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International Crime Control Strategy
International criminal activity has increased in scale and extent in the wake of globalization, becoming a complex worldwide threat. International criminals today engage in a wide range of illegal activities, including drug trafficking, terrorism, alien and contraband smuggling, fraud, extortion, money laundering, bribery, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, and counterfeiting. Many also resort to extreme violence to advance their criminal enterprises. International criminals ignore borders, except when seeking safe haven behind them. They move sums of money through the international financial system that are so huge they dwarf the combined economies of many nations. They are often organized in multi-crime businesses, and they have capitalized on growth in international communications and transportation to expand their criminal operations and form potent alliances. They threaten all nations, including our own. International crime is not only a law enforcement problem; it is a formidable and increasing threat to national and international security. This document discusses the corrosive activities of international criminals in the post-Cold War era, and how they no longer threaten particular countries or regions, but threaten the whole world.
National Security Council (U.S.)
1998-06
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Drug Interdiction Along the Southwest Border: U.S. Counterdrug Policy, History and Future Implications
From the thesis abstract: "Drug trafficking, a central issue of dispute with Mexico and other source and transit nations, also threatens their sovereignty and U.S. security. U.S. border interdiction efforts, to include military, have had more political impact, than serious effect, on the cartels. Implementation of the NDCS [National Drug Control Strategy] is deficient, though current strategic focus is sound. Intelligence management and interagency efficiency is poor. DoD will be a part of the solution. [...] U.S. must seize initiative to protect own vulnerabilities and attack those of traffickers. National interest of counterdrug is important, but not the absolute highest priority. It is a major quality of life issue. U.S. concepts of defense are changing and federal infrastructure is slow to adapt. Opportunities abound to shift initiative from traffickers to U.S."
Marine Corps University (U.S.). Marine Corps War College
Cooney, J. J.
1998-05-13
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Our Own Back Yard: Mexico and U.S. National Security
Political crisis, economic instability, armed revolt, and the rise of criminal organizations within Mexico pose a significant danger to the Southwest border of the United States. The importance of Mexico to our National Security has been mentioned in policy statements but has been marginalized when contrasted with other more traditional overseas threats. The author seeks to highlight several points of concern such as the changes in the Mexican political process, existing armed insurrection, economic collapses and illegal immigration. These points are viewed in conjunction with a brief overview of the history of Mexico and U.S.-Mexican relations over the last century. The author urges that, because of the proximity of Mexico, its growing economic ties to the U.S., and the increase in the Mexican-American population within the U.S., we must have a better understanding of Mexico in order to prepare appropriate courses of action should Mexico undergo future large scale political or economic upheaval which will have an impact on our National Security.
Army War College (U.S.)
Pappas, Gary A.
1998-04-08
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U.S. Economic Strategy in Shaping Mexico - Living Happily Ever NAFTA
The U.S. shaping of the Mexican economy appears to be a viable strategy to reduce the likelihood of border conflicts and future crises. Nevertheless, even with overwhelming U.S. economic power, the opportunities for both Mexico and U.S. economic growth are constrained. Because the U.S. government does not completely control all instruments of its economic power, the roles of the private sector, the free enterprise system, and cooperation with other competing nation states threaten to make U.S. economic policy both unwieldy and even counterproductive. Given these potential threats, how can the U.S. government effectively shape Mexico's economy in pursuit of its own interests? This paper discusses how the U.S. addresses this question in Mexico where several current and pending crises are subject to influences inimical to, or at least in competition with, United States security interests. Based on the economic underpinnings of U.S. national strategy, the focus of hemispheric relations is now on a "free trade" doctrine. This paper analyzes both U.S. and Mexico's interests and discusses how free trade theory both supports and inhibits pursuit of those competing interests. The dynamic of "shaping" Mexico's economy proves to be much more a political process than an economic one.
Army War College (U.S.)
Kelly, Thomas P.
1998-03-09
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Shaping the Future Security Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa
The nearly 40 year process of decolonization and the end of the Cold War have helped create major transformations in Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenges of extreme poverty, civil war, crime, cross-border interventionism, terrorism, outflows of refugees, environmental degradation and the spread of pandemic disease threaten the region's security environment and could threaten global stability. A contradiction exists between the United States government's stated foreign policy of engagement and its involvement in Africa. While stability is arguably its most important national interest, America does little to shape the security environment of this troubled region. If the United States is going to shape Africa's security environment, political leaders must become the visionaries of, and the advocates for, a more sophisticated foreign policy for the region. They must gain consensus on national interests in the region, and formulate a coherent set of policy objectives which will focus future engagement strategies. Through selective engagement the United States can help Africans solve African problems while shaping a security environment favorable to United States interests.
Army War College (U.S.)
Russell, Theodore S.
1998-03-01
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Terrorist Threat To United States Military Bases - Are We On The Verge Of Another Pearl Harbor?
Each year the list of terrorist activities worldwide grows at a frightening rate. Not only are these terrorist acts occurring in countries which have traditionally been plagued by such activity, but they have begun filtering into our own borders. Although the number of terrorist attacks has actually declined slightly in recent years, the number of deaths and injuries has steadily increased. This is largely due to the increased severity of terrorist attacks. The United States military is certainly not immune to these cowardly acts. The Beirut Bombing and khobar Towers Bombing, two well-known terrorist attacks on U.S. forces, have claimed the lives of hundreds of our military men and women. Even with these events etched into our collective memory, we continue to believe that terrorist acts are not likely to happen on our military bases stateside. This unhealthy lack of concern over a real terrorist threat creates a weakness in security that could be exploited by international as well as domestic terrorists. This paper seeks to raise the level of consciousness among all military and civilian personnel who serve and work on bases within our nation's borders. It also offers recommendations to be incorporated into the Department of Defense structure to ensure that not only personnel awareness of the terrorist threat is increased but that our capabilities to combat terrorism is developed to a higher level of security.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Carter, John F.
1998-02-13
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Full-Dimensional Protection: Safety Begins at Home
Full-Dimensional protection is designed to ensure the safety and security of our armed forces, and to assure that they retain freedom of action across the entire range of military operations. Extending beyond the traditional idea of force protection, full-dimensional protection must be applied within the borders of the continental United States. The increasing likelihood of an asymmetric attack direct against our armed forces, within our own borders requires careful examination. Failure to adequately assess and counter these threats will result in a military that is unprepared for the war of the 21st century.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Stanton, Patrick W.
1998-02-13
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Caspian Sea Region: A Look at Future U.S. and Allied Military Missions
"The Caspian Sea is rapidly becoming a region of increased attention to both U.S. civilian and military policymakers and planners. The region's large amounts of oil and gas reserves will allow the U.S. and its allies to diversify their sources of oil imports, and therefore, reduce the dependence on Middle Eastern oil. However, the Caspian is an inland sea and the export of the resources to markets is of critical concern. The pipelines, required to transport the oil and gas, will need to traverse a region complete with internal and external ethnic animosities, border disputes, and regional powers competing with each other for influence and control over the Caspian and its resources. Given this background, the U.S. and its allies may have to conduct military operations to secure their investments of capital and influence in the region as well as to resolve or prevent disputes among the Caspian nations and the other regional powers as the Caspian oil reaches full production in the next 10 to 15 years. The missions of peace operations, humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and others possibly await U.S. and NATO forces in the twenty-first century."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Chicky, Jon E.
1998-02-13
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Information-Based Warfare: A Brazilian Approach to 21st Century
"Brazil does not presently have an IW [Information-Based Warfare] doctrine capable of combating the existing and future threats to its national integrity, and Brazil will be unable to achieve its security objectives without an IW doctrine. […] Brazilian National Defense Policy considers border control and drug traffic as major threats for Brazilian security. The region most vulnerable to those threats is the Amazon. The Brazilian Amazon is considered an excellent way to allow drug traffic and cultivation. Drug traffickers use Brazilian territory to dispatch drug to consumer's center, inclusive US. That situation must be controlled for the next century. To solve the problems of border control and drug traffic Brazil has many approaches, but based on Brazilian Strategy, historical characteristic of peaceful nation, and resources' availability, the less expensive approach is the establishment of an IW doctrine for the year 2000. To do it, IW must be considered as an efficient tool to Brazil's strategy, and the legal, technological and intelligence environments must adequate to a new situation. Finally, beyond strategic evaluations, some operational changes must be considered, such as the Brazilian Marine Corps' Information Warfare independent company which would be responsible for IW analysis and employment during peacetime or crisis."
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Fonseca, Antonio Carlos Chianeli
1998
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United States Strategic Plan for International Affairs
This Strategic Plan articulates the fundamental national interests of the United States in terms of long-range goals to create a more secure, prosperous, and democratic world for the American people. The Plan is intended as an overarching framework for the international affairs goals of the executive agencies of the United States Government, under the foreign policy direction of the President and the Secretary of State. The Mission Statement defines core U. S. values and priority interests, establishing strategic goals for national security, economic prosperity, protection of American citizens and border security, law enforcement, democracy, humanitarian assistance, environment, population, and health. The Strategic Overview outlines trends that have a major, global impact on U.S. foreign policy, and identifies the means by which the United States pursues its objectives. The sixteen International Affairs strategic goals are long-term, with timeframes of 5 years-plus. Targets are specific where possible. A set of strategies is presented for achieving each goal, along with assumptions about potentially critical external factors and indicators that can be used to measure progress.
United States. Department of State
1998
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United States Department of State Strategic Plan
This Strategic Plan outlines the roles and mission of the Department of State in achieving the foreign policy goals of the United States, under the direction of the President and the Secretary of State. It is a companion to the International Affairs Strategic Plan, which articulates the fundamental national interests of the United States in terms of long-range goals to create a more secure, prosperous, and democratic world for the American people. The Strategic Overview outlines trends that have a major, global impact on U.S. foreign policy, and identifies the means by which the United States pursues its objectives. The International Affairs Mission Statement defines core U.S. values and priority interests, establishing strategic goals for national security, economic prosperity, protection of American citizens and border security, law enforcement, democracy, humanitarian assistance, environment, population, and health. The Department of State Mission Statement identifies the core responsibilities and values of State as the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The sixteen International Affairs strategic goals are long- term, with timeframes of 5 years-plus. Targets are specific where possible. A set of strategies is presented for achieving each goal, along with assumptions about potentially critical external factors and indicators that can be used to measure progress.
United States. Department of State
1998
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U.S. Border Patrol Operations [Updated November 10, 1997]
"In FY1995, the U.S. Border Patrol formally adopted a strategy known as 'prevention through deterrence.' This strategy calls for deploying Border Patrol agents directly on the border to deter illegal entry outright, rather than attempting to apprehend illegal aliens after they have entered the United States. Congress has supported expanding this strategy by providing the Border Patrol with greater finding and manpower. A key oversight issue for Congress is determining whether this strategy is effective in deterring illegal immigration. The U.S. Border Patrol's primary mission is to secure the 8,000 miles of land and water boundaries of the United States between ports of entry. The Border Patrol's major objectives are to prevent illegal entry into the United States, interdict drug smugglers and other criminals, and compel those persons seeking admission to present themselves legally at ports of entry for inspection. The Border Patrol is an enforcement division of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)-the primary agency in the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged with administering the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In contrast to the Border Patrol's mission, INS Inspections and the U. S. Customs Service (a division of the Department of Treasury) share jurisdiction over ports of entry. INS Inspections is responsible for screening travelers seeking admission; the Customs Service is responsible for clearing the entry of goods and merchandise into the country. Under current law, both agencies are cross-designated to enforce each other's respective areas of the law. Further, inspectors from both agencies are cross-designated to enforce federal drug laws."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Krouse, William J.
1997-11-10
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Global Trends 2010
"In fall 1996, the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) held a series of conferences at National Defense University to identify key global trends and their impact on major regions and countries of the globe. The exercise was designed to help describe and assess major features of the political world as they will appear in the year 2010. [...] The structure of international relations has been based primarily on relations between states, not developments within them. This was true whether under balance of power politics of the 19th century, superpower diplomacy of the last fifty years, or efforts at collective security as embodied in the United Nations. In all three variations, order rested fundamentally on a stable arrangement of power among states. States, in turn, were masters within their borders. This has been the hallmark of the international system that emerged at the end of World War II and the environment within which the United States has become the global superpower. That system is drawing to an end."
National Intelligence Council (U.S.); United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
1997-11
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Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures: The Report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
Our national defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life have long depended on the essential services that underpin our society. These critical infrastructures--energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human services, and telecommunications--must be viewed in a new context in the Information Age. The rapid proliferation and integration of telecommunications
and computer systems have connected infrastructures to one another in a complex network of interdependence. This interlinkage has created a new dimension of vulnerability, which, when combined with an emerging constellation of threats, poses unprecedented national risk. For most of our history, broad oceans, peaceable neighbors and our military power provided all the infrastructure protection we needed. But just as the terrible long-range weapons of the
Nuclear Age made us think differently about security in the last half of the 20th Century, the electronic technology of the Information Age challenges us to invent new ways of protecting ourselves now. We must learn to negotiate a new geography, where borders are irrelevant and distances meaningless, where an enemy may be able to harm the vital systems we depend on without confronting our military power. National defense is no longer the exclusive preserve of government, and economic security is no longer just about business. The critical infrastructures are central to our national defense and our economic power, and we must lay the foundations for their future security on a new form of cooperation between government and the private sector.
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997-10
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CFE Flank Agreement: Enhancing U.S. and European Security
The Flank Agreement to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty went into effect in May 1997, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved it and President Clinton signed the resolution of ratification. The agreement retains CFE limits on tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery in the Russian and Ukrainian flank zone, but applies them to a smaller area. The regions removed from the original flank zone will be subject to new constraints and additional verification and transparency measures. In this article, adapted from his April 1997 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Slocombe explores the impact of the Flank Agreement on the military security of the United States, its NATO allies, and its friends in the flank zone. The flank region, one of four zones into which the CFE area of application is divided, covers Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine and Russia. The flank limits were established during the CFE Treaty negotiations primarily to address Norwegian and Turkish concerns that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe might result in a significant buildup of Soviet forces on or near their borders. When the United States and the other CFE parties entered into the flank negotiations, we had several fundamental aims: retain the integrity and viability of the CFE Treaty; preserve the security interests of all states parties and regional non-participating states near Russia's flank region; and accommodate if possible the legitimate TLE needs of Russia and Ukraine in the flank zone. The Flank Agreement succeeded in meeting all those objectives. It gives Russia and Ukraine needed flexibility in their TLE deployments, but in a way that is limited in its geographic scope, numerically constrained, transparent, and consistent with their neighbors' security requirements. It ensures the continued viability of the flank regime, which is a matter of critical importance to our flank allies and friends in the region. The Department of Defense firmly believes that the Flank Agreement is in the best security interest of the United States and of all of Europe.
United States. Department of State
Slocombe, Walter
1997-08
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Chile and Argentina: Asymmetrical Air Force Modernization and the Building of Confidence
In the current environment, neither the United States, nor any other government, can effectively set a ceiling on aviation technology flowing to South America and its Southern Cone. Limits will come on the demand side because current supply is simply too great. Instead of trying to artificially limit supply of military aircraft, interested governments should put their political and diplomatic energies into initiatives to build political and economic stability in the region. In the military sphere, they can do so by promoting multilaterial service to service contracts and concrete political initiatives, such as a resolution of the last border dispute between Chile and Argentina, that will lessen the importance of military power in assisting regional security.
Naval War College (U.S.)
1997-07-30
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Information Warfare and Its Impact on National Security
"For years, the United States national security posture has relied heavily on secured sea lines of communication, friendly borders, unmatched human and material resources, unlimited mobilization capability, and nuclear hegemony. However, we are now an information dominate society and information warfare poses a different threat to our national security than we faced during the cold war. Acts of aggression will undoubtedly be aimed at our national information infrastructure and be launched from disgruntled nations or rogue states, by religious fanatics, terrorists, criminals, or drug cartels. Are we as a nation strategically prepared offensively and defensively to protect our national interests? This paper defines information warfare; examines its offensive and defensive components; explores potential threats, information warfare legalities and nature; and concludes that we face a tremendous challenge at the strategic level to keep our current status of being a world power to be reckoned with."
Naval War College (U.S.)
DeVries, Anita D.
1997-06-13
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Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP) Doing a Lot with a Little
This paper analyzes the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru, (MOMEP) and recommends that it serve as a model for future peacekeeping operations. This multinational peacekeeping mission formed in response to the January 1995 border conflict. This small group of 100 peacekeepers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US, separated the belligerents, supervised demobilization, created a demilitarized zone, integrated former belligerents into the peacekeeping force, and maintained a secure environment so diplomats could discuss the long-term resolution of the problem. MOMEP, financed by the former belligerents, was small and cost effective, making it particularly attractive in times of fiscal and manpower constraints. The author argues that regional peacekeeping forces have advantages over traditional UN collective peacekeeping missions. He also argues that a small, multinational peacekeeping force can be effective when certain conditions are met: when the observer support base is built on a standing unit headquarters, and when the observer force is provided superior communications and mobility. Finally he argues that observer actions; observing strict impartiality, integrating former belligerents into the peacekeeping force, and avoiding mission creep, are all key ingredients of success. The author stresses that the MOMEP model is most appropriate for those peacekeeping missions resembling the MOMEP environment--missions with a high level of consent designed to monitor an agreement.
Army War College (U.S.)
Higgins, Kevin M.
1997-06-01
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Criminal Activity: The Future Threat to our Nation's Security
"The Cold War saw the threat of superpower conflagration end, and with it, the notion of traditional warfare. America now faces an entirely different enemy. An enemy who operates within and outside its borders. He uses the inner cities as his battleground and conducts warfare through criminal activity. His multi-ethnic numbers are growing, fed by the disparate have-nots. His organization mirrors the C3 structure and global reach of the most successful international business enterprises. He readily uses the latest technological innovations to sustain his livelihood. The new world order allows him to carry on his activities relatively unencumbered. His future appears bright because he does not have an adversary who can counter him. Traditional means of coping with his criminal activity will likely be overwhelmed. This enemy has the ability of becoming our nation's primary security challenge. Sweeping changes in the way we conduct jurisdictional law enforcement must be made. A multilateral effort, cutting across law enforcement jurisdictions, both nationally and internationally, to include the use of federal armed forces is required. A separate Unified Crime Control Agency should be created that integrates the various local, state, federal and Department of Defense agencies, which is linked to the U.N."
Army War College (U.S.)
Raggio, Paul A.
1997-04-15
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National Drug Control Strategy: A Reality Check
"During the past decade the United States has steadily increased its efforts to curb drug abuse and drug trafficking. Counterdrug operations have become a major area of concern in the formulation of our National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy. However, the United States international drug policies have not been able to produce evidence of success. Despite unprecedented coordination and involvement by the U.S. military, federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, the amount of illegal drugs being smuggled across our borders has continued to increase. The international community has failed to stem the dramatic worldwide increase in the production of opium, marijuana and coca. Compounding this problem is the rise and popularity of drug use among America's youth. The economics of the illicit drug industry combined with a lack of international cooperation have been the root causes of the failure of the U.S. international drug control strategy. Our international policies are weighted heavily on the supply side tactics of eradication and interdiction and have had little impact on the flow of drugs into the United States. A historical review clearly indicates that the ways and means of our National Drug Control Strategy need to be adjusted."
Army War College (U.S.)
Brostrom, David P.
1997-01-31
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Counternarcotics Efforts in Mexico and Along the Southwest Border: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, February 25, 1997
From the opening statement of Chairman Dennis Hasert: "The subcommittee and Congress wrestle with an escalating national security threat posed by international drug trafficking. One country has been on our lips repeatedly over the last week; that country is Mexico. Today, we sit a few days away from the President's annual certification decision. Before next Monday, the President must either certify that Mexico is cooperating fully with the United States on all counternarcotics efforts or not cooperating fully. If he reaches the conclusion that they are not cooperating fully, he may, in the interest of continuing commercial trade and counternarcotics aid, grant Mexico a national interest waiver. Like last year, this decision is being closely watched, both domestically and internationally. Last year, President Clinton certified Mexico's counternarcotics efforts while decertifying Colombia's. Today's hearing is focused on learning more about drug trafficking along our Southwest Border and Mexican cooperation in the war on drugs. Make no mistake about it, the four powerful, wealthy, violent Mexican drug cartels pose direct and insidious national security threats to this country and, in fact, to Mexico's own stable future. In fact, the Mexican drug trafficking organizations are as much a threat as the Colombian cartels have been up to now." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Henry Bonilla, Tony Castaneda, Thomas A. Constantine, Mary Lee Warren, Douglas M. Kruhm, and Robert S. Gelbard.
United States. Government Printing Office
1997
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Oversight of Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts in Mexico: Review of a Rising National Security Threat, Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, Second Session, June 12, 1996
From the opening statement of Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.: "Today, we will hear testimony from four distinguished panels, each speaking on an issue of increasing urgency. That issue is the rising threat to American security posed by the four, newly-emergent and undeniably powerful cartels on our Southwest border. Specifically, we will address national drug policy and the action or inaction of Mexico in prosecuting counternarcotics efforts during the past year. [...] Too few policymakers and members of the press recognize the enormity of the challenge we confront. Last year, 400 tons of cocaine were shipped into the United States, 70 percent of it through Mexico. Mexico produced 150 tons of methamphetamine, most of which ended up on United States streets. Yet the President certified that Mexico is 'fully cooperating with United States counternarcotics efforts.' Shouldn't we expect more from Mexico? That is one question I hope to get an answer to in this hearing." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Ben Nelson, Allen Fleener, George Weise, Harold Wankel, Robert L. Ehrlich Jr., Charles E. Grsslley, and Louise McIntosh Slaughter.
United States. Government Printing Office
1997
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Volpe Engineers Use Biometrics to Help Ease Border Crush
"Using technology previously reserved for military and other high security applications, engineers from the Safety and Security Systems Division of the Volpe Center have developed a number of automated biometric systems to speed the processing of frequent travelers through United States immigration and to reduce the dependence on manual immigration inspections. These systems, now in use at selected border crossings by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, may serve as the basis for future automated immigration processing developments, both in the United States and around the world."
John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (U.S.)
1997
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Coast Guard Interdiction Efforts in The Transit Zone, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, March 10, 1997
From the opening statement of J. Dennis Hastert: "In today's hearing, we zero in on the national security threat posed by the explosion of maritime drug trafficking in the transit zone and the extraordinary efforts by the U.S. Coast Guard to combat it. Let me say, by transit zone, we mean the 2 million square miles between the United States and South American borders; it covers the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, Central America, Mexico and the Eastern Pacific. [...] Stopping the flow of cocaine into the United States is the No. 1 priority of the international drug control policy. Currently, over 30 percent of the cocaine entering the United States comes through the Caribbean, mostly from Colombia, bound for Mexico and Puerto Rico. Roughly $15 billion worth of cocaine travels through the Caribbean. A great deal of this cocaine enters the United States through the ports and borders of Puerto Rico. Have no doubts, drugs entering Puerto Rico don't stop there--80 percent continue on to the rest of the United States." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: J. Dennis Hastert, Jim Carlson, Mark Fitzmorris, Mike Burns, Robert E. Kramek, and Paul A. Yost.
United States. Government Printing Office
1997
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Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach
"The application of military force by a democratic government within the confines of its borders, and in some cases against its citizenry, has long been a controversial and politically sensitive topic. Though that is not a new type of operation for either the American or the Canadian military establishments, the nature of the threats each is being asked to confront has evolved. [...]. It is safe to assert that threats to North American domestic security will increase in nature, scope, and number in the next century. This in turn will presumably prompt more debate on and calls for an increase in the military's role in containing and neutralizing those threats. Military commentators, observers, and policymakers in both nations can perhaps learn from one another how democratic and culturally similar nations prepare for and respond to domestic situations requiring military force. The United States' closest ally and trading partner, Canada, has in the past 30 years undertaken several sensitive domestic operations. Canada has forged effective intragovernment legal and command mechanisms to conduct such operations effectively with its small but well-trained military. The purpose of this article is to explain what these mechanisms are, how they have evolved, and how they have been employed by the Canadian government. Though structured primarily to support and implement government policy overseas and to protect Canada from external threats, the Canadian Forces provide the battlefield attributes of coordination, communications, mobility, organization, discipline, and force which the civil power does not possess in abundance, if at all."
Army War College (U.S.)
Maloney, Sean M., 1967-
1997
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Building the NATO-Russia Relationship
"Relations between Russia and NATO--not the enlargement of NATO--is the main issue in European security. A Treaty on Cooperation or a Mutual Security Treaty are the most realistic options for legally binding arrangements between NATO and Russia. Either treaty would require Russia and NATO to agree, inter alia, to neither station forces in border territories nor use military threats against any neighboring states, to continue the de-nuclearization process, and update arms control treaties. The institutionalization of security cooperation between NATO and Russia requires the creation of an architecture for permanent coordination of foreign and military policies. Russian political participation at the annual NATO summits, involvement in NATO ministerial committees, and the establishment of liaison missions at the military headquarters of both sides would facilitate cooperation."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Rogov, Sergey M.
1996-05
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Arms Acquisition: An Impediment to ASEAN Collective Security
"Collective Security has received much attention among observers of the Association of South East Asian Nations(ASEAN)because of its unprecedented move in July 1994 to form the ASEAN Regional Forum to discuss security issues. The author examines current arms acquisition by ASEAN nations and traces the reasons for the continuing arms race and tensions among the nations that are fraught with historical conflicts arising from delineation of borders, illegal immigration, fishing rights, border violations and economic competition. Differences in religions, culture and ethnicity have also compounded the problems. As there are forces of integration there are equally a number of sources that tend to erode ASEAN resilience. The author argues that unilateral arms acquisitions will prevent ASEAN from developing collective security -- at least in the near future."
Army War College (U.S.)
Yusof, Rosli Mohd
1996-04-02
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Maritime Security Report [April 1996]
This quarterly report on maritime security deals with Cargo Theft, Stowaways and finally port security in Vietnam. United States' port cities and their hinterland areas are experiencing dramatic increases in the theft and in-transit hijacking of entire containers and trailers. For example: Cargo theft incidents are occurring most frequently in Florida, California, New York, and New Jersey; Industry estimates cargo theft losses in U.S. exceed $10 billion and average one-half million dollars per incident, and; FBI assesses the cargo theft problem to constitute a serious threat to the flow of commerce in the United States. The risk for ports and ocean carriers is being elevated by the forced migration of millions of people worldwide, now classified as refugees. Adding to that risk is the increased use of containers in organized criminal conspiracies to smuggle transnational asylum seekers to the West. Consequences include: Stowaways disrupt service, cause direct costs and revenue losses for container vessel operators, and jeopardize international commerce, and; Stowaways have posed a threat to crew and safe operation of the ship, and often have died during the voyage. The ports of Vietnam are vulnerable to being used by sophisticated smuggling schemes which rely on concealment of narcotics in shipments of commercial containerized maritime trade. They are utilizing front companies or exploiting legitimate shippers in the process. Also: Southeast Asia's explosive growth in containerized maritime trade is causing port congestion and inefficiencies exploited by smugglers, and; Removal of customs restrictions on cross-border trade, proposed by commercial interests, will create more opportunities for smugglers.
United States. Department of Transportation
1996-04
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Worldwide Threat Assessment Brief to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Statement for the Record
This report outlines the threats to the United States and its interests now and into the next century. We still call this the post-Cold War world. Among the opportunities and challenges of our time, there is not yet one dominant enough to define the era on its own terms and give it a name. Looking beyond our borders, we see much that is uncertain: --The stability of many regions of the world is threatened by ethnic turmoil and humanitarian crises. -- Two great powers, Russia and China, are in the process of metamorphosis and their final shape is still very much in question. --Free nations of the world are threatened by rogue nations - - Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Libya, that have built up significant military forces and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction. --The world community is under assault from those who deal in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs and crime. --And the interdependence of the world economy has made us more vulnerable to economic shocks beyond our borders. The strategic threat to our continent is reduced, but the potential for surprise is greater than it was in the days when we could focus our energies on the well-recognized instruments of Soviet power. No one challenge today is yet as formidable as the threat from the former Soviet Union. If nurtured by neglect on our part, these new challenges could expand to threaten the growth of democracy and free markets. All the tools of national security -- diplomacy, the military, and intelligence -- must remain sharp. It is the task of the Intelligence Community to provide policymakers and military commanders with early warning of emerging problems -- warning that can allow us to avoid crisis or military conflict. We must continuously monitor and assess the threats so that our leaders can manage these wisely.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Deutch, John M., 1938-
1996-02-22
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Defense Industrial Security: Weaknesses in U.S. Security Arrangements with Foreign-Owned Defense Contractors, Report to Congressional Requesters
"Since the mid-1980s, development, production, and marketing of weapon systems has been increasingly internationalized through government-sponsored cooperative development programs and various kinds of industrial linkages, including international subcontracting and teaming arrangements, joint ventures, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Foreign companies have acquired many U.S. defense companies and have legitimate business interests in them. The U.S. government allows such foreign investment as long as it is consistent with U.S. national security interests. Some foreign-owned U.S. companies are working on highly classified defense contracts, such as the B-2, the F-117, the F-22, and military satellite programs. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and intelligence agencies have reported that foreign intelligence activities directed at U.S. critical technologies pose a significant threat to national security. According to these agencies, some close U.S. allies are actively trying to obtain U.S. defense technologies through unauthorized means. To reduce the national security risks of foreign control over companies working on sensitive classified contracts, the Department of Defense (DOD) requires controls known as voting trusts, proxy agreements, and special security agreements (SSA)."
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-02-20
