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Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands, Report to Congressional Requesters
Since the mid-1990s-and especially since September 11-the government has focused attention and resources on preventing illegal aliens, drug smugglers, and potential terrorists from entering the United States across its land borders with Mexico and Canada. The Border Patrol is responsible for protecting the nation's borders. However, a significant portion of the borderlands are federal or tribal lands managed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service, and Forest Service. Realizing the importance of coordinating federal law enforcement efforts, GAO agreed to assess: (1) border-related law enforcement challenges for land management agencies in Arizona and Washington, (2) resources land management agencies have received to address these challenges, and (3) how the Border Patrol and land management agencies coordinate border-related law enforcement efforts. GAO is recommending that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, the Interior, and Agriculture coordinate strategic and funding plans with regard to federal borderlands. DHS, the Interior, Agriculture, Justice, and the Office of Management and Budget reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with its findings and recommendations.
United States. General Accounting Office
2004-06-16
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Re-Casting the U.S.-Mexico Border Security Net
From the thesis abstract: "The terrorist attack in 2001 left the United States with a sense of vulnerability and generated both demand and need to protect the nation. Fortifying the border has created diminishing returns. In addition, it has created negative side effects and unintended consequences that undermine the very nature and reason for installing border fences. Immigrants have been forced into the hands of criminal organizations and are more vulnerable now than in the past. Building a wall has deterred some illicit activity, but it does not deter the motivational factors. By hardening the borderline, the U.S. has issued a challenge, practically daring anyone to attempt entry though immigration has been reduced, drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have picked up the gauntlet thrown by the United States and are finding ingenious methods to overcome and bypass the tightening border controls. Determined and motivated people will continue to find a way, even if it takes multiple times to find loopholes and weakness in the border. Border policy has resulted in unintended consequences, specifically, attracting DTOs, stimulating innovation, creating sophisticated networks within the black market arena, and rendering the fence obsolete. The cost effectiveness of current border security practices have reached the culminating point. Policymakers need to find alternative solutions, because current methods are unsustainable."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Cory, Bettina J.
2014-03
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Border Security: Analysis of Vulnerabilities Identified by Frontline Agents
"U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) collects data annually from frontline Border Patrol agents and chiefs for each of the nine Border Patrol sectors along the southwest border. These data (1) identify vulnerabilities - or 'capability gaps' - that inhibit agents from securing the border and (2) catalog preliminary requests for solutions that would address each capability gap using infrastructure, technology, personnel, or other resources. The tool CBP uses to capture its vulnerability assessments and initial resource requests is known as the Capability Gap Analysis Process (CGAP). The following report summarizes the results of the Democratic Committee staff's review of nonpublic data contained in CGAP in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017."
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
2018-03-22
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Exploring Drug Gangs' Ever-Evolving Tactics to Penetrate the Border and the Federal Government's Ability to Stop Them, Hearing Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 31, 2011
From the opening statement of Mark L. Pryor: "Today, this Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs will discuss methods drug gangs are using to penetrate the Southwest border in an effort to traffic drugs and people into the United States. […] The fight to secure the United States borders is a constant concern for the people living in the border States as well as the government officials who represent them. There are few threats as deadly and menacing as those posed by drug gangs, particularly Mexican drug gangs, operating near the border. Many Americans, and likewise, many lawmakers, may be inclined to believe that this problem is for the border States only and for the border States to solve, yet there can be no doubt that this is a problem for all Americans, North to South, Coast to Coast. An estimated 230 American cities, including three cities in Arkansas, have a presence of the Mexican drug cartels in their communities. We must do everything we can to disrupt their networks and to prevent them from moving product onto American soil. […] The efforts of drug gangs to smuggle people and goods range from the truly bizarre to the truly extraordinary." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mark L. Pryor, John Ensign, Donna Bucella, James A. Dinkins, Thomas M. Harrigan, Frances Flener, and L. Kent Bitsko.
United States. Government Printing Office
2012
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Land Ports of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies and Enhance Analysis of Inspections, Report to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
From the Highlights: "CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection], within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is the lead federal agency charged with a dual mission of facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and trade at the nation's borders while keeping terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and inadmissible aliens out of the country. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review CBP's process for inspecting passenger vehicles, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at land POEs [ports of entry] to secure the border. This report examines to what extent CBP (1) has processes and policies for inspections, (2) monitors inspection activities, and (3) has measures to assess its efforts to detect illegal activity of passengers, pedestrians, and commercial vehicles at land POEs. To address these questions, GAO analyzed CBP documents and data related to inbound inspections; interviewed officials; and observed operations at a non-generalizable sample of seven land POEs, selected to reflect a range of traffic volumes and geographic locations, among other things. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in June 2019. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been omitted."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2019-08
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Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies, but Additional Efforts Are Needed, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"Information is a crucial tool in securing the nation's borders against crimes and potential terrorist threats, with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the FBI, having key information sharing roles. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which (1) local and tribal officials in border communities received useful information from their federal partners, (2) federal agencies supported state fusion centers'--where states collaborate with federal agencies to improve information sharing--efforts to develop border intelligence products, and (3) local and tribal agencies were aware of the suspicious activities they are to report. To conduct this work, GAO analyzed relevant laws, directives, policies, and procedures; contacted a nongeneralizable sample of 20 agencies in border communities and five fusion centers (based on geographic location and size); and interviewed DHS and FBI officials."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2009-12
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Enhancement of Border Security
"The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is revising program guidance for operational overtime costs associated with providing enhanced law enforcement operations in support of federal agencies for increased border security and border crossing enforcement in selected states, during the pre-election and pre-inauguration period of heightened terrorist threat. Effective October 1, 2004, through January 21, 2005, northern and southern border jurisdictions may use available Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) funds received through the FY 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program, Part II (SHSGP II) to support these activities. Reimbursement for State, tribal, and local law enforcement participation in these operations will be contingent upon approved operational plans developed jointly between State, tribal and local law enforcement officials and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)/Border Patrol sectors."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office for Domestic Preparedness
Mencer, Constance Suzanne, 1947-
2004-10-01
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Budget Hearing - United States Customs and Border Protection, Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, April 2, 2014
This hearing compilation is from the April 2, 2014 hearing on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 budget request held before the U.S. House Committee on Appropriations. From the opening statement of John Carter: "Today we welcome the recently confirmed Commissioner for U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in what marks his very first appearance before our Subcommittee. Commissioner Kerlikowske, welcome….we appreciate you being here and thank you for your willingness to serve DHS and our Nation. When we met, you said you requested this assignment because the job would draw on your experience as both a career police officer and in counter-narcotics. There is no question…your law enforcement background will be invaluable to CBP. You can count on this subcommittee to deliver the funding and tough oversight that CBP needs to fulfill its critical mission -- a mission which captures what DHS is all about -- facilitating legitimate travel and trade 'into' the country and securing our Nation's borders and keeping any and all threats out of our country. CBP's budget of nearly $13 billion dollars is almost 40% of DHS's total budget request. During today's hearing, we'll ask whether your front line operators -- the CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and Air and Marine interdiction agents -- have what they need to get the job done." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of John Carter and R. Gil Kerlikowske.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations
2014-04-02
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H.A.S.C. No. 109-119: U.S. Southern Border Security- National Security Implications and Issues for the Armed Services, Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, August 2, 2006
"The Committee on Armed Services meets this afternoon to learn more about the complexity of providing border security along the Southwestern Border and how current border security challenges impact the United States armed forces, both active duty and National Guard."
United States. Government Printing Office
2007
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National Security: Threats at Our Borders, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, March 23, 2016
This is the March 23, 2016 joint hearing on "National Security: Threats at Our Borders" held before the Subcommittee on National Security and the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. From the opening statement of Ron DeSantis: "The United States confronts a wide array of threats at its borders, ranging from terrorists seeking to harm the United States to transnational criminals smuggling drugs and counterfeit goods to foreign nationals entering illegally in order to work in the United States unlawfully. America's borders and ports are busy places. Every year, tens of millions of cargo containers and hundreds of millions of lawful travelers enter the country, while tens of thousands of illegal cargo entries are seized and hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants are arrested or denied entry." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ronald Vitiello, Steven McCraw, Brandon Judd, Jan C. Ting, and Eleanor Acer.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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Secure Border Initiative Fence Construction Costs
"The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, required DHS to complete construction by December 31, 2008, of either 370 miles or other mileage determined by the Secretary, of reinforced fencing along the southwest border wherever the Secretary determines it would be most practical and effective in deterring smugglers and aliens attempting illegal entry. DHS set a goal to complete approximately 670 miles of fencing by December 31, 2008. Of these miles, DHS planned about 370 miles of pedestrian fencing--fencing that prevents people on foot from crossing the border, and about 300 miles of vehicle fencing--barriers used primarily in remote areas to prohibit vehicles engaged in drug trafficking and alien smuggling operations from crossing the border. Most of the pedestrian fencing under construction is single layer fencing--referred to as primary fencing. However, in some areas a second layer of fencing--referred to as secondary fencing--is being constructed parallel to existing primary fencing for additional operational advantage to deter illegal cross-border activities. In September 2008, we testified that SBI fencing project costs were increasing and land acquisition issues posed a challenge to DHS in meeting its goal to have about 670 miles of fencing completed by December 31, 2008.3 Also in September 2008, DHS revised its goal such that it planned to have these miles either built, under construction, or under contract by December 31, 2008. In December 2008, DHS reported that it planned to complete all but one of the fence projects by March 2009."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2009-01-29
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Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security (Redacted)
"The Department of Homeland Security [DHS] has implemented several programs to screen foreign nationals who seek entry into the United States at air, land, and sea ports of entry, as well as persons who seek illegal entry through land and maritime borders. We evaluated whether levels of cooperation, resources, and technology were adequate for department officers charged with border security. This review is the second phase of a three-phase review. We have previously reviewed overseas screening (Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Overseas Screening OIG-11-68, April 2011). Some DHS components have developed special-purpose, user-friendly interfaces so that computer users performing focused operations, such as primary inspections at ports of entry, can access DHS databases. However, fragmented data systems and inadequate resources and infrastructure remain a challenge for many officers involved in border security. Relationships among components work well when they are adequately resourced and their missions are clearly defined. However, some relationships, most notably among law enforcement components on the northern and southern borders, struggle with mission overlap and inadequate information sharing. The U.S. Coast Guard's effective and efficient information sharing approach is an example of how complex multiagency efforts can succeed. However, the sharing of information among other components is still evolving. We are making eight recommendations to use DHS resources better and facilitate increased data sharing."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2012-02
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Military Police: Assisting in Securing the United States Southern Border
From the thesis abstract: "The lack of security along the U.S. southern border threatens our national security. This situation is caused by drug cartel related violence, illegal drug trafficking and the inability to prevent illegal entry by non-U.S. citizens. Drug related violence is creating instability within Mexico leading to an increasingly lawless environment which potentially threatens U.S. citizens. A second concern is the inability to secure our border from entry by unknown persons as demonstrated by the flow of illegal aliens to include a large number of other than Mexicans (OTMS). This creates a condition whereby anyone who wishes ill against the U.S. or its citizens might gain access into the country undetected. Together these two conditions make securing the southern border a national security priority. Efforts by both the Mexican and U.S. Governments have produced some success but in many instances the situation is growing worse. In order to assist in combating this problem due consideration should be given to employing active duty military forces to the southern border in particular Army Military Police forces. Military Police provide the optimal active duty force that if employed correctly could provide meaningful assistance and help to mitigate the security threat."
Army War College (U.S.)
Chase, David
2012-03-12
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Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, Report to Congressional Requesters
"The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders through, among other things, new technology, increased staffing, and new fencing and barriers. The technology component of SBI, which is known as SBInet, involves the acquisition, development, integration, and deployment of surveillance systems and command, control, communications, and intelligence technologies. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to determine whether DHS has defined the scope and timing of SBInet capabilities and how these capabilities will be developed and deployed, is effectively defining and managing SBInet requirements, and is effectively managing SBInet testing. To do so, GAO reviewed key program documentation and interviewed program officials, analyzed a random sample of requirements, and observed operations of a pilot project. GAO is recommending that DHS assess and disclose the risks associated with its planned SBInet development, testing, and deployment activities, and address the system deployment, requirements management, and testing weaknesses that GAO identified. DHS agreed with all but one of GAO's eight recommendations and described actions completed, underway, and planned to address them."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2008-09
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S. Hrg. 109-118: The Need for Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Securing the Cooperation of Participating Countries, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, June 30, 2005
From the opening statement of John Cornyn: "Today's hearing will focus on the fundamental issue of the level of cooperation the United States can expect from countries that will benefit from comprehensive immigration reform. Workers in this country come from many diverse countries. Essential to immigration reform will be increased cooperation on border security, efforts to combat human trafficking and alien smuggling, and stepped up crime prevention from any country that sends workers to our Nation. We are addressing these types of issues with Mexico and Canada. The United States, Mexico, and Canada have entered the Security and Prosperity Partnership Agreement designed to develop a common security strategy and promote economic development. According to this week's announcement, border security remains the central theme of that partnership. I hope that the partnership continues to identify additional security initiatives that our countries can jointly pursue and that this initiative can serve as a model to address security concerns that relate to other countries as well." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Edward M. Kennedy, Roberta Clariond, Andres Rozental.
United States. Government Printing Office
2005-06-30
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S. Hrg. 108-913; Serial No. J-108-24: Visa Issuance and Homeland Security: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, July 15, September 23, and September 30, 2003
From the opening statement of Saxby Chambliss: "Last month, GAO issued a report titled 'Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process.' That title is still appropriate for today's hearing, even as we look more generally at the visa process. Overall coordination and information-sharing between the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security is essential to our national security after September 11. We must reshape our Government in accordance with the President's vision for homeland security, from the creation of a new department to the culture change away from old habits, and down to the details of interagency cooperation. The GAO report brings into sharp focus the lack of communication between the State Department's Consular Affairs and the Homeland Security Department's Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, as well as its Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The report exposes how suspected terrorists may have entered the country even after their visas had been revoked. In this instance, terrorism is still illustrative of the underlying problem: policies and procedures must be adopted and formalized to stop immigration-related threats to our Nation's security." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Saxby Chambliss, John Cornyn, Patrick J. Leahy, Jayson P. Ahern, Michael T. Dougherty, Jess T. Ford, Janice L. Jacobs, Edmond M. Kennedy, John O. Brennan, Larry A. Mefford, William Parrish, Larry E. Craig, Maura Harty, and Asa Hutchinson.
United States. Government Printing Office
2006
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Secure Borders: An Arrival Zone Counterdrug National Security Strategy
The emergence of the narco-terrorist nexus has significant implications for the national security environment of the United States. The present focus on counterterrorism and the current debate on governmental reorganization and Homeland Security offer a unique opportunity to reevaluate and reprioritize our counterdrug national security strategy and policies. This paper traces the history of counterdrug strategy in the United States National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy from 1987 to the present within an analytical framework in terms of classical economics and Jominian spatial organization: Supply side and demand side; source zone, transit zone, arrival zone, domestic zone, and fiscal zone approaches. The current counterdrug National Security Strategy is a demand side domestic zone strategy, a supply side arrival zone strategy weakened by priority to free trade, and a multilateral, multinational source and transit zone supply side strategy focused primarily on Colombia. This analysis concludes that the ends, ways and means of the present strategy are not effective for the long term and leave the nation immediately vulnerable in the short term. The simple fact is that the United States does not have secure borders, or even marginal control of its border.
Army War College (U.S.)
Smith, Thomas T.
2002-11-14
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Improving Border Security and Public Safety, Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, April 5, 2017
This testimony compilation created by HSDL staff is from the April 5, 2017 hearing on "Improving Border Security and Public Safety," before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The purpose of this hearing was to discuss the role and efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in improving border security and public safety, as well as the challenges that DHS faces in that role and the support it receives from the current Trump Administration. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ron Johnson, Claire McCaskill, and John F. Kelly.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
2017-04-05
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Northern Border a Forgotten National Security Threat
"The nexus among border control, illegal immigration, homeland security, and other transnational criminal activity has been a subject of much debate in the past especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Because much of the immigrant population residing in the United States illegally is believed to be from Mexico, Central, and South America the focus on the border between the United States and Mexico is logical. However, the border between the United States and Canada is the largest land border between nations and represents almost 4,000 miles of poorly controlled territory and is more than twice the size of the boundary shared with Mexico. The threat is greater than the seam created by the boundary or the geography. More important, perhaps, is the potentially explosive nature of the environment created by the confluence of a myriad of issues. Concerns like the mature lines of communication (LOCs) used for trafficking and smuggling between the ports of entry (POEs), a focus on cross border economic flow at entry points, and a growing number of Syrian refugees in Canada, all come together and combine with the geography to create significant security concerns."
Air University (U.S.). Air War College
Brown, Jason P.
2017-04-06
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Transforming Border Security: Prevention First
"The events of September 11, 2001 caused the nation's leaders to accelerate existing border programs aimed at prevention. Traditionally, the 'prevention' of border violations has involved interdiction (physically impeding any incursion while it is occurring), preemption (through routine screening to intercept illegal shipments, weapons, people, or other illicit cargo), and deterrence (where an action taken means a potential violator does not plan or even attempt an illegal entry). While effective in some cases, none of these strategies - together or separately - has evolved into a comprehensive, prevention oriented approach to border security. The development of a prevention-led border strategy would involve at least four strategic shifts: aligning border security with global strategy; forging a new foreign policy; making progress on cooperation; and changing U.S. reactive approaches."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
Bach, Robert L.
2005
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Memorandum of Understanding: Cooperative National Security and Counterterrorism Efforts on Federal Lands Along the United States' Borders
"This Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) is made and entered into by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including and on behalf of its constituent bureau U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the CBP Office of Border Patrol (CBP-BP); the Department of the Interior (DOl), including and on behalf of its constituent bureaus, the National Park Service (NPS), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR); and the Department of Agriculture (USDA), including and on behalf of its constituent agency the U.S. Forest Service (USFS). […] This MOU is intended to provide consistent goals, principles, and guidance related to border security, such as law enforcement operations; tactical infrastructure installation; utilization of roads; minimization and/or prevention of significant impact on or impairment of natural and cultural resources; implementation of the Wilderness Act, Endangered Species Act, and other related environmental law, regulation, and policy across land management agencies; and provide for coordination and sharing information on threat assessments and other risks, plans for infrastructure and technology improvements on Federal lands, and operational and law enforcement staffing changes. This MOU provides guidance in the development of individual agreements, where appropriate, between CBP and land management agencies to further the provisions contained herein."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of the Interior; United States. Department of Agriculture
2006-03-31
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Improved Administration Can Enhance U.S. Customs and Border Protection Laptop Computer Security (Redacted)
"This report assesses the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) laptop computer security controls. It is based on interviews with CBP officials, direct observations, technical tests, and a review of applicable documents. Significant work remains for CBP to further strengthen the configuration, patch, and inventory management controls necessary to protect its government-issued laptop computers. Specifically, CBP has not established: (1) a standard configuration for its laptops that meets required minimum-security settings; (2) effective procedures to patch laptop computers; and (3) adequate inventory management procedures. As a result, sensitive information stored and processed on CBP's laptop computers may not be protected adequately. Further, because CBP uses the same procedures to develop a model for its desktop computers, the configuration weaknesses identified with laptop computers are relevant to all government-issued computers assigned within CBP."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2006-12
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Department of Homeland Security Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border [January 30, 2006]
In this press release, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff announces the implementation of Expedited Removal (ER) along the entire U.S.-Canadian border and all U.S. coastal areas, as part of the Secure Border Initiative. Today's announcement reflects the further implementation of ER that was initially implemented along the Southwest border and will now be implemented along all of the United States' border areas. ER is an effective border management process that swiftly returns illegal aliens to their countries of origin while maintaining protections for those who fear persecution.
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office
2006-01-30
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CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks
From the Highlights: "As a Trusted Traveler Program, CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] established the FAST [Free and Secure Trade] program to expedite processing for carriers and drivers pre-approved as low risk to enhance trade and safeguard against border security risks. We conducted this audit to determine the extent that CBP ensures only low-risk commercial drivers participate in the FAST program. [...] We made four recommendations to improve the program and mitigate risks at CBP land ports of entry."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2021-09-29
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Nomination of Kevin K. McAleenan, Hearing Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session on the Nomination of Kevin K. McAleenan, to Be Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, October 24, 2017
This is the October 24, 2017 hearing on "Nomination of Kevin K. McAleenan," held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Finance. From the opening statement of Orrin G. Hatch: "First, we will have a hearing to consider the nomination of Kevin McAleenan to serve as Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection or CBP. In addition, if a quorum is present at any point during the hearing, we will move to executive session to consider and hopefully report three pending trade-related nominations. [...] CBP is the United States' unified border agency, charged with facilitating legitimate trade and travel, while enforcing U.S. trade laws and securing our borders. There is a great deal of work to be done to improve enforcement, but this mission should not come at the expense of legitimate trade and travel. Striking the right balance is vital to ensuring that the United States remains competitive with the rest of the world. Balancing facilitation and security will require CBP to work with stakeholders in and out of the government." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record by Mazie K. Hirono.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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How COVID-19 is Changing Immigration and Security along the U.S. Border [audio]
From the Audio Description: "How is the coronavirus affecting immigration and security along the U.S. border with Mexico? In this episode, join host Glynn Cosker for a conversation with Sylvia Longmire, an expert in border security, immigration and Mexico's drug wars. Learn how COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] has suspended immigration hearings forcing asylum seekers to stay in crowded tent camps along the border for longer periods of time as they wait for courts to reopen. Also learn about the effects on DHS's relatively new migration protocols program (MPP) that changes the way CBP [U.S. .S. Customs and Border Protection] processes asylum requests from migrants." The duration of the audio is 33 minutes.
American Military University
2020-08-05
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Technical Security Evaluation of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Activities at the Chet Holifield Federal Building [Redacted] April 2008
"We initiated a program to determine the extent to which critical Department of Homeland Security sites comply with the department's technical and information security policies and procedures. Based on our internal analysis, we selected the Chet Holifield Federal Building located in Laguna Niguel, California where the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Southern California field support and Human Resources Management staffs are located. Our evaluation focused on how Customs and Border Protection has implemented computer security operational, technical, and We performed onsite inspections of the areas where these management controls for its information technology resources at this site. resources were located, interviewed departmental staff, and conducted technical tests of internal controls, e.g., scans for wireless networks. We also reviewed applicable departmental policies, procedures, and other appropriate documentation. The information technology security controls implemented at this site have deficiencies that, if exploited, could result in the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information technology systems. Specifically, Customs and Border Protection needs to improve its environmental, business continuity, and physical security controls for its computer room and telecommunications closets. Customs and Border Protection could also improve its technical controls at this site Additionally, management controls could be improved at this site by implementing effective capital planning and investment control procedures and by completing all required system accreditation activities."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2008-04
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U.S. Border Security: An Integrated Approach
From the thesis abstract: "This paper examines growing U.S. security concerns along the U.S. -- Mexican border due to the crime and violence brought on by the drug trade. Analysis of the drug trade and its impacts on security indicate that the Merida/Beyond Merida Initiative by itself is not increasing security along the southern border. This paper identifies an integrated approach along three lines of effort (LOE) as a more effective means of increasing security on the border. LOE 1 examines Mexican institutions; LOE 2 examines the flow of weapons and money to drug trafficking organizations; while LOE 3 examines U.S. drug demand. The paper goes on to explains how each LOE contributes to the integrated approach and provides recommendations along each LOE to increase its effectiveness and improve border security."
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Gaertner, Barry A.
2011-10-28
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Decision: Office of Management and Budget and U.S. Department of Homeland Security--Pause of Border Barrier Construction and Obligations
From the Digest: "Congress has appropriated funds to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) specifically for constructing fencing or barrier system at the southern border of the United States, commonly referred to as the border wall. On January 20, 2021, the President issued a Proclamation directing a pause in the construction of the border wall and a pause in obligation of funds for the wall. DHS has almost fully obligated funds appropriated in previous fiscal years for border fence or barrier construction projects, and suspended work on some projects. DHS has not yet obligated funds appropriated in fiscal year 2021. We conclude that delays in the obligation and expenditure of DHS's appropriations are programmatic delays, not impoundments. DHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) have shown that the use of funds is delayed in order to perform environmental reviews and consult with various stakeholders, as required by law, and determine project funding needs in light of changes that warrant using funds differently than initially planned. As explained below, because the delay here is precipitated by legal requirements, the delay is distinguishable from the withholding of Ukraine security assistance funds."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2021-06-15
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Privacy Impact Assessment for the Border and Transportation Security Network (BTSNet) Spiral 1
"The Border and Transportation Security Network (BTSNet) is a project of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate, Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA). BTSNet is a proof-of-concept prototype development. Its mission is to develop technology to secure our nation's borders by preventing the entry of terrorists and their instruments of terror, criminals, and illegal aliens into the country. BTSNet will be implemented using a spiral development, which means with each spiral there will be increased capabilities and a broader user base. Spiral 1 is focused on U.S. Border Patrol field operations with an emphasis on the Southwest border area. This development essentially extends the law enforcement data base query capability that is currently a field station function and moves it to the field agent via wireless communications using a handheld personal digital assistant (PDA) and/or a vehicle-mounted mobile data computer (MDC). The field agent will be able to make biographic and biometric queries on detainees from the field rather than physically transporting detainees to the station. Future developments will provide the agent access to other data sources and expand the user base to other DHS components. Personally identifiable information collected or retrieved by the BTSNet system will not be stored on the server, the handheld device or vehicle-mounted computer. This PIA will be updated accordingly as other spirals are developed."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2005-01-18
