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• Treasury and General Government Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2003, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session on H.R. 5120/S. 2740, an Act Making Appropriations for the Treasury Department, the United States Postal Service, the Executive Office of the President, and Certain Independent Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2003, and for Other Purposes

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  From the statement of Byron L. Dorgan: "Let me make just a couple of brief comments. I will put my entire statement in the record and then we will hear from you, Mr. Secretary, and have some questions. This hearing kickoff the subcommittee's series of hearings on President Bush's Fiscal Year 2003 budget request for the Treasury Department and other agencies under our jurisdiction. To no one's surprise, this is going to be a very difficult budget year. The anticipated budget surpluses have vanished and our resources are stretched thin. We have had an economic slowdown, a recession of sorts. We are not sure how deep and whether we are completely out of that recession, but we also face a war against terrorism, both at home and abroad. So things have changed dramatically since the last time we met. The Treasury Department is a key player in all of these activities. At a hearing 2 years ago I held up an orange rubber cone and talked about northern border security and the fact that at many ports of entry on the northern border that rubber cone represented America's security after 10:00 at night. I proposed early last year a northern border initiative and included $25 million in the budget to deal with that." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Paul H. O'Neill, Edward Kingman, Mitchell E. Daniels, James Gurule, Brian Stafford, Bradely Buckles, James Sloan, Paul Hackenberry, Michele C. Marx, John P. Walters, Charles O. Rossotti, and Byron L. Dorgan.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• United States and Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, October 16, 2002

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  From the opening statement of George W. Gekas: "On August the 30th, the Safe Third Country Agreement final draft text was initialed by our Administration as one point of the 30 point Ridge-Manley Smart Border Action Plan between the United States and Canada. This agreement would allow both countries to manage the flow of individuals seeking to access our respective asylum systems. Under the agreement if the alien seeks to travel from the United States to Canada through a land border port of entry to apply for asylum in Canada, the alien will generally be sent back to the U.S. to apply for asylum. If an alien travels from Canada to the United States for the same purposes, the alien must seek asylum in Canada, the first of the two countries in which the alien traveled. The intent is to prevent asylum shopping in both the U.S. and Canada, and it is possible between the two countries because both are parties to the protocol relating to the status of refugees. The theory behind the agreement is that an alien is safe in either country and should seek it in the first country in which the alien lands. The agreement is narrowly drafted, and if finalized, it would only apply to asylum claims made at land border ports of entry between Canada and the United States. It would not apply to aliens traveling through airports or seaports, nor would it apply to aliens who cross illegally between the two countries. In addition, the agreement would not apply to aliens who have already entered both countries. The agreement is prospective, not retroactive." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: George W. Gekas, Sheila Jackson Lee, Kelly Ryan, Joe Langlois, Mark Krikorian, Bill Frelick, Zoe Lofgren, Dan Stein, Bethany Olson, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• European Missile Defense - Issues and Options

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  "The NATO reaction to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States underscores the heightened European recognition of threats to Western security originating from beyond the borders of member nations. Nonetheless the European Allies remain wary of plans to extend missile defenses to their continent. In trying to change attitudes toward missile defense within NATO the administration will need to consider European interests and political and economic realities. The United States should not try to force missile defense on Europe. Nor should this issue be viewed as an exclusively NATO project or a test of Allied fealty. At the same time the Allies need to face the potentially damaging consequences of remaining vulnerable to ballistic missile attack while the United States builds defenses against such a threat. Hammering out a responsible NATO missile defense policy will be far more difficult if the transatlantic debate becomes polarized between those who believe Europe will never agree to missile defenses and those who argue that the continent must be protected regardless of its own wishes."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Sokolsky, Richard

  2002
• H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Days 1 and 2, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, July 15 and 16, 2002

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  From the opening statement of J.C. Watts, Jr.: "During my first year in the House of Representatives, the Oklahoma City bombing created a wake-up call on the need for a plan of action against domestic terrorism. During my last term here in Congress, the attacks on September 11, 2001, have forever changed the world and again demonstrated why the government must change the way we view threats to our homeland. […] I was pleased when President Bush called last month for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security, and I am thankful Speaker Hastert had the good judgment to create this committee. […] The Select Committee has offered a fair, open and bipartisan process for members to express their views as we discuss the proposal put forth by the President. George Mason, the Virginian and who made the case for the Bill of Rights to our Constitution, wrote, 'government is, or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, Nation or community.' Mr. Chairman, we need to secure our borders as we secure our liberty. We must protect our rights as Americans and as our government protects our freedom. But while we think outside the box in order to promote these values each of us holds dear, we must never think outside the parameters of the United States Constitution." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: J.C. Watts, Jr., Tom Ridge, Ann Veneman, Norman Y. Mineta, Tommy G. Thompson, Spencer Abraham, Kay Cole James, Mac Thornberry, Jane Harman, Jim Gibbons, Ellen O. Tauscher, F. James Sensenbrenner, Bobby L. Harnage, Sr., and Colleen M. Kelly.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?

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  "Since World War II, few countries have been of greater strategic concern to the United States than Iran. Whether as a dependable friend and preeminent regional partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has occupied a special place in U.S. security thinking. It exerts influence on a range of important policy issues--from the Middle East peace process to post-Taliban Afghanistan--and when it acquires nuclear weapons capability within the next decade, it could become a significant factor driving U.S. and regional government policies on proliferation. Since September 11, there has been much speculation in both countries about the possibility of a new opening in relations. Like America, Iran wants an Iraq without Saddam Hussein, Afghanistan under a stable government, and Central Asia absent Russian control of borders and resources. Yet dramatic breakthroughs in U.S.-Iran relations appear unlikely. Iran's reformist and conservative camps may be actively debating whether rapprochement with the United States is in Tehran's future, but no signs indicate that the conditions for achieving normalcy would be minimally acceptable to Washington. U.S. options must encompass several factors that shape decisionmaking in today's Iran: the rise of Persian nationalism, the consensus among leaders on foreign and security issues, the weakness of President Mohammad Khatami in the face of conservative obstacles to reform, fears of encirclement, and a bias toward self-sufficiency in defense posture. American policy can open a door, but Tehran must decide if and when to walk through it."

  National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies

  Yaphe, Judith Share, 1944-

  2002-01
• For Ray Downey: Third Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

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  This third annual report represents three years of focused deliberation and cumulative recommendations for protecting the United States against terrorism in five specific areas: state and local response; health and medical capabilities; immigration and border control; security against cyber attacks; and roles and missions on the use of military. These issues were chosen because they need the most attention in order to implement an effective national strategy.

  Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (U.S.)

  2001-12-15
• H. Rept. 107-320: Customs Border Security Act of 2001: Report Together with Dissenting Views to Accompany H.R. 3129, December 5, 2001

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  "The Committee on Ways and Means, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3129) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for the United States Customs Service for antiterrorism, drug interdiction, and other operations, for the Office of the United States Trade Representative, for the United States International Trade Commission, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass. […] H.R. 3129, as amended, would authorize appropriations for fiscal year FY 2002 and FY 2003 for the U.S. Customs Service, including specific authorization for anti-terrorism, drug interdiction and the prevention of child pornography. The bill would also provide more funding to textile transshipment efforts and assistance to African countries for implementation of the African Growth and Opportunities Act. The bill would further dedicate resources to reestablish the New York Customs offices formerly at the World Trade Center, which were destroyed in the terrorist attack of September 11th, and it would provide more resources to the Northern Border. H.R. 3129 would also authorize full funding for the Customs Automated Commercial Environment. H.R. 3129 would also authorize appropriations for the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) and the International Trade Commission (ITC)."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001-12-05
• IBETing on a Secure Border

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  In 1996, the United States and Canada formed the first Integrated Border Enforcement Team (IBET) to combat smuggling and illegal immigration on the northwest border between Blaine, Washington, and British Columbia. Although IBET has been effective, a number of operations have been hampered by communications deficits. This document discusses how technology could help make IBET operations safer and more efficient.

  National Institute of Justice (U.S.)

  2002
• United States-Canada Border Drug Threat Assessment December 2001

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  This report, published by the National Drug Intelligence Center, examines the current status of the movement of illicit drugs across the United States-Canadian border. "Canada and the United States of America enjoy a political, economic, and social partnership unique in the world. The concrete expression of this is the magnitude of the free flow of people and goods across the border between the two countries. The benefits from this relationship are of critical importance to the day-to-day conduct and the growth of the two nations. This is why the Canadian and United States governments are committed to improving the efficiency of the border and maintaining it as open as possible. While it is critical to facilitate travel and trade, however, it is also important to ensure that criminal organizations do not profit from this openness. In this regard, the two-way movement of drugs and drug traffickers across the border is a particular mutual concern. The ability of our countries to counter the threat posed by drugs and drug traffickers depends on the information we possess and the processes in place to use this information effectively. Maintaining the close partnership that exists between United States and Canadian law enforcement authorities is the best strategy to prevent the movement of drugs in both directions and to apprehend drug traffickers. An agreed, coordinated, regional approach is clearly the most effective way to secure our shared border."

  National Drug Intelligence Center (U.S.)

  2001-12
• Serial No. 107-11; Serial No. 107-58: Combating Terrorism: Options to Improve Federal Response: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, April 24, 2001

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  This hearing deals with discussion of proposals for improving the Federal response to terrorism. From the opening statement of Mr. LaTourette: "The first proposal, H.R. 525, would create a Presidential council to draft a national strategy and organize the Federal effort through the existing agency structure. It would eliminate duplication and fragmentation of Federal efforts by coordinating with agencies during the budget process to bring programs in line with the strategy. We will also address bills introduced by Congressman Ike Skelton, H.R. 1292, and Congressman Mac Thornberry, H.R. 1158. The Skelton bill would require the designation of a single individual within the Federal Government to be responsible for this effort. It would also require the drafting of a strategy to address terrorism. The Thornberry bill would transform FEMA into the 'National Homeland Security Agency' which would include the Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and Customs Service. This new agency would focus on operational planning and coordination." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Charles G. Boyd, James Clapper, Jr., Frank J. Cilluffo, Raymond J. Decker, William W. Ellis, Wayne Gilchrest, Amy E. Smithson, Mac Thornberry, William Lacy Clay, Jerry F. Costello, Benjamin A. Gilman, James L. Oberstar, Christopher Shays, Ike Skelton, and Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• Serial No. 107-139: Securing America: The Federal Government's Response to Nuclear Terrorism at Our Nation's Ports and Borders: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, October 17, 2002

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  Serial No. 107-139: From the opening statement of James C. Greenwood: "Given the findings of this committee's year-long review of port and border security, I believe it is imperative that the Senate act immediately to join the House in creating a Department of Homeland Security which will have as a primary mission the securing of our borders from terrorist threats and will serve as a focal point of the currently dispersed and diffused Federal efforts and programs aimed at preventing nuclear smuggling. This committee's responsibility is to ensure that the administration is taking all steps necessary to protect our Nation from such n unthinkable act. And, simply put, more needs to be done. We cannot let 401 more days go by before we significantly reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Robert C. Bonner, Linton Brooks, Gary L. Jones, Laurie E. Ekstrand, Jeffrey Rush, Jr., and Stephen M. Younger.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• S. Hrg. 107-212: Legislative Options to Strengthen Homeland Defense: Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, October 12, 2001

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  S. Hrg. 107-212: This hearing discusses and examines various legislative proposals to strengthen homeland security. S. 1449 would create a statutory White House office with a Senate-confirmed director responsible for coordinating government-wide terrorism policy. A House bill, sponsored by Representatives Gibbons and Harman, would also create a White House office with strong budget authority to coordinate programs to defend against terrorism and other homeland threats. The second bill is S. 1534, a proposal that would establish a Department of National Homeland Security. This bill would bring under a single administrative umbrella the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, the Coast Guard and other offices responsible for critical infrastructure protection. These agencies would be organized into three functional directorates for prevention, protection and preparation to respond. The head of the department would be a cabinet secretary who would be subject to Senate confirmation and thus, accountable to Congress and the American people. The Committee will also hear from Senator Smith about legislation he has offered to create a Domestic Terrorism Preparedness Council that would be charged with developing and implementing a terrorism preparedness plan. Representative Gilchrist has a similar measure pending in the House. Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Joseph I. Lieberman, Fred Thompson, Robert F. Bennett, Daniel K. Akaka, Richard J. Durbin, George V. Voinovich, Susan M. Collins, Carl Levin, Jean Carnahan, Jim Bunning, Bob Graham, Arlen Specter, Bob Smith, Wayne T. Gilchrest, Jane Harman, Mac Thornberry, Lee H. Hamilton, Barry R. McCaffrey, Charles G. Boyd, Stephen E. Flynn, Thomas H. Stanton, Comptroller General of the U.S. General Accounting Office, August 6, 2001, prepared statement, Dianne Feinstein, Jim Gibbons, Steven C. LaTourette, and Ivo H. Daalder.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• S. Hrg. 107-309: Weak Links: Assessing the Vulnerability of U.S. Ports and Whether the Government is Adequately Structured to Safeguard Them: Hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, December 6, 2001

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  From the opening statement of Joseph I. Lieberman: "This is one of a continuing series of hearings that this Governmental Affairs Committee has held since the terrorist attacks of September 11 which have examined the Federal Government's ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond in the event of future terrorist attacks. The Committee has taken a hard look at whether the Federal Government is appropriately structured to meet those challenges. Specifically, we have held hearings on our aviation and postal systems, on cyberspace, and more broadly, on the safety of our critical infrastructure and how we should organize for homeland security. Today, we direct our attention to the security of the Nation's 400- plus ports through which 95 percent of all U.S. trade flows. The picture, unfortunately, is not a reassuring one. U.S. ports are our Nation's key transportation link for global trade and yet there are no Federal standards for port security and no single Federal agency overseeing the 11.6 million shipping containers, the 11.5 million trucks, 2.2 million rail cars, 211,000 vessels, and 489 million people that passed through U.S. border inspections last year." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Joseph I. Lieberman, Carl Levin, Susan M. Collins, Max Cleland, Robert F. Bennett, Fred Thompson, Ernest F. Hollings, F. Amanda DeBusk, Rob Quartel, Richard M. Larrabee, Charles C. Cook, Argent Acosta, Michael D. Laden, and W. Gordon Fink.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• S. Hrg. 107-651: Effective Immigration Controls to Deter Terrorism: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, October 17, 2001

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  From the opening statement of Edward M. Kennedy: "We know that there has been some news affecting exposures to anthrax to some of the staff in our buildings and that is being dealt with very effectively by the Sergeant at Arms and by the health professionals that have been assigned to deal with that job. We feel strongly, since immigration issues have important implications in terms of national security and also to terrorism, that it was important that we move ahead. It is a privilege to chair this hearing today on the critical issue of border security and its critical importance in preventing terrorism. Strengthening the security of our borders is an indispensable part of this Nation's effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. We must develop policies and enact laws that meet the serious security threats we face from abroad, and we must do so without obstructing the entry of the more than 31 million foreign nationals who legally enter the United States each year. Clearly, the screening of foreign nationals who seek entry into the United States must be improved. To do so, we must make better use of intelligence information to identify high-risk individuals who are potential terrorists and make sure that the information is in the hands of the proper authorities in time to act." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following persons: Sam Brownback, Maria Cantwell, Mike DeWine, Charles E. Grassley, and Edward M. Kennedy, Jeanne A. Butterfield, Lino Gutierrez, Richard E. Norton, Demetrios G. Papademitriou, Mary A. Ryan, and James W. Ziglar.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• Serial No. 107-138: Improving Security and Facilitating Commerce at the Southern Border: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, January 31, 2002

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  Serial No. 107-138: "Today our subcommittee will explore the status of the border across the San Diego region. Even before the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the subcommittee was considering ways to improve both security of our Nation's borders and the efficient flow of international commerce, travel and tourism." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Adele J. Fasano, Rex Applegate, William T. Veal, Dianne Jacob, Roger Hedgecock, Donna Tisdale, Murial Watson, Teresa Montano, Berta Alicia Gonzalez, Steve Otto, Viviana Ibanez, and Mark E. Souder.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• S. Hrg. 107-239: Homeland Defense: Exploring the Hart-Rudman Report: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, April 3, 2001

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  From the opening statement of Jon Kyl: "At today's hearing we will examine the findings of the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, as presented in its report entitled, 'Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change'. This is the third hearing that this Subcommittee has held on the subject of terrorism and homeland defense in the past year. Each hearing has focused on the findings of a different commission. Each of the commissions has approached the issues from a slightly different perspective. It is the intent of this Committee to examine the details of their recommendations and arrive at a common understanding of the critical vulnerabilities that must be addressed through legislative action. There are a variety of recommendations presented in the report. Some of them, like combining the Coast Guard, Customs Service and Border Patrol under the control of a National Homeland Security Agency, built upon the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, would entail the wholesale restructuring of multiple Federal agencies. Other recommendations, like increasing the intelligence capabilities of the Customs Service, are less sweeping in nature. Regardless of the perceived complexity of the recommendations, our discussion here today will lead to a clearer understanding of the issues that must soon be addressed by the Congress if we are to adequately prepare for the national security challenges of the new millennium." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Dianne Feinstein, Jon Kyl, Lee Hamilton, Gary Hart, Warren Rudman, and the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2002
• Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3129: Customs Border Security Act of 2001

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  "H.R. 3129 would authorize appropriations for 2002 and 2003 for the U.S. Customs Service, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the International Trade Commission. The authorizations for the Customs Service would include funds for salaries and expenses, its Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) computer system, air and marine interdiction, reestablishment of Customs operations in New York City, and a program to prevent child pornography. This legislation would increase the personal duty exemption for travelers entering the United States. The bill also would make several changes to the current laws relating to overtime and premium pay for Customs officers. Finally, H.R. 3129 would direct the General Accounting Office (GAO) to prepare three reports on various Customs issues. Because an appropriation for fiscal year 2002 for the Customs Service has already been enacted, H.R. 3129 would have a relatively small effect on spending in that year. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 3129 would cost about $2.9 billion over the 2002-2006 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized and estimated amounts. We estimate that enacting H.R. 3129 also would decrease revenues by about $4 million annually because of the increased personal duty exemption. Finally, the bill could have a negligible net impact on direct spending for overtime and premium pay for Customs officers. Because the bill would affect revenues and direct spending, pay-as-you-go procedures would apply."

  United States. Congressional Budget Office

  2001-11-20
• Serial No. 107-14: USDA Biosecurity Programs and Authorities: Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, First Session, November 15th, 2001

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  USDA Deputy Secretary James Moseley testifies that food supply contamination or food flow interruption in the event of a malicious act would negatively impact not only America but the world. Accordingly, he stresses that "it is a safety issue, but it is an economic one as well". Texas Representative Larry Combest states that "we must temper or (sic) natural desire to take action with a certain degree of caution. It would be a cruel irony if in our haste to respond to the actions of Osama bin Laden, we do more economic damage to our food production system than the al Qaeda does." Both the FDA and the USDA regulate food inspection activities. The USDA is concerned with BSE and Foot and Mouth Disease and is reviewing APHIS (Animal and Plan Health Inspection Service) and FSIS (Food Safety Inspection Service) procedures accordingly. Security of USDA facilities is also a priority. Vulnerabilities and response plans to intentional food contamination is being studied. In particular, the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points pilot program comes under question. Also discussed are the USDA's relationship with the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Inspector General. Congressmen question the progress of USDA's APHIS program as it applies to America's port and border entry points. Ms. Murano of the USDA describes the FBAT (Food Biosecurity Action Team) program as a combination of FSIS and APHIS personnel. During questioning session, more attention is leveled at natural diseases than intentional terrorist attacks.

  United States. Congress. House. Committee on Agriculture

  2001-11-15
• Macedonia: Country Background and Recent Conflict [Updated November 7, 2001]

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  From the Document: "In 2001, ethnic Albanian rebels calling themselves the National Liberation Army (NLA) stepped up attacks on Macedonian security forces first in several villages near the city of Tetovo and by the western border with Kosovo, and later near the capital, Skopje. The NLA is thought to have ties to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and rebel Albanian forces operating in southern Serbia. In March, the Macedonian government began a counter-insurgency campaign. It opened talks on political reforms with elected ethnic Albanian representatives, but refused to negotiate with the rebels themselves. Clashes between the rebels and government forces continued, notwithstanding intermittent cease-fire agreements and ongoing political talks. With U.S. and European diplomatic intervention, the parties signed a framework agreement on August 13, amidst the deadliest violence to date. Deadlock in the Macedonian parliament over aspects of the accord has delayed implementation of the agreement by several weeks. In early 2001, the international community, including the United States, condemned the violent actions of the Albanian extremists and expressed support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia, while urging restraint on the part of the Macedonian forces. At the invitation of President Bush, Macedonian President Trajkovski came to Washington on May 2, where President Bush underscored U.S. support for Macedonia's efforts to resolve the conflict. While not leading NATO's Task Force Harvest mission, the United States supported the operation with medical, intelligence, and logistical assets provided by U.S. military forces and facilities already stationed in the Balkans. NATO allies have agreed to replace U.S. armed forces in the NATO Balkans missions if the United States needs to divert some of them to the anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan. U.S. officials have pressed the Macedonian and Albanian parties to implement the framework agreement.'"

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Kim, Julie

  2001-11-07
• Many Countries Benefit from U.S. Antiterrorism Training

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  The State Department's Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) has trained over 25,000 foreign police and security forces from 117 different countries in measures designed to combat, deter, and solve terrorist crimes in their countries. ATA Director Alan O. Bigler says that "in the process the program is improving both bilateral and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism." The assessment team considers five basic areas, which are seen as fundamental in any nation's defense against terrorism. Collectively they establish the framework for determining a country's ability to deter and respond to terrorist threats. In general terms, this framework involves the government's ability to: enforce the law, preserve the peace, and protect life and property; protect its national leadership, the seat and functions of government, and its resident diplomatic corps, including that of the United States; control its international borders; protect its critical infrastructure; and manage crises that have national implications. A major new area of training for ATA addresses the problems of managing the effects of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, or radioactive materials, which are referred to as WMD. Such attacks present significant problems that are new, different, and of much greater scope than terrorist incidents involving conventional weapons. In addition to providing individual students with enhanced training, there are numerous examples where ATA training has directly thwarted or solved several major terrorist incidents or major crimes. To learn more about ATA, the program office operates its own Internet Web site, which can be found at http://www.diplomaticsecurity.org.

  United States. Department of State

  Bigler, Alan O.

  2001-11
• Public Law 107-56: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001

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  "An Act to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes." The following Titles aim to increase and enhance domestic security: Title I--Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism, TITLE II--Enhanced Surveillance Procedures, Title III--International Money Laundering Abatement and Antiterrorist Financing Act of 2001, Title IV--Protecting the Border, Title V--Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism, Title VI--Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and Their Families, Title VII--Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection, Title VIII--Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism, Title IX--Improved Intelligence, and so forth. Section 101 of Title I--Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism addresses the Counterterrorism Fund. It states, "there is hereby established in the Treasury of the United States a separate fund to be known as the "Counterterrorism Fund."

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001-10-26
• Protecting the United States Against Terrorist Nuclear Attacks: A System of Systems Approach

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  "The threat of a nuclear weapon delivered against a US city by unconventional means has been recognized and studied for almost 50 years. For most of that time the threat was assumed to emanate from the Soviet Union, and as the Soviet arsenal of long range ballistic missiles and bombers grew, the threat of unconventional delivery receded. During the 1990s, the demise of the USSR, the end of the cold war, and improving relations with Russia all signaled a further decline in the threat. However, that same decade saw an increase in 'rogue states', state-sponsored terrorists, and non-state actors with great antipathy toward the US, and displaying greater success in obtaining weapons of mass destruction than in acquiring long-range means of delivering them. There was also an increase in nuclear proliferation--aided in part by the partial chaos that followed the end of the Soviet Union, and in part by the increasing accessibility of nuclear weapons technology now about 60 years old. There is ample reason for renewed concern about a terrorist nuclear threat. Most studies of preventing terrorist nuclear attacks have reached the same basic conclusion--none of the available basic techniques is sufficiently capable to preclude a successful attack with a high degree of confidence. These techniques are generally: (1) arms control and related diplomatic measures to control proliferation and access to technology and materials for making nuclear weapons; (2) physical security and control of existing weapons and materials; (3) pre-emptive actions; (4) deterrent threats of retaliation for attacks; (5) border controls and related domestic security measures aimed at preventing the movement of weapons or materials into the US; and (6) intelligence collection and law enforcement measures leading to the discovery and apprehension of would-be perpetrators. Effective consequence control and mitigation--still a long way from reality--could be at best a distant second in desirability." Note: This document has been added to the Homeland Security Digital Library in agreement with the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) as part of the PASCC collection. Permission to download and/or retrieve this resource has been obtained through PASCC.

  United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Advanced Systems and Concepts Office

  Shaw, Alan

  2001-10-25
• Securing America's Borders: INS Faces Information Technology Planning and Implementation Challenges

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  IT management process controls, such as investment management and enterprise architecture management, are recognized indicators of whether an organization, like INS, can successfully develop, acquire, implement, operate, and maintain IT systems and related infrastructure. Together, enterprise architecture management and investment management, respectively, serve to explicitly blueprint the future operational environment, in both business and technology terms, needed for an organization to effectively and efficiently achieve its strategic mission, and to assure adequate senior executive involvement in the crucial capital investment decisions required to effective and efficiently put in place this target environment. This report discusses how INS has yet to implement the set of practices (e.g., policies, activities, abilities, and measures) associated with effective IT investment and enterprise architecture management. As a result, INS is not positioned to know that its ongoing and planned IT investments are the "right things to do," meaning it does not know whether these investments will produce mission value commensurate with costs and risks or whether these investments are superior to competing investment alternatives. Further, INS does not know that these investments are "being done the right way," meaning it does not know whether investments are aligned with an agency wide blueprint (architecture) that defines how the agency plans to operationally and technologically function in the future, and it does not know whether each of its ongoing investments are meeting their cost, schedule, and performance commitments.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2001-10-11
• Statement on the Signing of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004

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  Chronicles the signing into law of H.R. 2555, the "Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004". This is the first recognized appropriations act for the Department of Homeland Security. Budget reccomendations outline the development of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology project; customs and border protection automated systems; immigration and customs enforcement automated systems; operations, maintenance and procurement of marine vessels, aircraft, and other related equiptement of the air and marine program, and all expenses of the United States Secret Service.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001-10-01
• World Law Bulletin: October 2001

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  This issue of the monthly publication of the Law Library of Congress includes the following relevant titles: 'Canada-Interim Counterterrorism Measure', 'Terrorism: Foreign Legal Responses', and 'Recent Developments in the European Union'. "On September 20, 2001, the European Union and the United States pledged cooperation in the following areas in order to avert future terrorist acts: aviation and other transport security; police and judicial cooperation, including extradition; denial of financing of terrorism, including financial sanctions; denial of other means of support to terrorists; export control and nonproliferation; border controls, including visa and document security issues; and law enforcement access to information and exchange of electronic data. The European Commission adopted two Council Framework Decisions, on Combating Terrorism and on European Arrest Warrant and Surrender Procedures Between the Member States. The first provides a common definition of terrorism and lists a number of offenses that must be punished as terrorist offenses by Member States if they fall within the definition of terrorism. Member States must also adopt the penalties, which range from twenty years for murder to two years for extortion, robbery, and theft. The second Decision introduces a European arrest warrant for search, arrest, detention, and surrender to the judicial authority of the issuing country. The objective is to facilitate the transfer of a person in a criminal investigation from one Member State to another. Upon implementation by Member States, it will basically replace existing extradition procedures used among them."

  Law Library of Congress (U.S.)

  Johnson, Constance Axinn; Zeldin, Wendy I.

  2001-10
• U.S. Customs Bonded Warehouses

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  This U.S. Customs and Border Protection publication "explains bonded warehouse, which is a building or other secured area in which dutiable goods may be stored, manipulated, or undergo manufacturing operations without payment of duty."

  U.S. Customs Service

  2001-10
• U.S.-EU Ministerial Statement on Combating Terrorism

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  This document provides the text of the joint U.S.-EU Ministerial statement on combating terrorism. It announces the U.S.-EU partnership in a broad coalition to combat "the evil of terrorism," which includes cooperation in the following areas: aviation and other transport security; police and judicial cooperation; denial of financing of terrorism; denial of other means to support terrorists; export control and nonproliferation; border controls; and law enforcement access to information and exchange of electronic data.

  United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs

  2001-09-20
• Treasury Press Conference on Terrorist Attacks [September 14, 2011]

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  "First off, I am pleased to report that all 760 U.S. Customs employees stationed in and around our World Trade Center facility are safe and accounted for. Within one hour of Tuesday's terrorist attacks, the Customs Service placed all of its personnel and facilities on Level 1 Alert. This is our highest state of alert, requiring the maximum level of examination of passengers, cargo, and conveyances entering our country. We are questioning more people, and looking at more goods, than ever before. In addition to our regular inspection duties at international airports, we have dispatched several hundred trained Customs officers with special inspection skills to augment security checkpoints at major U.S. airports. Customs remains and will remain at Level 1 Alert until further notice. At the current time, all of our resources are focused on national security in our skies, and at the airports, border crossings, and ports of entry across America. Despite our heightened security measures, I want to stress that at no time has the Customs Service closed any of its border operations. Although there have been delays, U.S. Customs Service continues to process incoming commercial cargo - and we are working to diminish any delays. However, we must ask for the public's patience with the longer waits and processing times these security measures may entail. I think we would all agree they are but a small inconvenience in return for our safety."

  U.S. Customs Service

  2001-09-14
• Farm Labor Shortages and Immigration Policy [Updated September 6, 2001]

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  "Slightly more than half of today's farmworkers are not legally eligible to hold U.S. jobs. Growers are concerned that if certain federal activities are effective, they could lose a considerable portion of their labor force and hence of their livelihood. These federal actions include increased border enforcement efforts, work eligibility verification pilot programs and audits of employees' work authorization documents to determine their authenticity. In addition, the Social Security Administration has more often been sending letters that notify employers of mismatches between their employees' names/social security numbers and those in SSA's [Social Security Administration] database in order to properly credit earnings to employee records. Growers contend that the sizeable presence of illegal aliens implies a shortage of legal farmworkers. Their advocacy groups argue that growers would rather not employ unauthorized workers because doing so puts them at risk of incurring penalties. Farmworker advocates counter that crop producers prefer illegal to legal employees because the former are in a weaker bargaining position with regard to wages and working conditions. If the supply of illegal workers were curtailed, it is claimed, growers could adjust to a smaller legal workforce by introducing laborefficient technologies and management practices, and by raising wages, which, in turn, would entice more legal workers to become farmworkers. Grower advocates respond that further mechanization would be difficult for some crops and that substantially higher wages would make the U.S. industry uncompetitive in the world marketplace without expanding the legal farm labor force. These remain untested arguments, as perishable crop growers have rarely, if ever, operated without illegal aliens in their workforces."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Levine, Linda (Linda H.)

  2001-09-06
• Antipersonnel Landmines Convention and the Evolving Politics of Arms Control

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  From the thesis abstract: "The setting and cast of characters involved in arms control have changed since the end of the Cold War. Changes in world dynamics occurring in tandem with globalization have brought about an increasing focus on human rights and human security. National borders and state sovereignty, still the foundation of our current international system, are declining in importance with these trends in globalization. This trend flowed into the arena of arms control in 1997 by banning a weapon stockpiled and used in almost every nation's military. This paper seeks to answer questions concerning these changes and about the implications of the 1997 Antipersonnel Landmine Convention as an example of a possible new framework for arms control. This paper seeks to answer the questions of whether or not the Ottawa Convention was an aberration or is likely to become a new way of doing business. It also seeks to understand the likelihood that certain weapon systems will become the target of such a future ban. From this analysis, this paper seeks to increase awareness of the Air Force and DoD with regard to international and domestic political contexts facilitating such a framework. The author provides general recommendations concerning U.S. policy approach with regard to conventional weapons and arms control negotiations."

  United States. Department of the Air Force

  Deam, Seth R.

  2001-09