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Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol [July 30, 2010]

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"The United States Border Patrol (USBP) has a long and storied history as our nation's first line of defense against unauthorized migration. Today, the USBP's primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and illegal aliens into the country, and to interdict drug smugglers and other criminals along the border. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 dissolved the Immigration and Naturalization Service and placed the USBP within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Within DHS, the USBP forms a part of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. During the last decade, the USBP has seen its budget and manpower more than triple. This expansion was the direct result of Congressional concerns about illegal immigration and the agency's adoption of 'Prevention Through Deterrence' as its chief operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter, and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry. Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In addition to a workforce of over 20,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft, watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border. In the course of discharging its duties, the USBP patrols 8,000 miles of American international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. However, there are significant geographic, political, and immigration-related differences between the northern border with Canada and the southwest border with Mexico. Accordingly, the USBP deploys a different mix of personnel and resources along the two borders. Due to the fact that approximately 98.7% of unauthorized migrant apprehensions by the USBP occur along the southwest border, the USBP deploys over 85% of its agents there to deter illegal immigration. The northern border is more than two times longer than the southwest border, features far lower numbers of aliens attempting to enter illegally, but may be more vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. As a consequence of this, the USBP has focused its northern border efforts on deploying technology and cooperating closely with Canadian authorities through the creation of International Border Enforcement Teams."

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

Haddal, Chad C.

2010-07-30
Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Three Years Later, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, First Session, September 17, 2009

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From the opening statement of Bennie G. Thompson, "Today's hearing on the Secure Border Initiative comes at a very important time, as next week marks an anniversary of sorts for the Department of Homeland Security [DHS]. On September 21, 2006, DHS awarded a contract to Boeing to help secure our nation's borders. At the time, we were told that Boeing would be integrating existing, 'off-the-shelf' technology to create a 'virtual fence' along the borders, known as SBInet. It was supposed to be a relatively easy project. Instead, the Government Accountability Office has repeatedly raised concerns about SBInet, including poor planning, insufficient testing, inadequate government oversight, and a failure to set and achieve project goals. Today, after spending nearly a billion dollars on the program, we are still waiting for an effective technological tool to secure America's borders." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bennie G. Thompson, Representative in Congress from Mississippi; Loretta Sanchez, Representative in Congress from California; Mark E. Soulder, Representative in Congress from Indiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism; David Aguilar, U.S. Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Mark Borkowski, Secure Border Initiative, U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Timothy E. Peters, Global Security Systems, The Boeing Company; and Richard Stana, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office.

United States. Government Printing Office

2010-07
Serial No. 115-54: Bang for the Border Security Buck: What Do We Get for $33 Billion? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, March 15, 2018

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This document is the March 15, 2018 hearing titled "Bang for the Border Security Buck: What Do We Get for $33 Billion?" before the House Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Martha McSally: "[The] Subcommittee is meeting today to review the critical infrastructure, technology, and personnel funding needed by U.S. Customs and Border Protection [CBP] to enhance our Nation's border security. [...] I have called today's hearing because I want to dive in to the details of the CBP request on border security and help the American people understand what the border security return on investment could be, what would be realized if this strategy is fully funded." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Martha McSally, Filemon Vela, Bennie G. Thompson, Lou Barletta, Claire M. Grady, Ronald D. Vitiello, Rebecca Gambler, Brandon Judd, and Anthony M. Reardon.

United States. Government Publishing Office

2018
Southwest Border: CBP Should Improve Oversight of Funds, Medical Care, and Reporting of Deaths, Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice and Mary Denigan-Macauley, Director, Health Care, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

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From the Document: "Beginning in fall 2018, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) CBP [Customs and Border Protection] experienced a significant increase in the number of individuals apprehended at or between U.S. ports of entry along the southwest border, resulting in overcrowding and difficult humanitarian conditions in its facilities. From December 2018 through May 2019, three children--ages 7, 8, and 16--died in CBP custody, prompting questions about CBP's medical screening and care of those in its custody. In July 2019, an emergency supplemental appropriations act (2019 Emergency Supplemental) was enacted, providing additional funds to CBP to respond to the significant increase in southwest border apprehensions, including approximately $112 million for 'consumables and medical care.' [...] Our remarks are based on our report, released today, entitled 'Southwest Border: CBP Needs to Increase Oversight of Funds, Medical Care, and Reporting of Deaths.' Specifically, we will summarize the report's key findings on (1) the extent to which CBP obligated and conducted oversight of funds for consumables and medical care; (2) steps CBP took to enhance medical care; (3) the extent to which CBP implemented and oversaw its medical care efforts; and (4) the extent to which CBP has reliable information on, and reported, deaths, serious injuries, and suicide attempts of individuals in custody."

United States. Government Accountability Office

Gambler, Rebecca; Denigan-Macauley, Mary

2020-07-15
Follow up Report on Border Patrol's Efforts to Improve Northern Border Security (Redacted Version)

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"The purpose of this follow-up review was to examine the progress the Border Patrol has made in improving the security of the northern border since the OIG issued the original report, indicating that the Border Patrol faced significant enforcement challenges along the United States-Canada border and was unable to adequately respond to illegal activity, primarily because of a lack of sufficient staff and resources. The Border Patrol has made some improvements in enhancing its northern border operations. The INS's IBET/IMET initiatives to increase international and multi-agency cooperation should improve security. The northern border sectors have received increases in sensor systems, night vision devices, computer systems, and vehicles. The northern border has received minimal Border Patrol agent enhancements and no support staff enhancements. As of December 2001, only 368 full-time Border Patrol agents monitor the 4,000-mile northern border. This understaffing continues to offer an avenue for aliens, criminals, and terrorists to enter the United States illegally. Even though the Border Patrol agents are augmented by the temporary assignment of Border Patrol agents, an increase in sensor systems and other devices, the Border Patrol's current staffing and resources still cannot adequately assess or respond to illegal activity on the northern border."

United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General

2002-02
Southwest Border Security: CBP is Evaluating Designs and Locations for Border Barriers but is Proceeding Without Key Information, Report to Congressional Requesters

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"In January 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13767, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to immediately plan, design, and construct a wall or other physical barriers along the southwest border. CBP's fiscal year 2018 appropriation provided funding for barrier planning and design, but limited use of funds for primary barrier construction to previously deployed fencing designs. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review DHS's efforts to deploy barriers along the southwest border. This report examines (1) how CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] evaluated potential designs for barriers, (2) DHS's process for identifying and assessing locations for future deployments of barriers, and (3) how DHS is managing the acquisition of the Border Wall System Program, among other things. GAO analyzed planning documents; interviewed DHS, CBP, and Border Patrol officials; and conducted a site visit to San Diego to observe CBP's testing of barrier prototypes. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in June 2018. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been omitted."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2018-07
Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, Statement for the Record of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate

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"Securing the nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens and contraband, including terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a major challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the launch of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI)--a multiyear, multibillion dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) provides agents and officers to support SBI. As requested, this statement summarizes (1) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on SBI's technology, known as SBInet (including such things as cameras and radars), and DHS's recent actions on SBInet; and (2) the findings and recommendations of GAO's reports on tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, and the extent to which CBP has deployed tactical infrastructure and assessed its operational impact. This statement is based on products issued from 2007 through 2010, with selected updates as of April 2010. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed program schedules, status reports and funding and interviewed DHS officials."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2010-05-04
Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence

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"This report covers CBP's progress in constructing the tactical infrastructure needed to meet border security mission requirements. Specifically, the report discusses CBP's efforts to develop, refine, and document the underlying operational needs of the Border Patrol, and as set forth in the Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended, to build pedestrian and vehicle fences along the Southwest border of the United States to guard against illegal entries. The report also addresses related management improvements, including establishing, staffing, and equipping an acquisition program management office to oversee tactical infrastructure construction, including fencing. The report is based on interviews with employees and officials of the Department of Homeland Security, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. [...] Achieving the optimal mix of personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure is key to the Secure Border Initiative strategy for protecting and controlling the Nation's borders. We conducted an audit of the United States Customs and Border Protection to determine its progress in addressing Secure Border Initiative requirements and in constructing tactical infrastructure, which includes fencing to secure the Southwest border as mandated by Congress and determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Customs and Border Protection has made progress in identifying the Border Patrol's operational requirements for technology and tactical infrastructure. However, Border Patrol assessments could better document and define operational requirements for tactical infrastructure to ensure that border fence construction is linked to resource decisions and mission performance goals."

United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

2009-04
Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

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"According to DHS's CBP [Customs and Border Protection], Arizona and South Texas represent some of the highest-threat areas along the southwest border for illegal entrants and smuggling. DHS and CBP coordinate border security with interagency partners, including other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. DHS established collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to integrate CBP operations and improve interagency coordination. GAO [U.S. Government Accountability Office] was asked to review DHS efforts to coordinate resources along the southwest border. This report (1) describes how DHS uses collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas to coordinate border security efforts, and (2) examines the extent to which DHS has established performance measures and reporting processes and how, if at all, DHS has assessed and monitored the effectiveness of the collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas. GAO analyzed documentation, such as campaign plans for the mechanisms; conducted visits to Arizona and South Texas; and interviewed CBP components and interagency partners selected on the basis of agency type and level of participation in the mechanism. Information from these interviews cannot be generalized to all components and partners, but provided insights into the mechanisms."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2014-06-27
Serial No. 113-8: Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 20, 2013

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This is the hearing entitled "Measuring Outcomes to Understand the State of Border Security" before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Maritime Security on March 20, 2013. From the statement of Veronica Escobar: "We're dealing with this question of how to measure security because border security was mandated to be achieved before immigration reform would be enacted. We were told by our policy-makers that our pursuit would be 'enforcement first,' but it quickly became 'enforcement only,' to the detriment of any thoughtful policy considerations or reform. Those of us who have been engaged in this issue have long said that immigration reform should come first -- that approaching enforcement first (or only) is a backward way to deal with the flow of people and goods across our borders. In 2007 when the federal government erected the wall that scars my community, I took a tour of it with Border Patrol Agents, who told me that 85% of apprehensions at the border were of non-criminal offenders. That meant only 15% or fewer of the apprehensions made were for 'criminal aliens.' It's important to note that the definition of 'criminal aliens,' is broad and includes people who do not necessarily represent a security threat to the United States. The more important fact is that 85% (and even some of the 15%) of undocumented crossers are risking jail time and even their lives to be in this country to find work, perhaps establish a safer and better life, or reunite with their families. In 2008, Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar wrote that '90 percent of the illegal aliens we arrest are drawn to this country for socio-economic reasons.'" Statements, letters and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Candice Miller, Michael J. Fisher, Kevin McAleenan, Mark Borkowski, and Veronica Escobar.

United States. Government Printing Office

2013
Border Corruption: Assessing Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General's Office Collaboration in the Fight to Prevent Corruption, Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, June 9, 2011

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From the opening statement of Mark L. Pryor: "We are going to examine the progress of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in preventing corruption in its workforce as well as the work of the Inspector General's office at the Department of Homeland Security in investigating and prosecuting those individuals who have been accused of corruption. Securing the United States' borders is a constant struggle for the residents of the border States and for the government officials who represent them. The Mexican cartels dominate drug trafficking into the United States. Their operations and methods are sophisticated, ruthless, and well funded. Their notorious presence and power in Mexico is made possible by bribery and corruption, intimidation, paramilitary force, and murder. […] We must continue to do everything that we can to disrupt and prevent these gangs from penetrating our communities. That is why I am pleased that last year the Congress passed and the President signed the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010. This bill is designed to complement CBP's Workforce Integrity Plan and prevent rogue border agents from being hired and retained. […] Hiring new Border Patrol agents will help secure our borders only if these agents are truly committed to protecting our country. […] Another area of interest today is the ongoing concern about the lack of true collaboration and information sharing between CBP and the Inspector General's office when it comes to investigating alleged acts of corruption. Fighting corruption is vital to protecting our borders and securing our communities. We must aggressively attack and investigate these cases if we are going to end corruption within the U.S. law enforcement agencies. However, we must conduct these investigations in an efficient and collaborative way that leads to results in the quickest way possible." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mark L. Pryor, Rand Paul, Alan D. Bersin, and Charles K. Edwards.

United States. Government Printing Office

2011
S. Hrg. 109-51: Strengthening Border Security Between the Ports of Entry: the Use of Technology to Protect the Borders, Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, April 28, 2005

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From the opening statement of John Cornyn: "President Bush has articulated a vision for the comprehensive reform of our Nation's immigration laws. I am personally sympathetic to the President's vision, and I look forward to the critical role that our Subcommittees will play in the coming congressional debate. No serious discussion of comprehensive immigration reform is possible, however, without an overall review of our Nation's ability and will to secure our borders and enforce our immigration laws. We must provide sufficient tools and resources to those whose job it is to protect our borders and maintain our homeland security and identify those in our country who should be apprehended and removed, including those who should be deported. Accordingly, today's hearing is the third in a series of hearings focusing on identifying holes in our immigration enforcement system, places where enforcement has been badly deficient. Unfortunately, there are too many of those holes. Our immigration laws have been poorly enforced for far too long. That is because, in my view, the Federal Government has simply not lived up to its obligation to provide the resources and manpower in order to do just that. That must end and that will end." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Tom Coburn, Jon Kyl, Patrick J. Leahy, David Aguilar, Kirk Evans, Kathleen Campbell, Jeffrey S. Passel, Henry F. Taylor.

United States. Government Printing Office

2006
U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Management of the Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border Initiative

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"The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection uses infrastructure to impede illegal entry into the United States and provide officers access to their areas of operations. Since 2008, Customs and Border Protection has spent approximately $1.2 billion to construct physical barriers along the southwest border as part of the Department's Secure Border Initiative. About $310 million of the cost was to purchase and store steel in support of fence construction. We performed this audit to determine the effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection's management of the purchase and storage of steel in support of the Secure Border Initiative. Customs and Border Protection completed 299 miles of fence; however, it did not effectively manage the purchase and storage of steel in support of the Secure Border Initiative. It purchased steel based on an estimate before legally acquiring land or meeting international treaty obligations. In addition, it did not provide effective contract oversight during the project: it paid invoices late, did not reconcile invoices to receiving documents, and did not perform a thorough review of the contractor's selection of a higher-priced subcontractor or document the reasons for its approval of the subcontractor. As a result, Customs and Border Protection purchased more steel than needed, incurred additional storage costs, paid interest on late payments, and approved a higher-priced subcontractor, resulting in additional expenditures of about $69 million that could have been put to better use. We made five recommendations to improve Customs and Border Protection's management of future fence construction and contract oversight. Customs and Border Protection concurred with four recommendations, and the Department of Homeland Security proposed an alternative to the fifth recommendation that met the intent of that recommendation. Customs and Border Protection is taking action to implement the recommendations."

United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

2011-11
Border Security Challenge: Recent Developments and Legislative Proposals, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border, Martime, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, May 22, 2008

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From the opening statement of Loretta Sanchez: "This is the 11th border security hearing that this subcommittee has held this Congress, and we welcome the opportunity to continue our examination of the challenges we face in securing our borders and implementing real, comprehensive reform of the immigration system. In developing a strategy to secure our border and reduce illegal immigration, we must also create strategies and reforms to holistically address the important commercial, humanitarian and environmental issues involved in border security and immigration reform. Many of the agents on the frontlines of our border have to consider combinations of these issues every day, and it is our responsibility to make sure they have the adequate training and resources to do that job. The 110th Congress has increased border security funding by $2.4 billion between fiscal years 2007 and 2008, far surpassing the administration's proposed funding levels. So I look forward to hearing how the U.S. Customs and Border Protection is using this ample and increased funding to enhance our Nation's border security. I believe that these funds can help address some of the issues that were recently reported." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Loretta Sanchez, Mark E. Souder, Bennie G. Thompson, Silvestre Reyes, Brian P. Bilbray, Ginny Brown-Waite, Gabrielle Giffords, Heath Shuler, Thomas S. Winkowski, David V. Aguilar, and Michael C. Kostelnik.

United States. Government Printing Office

2008
Using Resources Effectively to Secure Our Border at Ports of Entry Stopping the Illicit Flow of Money, Guns, and Drugs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, April 5, 2011

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From the opening statement of Candace S. Miller: "Our first two hearings examine security between points of entry by focusing on the concept of operational control, focusing on the right mix of technology, infrastructure, and personnel. Today I want to pivot and focus on the security at our ports of entry. So this hearing builds on the previous two by examining how the Office of Field Operation uses the resources appropriated by Congress to stop the illicit flow of money, guns, and drugs. When we think about border security, I think one of the first things we think about are discussions of Border Patrol agents and fences and camera towers, et cetera, all focused on getting control of the border again between the ports of entry. However, I think it is very important that we understand that we face just as serious challenges at the ports of entry in our Nation. In fact, a recent Department of Justice report said that nearly 90 percent of all the drugs that come into our Nation flow through the official ports of entry. They are not coming in between the ports of entry. They are coming through the actual ports of entry. Where there are drugs, there will be money, there will be guns. Make no mistake, the cartels are running drugs across the Southwest border. They are very highly sophisticated and they are an enemy with one goal, and that is certainly for them to make as much money as possible. […] When it comes to National security, we need to do better. When it comes to border security, we need to do much better. So I will be very interested to hear why those statistics were not included in this year's budget documents and what we can do to ensure that we are catching the overwhelming majority of drug traffickers at or near the border." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Candice S. Miller, Henry Cuellar, Bennie G. Thompson, Thomas Winkowski, Stanley F. Korosec, Timothy J. Koerner, Richard F. Cortez, Colleen M. Kelley, and Nelson H. Balido.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012
Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, July 15, 2015

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This is a testimony compilation of the July 15, 2015 hearing on "Securing the Border: Understanding Threats and Strategies for the Maritime Border," held before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. From the opening statement of Chairman Ron Johnson: "The United States coastline, which includes the Atlantic, Caribbean, Pacific and Great Lakes coasts, measures over 95,000 miles long--one of the longest coastlines in the world. Across these coastlines migrants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti seek to illegally enter the U.S., often forced into overcrowded boats with unsafe and unsanitary conditions. Transnational criminal organizations also transport drugs--marijuana on the west coast and cocaine on the east coast--into the U.S. via the maritime border. Terrorism is also a continuing threat across our maritime borders. In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security released its Northern Border Strategy, which in part focused on the vulnerabilities in the Great Lakes region. The report cautioned that these shared waterways provided a conduit for potential exploitation. In particular, the ability of small vessels to traverse the Great Lakes and blend in with commercial trade and recreational boaters creates a challenging enforcement environment. As a Wisconsinite, I can attest to this observation firsthand. Despite these threats, as compared to the southwest border, the U.S. has very little domain awareness across our maritime border. And of the threats of which we do become aware, the U.S. Coast Guard is only able to respond to approximately 30 percent. This means that, similar to our southwest border, along which we are only interdicting 5 to 10 percent of the drugs smuggled across, a large amount of drugs are coming across our maritime border undetected." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following:

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

2015-07-15
Cyber Border Security - Defining and Defending a National Cyber Border

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"Concerns stemming from the convergence of border and cyber security threats are nothing new to those involved in both disciplines. Criminals and foreign actors have been exploiting computers and cyber methods to circumvent physical border security for decades. Today nearly every crime or homeland security threat that once required some physical nexus with the nation's traditional borders (land, sea, and air) is being committed, or at least facilitated, by some cyber component. In many ways vulnerabilities in cyber security render some aspects of traditional border security irrelevant, or at the very least, much less secure. The article explores this convergence of traditional border and cyber security and proposes a policy that would seek to evolve the concept of border security to include the cyber domain. Based on policy work begun over a decade ago by the author while the national cybercrime program manager for the U.S. Customs Service, the article details how a national cyber border can be defined and enforced. Relying on a methodology that adapts existing authorities, the article provides logical justifications and arguments for the need and legal authority to define a national cyber border. The strengths and shortcomings of this adaptive methodology are explored along with issues which may require new legislation. The article addresses some of the privacy concerns which are certain to arise from the cyber border concept using the same adaptive methodology of existing protections and expectations of privacy. The ultimate goal of the article is to stimulate thought- provoking discussion and spur further academic research into the convergence of cyber and border security; issues which are interdependent and clearly in the forefront of homeland and national security."

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security

Osborn, Phillip

2017-10
Border Cracks: Approaching Border Security from a Complexity Theory and Systems Perspective

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From the thesis abstract: "Presently, U.S. border security endeavors are compartmentalized, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. Moreover, international collaborations are extremely limited; success hinges on effective international cooperation. This thesis addresses U.S. border security management using complexity theory and a systems approach, incorporating both borders and all associated border security institutions simultaneously. Border security research has rarely viewed all stakeholders as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border security been thoroughly examined using a systems approach. This research scrutinizes the current U.S. border security paradigm in an attempt to determine the systemic reasons why the system is ineffective in securing U.S. borders. Additionally, the research investigates the current level of international cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase North American security. The thesis contends that the establishment of a tri-national--United States, Canadian, and Mexican--border security agency, in addition to legalizing drugs and reestablishing a guest worker program, will be more effective and cost-efficient in securing North American borders."

Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

Schwan, Michael J.

2012-12
Serial No. 114-63: Keeping Pace with Trade, Travel, and Security: How Does CBP Prioritize and Improve Staffing and Infrastructure?, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, April 19, 2016

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This document is from the April 19, 2016 hearing titled "Keeping Pace with Trade, Travel, and Security: How Does CBP Prioritize and Improve Staffing and Infrastructure?" held before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Martha McSally: "U.S. Customs and Border Protection's job is to make sure passengers and cargo that power our economy keep moving while keeping bad things and bad people out of the country. These missions require 2 basic prerequisites: An appropriate number of well-trained Customs and Border Protection Officers to process travelers and trade, and a modernized infrastructure to accommodate and channel the traffic so that it moves across the border quickly and safely. However, CBP is seriously understaffed, despite Congress' recent infusion of dollars to hire an additional 2,000 officers. Land ports of entry across the country are in dire need of expansion and renovation to keep pace with increasing demand and security requirements." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Eugene Schied, Linda Jacksta, John P. Wagner, Michael Gelber, and Anthony M. Reardon.

United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security

2016-04-19
S. Hrg. 109-71; Serial No. J-109-6: Strengthening Enforcement and Border Security: The 9/11 Commission Staff Report on Terrorism Travel: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship and Subcommittee on Terrorism, technology and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, March 14, 2005

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From the opening statement of John Cornyn: "Today's hearing will examine the challenges to enforcement we face at the border. It will examine the analysis and recommendations from the border security staff report of the 9/11 Commission, entitled ''9/11 and Terrorist Travel.'' The 9/11 Commission and their staff performed a tremendous public service by providing a comprehensive review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the attacks of September the 11th. I hope that those of us in Congress will never tire of reviewing the lessons learned from the failures that led to that terrible day. As that report makes clear, defects in our ability to enforce our laws and to secure the border pose a threat not only to the rule of law, but to the security of our Nation as well. Specifically, the border security staff identified several deficiencies in the training of border personnel and several defects with regard to our visa policy. The report noted that our immigration inspectors, now called CBP officers, received little counterterrorism and behavioral science training, no cultural training, and rarely received follow-up training. They also wrote that ''critical continuing education on document fraud was rare.'' The report also recognized that our visa process allowed terrorists to exploit our system and gained extended stays within our country. Recognizing this defect, terrorists concentrated on ways to exploit legal entry into our country, whether by lying on entry forms or using manipulated or fraudulent documents. All but two of the non-pilots involved in the 9/11 attacks were admitted as tourists and were granted automatic six-month stays. This allowed them to maintain a legal immigration status through the end of the 9/11 attacks. We should examine the process by which length of stay is determined to ensure that inspectors grant an appropriate time period to those seeking to enter our country." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: John Cornyn, Dianne Feinstein, Edward M. Kennedy, Jon Kyl, Patrick J. Leahy, Elaine Dezenski, Janice L. Kephart, Doris Meissner, Thomas J. Walters, and Susan Benesch.

United States. Government Printing Office

2005
Border Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Provides Integrity-Related Training to Its Officers and Agents throughout Their Careers

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"This letter formally transmits information we provided your offices on July 24, 2013, in response to a mandate in the House Committee Report (112-492) accompanying the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act, 2013. This mandate required us to review U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) ethics, conduct, and integrity training programs. CBP, within DHS, is responsible for securing U.S. borders and facilitating legal travel and trade. CBP officers, within the Office of Field Operations (OFO), are responsible for securing the border at U.S. ports of entry, locations at which individuals and merchandise may seek legal entry into the United States. Border Patrol (BP) agents, within the Office of Border Patrol (OBP), are responsible for securing the national border between the ports of entry. The Office of Training and Development (OTD) designs, develops, and delivers CBP-wide training courses and establishes training standards and policies. CBP's Office of Chief Counsel is responsible for developing and providing annual ethics training for employees who submit public financial disclosure information as well as some ethics training for officers assigned overseas. CBP Internal Affairs (IA) is responsible for promoting the integrity of CBP's workforce, programs, and operations. DHS officials have stated that drug-trafficking organizations are attempting to infiltrate the CBP workforce through conspired hiring operations and aggressive targeting of incumbent CBP officers and BP agents. DHS officials have testified that CBP's increased hiring of officers and agents since fiscal year 2006 has increased the opportunities for attempted corruption of the CBP workforce through bribery, infiltration, or other means. In December 2012, we reported on CBP's efforts to ensure the integrity of its workforce. For the purposes of that report, integrity issues included acts of corruption such as accepting cash bribes and other gratuities in return for allowing contraband or inadmissible aliens into the country, as well as other criminal activities or misconduct such as drug or alcohol abuse."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2013-08-28
Testimony of CBP Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner Major General Michael Kostelnik (Ret.), Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, 'Protecting the Maritime Borders: Leveraging Law Enforcement Cooperation to Enhance Security Along America's Coasts' [July 12, 2011]

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On July 12, 2011, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Air and Marine Assistant Commissioner Major General Michael Kostelnik (Ret.) went before the House Committee on Homeland Security to discuss the Protection of the Maritime Borders. Topics included national cooperation and shared situational awareness.

United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

2011-07-12
Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency Coordination is Needed for the Northern Border, Report to Congressional Requesters

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"The challenges of securing the U.S.-Canadian border involve the coordination of multiple partners. The results of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to integrate border security among its components and across federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners are unclear. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to address the extent to which DHS has (1) improved coordination with state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners; (2) progressed in addressing past federal coordination challenges; and (3) progressed in securing the northern border and used coordination efforts to address existing vulnerabilities. GAO reviewed interagency agreements, strategies, and operational documents that address DHS's reported northern border vulnerabilities such as terrorism. GAO visited four Border Patrol sectors, selected based on threat, and interviewed officials from federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian agencies operating within these sectors. While these results cannot be generalized, they provided insights on border security coordination. […] GAO is recommending that DHS enhance oversight to ensure efficient use of interagency forums and compliance with interagency agreements; and develop guidance to integrate partner resources to mitigate northern border vulnerabilities. DHS concurred with our recommendations."

United States. Government Accountability Office

2010-12-17
Serial No. 112-31: Securing the Nation's Ports and Maritime Border -- A Review of the Coast Guard's Post-9/11 Homeland Security Missions, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, June 14, 2011

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From the opening statement of Candice S. Miller: "For most of this year, this subcommittee has appropriately focused on securing the Nation's borders, both at and between the ports of entry. But the border isn't just the desert or along the Mexican border, or even along the Northern border. […] I want to focus on a very often overlooked, but just as vital issue and that is port and maritime security, and the changing role of the U.S. Coast Guard since September 11. […] Men and women of the Coast Guard serve off the coast of Iraq, and help to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Even before 9/11, the Coast Guard had its hands full with its 11 statutory missions like marine safety, ice breaking, search and rescue, and aids to navigation. But since September 11, we have loaded up the Coast Guard with additional responsibility and asked them specifically to focus resources on port and maritime security. This committee has jurisdiction of the Coast Guard as it relates to port and maritime security and today we will conduct our oversight on how the Coast Guard has been additionally missioned and if they have been adequately and appropriately funded and resourced. In fact, the number of hours spent on ports, waterways, and coastal security has increased by more than 900 percent since 9/11. Admiral Papp has taken a look at these figures and earlier this year he reported that the service may need, as he said, to reduce the number and range of capabilities added since 9/11 until properly resourced." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Candice S. Miller, Henry Cuellar, Benni G. Thompson, Robert J. Papp, Jr., Peter T. King, Michael T. McCaul, Benjamin Quayle, Scott Rigell, Jeff Duncan, Jeff Duncan, Loretta Sanchez, and Sheila Jackson Lee.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives

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Richard M. Stana discusses "the longstanding challenge of balancing our nation's security and commercial needs, an issue that is especially important in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that changed the nation's security environment. Addressing this challenge now falls principally to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Border and Transportation Security directorate. Within this directorate, the responsibility has been assigned primarily to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). BCBP consists of the inspections component of the former U.S. Customs Service; the Border Patrol and Inspections components of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); and a former component of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)."

United States. General Accounting Office

2003-06-16
Frequent Traveler Programs: Balancing Security and Commerce at Our Land Borders, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, July 26, 2007

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From the opening statement of Loretta Sanchez: "Today's hearing is our subcommittee's eighth hearing specifically focused on border issues. [...] Today we turn to the frequent traveler programs that impact both our Nation's security and the free flow of commerce. Customs and Border Protection currently operates three frequent travel border crossing programs: NEXUS, which is a binational program with Canada for people traveling between the U.S. and Canada via air, land, or private boat for business or pleasure; we have SENTRI, which is a unilateral initiative for pedestrians and noncommercial vehicle travelers crossing into the U.S. across the southwestern border; and FAST, a binational program with Canada for cargo shipments at specific locations on the northern border; and it is also accepted in conjunction with Mexico's Express program along the southern border. These programs are designed to allow preapproved, low-risk travelers or shipments to receive expedited processing at certain border crossings. And today I am interested in examining the security implications of these programs and the effect they have on commerce, particularly to our border regions. I would also like to gain a better understanding of how Customs and Border Protection administers these various programs, and to discuss whether it makes sense to keep these programs separate." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Loretta Sanchez, Mark E. Souder, Henry Cuellar, David G. Reichart, Robert M. Jacksta, Neal M. Belitsky, Luisa O'Connell, Thomas Gann, and Bennie G. Thompson.

United States. Government Printing Office

2009
Securing Our Borders--Operational Control and the Path Forward, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, February 15, 2011

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From the opening statement of Candice S. Miller: "This hearing provides the opportunity to examine the concept of operational control of the border. Operational control has sort of become a buzz word of choice when describing how much or how little of the border the Border Patrol can effectively control. The American people rightly expect and demand that we achieve operational control of the border, that the preamble of the United States, of course, says that the first and foremost responsibility of the Federal Government is to provide for the common defense. I don't think we can provide for the common defense if we cannot protect the sovereignty of our Nation by securing our borders. According to the Border Patrol, 1,107 miles are currently under effective operational control. Today I want to explore the metrics that the Border Patrol utilizes when they announce that these miles are under operational control because, interestingly, in the budget justification documents, apparently there is not a plan to gain any additional miles for the rest of fiscal year 2011 or fiscal year 2012. I am sure there will be some questions raised about those documents." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Candice S. Miller, Henry Cuellar, Bennie G. Thompson, Michael J. Fisher, Richard M. Stana, and Raul G. Salinas.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012
Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, ICE Acting Director of Detention and Removal John Torres and CBP Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar on the Secure Border Initiative [August 23, 2006]

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In these remarks, Secretary Chertoff addresses the Secure Border Initiative and describes it as part of a comprehensive strategy to control illegal immigration. He describes the biggest accomplishments so far as the elimination of the catch-and-release policy, secondly there is a real market decrease in the number of non-Mexicans coming across the border illegally. All of this demonstrates a change in direction and momentum in border control.

United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

2006-08-23
Serial No. 113-77: Border Security Oversight, Part III: Border Crossing Cards and B1/B2 Visas, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, November 14, 2013

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This is the November 14, 2013 hearing, "Border Security Oversight Part III (3): Border Crossing Cards and B1/B2 Visas" held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. From the opening statement of Jason Chaffetz: "Today's proceedings are the third in a series of hearings designed to assess U.S. border security efforts, as well as challenges in obtaining operational control, particularly of the Southwest border. [...] B1 and B2 cards are non-immigrant visas for persons who want to enter the United States temporarily for business, a B1; tourism, pleasure, or visiting, a B2; or combination of both purposes, often referred to as a B1/B2. According to the Department of State, more than 5.3 million B1/ B2 non-immigrant visas were issued in the fiscal year 2012. [...] In 2008, the State Department issued 3.5 million B1/B2 visas, representing an approximate 55 percent increase in the issuance of these visas from 2008 to 2012. Likewise, the State Department issued 1.3 million border crossing cards in fiscal year 2013, continuing to issue millions of border crossing cards over the last three years. [...] Border crossing cards are only issued to applicants who are citizens and residents of Mexico and 'must demonstrate that they have ties to Mexico to compel them to return after a temporary stay in the United States.' Today I am interested in learning what the standard is for determining what types of ties are considered strong enough to qualify for a border crossing card." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jason Chaffetz, John Wagner, John P. Woods, Edward J. Ramotowski, and Juan Osuna.

United States. Government Printing Office

2014
Strengthening the Border - Finding the Right Mix of Personnel, Infrastructure, and Technology, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 15, 2011

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From the opening statement of Candice S. Miller: "This hearing determines and tries to build on that discussion by examining the three main pillars that allow Border Patrol agents to be effective. That, of course, is a combination of personnel, infrastructure, and technology. I think we certainly need all three to be successful in securing our borders. The Department of Homeland Security's Analysis of Alternatives, which formed a new technology plan for the State of Arizona, consists of a combination of Remote Video Surveillance Systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Unattended Ground Sensors and other types of technology. The backbone of the Arizona plan actually consists of Integrated Fixed Towers, which look very similar to the original design of SBInet. However, it now appears that the technology plan for the entire Southwest border currently being prepared will not be ready until July instead of March, as we had originally hoped. I am concerned about the lack of a comprehensive technology plan as well for the Northern border, which does not appear to be something that CBP is considering at this time. I just would once again, and I always say that I am totally cognizant and very sensitive to all of the challenges that are happening on the Southern border of our Nation, but I like to remind folks we actually have two borders, so the Northern border as well. Both of them need to be secured." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Candice S. Miller, Henry Cuellar, Bennie G. Thompson, Michael J. Fisher, Mark Borkowski, Michael C. Kostelnik, General Hugo Salazar, and Richard M. Stana.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012

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