstrates America's prioritization of domestic security goals over international norms and laws, weakening its security in the long run. And the anger and political turmoil that now embroils Pakistan, along with the concurrent weakening of US-Pakistan relations, does little to help United States security."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Contemporary Conflict

  Guo, Jerry M.

  2011
• Serial No. 112-91: Keeping America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of Threat Detection Technologies, Hearing Before the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, Thursday, July 19, 2012

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  This is the July 19, 2012 hearing on "Keeping America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of Threat Detection Technologies," held before the U.S. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. From the opening statement of Ralph M. Hall: "The Committee on Science, Space, and Technology will come to order, and I say to you, good morning and thank you. Welcome to today's hearing entitled 'Keeping America Secure: The Science Supporting the Development of Threat Detection Technologies.' […] The September 11th terrorist attacks forced the American public to confront the daily threat of domestic terrorism, and advancing threat detection technologies, I think, is one of the many ways research and development contributes to keeping our country secure. Recognizing the need to respond quickly when a potential threat is identified and to counter the growing list of threats to our country, the U.S. government and the private sector focused research and development activities on the detection of explosives, firearms, and dangerous materials including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear matter. Scientific research has advanced the development of technologies to protect the Nation, but the rapidly changing threats that we face require continued research and development to ensure that we keep ahead of our enemies. We recognize that the terrorists only need to get it right once to succeed, whereas we need to get it right every time to ensure the protection of our citizens." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ralph M. Hall, Eddie Bernice Johnson, Richard Cavanagh, Huban Gowadia, Anthony Peurrung, Thomas Peterson, and Jerry Costello.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2012
• Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa: U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa

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  "Domestic and international terrorism aside, the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), are vying for influence over African governments and people. Not unlike the Cold War, the primary means of exerting influence in Africa is through the use of nonviolent instruments of grand strategy. The author considers one nonviolent instrument of grand strategy in particular, political warfare. He suggests that the PRC has used political warfare as its leading grand strategic instrument in Africa and offers a concise, detailed overview of U.S. capabilities to conduct political warfare in Africa in four of its nation-states."

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Chau, Donovan C.

  2007-03
• Iran Nuclear Deal and its Impact on Terrorism Financing, Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, July 22, 2015

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  This compilation is from the July 22, 2015 hearing titled "Iran Nuclear Deal and its Impact on Terrorism Financing," held before the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services. The following is from the statement of Ilan I. Berman: "In his July 14th statement formally announcing the agreement, President Obama asserted that it 'prevents' Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. In point of fact, however, it does no such thing. The JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] is time--‐limited in nature, designed to last for just a decade, with the majority of its provisions expiring in 2025 (and some doing so earlier). For the coming ten years, the deal will indeed make it more difficult--although not impossible--for Iran to develop the constituent parts of a nuclear program. […] The terms of the JCPOA demonstrate that the Iranian regime has persevered on this point. Under the agreement, Iran is poised to receive massive economic relief in the near future. Specifically, later this year, upon IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] verification that Iran has divulged the requisite details of its military--‐related nuclear work, the U.S. will begin unblocking $100 billion or more of Iranian revenue from oil sales that had been locked in escrow accounts in China, South Korea, and other nations. To put this sum in context, it amounts to roughly a quarter of Iran's annual gross domestic product (GDP), which totaled $415 billion in 2014." Statements, letters, and other materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ilan I. Berman, Mark Dubowitz, Steven R. Perles, Olli Heinonen, Richard Nephew.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Financial Services

  2015-07-22
• Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Annex for Public Assembly Stakeholders

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  From the Document: "Bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common security concern related to terrorism and violence in the United States (U.S.). High-profile domestic incidents have occurred and international attacks are frequently in the news. Public Assembly venues are not immune from IED incidents, including bomb threats, suspicious items, and actual bombings. This guide defines tasks and related processes that security managers and staff at public assembly venues can use to understand and improve their ability to perform counter-IED (C-IED) activities and make decisions. This guide is designed to provide security managers and staff at public assembly facilities with: 1) A practical framework to examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and 2) Supporting guidance and materials to strengthen their C-IED preparedness."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Annex for Outdoor Events Stakeholders

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  From the Document: "Bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common security concern related to terrorism and violence in the United States (U.S.). High-profile domestic incidents have occurred and international attacks are frequently in the news. Outdoor events venues are not immune from IED incidents, including bomb threats, suspicious items, and actual bombings. This guide defines tasks and related processes that security managers and staff at outdoor events venues can use to understand and improve their ability to perform counter-IED (C-IED) activities and make decisions. This guide is designed to provide security managers and staff at outdoor events venues with: 1) A practical framework to examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and 2) Supporting guidance and materials to strengthen their C-IED preparedness."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Security and Resiliency Guide Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Annex for Lodging Stakeholders

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  From the Document: "Bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common security concern related to terrorism and violence in the United States (U.S.). High-profile domestic incidents have occurred and international attacks are frequently in the news. Hotel and lodging venues are not immune from IED incidents, including bomb threats, suspicious items, and actual bombings. This guide defines tasks and related processes that security managers and staff at lodging venues can use to understand and improve their ability to perform counter-IED (C-IED) activities and make decisions. This guide is designed to provide security managers and staff at lodging facilities with: 1) A practical framework to examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and 2) Supporting guidance and materials to strengthen their C-IED preparedness."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• Security and Resiliency Guide: Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Annex for Sports Leagues and Venues Stakeholders

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  From the Document: "Bombings using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a common security concern related to terrorism and violence in the United States (U.S.). High-profile domestic incidents have occurred and international attacks are frequently in the news. Sports league and venues are not immune from IED incidents, including bomb threats, suspicious items, and actual bombings. This guide defines tasks and related processes that security managers and staff at sports venues can use to understand and improve their ability to perform counter-IED (C-IED) activities and make decisions. For the purposes of this Guide, sports leagues include professional leagues (major, minor, and independent) and amateur associations (intercollegiate, interscholastic, and Olympic). This guide is designed to provide security managers and staff at sports venues with: 1) A practical framework to examine their ability to perform C-IED activities, and 2) Supporting guidance and materials to strengthen their C-IED preparedness."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security
• S. Hrg. 115-397: Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations' Use of Social Media Platforms (Third Party Expert Witnesses), Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, August 1, 2018

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  This is the August 1, 2018 hearing on "Open Hearing on Foreign Influence Operations' Use of Social Media Platforms (Third Party Expert Witnesses)," held before the United States Senate Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Richard Burr: "We're here to discuss a threat to the Nation that this Committee takes every bit as seriously as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, espionage and regional instability. Today we're talking about how social media platforms have enabled foreign influence operations against the United States. Every member of this Committee and the American people understand what an attack on the integrity of our electoral process means. Election interference from abroad represents an intolerable assault on the democratic foundation this republic was built on. The Committee, in a bipartisan fashion, has addressed this issue head on. In May, we released the initial findings of our investigation into Russia's targeting of election infrastructure during the 2016 election. Today's hearing is an extension of that effort. But in some ways it highlights something far more sinister, the use of our own rights and freedoms to weaken our country from within. It's also important that the American people know that these activities neither began nor ended with the 2016 election. As you can see on the one graph on display to my left, your right, the Kremlin began testing this capability on their domestic population several years ago, before using it against their foes in the Near Abroad and on the United States and Western democracies." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Todd Helmus, Renee DiResta, John Kelly, Laura Rosenberger, and Philip Howard.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2018
• Homeland Security - The National Strategy; U.S. Northern Command's and the U.S. Navy's Roles in Homeland Defense and Civil Support

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  "Even though Americans have seen the consequences of terror on their homeland as a result of the attacks in Oklahoma City in 1995 and on the World Trade Center in 1993 the majority of U.S. citizens still could not fathom the contemplation of a true catastrophic attack on our soil until September 11 2001. In the past thoughts of disasters and emergencies were limited to small rare and relatively short-lived incidents primarily related to natural disasters. September 11th presented our nation with a new challenge that is much more complex and difficult to deal with. This paper will present an overview analysis of two pieces of the overall Homeland Security policy: the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the Department of Defense's (DoD) support roles. The paper will review the Nation's civil defense history since World War II and analyze the recently released National Strategy for Homeland Security. The military's efforts to perform its mission of homeland defense while homeland security and civil support become increasingly important will be discussed. The role of the military's support to civil authorizes both before and after a domestic incident is increasing in complexity and frequency. DoD's current approach to Homeland Security will be discussed and possible new military tasks will be provided. Finally I will offer recommendations to improve the national strategy and the U. S. Navy's support role to be better prepared to defend the Homeland and provide support to Civil Authorities."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Fitzgerald, Steve

  2004-03-19
• Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Staff Statement No. 3: The Aviation Security System and the 9/11 Attacks, January 27, 2004

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  The seventh public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was held January 26-27, 2004 in Washington, DC. The two-day investigative hearing developed facts and circumstances relating to border and aviation security, two central aspects of the Commission's mandate. The focus of this Staff Statement is on "The Aviation Security System and the 9/11 Attacks." The following is an excerpt from the introduction: "Before September 11, 2001, the aviation security system had been enjoying a period of relative peace. No U.S. flagged aircraft had been bombed or hijacked in over a decade. Domestic hijacking in particular seemed like a thing of the past, something that could only happen to foreign airlines that were less well protected. The public's own 'threat assessment' before September 11 was sanguine about commercial aviation safety and security. In a Fox News/Opinion Dynamics survey conducted at the end of the 1990s, 78 percent cited poor maintenance as 'a greater threat to airline safety' than terrorism. Demand for air service was strong and was beginning to exceed the capacity of the system. Heeding constituent calls for improved air service and increased capacity, Congress focused its legislative and oversight attention on measures to address these problems, including a 'passenger bill of rights' to assure a more efficient and convenient passenger experience. The leadership of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) also focused on safety, customer service, capacity and economic issues. The agency's security agenda was focused on efforts to implement a three-year-old Congressional mandate to deploy explosives detection equipment at all major airports and complete a nearly five-year-old rulemaking effort to improve checkpoint screening. This staff statement will not address certain security performance issues leading up to 9/11 at the airports from which the hijacked planes departed. Such work is still ongoing. It should be noted that the airports themselves did not have operational or enforcement jurisdiction over checkpoint screening operations. Passenger prescreening and checkpoint screening, based on regulations from the FAA, were the responsibility of the air carriers. Nevertheless, airport authorities do play a key role in the overall civil aviation security system."

  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

  2004-01-27
• Closing the Cyber Gap: Integrating Cross-Government Cyber Capabilities to Support the DHS Cyber Security Mission

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  From the thesis abstract: "Following the 9/11 terror attacks, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was mandated to ensure the security of the nation's cyber-supported critical infrastructure, which is predominantly privately owned and outside of the control of the U.S. government. This thesis examines the development of the government's cyber-security policies and primary operational entities through their lawful authorities and capabilities. The thesis also examines and contrasts the effectiveness of DHS's technology-centric, cyber-security approach, the deterrent effect realized through law enforcement cyber operations, and the suitability and effectiveness of the utilization of military or intelligence agencies, specifically the FBI, National Security Agency or Department of Defense, to fulfill the nation's domestic cyber-security mission. Evidence suggests that DHS has consistently chosen to devote disproportionate budgetary resources to develop defensive technologies of questionable effectiveness, initiate redundant information-sharing programs, and develop cyber incidence response teams while not fully utilizing the U.S. Secret Service's legal authorities and capabilities in furtherance of the department's mission. Recommendations are offered to develop a whole-of-government cyber-security policy for an effective, integrated, cyber-security operation through the utilization of agency-specific authorities and capabilities, while protecting our nation's critical infrastructure and our citizens' civil liberties."

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

  Lowery, Edward W.

  2014-12
• H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Days 1 and 2, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, July 15 and 16, 2002

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  From the opening statement of J.C. Watts, Jr.: "During my first year in the House of Representatives, the Oklahoma City bombing created a wake-up call on the need for a plan of action against domestic terrorism. During my last term here in Congress, the attacks on September 11, 2001, have forever changed the world and again demonstrated why the government must change the way we view threats to our homeland. […] I was pleased when President Bush called last month for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, and I am thankful Speaker Hastert had the good judgment to create this committee. […] The Select Committee has offered a fair, open and bipartisan process for members to express their views as we discuss the proposal put forth by the President. George Mason, the Virginian and who made the case for the Bill of Rights to our Constitution, wrote, 'government is, or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, Nation or community.' Mr. Chairman, we need to secure our borders as we secure our liberty. We must protect our rights as Americans and as our government protects our freedom. But while we think outside the box in order to promote these values each of us holds dear, we must never think outside the parameters of the United States Constitution." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: J.C. Watts, Jr., Tom Ridge, Ann Veneman, Norman Y. Mineta, Tommy G. Thompson, Spencer Abraham, Kay Cole James, Mac Thornberry, Jane Harman, Jim Gibbons, Ellen O. Tauscher, F. James Sensenbrenner, Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., and Colleen M. Kelly.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• Lebanon and Iraq Protests: Insights, Implications, and Objectives for U.S. Policy, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, December 4, 2019

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  This is the December 4, 2019 hearing "Lebanon and Iraq Protests: Insights, Implications, and Objectives for U.S. Policy" held before the Subcommittee on near East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Counterterrorism of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. From the opening statement of Mitt Romney: "The focus of today's hearing is to assess the implications of the protest movements in Lebanon and Iraq and understand the impact of these on U.S. policy in each of these countries. [...] Both Iraq and Lebanon are geographically significant from a regional security perspective. They also face similar challenges. They are fragile democracies. They have faltering domestic economies, and there are increasing efforts by Iran and Iranian-backed groups to gain greater influence over their respective governments and civil societies. Both countries are currently engaged in protests, with civilians decrying corruption, high unemployment, and what they perceive as Iranian intervention." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Joey Hood.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2020
• Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy [January 4, 2011]

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  "As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States holds what should be a winning hand of a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. The nation's security should be secure. Yet the debate over national security seems to be both intensifying and broadening. The problem appears not only in the difficulty of finding a winning strategy in the long war against acts of terrorism but having to face economic constraints that loom large in the public debate. In addition, the global financial crisis and recession have highlighted the trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and spending to provide jobs and income for citizens at home. The United States has long been accustomed to pursuing a 'rich man's' approach to national security. The country could field an overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation's security. The economy has always been there both to provide the funds and materiel for defense and to provide economic security for most households. Policies for economic growth and issues such as unemployment have been viewed as domestic problems largely separate from considerations of national security."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Nanto, Dick Kazuyuki

  2011-01-04
• Iran's 2009 Presidential Elections [June 22, 2009]

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  "On June 12, 2009, following a heated campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iranians turned out in record numbers to vote in the presidential election. Shortly after the polls closed, the Interior Minister announced that President Ahmadinejad had been reelected by a 62% margin. The announcement was followed by allegations of vote rigging and election fraud and prompted supporters of leading reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and others to hold public demonstrations in several major cities of a size and intensity unprecedented since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Despite a government ban on unauthorized public gatherings, protests have reportedly continued every day since the election. Restrictions on foreign and domestic journalists, reported disruptions of mobile phone networks, limited accessibility of some internet sites, mass arrests, and clashes between civilian protestors and Basij forces have garnered international attention and increased concerns about the Iranian government's apparent disregard for human rights and basic civil liberties. Regardless of the actual election results, the current stand-off between the government and opponents of the election outcome has caused observers to speculate about how this stalemate will be resolved, and what the outcome might mean for U.S. efforts to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear weapons program, its support for terrorism, and other national security concerns. This report will be updated to reflect recent events. For more information and background on Iran, see CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Addis, Casey L.

  2009-06-22
• Greece: Threat of Terrorism and Security at the Olympics [April 30, 2004]

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  "The summer 2004 Olympic Games will take place in Athens, Greece, where their success is a point of national pride. The Greek government is planning unprecedented security measures to deal with possible terrorist threats. Attacks by Al Qaeda or its allies in Europe and elsewhere heightened the government's awareness of the potential for terrorism at the Olympics. Athens believes that it has effectively dismantled major domestic terrorist groups in recent years and is preparing mainly for external threats, although anarchists and anti-globalization groups may be disruptive as well. The Greek Ministry of Public Order is in charge of security and Greece requested assistance from NATO and others, including the United States. The U.S. Administration is taking its own steps to protect the U.S. Olympic team. This report will be updated if developments warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Migdalovitz, Carol

  2004-04-30
• Terrorism in Southeast Asia [Updated April 7, 2004]

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  "Since September 2001, U.S. has been concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore that are known to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to penetration by anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. To combat the threat, the Bush Administration has pressed countries in the region to arrest suspected terrorist individuals and organizations, deployed over 1,000 troops to the southern Philippines to advise the Philippine military in their fight against the violent Abu Sayyaf Group, increased intelligence sharing operations, restarted military-military relations with Indonesia (including restoring International Military Education and Training [IMET]), provided or requested from Congress over $1.1 billion in aid to Indonesia and the Philippines, and has signed a multilateral counterterrorism agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The responses of countries in the region to both the threat and to the U.S. reaction generally have varied with the intensity of their concerns about the threat to their own stability and domestic politics."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Niksch, Larry A.; Cronin, Richard P.; Manyin, Mark E.

  2004-04-07
• Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and Approaches [Updated January 14, 2009]

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  This CRS Report "provides a potential conceptual model of how to frame HSINT (homeland security intelligence), including geographic, structural/statutory, and holistic approaches. Given that state, local, tribal, and private sector officials play such an important role in HSINT, the holistic model, one not constrained by geography or levels of government, strikes many as the most compelling. The report argues that there is, in effect, a Homeland Security Intelligence Community (HSIC). Although the HSIC's members are diffused across the nation, they share a common counterterrorism interest. The proliferation of intelligence and information fusion centers across the country indicate that state and local leaders believe there is value to centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that assists them in preventing and responding to local manifestations of terrorist threats to their people, infrastructure, and other assets. At the policy and operational levels, the communication and integration of federal HSINT efforts with these state and local fusion centers will likely remain an important priority and future challenge. This report will not be updated. [...] Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has focused considerable attention on how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in order to protect the homeland against terrorist threats. Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between 'domestic intelligence'--primarily law enforcement information collected within the United States--and 'foreign intelligence'-- primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected outside the country. Today, threats to the homeland posed by terrorist groups are now national security threats. Intelligence collected outside the United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Randol, Mark A.

  2009-01-14
• Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation [Updated May 15, 2008]

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  This CRS report "provides an overview of recent industry proposals for new LNG [Liquefied Natural Gas] import terminals. The report summarizes LNG hazards and the industry's safety record. It discusses federal laws and regulations related to LNG terminal siting with a focus on the authorities of key federal agencies and safety provisions in the permitting of onshore facilities. The report reviews controversial safety issues in recent LNG siting proceedings, such as safety zones, marine hazards, hazard modeling, and remote siting." It also "outlines policy issues related to LNG terminal safety, including the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's [FERC's] LNG siting authority, regional LNG siting, 'remote' siting requirements in federal regulations, state permitting requirements, terrorism, and other issues […] Liquefied natural gas [LNG] historically has played a minor role in U.S. energy markets, but concerns about rising natural gas prices, current price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages are sharply increasing demand for LNG imports. To meet this demand, dozens of new onshore and offshore LNG import terminals have been proposed in coastal regions throughout the United States. But LNG, like other fossils, is a hazardous1 liquid transported and stored in enormous quantities, often near populated areas. Concerns exist about the safety of new LNG import terminals and the federal government's role in addressing LNG safety in the terminal siting process. In addition, various energy policy proposals could impact the need for new LNG terminals by encouraging the development of alternative U.S. energy supplies and promoting conservation."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Parfomak, Paul W.; Vann, Adam

  2008-05-15
• Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety, and Regulation [December 14, 2009]

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  "Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a hazardous fuel shipped in large tankers to U.S. ports from overseas. While LNG has historically made up a small part of U.S. natural gas supplies, rising price volatility, and the possibility of domestic shortages have significantly increased LNG demand. To meet this demand, energy companies have proposed new LNG import terminals throughout the coastal United States. Many of these terminals would be built onshore near populated areas. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) grants federal approval for the siting of new onshore LNG facilities under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 and the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58). This approval process incorporates minimum safety standards for LNG established by the Department of Transportation. Although LNG has had a record of relative safety for the last 45 years, and no LNG tanker or land-based facility has been attacked by terrorists, proposals for new LNG terminal facilities have generated considerable public concern. Some community groups and governments officials fear that LNG terminals may expose nearby residents to unacceptable hazards. Ongoing public concern about LNG safety has focused congressional attention on the exclusivity of FERC's LNG siting authority, proposals for a regional LNG siting process, the lack of 'remote' siting requirements in FERC regulations, state permitting requirements under the Clean Water Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act, terrorism attractiveness of LNG, the adequacy of Coast Guard security resources, and other issues."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Parfomak, Paul W.; Vann, Adam

  2009-12-14
• American Foreign Fighters and the Islamic State: Broad Challenges for Federal Law Enforcement [September 19, 2014]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has assessed that the terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, previously referred to as ISIS or ISIL) currently poses no specific or credible threat to the homeland. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Matthew G. Olsen, has also noted that, 'any threat to the U.S. homeland from these types of extremists is likely to be limited in scope and scale,' perhaps involving individuals acting without specific IS direction. In this vein, policy makers continue to voice concerns about American IS fighters who may leave Syria or Iraq, return to the United States, and strike targets on their own at home. This CRS [Congressional Research Service] Insight offers a framework for considering the challenges to domestic security posed by American IS fighters and outlines some of the ways that U.S. law enforcement responds to such challenges."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Bjelopera, Jerome P.

  2014-09-19
• November 2015 Terrorist Siege in Mali [November 23, 2015]

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  "On November 20, 2015, gunmen laid siege to the Radisson Blu, a hotel popular with foreigners in Mali's capital, Bamako. At least 22 people are reportedly dead, including one American. Other Americans were among more than 100 hostages safely recovered. Malian and French forces conducted rescue operations; U.S. Special Operations forces supported those efforts. Al Murabitoun, a Sahel-based terrorist group affiliated with Al Qaeda, and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) jointly claimed responsibility for the assault, possibly in coordination with other Mali-based groups. The Bamako attack came one week after the terrorist attacks in Paris, amid heightened international concern about threats to soft targets. It was the latest in a series against domestic and international targets in Mali and Northwest Africa. After several high-impact attacks by the self-declared Islamic State, the assault is also an indication of the growing fragmentation within the 'larger terrorism landscape,' with an array of groups emerging in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and growing threats against U.S. partners. Some groups have aligned themselves with Al Qaeda and others with the Islamic State, creating competition for recruits, resources, and public attention. Despite rhetorical affiliation with transnational groups, many Africa-based groups operate with relative autonomy."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Blanchard, Lauren Ploch; Renard, Emily; Arieff, Alexis

  2015-11-23
• Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch [Updated October 15, 2019]

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  From the Introduction: "Federal courts may not order a defendant to pay restitution to the victims of his or her crimes unless empowered to do so by statute. Two general statutes vest the courts with authority to order restitution. One, 18 U.S.C. § 3663, permits it for certain crimes. The second, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, requires it for other crimes. In addition, several individual restitution statutes authorize awards for particular offenses, i.e.: (1) animal enterprise terrorism; (2) failure to provide child support; (3) human trafficking; (4) sexual abuse; (5) sexual exploitation of children; (6) stalking or domestic violence; (7) copyright infringement; (8) telemarketing fraud; (9) amphetamine or methamphetamine offenses; (10) reckless disregard of sex trafficking; and (11) transportation or travel for unlawful sexual purposes. Federal courts also may order restitution pursuant to a plea bargain or as a condition of probation or supervised release, even where it is not otherwise authorized. Section 3664 supplies the procedure under which the restitution order is ordinarily imposed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Doyle, Charles

  2019-10-15
• Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident

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  This "Guidelines for Responding to a Chemical Weapons Incident" document has been developed by the Domestic Preparedness Program (DPP). Through the U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Chemical Weapons Improved Response Program (CWIRP), members of the Law Enforcement, Health and Safety, and the Emergency Response Functional Groups designed these guidelines with the intent to give assistance to all response personnel in dealing with critical incident management decisions consistent with an actual chemical weapons (CW) emergency response. These guidelines are neither mandated nor required procedures for response to the scene of a chemical terrorism incident. Rather, they are presented to provide technical and operational guidance for those agencies wishing to improve their response and related operations should a CW incident occur in their community. The focus of these guidelines was to validate the procedures and recommendations developed through the series of emergency response technical reports that have already been published by the CWIRP. That validation process was conducted via a forum consisting of representatives from the fire, Emergency Medical Services (EMS), police, and health and safety communities.

  U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command

  2001
• United States Coast Guard National Strike Force

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  A presentation from the World Wide Chemical Conference 19 (XIX) by the commander of the U.S. Coast Guard [USCG] National Strike Force. Outlines primary mission of the Strike Force which includes expertise in chemical, oil, and bio tactical response. The Force's primary mission is to "provide assistance to USCG and EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] Federal On Scene Coordinators while executing their responsibilities under the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Response Plan, and/or Domestic Terrorism Conplan."

  United States. Coast Guard. National Strike Force

  Hartley, Scott

  2002-09-11