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• Road Map For National Security: Addendum on Implementation

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  "The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (USCNS/21) stated throughout its reports that homeland security (HLS) was perhaps the most significant threat facing the nation. As the Commission noted in its initial report, the nation 'will become increasingly vulnerable to attacks on our homeland.' The Commission recommended a three-layered HLS strategy: prevention, protection, and response. In satisfying the requirements posed by each layer, the USCNS/21 noted the need for an overarching strategy; strategic integration at the NSC; a new, specialized organization; improved intelligence analysis, coordination, and dissemination; better oversight and integration within the Department of Defense (DoD); re-prioritizing National Guard missions; and different ways for providing Congressional oversight. These improvements are necessary to ensure greater operational integration and cohesiveness in areas ranging from border security through emergency management. These recommendations are listed in the following table. […] The following sections examine ways in which these recommendations might be implemented. They are not designed to present definitive answers; rather they provide a framework for thinking about the best ways to put the Commission's findings into practice. The implementation plans that accompany each recommendation take into account actions that might be required by the Administration and Congress. They do so by providing a notional, step-by-step blueprint of suggested actions, and discuss the nature of the coordination and consultation that must occur between the Executive and Legislative branches. The plans also note personnel implications for each recommendation and major considerations that impact recommendations and, unless addressed, are likely to render implementation less effective."

  United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

  2001-04-15
• Civil War Railroads: A Revolution in Mobility

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  The Civil War pitted two armies against each other on a grand battlefield in the East that focused on Virginia and its Border States and an equally demanding battlefield in the West for control of the Mississippi River. Both sides faced the extremely difficult challenges associated with defending key terrain and the need to seize the initiative through offensive maneuvering and engagement. Limited manpower and the operational ambiguities caused by movement (or deployment) to several locations on an ever-changing battlefield caused railroad usage to become a matter of military readiness and national security for both sides. This paper provides a brief review of railroad capabilities of the United States before the Civil War, elaborates on the railroad capabilities and usage of both sides during the war, and discusses instances where the effective use of railroad mobility was the decisive factor in the outcome of the battle. Lastly, provides an examination of the impact of railroad mobility on the Civil War and warfare.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Bryan, Irby W., Jr.

  2001-04-10
• Illegal Immigration: Is the Use of Military Force in Policing the United states' Border with Mexico a Viable Option?

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  "Illegal immigration across the United States' borders, in particular the Southern Border with Mexico, has been a continual problem confronting our local, state and national political decision makers. Over the years, numerous attempts at quelling this illegal immigration have been attempted. Attempts to eliminate this problem ranged from open borders, limited use of military force, economic development efforts, diplomatic efforts, and the eventual creation of a U.S. Border Patrol responsible for policing U.S. borders. Progress has not been easy and today, the United States finds itself in a continual battle against illegal immigration. Is illegal immigration of such importance to our national security that military force be used to combat this problem? This paper examines whether or not the use of military force on the U.S.-Mexico Border is a viable option to combat illegal immigration. This paper will propose that illegal immigration is a national security issue and there may be instances where the application of U.S. military force, whether it be active, reserve, or national guard to combat illegal immigration is appropriate. A review of past political, diplomatic, economic, and military tools previously proposed and implemented to address illegal immigration on the border will be provided."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Lopez, David

  2001-04-10
• Terrorism: The United States is Not Ready to respond to the Threat Against the Homeland

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  The principle threat to the United States' national security has undergone a significant change. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has shattered the global balance of power and left the United States as the world's lone superpower. The threat facing our nation has shifted from a single, definable foe to one that is much less clear. The threat facing our nation today is characterized by terms such as homeland defense, rogue state, non-state actor, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This modern threat is terrorism within our nation's borders. Currently, the United States is not prepared to counteract this threat. While significant attention has been paid to the terrorist threat over the past five years, our nation's strategy for dealing with this danger is still unfocused and inefficient. Today, America's strategy to defeat terrorism is contingent on the participation of several different state, local and federal agencies. Due to civil liberty concerns, the nation's most qualified agency, the Department of Defense (DoD), plays only a minor role. More importantly, the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), which is assigned the responsibility of providing military assistance during homeland terrorist attacks, has an equally limited role in countering the terrorist threat. To improve our ability to counter this emerging threat, the United States must re- evaluate the way in which we deal with this threat and assign assets based on capability. In particular, our nation must amend the laws, which restrict Department of Defense's participation in homeland defense so that the U.S. Joint Forces Command is allowed to play a larger role in the Crisis and Consequence Management missions.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Coffey, John S.

  2001-02-05
• Executive Summary of U.S. Commission on National Security Report

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  Included in the report released January 31 by the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century are a proposal for a new, cabinet-level National Homeland Security Agency that would combine the Federal Emergency Management Agency with several other agencies, and a prescription for recasting a "crippled" State Department and the Department of Defense. The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated governmental structures. We therefore recommend the creation of a new independent National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. NHSA would be built upon the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with the three organizations currently on the front line of border security -- the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the Border Patrol -- transferred to it. NHSA would not only protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the protection of the nation's critical infrastructure, including information technology.

  United States Commission on National Security/21st Century

  2001-01-31
• Analysis of U.S. Counterdrug Policy and Strategy as Related to DoD Interdiction Efforts along the Mexican Border

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  The trafficking of illegal drugs into the United States continues to damage our social institutions, decay the moral fabric of our youth, and rob the economy of countless billions in revenue. President Richard M. Nixon first proclaimed the war on drugs in 1970; unfortunately, the succeeding 30 years have seen relatively few victories in this war. Politicians and law enforcement officials relentlessly tout new strategies and policies that they guarantee will either reduce or stop the ever-present scourge of drugs and violence in our schools, our neighborhoods, and even our playgrounds. But, as the nation enters a new century the demand for these drugs remains high and the supply ever steady. In 1989, with U.S. prisons full of smugglers and pushers and with hospitals attempting to save overdose victims and cure addicts, Congress enacted legislation mandating Department of Defense (DoD) support. The eventual enlistment of the military in the crusade against drugs was the logical outcome of the strategies pursued by U.S. lawmakers. Today, uniformed soldiers, sailors, and airmen work side-by-side with border officials and Customs agents as they search for illegal drugs. The military is manning aircraft, watercraft, and observation posts providing real-time surveillance and intelligence information to more than 50 agencies attempting to interdict illegal drugs before they hit the streets of America. With all this effort, why is illegal drug trafficking still listed as a national security threat in the most recent National Security Strategy? This paper will analyze past policy and strategy failures, look at legal barriers impacting military involvement, and present real world concerns that prevent the full implementation of successful strategies.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Clemons, Terry L.

  2001-01-12
• Enhancing Border Security: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, February 10, 2000

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  From the opening statement of Spencer Abraham: "Today, we will address the issue of enhancing border security. On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested after attempting to enter Port Angeles, WA. He was found with nitroglycerin and other potential bomb-making material. He was successfully apprehended, but he will not be the last one to try. I hope today's hearing will shed light on four areas, in particular: First, what happened in Washington State in the days prior to the New Year and how Federal agencies responded to those events; second, what steps INS and Customs took and how did the two agencies coordinate their activities. Third, what other factors enhanced our ability to respond? In particular, how did cooperation between Canada and the United States, the world's strongest bilateral relationship, work during these incidents, and how does it work more broadly to protect Americans from potential dangers? And, finally, fourth, what additional resources are necessary to help deter and defend against terrorists, drug smugglers, and others seeking to do harm across our borders?" Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Spencer Abraham, Dianne Feinstein, Patrick J. Leahy, Rayn H. Callister, Slade Gorton, Colleen M. Kelley, Robert E. Lindemann, Michael A. Pearson, Ora A. Smith, and Charles W. Winwood.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001
• Serial No. 106-252: Computer Security: Cyber Attacks-War Without Borders: Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, July 26, 2000

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  Serial No. 106-252: The Opening Statement of Chairman Stephen Horn regarding Computer Security provides an overview on Cyber Attacks: "In the United States, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Departments of Commerce and Defense all have a role in tracking and investigating cyber attacks. Many other agencies and private organizations also track and share this critical information. Other countries also have law enforcement agencies and organizations set up to investigate and share cyber attack information. But among the variety of players, who is coordinating an efficient, effective response to this international problem? Today, we will examine the challenges of coordinating these cyber attack investigations. Our witnesses represent cyber crime investigation units in several countries, including the United States. They will discuss their experiences. There is a great need for a sharing of these experiences daily, weekly and at least monthly. Alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should work together if we will be able to win these cyber wars." Statements, letters, and materials for the record include those of the following: Roger Molander, John Pescatore, Richard C. Schaeffer, Jr., Mario Balakgie, Jack Brock, John T. Spotila, Michael Vatis, Juris Reksna, Stefan Kronqvist, Juergen Maurer, Elfren L. Meneses, Jr., Ohad Genis, Edgar A. Adamson, Thomas M. Davis, Stephen Horn, Stefan Kronqvist, Elfren L. Meneses, Jr., and Jim Turner.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001
• Using Information Technology to Secure America's Border: INS Problems with Planning and Implementation, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, First Session, October 11, 2001

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  From the opening statement of George W. Gekas: "Way before the events of September 11, and especially since, the status of aliens in our country is a weighty problem, heightened of course by what we have seen, the fury of activity in tracing aliens, and hijackers, and potential hijackers, et cetera, ever since the calamities of September 11. [...] We want to indulge in finding out what has happened to some of the mandates that we have presented to the INS in the past as a Congress, particularly with the border crossing cards and that technology. Then there is the student visa problem, SEVIS or SEVIS [long e], as we want to call it, where it has been uncovered that the intent of Congress has not been fulfilled with an accountability on a range of people who are involved in the prosecution of that program. So the technology involved there and in the border crossing cards will be two of the focus issues of this hearing. We may wander into others, as is the want of the Members of Congress from time to time, like always, and we will ask the witnesses to consider what the chair has said as to the focus during the question and answer period that will follow the initial presentations." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: George W. Gekas, Sheila Jackson Lee, Randolph C. Hite, Glenn A. Fine, James W. Ziglar, and Demetrios G. Papademetriou.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001
• Ethics of Computer Network Attack

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  "Technologically capable nations are, perhaps by necessity, contemplating the addition of computer attack to their arsenals. During the Kosovo intervention, the United States attempted limited electronic attacks on Serbian computers containing banking records of Serbian leaders. The United States is not alone, however. In 1995, the National Security Agency and Department of Energy estimated that more than 120 nations already had some sort of computer attack capability. [...] The potential for such a crisis makes the application of computer network attack a very different sort of combat power than the kinetic weapons it may someday supplement or replace. Like kinetic weapons, a computer network attack can destroy both military and civilian targets. Unlike kinetic weapons, however, a computer network attack can reach across the world at the speed of light, invisibly transiting many international borders en route to its target. Like chemical and biological weapons, cyber weapons can target large masses of people in both military and civilian communities. Unlike biological and chemical weapons, however, they affect humans indirectly rather than directly. Cyber weapons thus share some similarities with weapons of yesterday, yet they occupy a completely new niche by their nature. [...] To use these weapons ethically and legally, commanders and staffs must weigh their use against classes of targets and in some cases against individual targets, using clearly enunciated interpretations of the doctrines of discrimination and proportionality. The most basic questions were posed clearly by a newspaper reporter: 'For now, many sticky questions must be considered: When is a cyber attack justified, what if it affects civilians, and is a cyber attack an act of war?'"

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Bayles, William J.

  2001
• INS Reform and Border Security Act of 1999, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Sessions on S. 1563, a Bill to Establish the Immigration Affairs Agency Within the Department of Justice, and for Other Purposes, September 23, 1999

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  From the opening statement of Hon. Spencer Abraham, U.S. Senator from Michigan: "I am going to make a brief, or maybe not so brief, opening statement here today and will turn to Senator Feinstein, and if Senator Kennedy or any of the other members are here and wish to make opening statements, we will have an opportunity before we start the panels and then sort of play it by ear a little bit once we do. Today, our subcommittee is here to examine the INS Reform and Border Security Act, a bill which I introduced just before the end of the session in August along with Senators Kennedy and Hagel. There is widespread agreement today, I think, that there are serious problems as to how the Immigration and Naturalization Service handles its service and enforcement functions. We understand that no structure is going to result in perfect enforcement or perfect service. However, the current problems are too large to ignore and I believe that fundamental structural changes should be made. It should not be the case, whether it is in Michigan or Mississippi or Texas, that individuals who are arrested for flouting our laws are let go because of a lack of adequate detention space or because of a breakdown in detention policy." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Spencer Abraham, Dianne Feinstein, Doris Meissner, Paul M. Berg, T. J. Bonner, Richard J. Gallo, Warren R. Leiden.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2001
• Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2000 [November 3, 2000]

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  "No major confrontations or crises have occurred in the Persian Gulf since 1998, but regional security challenges that could erupt into crises on short notice have not been eliminated. Most observers agree that Iraq is contained militarily, unable to rebuild its conventional forces and constrained in its ability to acquire technology that could be used to build prohibited weapons of mass destruction (WMD). On the other hand, the U.N. Security Council has become deeply divided on Iraq policy, and unable to obtain a restart of U.N. weapons inspections, which ended on the eve of a U.S./British bombing campaign against Iraq in December 1998. Administration officials acknowledge that, without inspections, there is substantial uncertainty about the state of Iraq's WMD capabilities and activities, if any. The Administration has moved to end twenty years of hostility with Iran since the unexpected election in May 1997 of a relative moderate, Mohammad Khatemi, as President. Administration efforts might have contributed to an apparent reduction in Iranian support for international terrorism and an accelerated effort by Iran to end its international isolation. However, Administration overtures toward Iran over the past year have not yet brought Iran into a formal dialogue with the U.S. government. Administration hopes that a moderating Iran might also slow its WMD acquisition and development programs have not materialized, although most observers attribute Iran's commitment to those programs to the security threats Iran perceives on virtually all its borders. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran is or has been at odds with several of its neighbors, including the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman), Iraq, and the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, and it views Israel as an adversary."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2000-11-03
• Maritime Security Report [November 2000]

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  Port and cargo security programs being implemented in Colombia's port facilities, maritime jurisdictions, and the marine inter-modal shipping cycle are producing successful results against commercial maritime drug smuggling. Sustaining those improvements may contribute to an effective, long-term attack on commercial maritime drug smuggling via the seaports of Colombia and the Hemisphere. Implementation of successful port security programs on a national scale in Colombia may be replicated by the countries with which it shares a border-Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador-generating regional international results. The continued initiative and leadership of the Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy Bogot, could facilitate the formulation, documentation, and implementation of relevant activities in Colombia over the near term.

  United States. Department of Transportation

  2000-11
• Measures to Control Transnational Organized Crime, Summary

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  "Transnational criminal activity has increased in scale and extent, becoming a complex worldwide threat. Transnational criminals ignore borders, they move sums of money through the international financial system that are so huge they dwarf the combined economies of many nations. They are often organized in multi-crime businesses, and they have capitalized on growth in international communications and transportation to expand their criminal operations and form potent alliances. The corrosive activities of transnational criminal groups in the post-Cold War era no longer threaten particular countries or regions. They threaten all nations. Transnational organized crime is not only a law enforcement problem, it is a formidable and increasing threat to national and international security. Transnational organized crime is not something completely new, but there is no standard, universally accepted definition of these kind of criminality in the criminological and criminal law theories. The problem of definition is an important factor contributing to the inability of international law enforcement bodies to identify the size and scope of transnational organized crime accurately. Efforts to form a definition were made many times, but they only made this problem more difficult or created new problems. Some definitions of this kind came to light during the international simposium on organized crime in Sant Claud (France), 1988, which is where the headquarters of Interpol was situated. Just before this event, 84 participants from 46 member-countries of Interpol agreed to accept the working formula (transnational organized crime) as a basis for further discussion."

  National Criminal Justice Reference Service (U.S.)

  Voronin, Yuriy A.

  2000-10-05
• Securing Technology: Aerospace Procurement and Japan's National Security Strategy

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  Japan's national security strategy is not engineered primarily to defend the country against military threats, but rather to protect Japan from what it fears most: technological inferiority and economic decline. As a result, military rationale plays a subordinate role to economic concerns in defense planning. In this research I analyzed Japan's national security strategy as it is manifested in three cases of aerospace procurement policy: licensed production of U.S. fighter aircraft, co-development with the U.S. of new fighter aircraft, and indigenous development of a constellation%of intelligence-gathering (spy) satellites. I showed how each of these policies demonstrates a conscious choice to sacrifice military utility for the sake of technological advancement in domestic industries. Cutting-edge technology gives Japanese industries their edge in world markets, and losing them represents the ultimate compromise of what Japan defines as national security. Security, from the perspective of Japanese security policy, is not about military strength. It is about the viability of the national economy, the competitiveness of domestic industries, and the strength of the country's technology base. Japan's strategy for preserving its national security is aimed at a threat, but it is not the kind that will likely come flying across the border dropping bombs. The threat is economic decline. Put another way, the threat is technological inferiority that leads to economic decline. The battlefields where Japan's security strategy is put to the test are the marketplaces of the world. If its strategy fails, technologically superior foreign industries will occupy the market both at home and abroad. If it succeeds, Japan will be able to fend off its technological foes in an effort to secure its future economic health.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Seals, Jeremy C.

  2000-08-22
• Ethiopia's Foreign Relations With Israel: 1955-1998

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  This thesis "Ethiopia's Foreign Relations With Israel: 1955-1998," examines the nature and the impact of the diplomatic relationship between Ethiopia and Israel. From the rupture in relations during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 to the drama of Operation SOLOMON in 1991, the nature of the relationship has changed. What remains constant is the pragmatic adherence to national interests as the driving forces behind foreign policy. Early relations between Ethiopia and Israel were amicable and based on a sense of shared heritage and common interests. A mixture of idealism, economic cooperation, and technical assistance characterized the relations in the 1950s and 1960s. However, pragmatic acknowledgement of the geopolitical realities held greatest sway in the foreign policy arena. Thus, when Ethiopian interests shifted to border security and Israel became more concerned with freedom of the Red Sea, Israeli military assistance was added to the economic programs. The military relationship grew stronger into the early 1970s until Ethiopia severed relations with Israel in 1973. However, a year after the Ethiopian monarchy was toppled by an armed revolt, the new rulers turned to Israel for military assistance against Eritrean insurgents. This tacit military relationship was the hallmark of the relationship between Ethiopia and Israel in the 1970s and 1980s.

  Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)

  Joyce, Jennifer A.

  2000-06-15
• Visible Hand: The Government-Industrial Relationship and Its Effects on Transatlantic Arms Cooperation

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  The economic realities of declining defense budgets and a smaller global arms market have, in recent years, forced governments to look beyond their own national borders when purchasing new armaments. This new global approach by governments in both the United States and Western Europe has resulted in an unprecedented consolidation of defense industries on both sides of the Atlantic. The key to understanding these events and what the future will hold is found in an examination of the government-industrial relationship, national corporate governance systems, the direction of the consolidation process in Western Europe, obstacles to future consolidation, and the prospects for transatlantic cooperation. An analysis of corporate profit data from British, French, and German defense companies was completed to study the effects of government involvement in industry and ownership concentration. While no direct connection between corporate performance and these issues is possible, both government involvement and ownership concentration are shown to play a significant role in determining the national composition of mergers and investments. Cross-border mergers of defense firms are currently obstructed, however, by a state focus on employment issues, foreign investment restrictions, industrial security regulations, and arms export controls. An understanding of these issues and the will to enact reforms is necessary for the future of transatlantic cooperation.

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  McNichols, Jeffrey R.

  2000-06
• Executive Order 13149: Greening the Government Through Federal Fleet and Transportation Efficiency, April 21, 2000

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  "To achieve compliance with the requirements of E.O. 13149, DHS is urging its components to acquire 75 percent of new covered light-duty vehicles as AFVs, and to use alternative fuel in these vehicles a majority of the time, where the vehicles and alternative fuels are readily available and do not adversely affect mission accomplishment. The decision to take advantage of a surcharge program that adds $10 monthly to the cost of every vehicle leased through the General Services Administration (GSA) to help cover the higher incremental cost of many AFV models (compared to conventional vehicles) rests with each bureau and factors in alternative fuel availability, funding availability, and mission needs. DHS will endeavor to acquire light duty vehicles with a higher fuel economy of 3 mpg FY 2005, consistent with mission suitability. DHS will also investigate the possibility of adding to its own refueling facilities, although the majority of the fleet not already using them neither starts from nor returns to a common location. In addition to the Customs and Border Protection sites with refueling capability, a few of the training facilities operated by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and United States Secret Service have the capability, but are not readily accessible to vehicles not associated with the those facilities."

  United States. Office of the Federal Register

  Clinton, Bill, 1946-

  2000-04-21
• NSC-81/1 and the Evolution of U.S. War Aims in Korea June - October 1950

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  The North Korean attack across the 38th Parallel in June 1950 created a crisis for American decision-makers and the newly constituted National Security Council. The convoluted structure of military command responsibilities in the Far East, the relationships among military and political personalities, and the domestic and international political environment significantly affected the crisis decision-making process. In the event, our response evolved in the period June-October 1950 from restoration of the status quo ante bellum along the inter-Korean border to occupation of the North and reunification of Korea. This effect, which we now refer to as "mission creep", led directly to the intervention of Chinese Communist forces which completely changed the character of the Korean War. The inter-Korean border at the 38th Parallel was effectively restored within three weeks of the Inch'on landings. The decision to pursue North Korean forces and to occupy and reunify North Korea catalyzed a much longer war. An analysis of how this decision was reached, and a review of the factors involved, makes it a useful model for future policy decisions. The experience is not unique. Political factors in the wake of Somalia (where mission creep led to failure) and the Gulf War (where adherence to our original objectives led to a decade of second-guessing) reveal its relevance. Time alone will tell what our Balkans adventure will bring.

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Nerheim, Steven W.

  2000-04-10
• From Drugs to Bugs: The National Guard's Expanding Role in the National Security Strategy

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  "The National Guard continues to expand its role in the National Security Strategy with increased involvement in Counter Drug operations and the mission to defend the Homeland. This research discusses the National Guard's involvement as a Department of Defense Agency in two of the Nation's biggest concerns, the insidious drug problem and the Asymmetrical Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction use within the borders of the United States. The status of the National Guard under the individual Governor's control and the natural link between the military and civilian agencies provide a cost effective means to assist in countering the drug problem and reacting to a weapons of mass destruction attack."

  Army War College (U.S.)

  Bloomquist, Robert D.

  2000-03-15
• NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives [March 1, 2000]

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  "The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) includes several environment-related provisions, that while limited, were lauded for their inclusion in a trade agreement. However, further environmental (and labor) assurances were needed to secure passage of NAFTA, and ultimately, the negotiating parties agreed to a side accord that promotes trilateral cooperation on environmental matters and includes provisions to address a party's failure to enforce environmental laws. Further to gain NAFTA support, the United States and Mexico agreed to establish a bilateral Border Environment Cooperation Commission and North American Development Bank to help border-area communities finance environmental infrastructure projects. The United States and Mexico also developed a cooperative plan to address a range of border environmental issues; phase two of the plan, the Border XXI Program, began in 1996. Since NAFTA's inception, its environmental implications have remained a subject of debate and legislation. Ongoing issues include NAFTA's possible environmental effects, border funding, and the implementation of NAFTA-related environmental agreements. This report provides an overview of NAFTA's environmental provisions and associated agreements and initiatives, and discusses recent issues and congressional activities. It will be updated as events warrant."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Tiemann, Mary

  2000-03-01
• Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsular Shield Force

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  In response to the escalation by both participants during the Iran- Iraq war, the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) enjoined to conduct joint military exercises. As the war increased in intensity, a standing coalition laud force, the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), was created. The PSF is comprised of infantry, armor, artillery, and combat support elements from each of the GCC countries. Tasked with the defense the GCC nation-states, it has amassed a less than spectacular record of performance daring several Arabian Gulf crisis, most notably during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Political limitations have been the greatest hindrance to the Peninsula Shield Force's development. As a result, the Peninsula Shield Force faces challenges in material readiness, combat system and combat support interoperability, and appropriate manning. Despite its shortcomings the Peninsula Shield Force has achieved some success including the establishing of a permanent Headquarters staff, yearly exercises, and two deployments to Kuwait as a show of force during the Iran-Iraq war and in 1994 in response to an Iraqi troop buildup on the Iraq- Kuwait border. The Peninsula Shield Force must more fully develop its capabilities as a military force before it is able to unilaterally defend the Gulf Cooperation Council member-states' borders. Until then reliance on foreign intervention, namely from the United States, will continue to be required to support the Gulf Cooperation Council's security needs.

  Naval War College (U.S.)

  Kuffel, Glenn P., Jr.

  2000-02-07
• Contagion and Conflict: Health as a Global Security Challenge: A Report of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and the CSIS International Security Program

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  Historically, the concept of national security has focused on the use of military power to protect national borders and interests abroad. Over time, however, the concept of national security evolved to encompass a broader spectrum of concerns that included not only military power and protected borders, but also economic prosperity, access to natural resources and markets, and internal stability. Today, the international community, finding itself faced with challenges not readily amenable to military solutions, is beginning to embrace concepts of security that expand the notion of national security still further. Although some people argue that "security" in the post-Cold War era should continue to focus on challenges involving the use of military force, others contend that post-Cold War security also encompasses new challenges. Indeed, a look at a range of global developments since the end of the Cold War suggests that the intersections between health and security issues are worth examining. That was the purpose of the CBACI/CSIS project whose work is reflected in this report. The goals of the project were to: elucidate critical trends in the global health arena and determine the ways in which they pose major security challenges in the post-Cold War environment; highlight the tough policy choices created by the interaction of health and security issues; sensitize policymakers to the challenges inherent in this under-examined relationship; and consider policy recommendations that could provide the basis for practical steps by each of the critical constituencies. An underlying question in the project was whether a conceptual framework could be developed for tackling health and security issues that have come together in the post- Cold War environment in unique and challenging ways.

  Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.); Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute

  2000-01
• Law Enforcement Problems at the Border Between the United States and Canada: Drug Smuggling, Illegal Immigration and Terrorism, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, April 14, 1999

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  From the opening statement of Lamar Smith: "This subcommittee has never held a hearing specifically addressing the northern border. In recent years, there have been an increasing number of reports highlighting the lack of Federal resources on the northern border and the resulting threat to U.S. national security and community safety. Three threats need to be addressed: drug smuggling, illegal immigration and terrorism. All these threats are exacerbated by the lack of resources on the northern border. In fact, the Border Patrol currently has only 289 agents along the 3,500 mile northern border. It is obvious that if we do not know who comes into our country, we do not know what comes into our country, like illegal drugs. A porous border is an open invitation for illegal drug smugglers and for terrorists and their goal of mass destruction. […] Drug smugglers, terrorists and illegal aliens travel both ways across the border. Canadians as well as Americans will benefit from better border security. The United States and Canada already have engaged in cooperative efforts to combat illegal alien smuggling and to share intelligence information regarding drug smugglers and terrorists. Both countries have much to gain by supporting joint and individual efforts to reduce the threats to both Americans and Canadians." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Lamar Smith, Dale Brandland, Michael Bromwich, Eugene Davis, Mark Hall, David Harris, Demetrios G. Papademetriou, Michael A. Pearson, John Conyers, Jr., and Robert Trotter.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000
• National Intelligence Estimate: Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States

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  "This [National Intelligence Estimate] report represents an important initiative on the part of the Intelligence Community to consider the national security dimension of a nontraditional threat. It responds to a growing concern by senior US leaders about the implications-in terms of health, economics, and national security-of the growing global infectious disease threat. The dramatic increase in drugresistant microbes, combined with the lag in development of new antibiotics, the rise of megacities with severe health care deficiencies, environmental degradation, and the growing ease and frequency of cross-border movements of people and produce have greatly facilitated the spread of infectious diseases."

  National Intelligence Council (U.S.)

  2000-01
• United States' Second Major Theater of War: A Bridge Too Far?

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  "The United States National Security Strategy (NSS), as set forth by President William Jefferson Clinton in 1998, articulated the 'Imperative for Engagement' abroad in order to remain secure at home in the aftermath of the 'Cold War.' Accordingly, in an era marked by globalization, transnational interests and threats, and ethnic and regional strife, '...the United States must be prepared to use all instruments of National Power, alone or in concert with allies and partners, to influence the actions of both state and non-state actors. It further states 'we must have the demonstrated will and capabilities to continue to exert global leadership and remain the security partner for the community of states that share our interests.' Implicit in our NSS is a commitment by the United States Government (USG) to dedicate the resources necessary to successfully execute this global engagement strategy. To that end, this paper will explore the National Military Strategy (NMS) intended to support an NSS of "'Engagement,' its three elements ('Shape, Respond, Prepare Now'), and the 'Core Military Requirement' of being able to 'deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theatres in overlapping time frames, preferably in conceit with regional allies.' The basic question is: Does the military possess the capability in the decade ahead to execute this essential requirement? I submit the United States Armed Forces are capable of being defeated in a Second Major Theatre of War by a determined an opportunistic foe!"

  National War College (U.S.)

  Christie, R.A.

  2000
• Serial No. 106-83: Oversight of United States/Mexico Counternarcotics Efforts: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, March 4, 1999

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  From the opening Statement of John Mica: "Today, our subcommittee will examine Mexico's role in the fight against illegal drugs. Without question, no country in the world possesses a more immediate drug threat and national security danger to the United States. Over 14,200 Americans lost their lives last year to drugs and drug-related crime at a cost of billions and billions of dollars, not to mention the cost to families and to communities in distress. Despite a long and productive relationship with our ally to the south, Mexico, the hard river of drugs ending up on America's streets is coming across the Mexican border. Not only is Mexico the leading source of deadly hard drugs entering the United States, according to DEA's signature program, Mexico has now become a major producer of high purity heroin. In an effort to fully examine this issue, we will hear testimony from our DEA Administrator Tom Constantine, and Randy Beers from the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. They will be followed by the General Accounting Office who will outline Mexico's counternarcotics activities taken over the last year." Statements, letters, and material submitted for the record include those of the following: Thomas A. Constantine, Rand Beers, Benjamin Nelson, Ron Kushner, Benjamin A. Gilman, Dennis J. Kucinich, John L. Mica, Patsy T. Mink, chart concerning Mexican extradition statistics; and a chart concerning Mexico eradication and seizure statistics.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2000
• Entangled in Southern Lebanon: Israel, Iran, Syria and Hizbollah

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  Israel invaded Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 with the intention of destroying the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) infrastructure. Hizbollah filled the vacuum that was created by the removal of the PLO. In an effort to neutralize Hizbollah and obtain a secure northern border, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has undertaken many military operations that have appeared to be counter-productive. These operations have only served as a catalyst for "tit for tat" battles between the IDF and Hizbollah. The purpose of this thesis is to examine and analyze why Israel's military efforts in southern Lebanon have failed to achieve a secure and peaceful northern border and argue that the time is ripe to end the Israeli-Lebanon conflict via a diplomatic solution.

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  Facey, Ian M., Sr.

  1999-12
• Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia

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  With continued fighting in Kashmir, "the risk of another India-Pakistan conventional war seems higher than ever before," says Lavoy. "Even if India and Pakistan do manage to establish nuclear deterrence, the effect will be that every Indian and Pakistani will live under the threat of nuclear annihilation." Lavoy is Director of Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 received wide and vocal support in each country. Patriotic Indians and Pakistanis had much to celebrate: their scientists had surmounted high political, financial, and technical barriers to achieve what only five other states had done: develop and detonate nuclear bombs. That their leaders authorized these tests in spite of strong international political pressures, including the threat of economic sanctions, only spurred the nationalist fervor in India and Pakistan. A year and a half after the Pokhran and Chagai Hills explosions, however, public confusion and anxiety have supplanted euphoria. Military clashes bordering on open warfare in Kashmir make even ardent nuclear advocates question the utility of nuclear deterrence, or whether it actually exists in South Asia. And in the face of deep poverty, outdated economies, and teetering governments, Indians and Pakistanis now prudently ask whether they can afford their growing arms competition. Continued fighting over Kashmir and the downing of aircraft in other areas indicate that nuclear deterrence has not yet emerged in South Asia. The risk of another India-Pakistan conventional war seems higher than ever before and India's relations with China also have deteriorated. Added to these problems are new risks of inadvertent or accidental nuclear use because of unsophisticated nuclear command-and-control systems and poorly defined nuclear doctrines. And, even if India and Pakistan do manage to establish nuclear deterrence, moreover, the effect will be that every Indian and Pakistani will live under the threat of nuclear annihilation. Welcome to the nuclear club. As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has stated, "India and Pakistan need security, deserve security, and have a right to determine what is necessary to attain security." Are there ways for India and Pakistan to enhance their security without deploying nuclear weapons and missiles? Considering the dangerous and expensive record of the Soviet-American arms race, the enormous political and economic costs of Indian and Pakistani deterrent programs, and the growing risk of nuclear war in South Asia, India and Pakistan should make every effort to pursue nonnuclear sources of security. And, all concerned states should help them to achieve that security.

  United States. Department of State

  Lavoy, Peter R. (Peter René), 1961-

  1999-09
• Selected Principles of War as They Apply to Counterdrug Operations

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  From a doctrinal perspective the Department of Defense has two distinct sets of principles for conducting operations, one for war and one for operations other than war. It is Cook's contention that in order to win the "War on Drugs" we need to apply a hybrid set of principles. He feels that the principles of unity of command, objective, offensive, surprise, security, and perseverance have the most utility in this war. This thesis will look at the historical background of the "War on Drugs", how it is currently being fought, and, with the application of this hybrid set of principles, how we can improve our counterdrug operations. Cook's thesis and recommendations will focus on the operational level of war with specific attention being paid to America's southwest border.

  Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department

  Cook, Edward R.

  1999-05-17