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• Privacy Impact Assessment for the Malware Lab Network

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  "The goal of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) is to advance the risk-reduction segment of the Department's overall mission. To meet this goal, the NPPD/U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) provides key capabilities in four cyber mission areas: 1) Alert, Warning, and Analysis; 2) Coordination and Collaboration; 3) Response and Assistance; and 4) Protection and Detection. The Malware Lab Network (MLN) contributes critical support to existing tools used by US-CERT to better meet these cyber mission areas. The MLN collects, uses, and maintains analytically relevant information in order to support the Department's cyber security mission, including the prevention and mitigation of cyber attacks, protection of information infrastructure, the assessment of cyber vulnerabilities, and response to cyber incidents. DHS is conducting this PIA to publicly analyze and evaluate the personally identifiable information (PII) within the MLN."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Privacy Office

  2010-05-04
• DHS Can Strengthen Its International Cybersecurity Programs (Redacted)

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  "The borderless nature of threats to, and emanating from, cyberspace requires robust engagement and strong partnerships with countries around the world. International engagement is a key element of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) cyber mission to safeguard and secure cyberspace. As such, the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) has established multiple functions to support its international affairs program, which promotes cybersecurity awareness and fosters collaboration with other countries and organizations. We determined whether NPPD has established effective programs and partnerships to collaborate and share cybersecurity information with the international community. We also evaluated whether NPPD is promoting the benefits of networked technology globally, and a secure, reliable, and interoperable cyberspace. Overall, NPPD and its subcomponents have undertaken actions to promote collaboration with the international community and develop partnerships with other nations to better protect cyberspace. For example, NPPD and its subcomponents participate in international cyber exercises, capacity building workshops, and multilateral and bilateral engagements. The Directorate also utilizes innovative technologies to share cyber data with its partner nations. While continuing to build upon existing partnerships, NPPD's Office of Cybersecurity and Communications needs to establish and implement a plan and goals to further its international affairs program with other countries, international industry, and the private sector to protect global cyberspace and critical infrastructure. For more efficient and effective operations, NPPD should streamline its international affairs functions to better coordinate foreign relations and consolidate resources. Finally, the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team needs to strengthen its communications and information-sharing activities with and among its counterparts to promote international incident response and the sharing of best practices."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

  2012-08
• Defense Support to Civil Authorities Doctrinal Shortfalls During Cyber Attacks

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  From the Abstract: "As doctrine continues to evolve towards multi-domain battle, the homeland is under increasing risk. In the multi-domain extended battlefield, US reliance on the defense industrial base and strategic lines of communication present adversaries with unique opportunities. At the same time, access to domestic critical infrastructure and key resources in the cyber domain could put the homeland in play in the next war. Efforts to protect the nation's infrastructure in the cyber domain currently remain largely focused on cyber-defense. What if a threat actor successfully penetrated cyber-defenses and impacted critical infrastructure? What would the defense response look like if this attack came during a major combat operation? Would such an attack be defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) or homeland defense (HD), and does it matter? This thesis explores these questions by analyzing the current DSCA doctrine and comparing it to current cyber threats."

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

  Buller, Thomas T.

  2018-06-15
• Cyberspace as a Complex Adaptive System and the Policy and Operational Implications for Cyber Warfare

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  "The overall implication of depicting cyberspace as a complex, adaptive ecosystem is that it provides an avenue for further insight and understanding of the complexities associated with operating in cyberspace. This renewed reality highlights a source of vulnerability, a potential threat to national security, due to the intermixing of public and private infrastructure and the reliance of the United States Government (USG) on infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector. The fact that most, if not all, of the underlying infrastructure for seamless cyber interactions are controlled and managed by non-state entities means that the USG most recognize the power of the private sector in cyberspace. This represents a disturber of the familiar international order because the major actor that constitutes and defines international relations (the state) is not able to control cyberspace or to insulate itself from the implications of the new cyber realities. This recognition suggests that adopting a policy position that is primarily offensive in nature better serves the US, especially in regards to the protection of the cyber ecosystems of the private sector. Specifically it proposes that offensive cyber attacks should not be limited to only the authorized entities of the United States military, but should be expanded to include authorized entities in the private sector. Central to this proposition is the introduction of a new element of operational art specific to the cyber realm to guard against unintended consequences--the operational art element of precision."

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies

  Olagbemiro, Albert O.

  2014-05-22
• Cyberspace as a Complex Adaptive System and the Policy and Opertional Implications for Cyber Warfare

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  From the thesis abstract: "The overall implication of depicting cyberspace as a complex, adaptive ecosystem is that it provides an avenue for further insight and understanding of the complexities associated with operating in cyberspace. This renewed reality highlights a source of vulnerability, a potential threat to national security, due to the intermixing of public and private infrastructure and the reliance of the United States Government (USG) on infrastructure owned and operated by the private sector. The fact that most, if not all, of the underlying infrastructure for seamless cyber interactions are controlled and managed by non-state entities means that the USG most recognize the power of the private sector in cyberspace. This represents a disturber of the familiar international order because the major actor that constitutes and defines international relations (the state) is not able to control cyberspace or to insulate itself from the implications of the new cyber realities. This recognition suggests that adopting a policy position that is primarily offensive in nature better serves the US, especially in regards to the protection of the cyber ecosystems of the private sector. Specifically it proposes that offensive cyber attacks should not be limited to only the authorized entities of the United States military, but should be expanded to include authorized entities in the private sector. Central to this proposition is the introduction of a new element of operational art specific to the cyber realm to guard against unintended consequences--the operational art element of precision."

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies

  Olagbemiro, Albert O.
• Survey of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate

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  "The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) directorate was created to support a key strategic mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). IAIP analyzes and integrates terrorist threat information, mapping those threats against both physical and cyber vulnerabilities to critical infrastructure and key assets, and implementing actions that protect the lives of Americans, ensures the delivery of essential government services, and protects infrastructure assets owned by US industry. IAIP is unique in that no other federal organization has the statutory mandate to carry out these responsibilities under one organizational framework. The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this survey to learn more about the department's plans for IAIP and to prepare us for more detailed future work as part of our general oversight responsibility for DHS and its component parts."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

  2004-02
• Planning for the Future of Cyber Attack Attribution: Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, July 15, 2010

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  From the opening statement of David Wu: "This cybersecurity hearing is one in a series that this subcommittee had held on ways that we can protect our nation's critical cyber infrastructure. Over the last two years, we've held hearings on cyber security activities at the National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as on the administration's Cyberspace Policy Review. Just two weeks ago, we had an important hearing on the smart grid, and spent a great deal of time talking about the necessity of developing strong cyber security standards for our national energy infrastructure. We are well aware of the critical role that IT networks play in managing much of our day-to-day activity--from online banking to systems that make sure there is food on grocery store shelves. This growing reliance on networks has made us more vulnerable to cyber attacks and has increased the potential for such attacks to have far-reaching and crippling effects. Now more than ever, we need to be focused on the development of tools and technologies to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber attacks. History shows that one of the best deterrents to an attack is the ability to identify your attacker." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: David Wu, Representative from Oregon; David A. Wheeler, Institute for Defense Analyses; Robert Knake, Council on Foreign Relations; Ed Giorgio, Ponte Technologies; and Marc Rotenberg, Electronic Privacy Information Center.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2010
• Coast Guard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea: Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council [Volume 71, Number 4]

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  This edition of Coast Guard Journal of Safety at Sea, Proceedings of the Marine Safety & Security Council is titled, "Cybersecurity: Vulnerabilities, Threats and Risk Management". Featured articles include: "Maritime Governance: Designed with security in Mind"; "The Coast Guard and Cybersecurity: A Legal Framework for Prevention and Response"; "C-Cubed: Increasing Cyber Resilience, Awareness, and Managing Risk"; "Reducing Cyber Risk: Marine Transportation System Cybersecurity Standards, Liability Protection, and Cyber Insurance"; "Cyberspace-The Imminent Operational Domain: A Construct to Tackle the Coast Guard's Tough Challenges"; "Shifting the Paradigm: The DHS Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program"; "Hacking 101: Using Social Engineering Increases Security Attack Effectiveness"; "Zero-Day Vulnerabilities: What To Do When It's Too Late To Prevent an Attack"; "Securing Your Control Systems: Overcoming Vulnerabilities"; "Building Port Resilience: How Cyber Attacks Can Affect Critical Infrastructure"; "Maritime Critical Infrastructure Cyber Risk: Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Consequences"; "Hide and Seek: Managing Automatic Identification System Vulnerabilities"; and "GPS Spoofing and Jamming: A Global Concern For All Vessels".

  United States. Coast Guard

  2014
• Cybersecurity: Actions Needed to Strengthen U.S. Capabilities, Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives

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  From the Highlights: "Cyber-based intrusions and attacks on federal systems and systems supporting our nation's critical infrastructure, such as communications and financial services, are evolving and becoming more sophisticated. GAO [Government Accountability Office] first designated information security as a government-wide high-risk area in 1997. This was expanded to include the protection of cyber critical infrastructure in 2003 and protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information in 2015. This statement (1) provides an overview of GAO's work related to cybersecurity of the federal government and the nation's critical infrastructure and (2) identifies areas of consistency between GAO recommendations and those recently made by the Cybersecurity Commission and CSIS [Center for Strategic & International Studies]. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previously published work and its review of the two recent reports issued by the Commission and CSIS. [...] Over the past several years, GAO has made about 2,500 recommendations to federal agencies to enhance their information security programs and controls. As of February 2017, about 1,000 recommendations had not been implemented."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  Wilshusen, Gregory C.

  2017-02-14
• Computer Network Security & Privacy Protection

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  "The Nation's electronic information infrastructure is vital to the functioning of the Government as well as maintaining the Nation's economy and national security. This infrastructure, however, is under perpetual attack by a variety of sources, from novice hackers to sophisticated groups that seek to gain or deny access to, disrupt, degrade, or destroy the systems and the data contained therein. These threats will likely expand over time as more of our critical infrastructure is connected to the Internet, and malicious cyber activity grows in volume and becomes more sophisticated and targeted, creating ever greater potential for more severe consequences. Leading the protection and defense of the Federal Executive Branch civilian networks against cyber threats, and coordinating response to cyber threats and vulnerabilities, falls within the mission responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The threat is constantly evolving, requiring DHS to continually evaluate its capabilities and supporting technology. In line with its mission, the Department is upgrading its cybersecurity capabilities-- using both proven and emerging technologies--to secure and defend against threats from cyberspace. It is particularly important in this regard to defeat attacks from high-level threat actors who can potentially damage, cripple, exploit, and leverage Federal Executive Branch civilian networks and other critical national systems. While executing this mission, DHS takes the protection of privacy and civil liberties seriously, as discussed in greater detail below."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2010-02-19
• Cyber Security: Recovery and Reconstitution of Critical Networks: Hearing Before the Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, July 28, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Tom Coburn: "Today's hearing is titled 'Cyber Security: Recovery and Reconstitution of Critical Networks.' This is the second hearing in a series we will be conducting on cyber security. It is actually the third. We have had a high-level secured briefing and hearing on this, as well. On July 19, 2005, this Subcommittee held a hearing on the importance of cyber security to our Nation's critical infrastructures. The hearing highlighted the importance of forging a public-private, and I will emphasize private, partnership to protect critical infrastructure and focused on challenges facing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in facilitating and leveraging such partnerships. Things that we have learned through the September 11 terrorist attacks and the response to Hurricane Katrina further emphasize these challenges. Today, despite spending millions of dollars over the past year, DHS continues to struggle with how to effectively form and maintain effective public-private partnerships in support of cyber security, including how to protect Internet infrastructure and how to recover it in the case of a major disruption. The public-private partnership necessary to accomplish DHS's goals in securing computer networks continues to remain a public-private divide." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Tom Coburn, George Foresman, Richard C. Schaeffer, Jr., Karen Evans, Keith Rhodes, Thomas E. Noonan, Roberta A. Bienfait, Michael A. Aisenberg, Karl Brondell, and Thomas Jarrett.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• United States Coast Guard Cyber Strategy

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  "The Coast Guard is committed to ensuring the safety, security, and stewardship of our Nation's waters. This commitment requires a comprehensive cyber strategy that provides a clear framework for our overall mission success. Cyber technology has fueled great progress and efficiency in our modern world. Coast Guard operations are more effective because of the rapid evolution in cyber technology, and advanced technologies have also led to an unprecedented era of efficiency of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS). However, with these benefits come serious risks. Information and its supporting systems are continually attacked and exploited by hostile actors. Foreign governments, criminal organizations, and other illicit actors attempt to infiltrate critical government and private sector information systems, representing one of the most serious threats we face as a nation. As the Coast Guard relies on modern digital information and communications systems to execute its missions, the Service must defend against those who threaten them. The Coast Guard must also build and sustain an operational advantage in cyberspace to ensure optimal integration of information and intelligence with our operations. Moreover, the Coast Guard must lead the effort to protect maritime critical infrastructure from a broadening array of cyber threats. To fully ensure the Coast Guard is able to perform its essential missions in the 21st Century, it must fully embrace cyberspace as an operational domain. To this end, the Coast Guard will focus on three specific strategic priorities in the cyber domain over the next ten years: [1] Defending Cyberspace [2] Enabling Operations [3] Protecting Infrastructure."

  United States. Coast Guard

  2015-06
• Executive Order 13691: Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing

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  "By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: Section 1. Policy. In order to address cyber threats to public health and safety, national security, and economic security of the United States, private companies, nonprofit organizations, executive departments and agencies (agencies), and other entities must be able to share information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents and collaborate to respond in as close to real time as possible. Organizations engaged in the sharing of information related to cybersecurity risks and incidents play an invaluable role in the collective cybersecurity of the United States. The purpose of this order is to encourage the voluntary formation of such organizations, to establish mechanisms to continually improve the capabilities and functions of these organizations, and to better allow these organizations to partner with the Federal Government on a voluntary basis. Such information sharing must be conducted in a manner that protects the privacy and civil liberties of individuals, that preserves business confidentiality, that safeguards the information being shared, and that protects the ability of the Government to detect, investigate, prevent, and respond to cyber threats to the public health and safety, national security, and economic security of the United States. This order builds upon the foundation established by Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 (Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity), and Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience)."

  United States. Office of the Federal Register

  Obama, Barack

  2015-02-13
• Office of Infrastructure Protection Strategic Plan: 2012-2016

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  "Our Nation's critical infrastructure is essential to the economy, security, and sustainment of the American way of life. From the provision of essential goods and services--including energy, communications, food, and water--to the facilitation of essential commerce such as our transportation networks and critical manufacturing base, the owners and operators of America's critical infrastructure enable the daily activities of our country. Securing our physical and cyber infrastructure, helping to modernize it, and making it more resilient is a crucial part of our homeland security effort. We must continue to prioritize a strategic approach to accomplishing that mission. A major element of accomplishing that mission is the Department of Homeland Security's National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), which leads the coordinated national effort to manage risks to our Nation's critical infrastructure. IP acts on behalf of the Secretary of Homeland Security, helping execute the national critical infrastructure protection responsibilities set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). The vast majority of our Nation's critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, and IP's strategy is based largely on building partnerships, planning for preparedness, and sharing information and tools to ensure the availability, security, and resilience of the Nation's critical infrastructure."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2012-08
• Legal Foundations: Studies and Conclusions: Report 1 of 12: Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

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  "Executive Order 13010 established the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and tasked it with assessing the vulnerabilities of, and threats to, eight named critical infrastructures and developing a national strategy for protecting those infrastructures from physical and cyber threats. The Executive Order also required that the PCCIP consider the legal and policy issues raised by efforts to protect the critical infrastructures and propose statutory and regulatory changes necessary to effect any subsequent PCCIP recommendations. To respond to the legal challenges posed by efforts to protect critical infrastructures, the PCCIP undertook a variety of activities to formulate options and to facilitate eventual implementation of PCCIP recommendations by the Federal government and the private sector. The PCCIP recognized that the process of infrastructure assurance would require cultural and legal change over time. Thus, these activities were undertaken with the expectation that many would continue past the life of the PCCIP itself. The Legal Foundations series of reports attempts to identify and describe many of the legal issues associated with the process of infrastructure assurance. The reports were used by the PCCIP to inform its deliberations. […] Legal Foundations: Studies and Conclusions is the overall summary report. It describes the other reports, the methodologies used by the researchers to prepare them, and summarizes the possible approaches and conclusions that were presented to the PCCIP for its consideration. The series has been sequenced to allow interested readers to study in detail a specific area of interest. However, to fully appreciate the scope of the topics studied and their potential interaction, a review of the entire series is recommended."

  United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

  1997
• Homeland Security Advisory Council: Report of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force

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  "The objective of this report by the Critical Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) is to advance national policies and strategies that will foster the development of more resilient critical infrastructures. The recommendations contained herein leverage the foundation built by prior and ongoing Critical Infrastructure Protection programs, but assert that a future focus on resilience would establish a more appropriate basis for risk-based decision-making. Our Nation's critical infrastructures-cyber and physical-empower and enable every aspect of our society and economy. From a homeland security perspective, fully functioning infrastructures are fundamental to all preparedness efforts. Consequently, our critical infrastructures represent attractive targets to adversaries. At the same time, critical infrastructures are inherently vulnerable to natural disasters, accidents, and other hazards that are a part of daily life. Given this diverse spectrum of potential threats, coupled with the reality that resources are limited, the CITF concluded that policies and strategies focusing on achieving resilience would be more robust than current guidance, which focuses primarily on protection. Specifically, the CITF observes that while protection is a necessary component of building resilience, resilience is not an inevitable outcome of strategies that focus on protection."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2006-01
• Defensive Information Operations - An Interagency Process

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  "The United States military has long held the mission of protecting this country against foreign attack. One of the biggest threats facing the United States in the 21st century, however, is of a far different nature than that of a conventional armed attack. A cyber attack zeroing in on critical information or on the information systems which support critical national infrastructures could be launched from any corner of the globe, by a variety of potential state and non-state actors, and could be directed against military or civilian targets. Due to the quantity, complexity, and diverse ownership of this country's information systems and critical infrastructures, no single governmental or private agency can single-handedly provide an adequate defense. As a result, the nation's information and infrastructure protection effort requires governmental interagency and private sector cooperation. The Department of Defense, as a key player in the interagency effort, must rapidly respond to information attacks in coordination with a host of government departments and agencies, including the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State. It must be prepared to defend its own information and infrastructure; to support other government agencies in their defense, enforcement, and consequence management functions; and to counterattack with information operations weapons. This paper discusses the nature and level of the cyber threat and DoD's roles in countering it in an interagency environment. The paper also looks at the legal issues DoD must consider in planning and executing its information defense mission. It examines the current arrangement for protection of the nation's infrastructure and suggests there are organizational issues impeding the speed and effectiveness of the country's defense that must be addressed."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Schutze, James T.

  2001-03-01
• Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program Network Security Management - What is Happening on the Network? How is the Network Protected?

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  From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program is a dynamic approach to fortifying the cybersecurity of government networks and systems. The CDM Program provides cybersecurity tools, integration services, and dashboards to participating agencies to help them improve their respective security postures. The CDM Program ultimately reduces the threat surface and improves federal cybersecurity response through four capability areas: Asset Management, Identity and Access Management, Network Security Management (NSM), and Data Protection Management. The NSM capability is designed to provide agencies with greater visibility into what is happening on their networks, which also gives them a better understanding of how the networks are being protected. This capability makes use of defense-in-depth boundary protection mechanisms and incident detection and response procedures to protect agencies against hacking, misuse, and unauthorized changes of network devices. NSM capabilities protect the external and internal boundaries of agency systems by providing visibility into network behavior, firewall traffic, encrypted and decrypted data, virtual private network connection, and ports and protocols. NSM consists of four overarching component capabilities, including: boundary protection (BOUND); manage events (MNGEVT); operate, monitor, and improve (OMI); and design and build in security (DBS)."

  United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

  2021-05-26?
• Joint Economic Committee Report on New Security Challenges and Strategies

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  Over the years, the Joint Economic Committee has investigated a wide range of threats to the United States and its economy. The committee has consistently identified emerging issues including radio frequency weapons, bioterrorism, information warfare, espionage, technology transfers, transnational crime, and weapons proliferation. We continued that course in June 2001 with a hearing entitled, "Wired World: Cyber Security and the U.S. Economy." Following this hearing, it became clear that we needed to better understand an increasingly complicated set of diffuse security threats. Senator Bennett volunteered to identify individuals whose perspectives about critical infrastructure protection would be of value to the Congress and compile a study. Computer networks connect and control everything from pipelines to stock exchanges. At a speech given on March 23, 2001, to the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Condoleeza Rice, United States National Security Advisor said, "Today, the cyber economy is the economy. . . . Corrupt those networks and you disrupt this nation." The September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon make it clear that we must be better aware of our vulnerabilities and develop viable strategies to detect, deter, and counter both physical and cyber-based threats to our people and our infrastructures. This compendium represents a range of perspectives on infrastructure protection, from definitions and strategies to business challenges and policy actions. I thank Senator Bennett for his efforts and the authors for sharing their expertise.

  United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

  2002-05-29
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity, Statement of David A. Powner, Director, Information Technology Management Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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  "Increasing computer interconnectivity has revolutionized the way that our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. While the benefits have been enormous, this widespread interconnectivity also poses significant risks to our nation's computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and federal policy established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the focal point for coordinating activities to protect the computer systems that support our nation's critical infrastructures. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to summarize previous work, focusing on (1) DHS's responsibilities for cybersecurity related critical infrastructure protection (CIP), (2) the status of the department's efforts to fulfill these responsibilities, (3) the challenges it faces in fulfilling its cybersecurity responsibilities, and (4) recommendations GAO has made to improve cybersecurity of our nation's critical infrastructure."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2005-07-19
• National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC): Meeting Agenda, July 22, 2003

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  The following are the Meeting notes for the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) on Tuesday, July 22, 2003. "General Gordon began by thanking Chairman Davidson, the members of the NIAC, and representatives of the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) present. General Gordon then warned that cyber weapons are tested everyday in one form or another, and though this testing is done without cover, it is difficult to detect. He stressed the difficulty and importance of defending against direct attacks from various sources, including terrorists, criminals, and amateur hackers, noting that cyber attacks, while dangerous in their own right, can also be launched as a prelude to a physical attack, thereby magnifying their potential for harm. He called the cyber threat both serious and real, and remarked that the NIAC is a visible sign of the importance placed on the partnership between the public and private sectors. General Libutti opened by thanking General Gordon, Chairman Davidson, and the NIAC members for their attention and support of the Nation. After discussing his career highlights, General Libutti focused attention on his current position as Under Secretary, where he asserted that his job is to muster and motivate the resources of the IAIP Directorate to accomplish the mission of IAIP: delivering an integrated, end-to-end capability to identify and assess current and future threats to the homeland; map those threats against the nation's vulnerabilities; coherently and efficiently communicate threat and warning information; and prioritize protective measures to prevent attacks, reduce vulnerabilities, minimize damage, and assist in the restoration of critical services and functions in the wake of a crisis event."

  National Infrastructure Advisory Council (U.S.)

  Wong, Nancy J.; Libutti, Frank, 1945-; Gordon, John A.

  2003-07-22
• H. Rept. 115-1099: Summary on the Activities of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure for the 115th Congress, Report, December 21, 2018

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  "This bill amends the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to redesignate the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) National Protection and Programs Directorate as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to be headed by a Director of National Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security to lead national efforts to protect and enhance the security and resilience of U.S. cybersecurity, emergency communications, and critical infrastructure. CISA shall be composed of DHS components reorganized as: (1) the Cybersecurity Division; (2) the Infrastructure Security Division; and (3) the Emergency Communications Division, which was previously the Office for Emergency Communications. The agency will also have a privacy officer to ensure compliance with relevant federal laws. CISA must carry out DHS's responsibilities concerning chemical facilities antiterrorism standards."

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2018-12-21
• Cyber Security for the 44th Presidency: Hearing before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, September 18, 2008

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  This testimony compilation is from the September 18, 2008 hearing, "Cyber Security for the 44th Presidency," before the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. From Paul Kurtz' opening statement: "Cyber security is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we will face in the 21st century. U.S. Government leadership is vital to mitigating massive problems with our information infrastructure. Our current information infrastructure is riddled with holes, unknown backdoors, and is extremely difficult to protect in the face of increasingly sophisticated adversaries. Unlike Y2K [Year 2000], there is no single fix. Adversaries are not limited to nation states' military and intelligence organizations. Criminals, organized crime, terrorists, malicious insiders, and business competitors can and do engage. The battle in cyberspace is just beginning. It is destined to be complicated and costly. There is an urgent need to understand the problem and set the foundations for a more secure, reliable, resilient information infrastructure that can operate in an increasingly hostile environment." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Paul Kurtz, Former Senior Director, Critical Infrastructure Protection White House Homeland Security Council, Amit Yoran, Former Director, National Cyber Security Division, Department of Homeland Security, John Nagengast, Former Assistant Deputy Director, National Security Agency.

  United States. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

  2008-09-18
• Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges Need to Be Addressed, Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Director, Information Security Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

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  "The explosion in computer interconnectivity, while providing great benefits, also poses enormous risks. Terrorists or hostile foreign states could launch computer-based attacks on critical systems to severely damage or disrupt national defense or other critical operations. Presidential Decision Directive (33 and Executive Order 13231, issued in 1998 and 2001, respectively, call for various actions to improve our nation's critical infrastructure protection (CIP) , including establishing partnerships between the government and the private sector. CIP involves activities that enhance the security of our nation's cyber and physical public and private infrastructure that are essential to national security, national economic security, and/or national public health and safety. The President's national strategy for homeland security, issued last week, identifies protecting critical infrastructures and intelligence and warning, a critical CIP component, as two of six mission areas and expands our nation's approach to cover additional sectors of our economy (see graphic). At the subcommittee's request, GAO [General Accountin Office] discussed challenges the nation faces in protecting our critical infrastructures and addressing federal information security."

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2002-07-24
• Vulnerability Assessment Framework 1.1

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  Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation's critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and protect both domestic and international security. Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States. Our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported infrastructures and non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy."

  United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

  1998-10
• National Institute of Standards and Technology: Cybersecurity Framework

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  This webpage from the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) provides the organization's Cybersecurity Framework. From the webpage: "Recognizing the national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable function of critical infrastructure, the President issued Executive Order (EO) 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, in February 2013. The Order directed NIST to work with stakeholders to develop a voluntary framework - based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices - for reducing cyber risks to critical infrastructure. The Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 reinforced NIST's EO 13636 role. Created through collaboration between industry and government, the voluntary Framework consists of standards, guidelines, and practices to promote the protection of critical infrastructure. The prioritized, flexible, repeatable, and cost-effective approach of the Framework helps owners and operators of critical infrastructure to manage cybersecurity-related risk."

  National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
• Implementation Status of the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services Program

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  From the "Spotlight" report's "Why This Matters" section: "The National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) leads the national effort to protect and enhance the resilience of the Nation's physical and cyber infrastructure. The office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C), a sub-component of NPPD, manages the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) program which is a voluntary information sharing program that assists critical infrastructure entities in improving the protection of their systems and networks from external cyber threats and attacks."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

  2014-07
• National Guard Forces in the Cyber Domain

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  From the student thesis: "The National Guard has played a vital role in the defense of this nation's threats since the country's inception. Over 200 years ago, the militia helped George Washington strike a blow against the British after they forced him from New York and pursued the Continental Army across New Jersey. Today the nation faces the new challenge of how to best defend itself against cyber attacks. Just as the militia, forbearers to the National Guard, enabled George Washington's attack against Trenton, the National Guard stands ready today to work with Department of Defense (DoD) to counter the growing cyber threat. Given the challenges facing the US to develop a comprehensive cyber strategy, the question is why and how should DoD integrate the National Guard into the national cyber forces. DoD should integrate the National Guard into the national cyber forces because of the cyber threats and the need for assistance at the state level. In addition, existing Guard cyber capabilities, Presidential, Congressional, and Department of Homeland Security mandates to protect critical infrastructure, and US Army doctrine points to full integration as the best path to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage."

  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies

  McCullouch, Murry

  2015-01
• H. Rept. 114-756: Cyber Preparedness Act of 2016, Report to Accompany H.R. 5459, Including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office, September 19, 2016

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  "The purpose of H.R. 5459 is to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to enhance preparedness and response capabilities for cyber-attacks, bolster the dissemination of homeland security information related to cyber threats, and for other purposes. [...] Cybersecurity is a major national security issue and the threat is real and immediate. For instance, a cyber-attack causing widespread power outages could have major cascading consequences on public health and safety. During a joint hearing of the Subcommittees on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications and Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies on May 24, 2016, Members heard from State officials about their best practices and lessons learned in enhancing cybersecurity capabilities and how the Federal Government can help mitigate some of the challenges States face. Among the issues raised by the witnesses was the need for better information sharing between the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and state and major urban area fusion centers; the need for clarity on the use of homeland security grants to address cybersecurity; and the impact the level of classification of cyber threat information has on States and fusion centers' ability to share that information with relevant stakeholders. This legislation seeks to address these concerns."

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2016-09-19
• U.S. Cybersecurity Defense Assessment

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  From the Abstract: "In today's global cybersecurity environment, U.S. federal agencies and private sector organizations are engaged in national cyber defense actions designed to protect against intrusion from state and non-state actors, foreign militaries, organized crime, and sophisticated hackers attempting to commit malicious activity or espionage against America's essential networks. The purpose of this paper, which concentrates in US cybersecurity defense as a strategic 'way' of supporting America's enduring national security interests, is threefold. To define cybersecurity defense in a paradigm that is universally acceptable within the American construct; to identify and discuss U.S. cybersecurity defense strategies by examining the progression of America's cybersecurity defense policies and the subsequent Federal agency roles which have developed within the U.S. government configuration; and provides a recommendation to improve America's national cybersecurity defense posture by implementing public-private partnership information sharing programs for critical network infrastructure security within the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) sector."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Sherman, Darren C.

  2013-03