Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: ALL (Border AND Security) in: title or summary
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2016 Seizure Statistics
From the Document: "Products that infringe U.S. trademarks and copyrights or are subject to exclusion orders issued by the United States International Trade Commission threaten the health and safety of American consumers and pose risks to our national interests. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) - Homeland Security Investigations' (HSI) enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) mitigates these risks while promoting a fair playing field, protecting American jobs, and advancing the U.S. economy. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, the number of IPR seizures increased 9 percent to 31,560 from 28,865 in FY 2015. The total estimated manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) of the seized goods, had they been genuine, increased to $1,382,903,001 from $1,352,495,341 in FY 2015. In FY 2016, ICE-HSI arrested 451 individuals, obtained 304 indictments, and received 272 convictions related to intellectual property crimes."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Office of Trade
2017-01-25?
-
Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2004 Seizure Statistics
This document contains information on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement FY 2003 and FY 2004 Top IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] Commodities Seized. It also includes data on the U.S. trading partners for IPR seizures. From the Document: "The Domestic Value of IPR seizures in FY 2004 increased almost 48% from FY 2003, to reach the highest level in the history of Customs/Department of Homeland Security."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Office of Trade
2004-10-22
-
Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2007 Seizure Statistics
This document contains information on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement FY 2006 and FY 2007 Top IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] Commodities Seized. It also includes data on the U.S. trading partners for IPR seizures. From the Document: "The value of IPR seizures in FY 2007 increased by 27%, from the value in FY 2006. The FY 2007 domestic value is the highest in the history of Customs/ Department of Homeland Security."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Office of Trade
2007-11-14
-
Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2006 Seizure Statistics
This document contains information on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement FY 2005 and FY 2006 Top IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] Commodities Seized. It also includes data on the U.S. trading partners for IPR seizures. From the Document: "The value of IPR seizures in FY 2006 increased by 67%, from the value in FY 2005. The FY 2006 domestic value is the highest in the history of Customs/ Department of Homeland Security."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Office of Trade
2006-11-07
-
Intellectual Property Rights: Fiscal Year 2003 Seizure Statistics
This document contains information on the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement FY 2002 and FY 2003 Top IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] Commodities Seized. It also includes data on the U.S. trading partners for IPR seizures. From the Document: "The value of IPR seizures in FY 2003 decreased 5% from FY 2002, but was the third highest domestic value in the history of Customs/Department of Homeland Security."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Office of Trade
2003-12-02
-
Convoy Ambush Case Studies: Volume II - Iraq and Afghanistan
"On 20 March 2003, coalition forces crossed the Iraqi border heading straight for the heart of Baghdad. It had been 30 years since the US Army had pulled truck companies out of Vietnam and had forgotten all lessons on convoy security from that war. Having accepted much of the media myth about the Americans losing the war, many senior Army officers were reluctant to accept any solution from that war. In fact the major lesson learned from that war was that the United States would never again find itself fighting an insurgency."
US Army Transportation School
Killblane, Richard E.
2015
-
National Drug Control Strategy 2011
"My Administration's 2011 National Drug Control Strategy contains support for smart and cost-effective programs to reduce drug use and its consequences. There are new prevention initiatives to encourage young people to make good decisions. There are increasing numbers of evidence-based treatment programs for those with substance use disorders. There is a focus on smart criminal justice approaches that use our criminal justice system to break the cycle of drug use and crime by diverting non-violent offenders into treatment instead of prison. From pre-trial diversion to alternatives to incarceration, to re-entry efforts that fundamentally change how drug-related crime and substance-abusing offenders are addressed, these approaches reduce recidivism and help ex-offenders return to their communities. On our borders and around the world, we highlight our collaboration with international partners to stop drugs from reaching our shores and prevent proceeds of illicit drug sales from returning to traffickers. This Strategy also builds on several legislative accomplishments passed with broad, bipartisan support from Congress over the past year. I was proud to sign two important pieces of legislation since the release of the Inaugural Strategy; the Fair Sentencing Act and the Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act."
United States. White House Office
2011
-
S. Rept. 115-353: Opioid Act of 2018, Report of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, to Accompany S. 3047 to Establish a Narcotic Drug Screening Technology Pilot Program to Combat Illicit Opioid Importation, and for Other Purposes
"S. 3047, the Opportunities to Provide for Illicit Opioid Interdiction and Detection (OPIOID) Act of 2018, or the ''OPIOID Act of 2018'', directs Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), to coordinate with the United States Postal Service (USPS) and other appropriate Federal agencies to develop new technology to detect illicit substances entering the United States at ports of entry."
United States. Government Publishing Office
2018
-
Virtual Border: Countering Seaborne Container Terrorism
America's potential vulnerability to terrorist attack through exploitation of the global trade and transportation system is now widely recognized. Maritime commerce, and container shipping in particular, provides a highly attractive means not only of delivering weapons but also of smuggling terrorists themselves into the American homeland.
This situation stems in part from a lack of information specifying cargo contents, complicating U.S. Customs Service efforts to identify high-risk containers for inspection upon arrival, and from the commercially driven need to move trade goods rapidly through the transportation system. The first and most important line of defense against container terrorism, therefore, is at the foreign point of origin. A virtual border must be designed to provide a multilayered defense, addressing container security from the initial loading of the container to its movement through the entire international transportation network.
National Defense University. Center for Technology and National Security Policy
Binnendijk, Hans; Caraher, Leigh C.; Coffey, Timothy, 1941- . . .
2002-08
-
Central America: USAID Assists Migrants Returning to Their Home Countries, but Effectiveness of Reintegration Efforts Remains to Be Determined, Report to Congressional Requesters
"In 2014, instability driven by insecurity, lack of economic opportunity, and weak governance led to a rapid increase of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras arriving at the U.S. border. In fiscal year 2017, the Department of Homeland Security reported (DHS) apprehending more than 200,000 nationals from these countries and removed nearly 75,000 nationals, including UAC, of these countries from the United States and returned them to their home countries. Current estimates also indicate nearly 350,000 individuals may need to be reintegrated to El Salvador and Honduras over the next few years when their Temporary Protected Status in the United States expires. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review U.S. efforts to support the reintegration of Central American migrants. This report describes (1) USAID [United States Agency for International Development] efforts to assist reception and reintegration of migrants from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras into their home countries since fiscal year 2014; and (2) what is known about the effectiveness of these efforts. GAO reviewed agency program documents and funding data; interviewed officials from U.S. government agencies, IOM [International Organization For Migration], and host governments and beneficiaries; and conducted site visits in these countries. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. USAID and IAF [Inter-American Foundation] provided formal comments, which are reproduced in this report, and all agencies provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2018-11
-
Blind Data Attack on BGP Routers
From the Thesis Abstract: "Transport Communication Protocol (TCP) implementations may not properly implement blind attack protection, leaving long-standing connections, such as Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) sessions, vulnerable to exploitation. This thesis aims to understand the efficacy of a blind data attack on BGP sessions. This thesis examines BGP, the protocols BGP relies on, and the effectiveness of safeguards against BGP blind attacks. A series of blind attack tests are performed against various production BGP implementations to determine how dangerous and feasible a blind attack is on BGP routing information integrity. Blind data attacks can inject and temporarily propagate erroneous routing information; however, on the routers tested, the complexity required to brute force connection-specific values makes blind data attacks difficult. Also, there is a high probability that a blind data attack will desynchronize a BGP session without modifying routing information. Protective measures are available that could further safeguard BGP sessions, but older router images may not implement some of the most vital protections recommended today. Organizations responsible for routing infrastructure and network security must carefully weigh the risk of not implementing more strict protection measures should a discovered vulnerability reduce attack complexity."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Catudal, Joseph W.
2017-03
-
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 1232, Rescinding DHS' Waiver Authority for Border Wall Act
From the Document: "Current law authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to waive all state, local, and federal laws--including environmental and land management laws, for example--as necessary to expedite the construction of barriers and roads near United States borders. The department has exercised its waiver authority in recent years, including in 2018 and 2019. H.R. 1232 would repeal this authority for any future construction."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2019-05-24
-
Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Addressing Critical Infrastructure Security Challenges
From the Document: "In addition to recreational use, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)--also known as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones--are used across our Nation to support firefighting and search and rescue operations, to monitor and assess critical infrastructure, to provide disaster relief by transporting emergency medical supplies to remote locations, and to aid efforts to secure our borders. However, UAS can also be used for malicious schemes by terrorists, criminal organizations (including transnational organizations), and lone actors with specific objectives."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2017-02
-
Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States: Proclamation 9880 by the President of the United States of America, May 8, 2019
Proclamation 9880 issued by the president on May 8, 2019 is a 90 day extension of Proclamation 9842 issued on February 7, 2019, which extended Proclamation 9822 issued on November 9, 2018. Proclamation 9822 established that any asylum seekers attempting to enter the U.S. must enter at a legal port of entry to be processed accordingly. Aliens attempting entry through illegal ports will be ineligible for asylum claims. The president states in Proclamation 9880: "As President, I must act to protect the national interest and to maintain an effectively functioning asylum system for legitimate asylum seekers who demonstrate that they have fled persecution and warrant the many special benefits associated with being granted asylum. In view of the foregoing circumstances, and the joint recommendation from the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security, I have determined to extend the suspension and limitation, as set forth below, on entry into the United States through the southern border established by Proclamation 9822 and extended by Proclamation 9842."
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Trump, Donald, 1946-
2019-05-08
-
Raging Waters: China, India, Bangladesh, and Brahmaputra River Politics
From the Introduction: "Events in the past decade--and especially during the past year--highlight the need for policy makers and scholars of Asia and water security to pay more attention to the stability of the Brahmaputra River basin. Originating in China, and flowing through India and Bangladesh, the river runs through three of the most populated countries in the world. China and India are major geopolitical players and fought a war in 1962 over territory that they still dispute and through which the Brahmaputra runs. In the summer of 2017, military forces of both countries engaged in a lengthy standoff due to a border dispute involving a third country--Bhutan. While the standoff was not directly tied to Brahmaputra basin resources, the conflict resulted in Beijing halting data sharing to New Delhi for flood forecasting purposes. This is an important cooperative measure, considering no water management agreement has been achieved in the basin."
Marine Corps University (U.S.). Press; CNA Corporation
Samaranayake, Nilanthi; Limaye, Satu P.; Wuthnow, Joel
2018
-
Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General: Semiannual Report to the Congress, October 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019
From the Inspector General's Message: "I am pleased to present our 33rd semiannual report (SAR), which summarizes the work and accomplishments of our office during the first half of fiscal year 2019. The audits, inspections, and investigations we conducted during this reporting period should continue to help improve treatment and care of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees at detention facilities, secure the election infrastructure, and strengthen the Federal Protective Service's management of overtime. Our work should also help the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to better safeguard Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Sensitive PII (SPII) of disaster survivors, as well as enhance FEMA's oversight of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System. Finally, U.S. Customs and Border Protection ultimately canceled a multi-million dollar hiring contract with Accenture in which we identified serious performance issues."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2018-10-01
-
Department of Homeland Security: Arctic Icebreaking Capabilities (Fiscal Year 2016 Report to Congress)
"The U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategy (published May 2013) aligns with the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and aims to ensure safe, secure, and environmentally responsible maritime activity in the Arctic. Polar icebreakers support evolving strategic goals for the U.S. Arctic, including mapping the extended continental shelf, monitoring our borders, protecting natural resources, and fulfilling international commitments for emergency response in this region. Pursuant to 14 U.S.C. § 2, the Coast Guard shall develop, establish, maintain, and operate icebreaking facilities for (1) the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and (2) as specified in international agreements. In the Polar Regions, the Coast Guard's icebreaking operations are currently carried out by one medium polar icebreaker, the Coast Guard Cutter (CGC) HEALY and one heavy polar icebreaker, CGC POLAR STAR."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2016-12-19
-
Serial No. J-113-65, S. Hrg. 113-890 : Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, June 11, 2014
This document is the June 11, 2014 hearing titled "Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security" before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. From the opening statement of Patrick J. Leahy: "[O]ne year ago, this Committee came together after weeks of exhaustive deliberations. We met all day, way into the evening, day after day, and we passed bipartisan legislation to fix the broken immigration system. We then had major debate on it on the floor of the Senate, and we passed it in the Senate with a bipartisan majority. It would unite families, certainly spur the economy--as everybody from Grover Norquist on said, it would give a huge boost to our economy--and it would help protect our borders. We knew last year that the cost of inaction was too great, and Members of this Committee and the full Senate passed historic legislation that would create a system worthy of American values. Unfortunately, the House leadership refused to act. [...] Every day the House fails to act is another day that families are torn apart and our economy lags. Every day the House fails to act, we realize the human cost of doing nothing to fix our broken immigration system." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jeh Johnson.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2018
-
First Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Statement of Lee S. Wolosky, April 1, 2003
The first public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was held on March 31-April 1, 2003 at the Alexander Hamilton U.S. Custom House in New York City, NY. The purpose of this public hearing was to engage those whose lives were forever changed by the events of September 11 in a public dialogue about the Commission's goals and priorities. The Commission also sought to learn about work already completed and the state of current knowledge, in order to identify the most important issues and questions requiring further investigation. This testimony was part of a panel entitled "Borders, Money, and Transportation Security". Lee S. Wolosky is an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He testified on the subject of terrorist financing.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
2003-04-01
-
Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Statement of Peter Gadiel, January 26, 2004
The seventh public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was held January 26-27, 2004 in Washington, DC. The two-day investigative hearing developed facts and circumstances relating to border and aviation security, two central aspects of the Commission's mandate. In this statement submitted for the record, Peter Gadiel discusses "The Role of Non-enforcement of Immigration Law In Permitting the Terrorist Acts of September 11" stating, "Massive failures within our government contributed to the tragic deaths of nearly 3,000 people on September 11th, 2001. Much of this is attributable to non-enforcement of immigration law. Failure to enforce immigration law aided the terrorists first, by a permissive policy of admission for Saudi citizens and secondly, by allowing those who entered the United States, legally or illegally, to remain here unmonitored and unchallenged. All were free to function with little fear of interference from immigration agents or law enforcement officers."
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
2004-01-26
-
Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Staff Statement No. 2: Three 9/11 Hijackers: Identification, January 26, 2004
The seventh public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was held January 26-27, 2004 in Washington, DC. The two-day investigative hearing developed facts and circumstances relating to border and aviation security, two central aspects of the Commission's mandate. The focus of this Staff Statement is on "Three 9/11 Hijackers: Identification, Watchlisting, and Tracking." The following is an excerpt from the introduction: "The Congressional Joint Inquiry highlighted this story as one of failed opportunities to put these suspected terrorists on a watchlist to prevent them from entering the United States. Therefore the lesson learned, as Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet put it, was to do a better job of putting people on the watchlist, to correct what he called 'a weakness in our internal training and an inconsistent understanding of watchlist thresholds.' We believe the portrayal of this story as a 'watchlisting' failure may literally be true. But we think this label is profoundly misleading. [...] We suggest instead that the watchlisting failure was just one symptom of a larger intelligence failure. The failure raises questions for the Commission about the CIA's and the Intelligence Community's management of transnational intelligence operations."
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
2004-01-26
-
Seventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Statement of Donna A. Bucella, January 26, 2004
The seventh public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States was held January 26-27, 2004 in Washington, DC. The two-day investigative hearing developed facts and circumstances relating to border and aviation security, two central aspects of the Commission's mandate. This testimony was part of a panel entitled "Visas and Watchlisting Today". In this statement, Donna A. Bucella discusses the mission and objectives of the new Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) which was created to ensure that government investigators, screeners, agents and state and local law enforcement officers have ready access to the information and expertise they need to respond quickly when a suspected terrorist is screened or stopped.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
2004-01-26
-
Giving Lip Service with an Attitude: North Korea's China Debate
"China's influence in North Korea is grossly misrepresented and exaggerated. In the past five years, Beijing's economic assistance to Pyongyang and the latter's economic dependence on China in terms of food, fuel, fertilizers, and monetary remittances declined in both absolute and relative terms. China's military-technical assistance is sporadic and of questionable value. The DPRK-PRC mutual defense alliance is hollow and on paper only. Controversial cross-border contacts aggravate tensions and increase uncertainty in the overall stressful bilateral relationship. North Korean elite perceptions and popular images of China grow increasingly ambiguous and negative. Strategic interaction on international security issues is self-interested, with very few common interests and shared approaches. Despite calendar exchanges of standard reverences, political relations are frosty. Revolutionary traditions have faded away, and personal loyalties and leadership bonds have already dissolved. The North Korean breed of resurgent neo-traditionalist and isolationist nationalism is hardly compatible with the hegemonic ideology of the revisionist Chinese pseudo-Marxist internationalism. Pragmatism and rational calculation of national interests prevail in both capitals. The United States should not count on China's perceived ability 'to deliver the DPRK'--it hardly can. Although Beijing may be able to bring Pyongyang to 'the party' occasionally, it definitely cannot make North Korea dance to its music, let alone to the tunes emanating from Washington. North Korea would rather spoil the multinational party than give the spoils to its Chinese 'benefactor' or American 'villain,' if its concerns are not satisfied 'in a just and appropriate manner.'"
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
Mansourov, Alexandre Y.
2003-12
-
Near-Space Airships: The Solution to Persistent ISR
From the thesis abstract: "Long duration conflicts have become the staple for 21st century engagements. Whether for counter-insurgency operations, humanitarian assistance, border patrol, or homeland security, the need for years or even decades of persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) has place tremendous strain on collection platforms. The Department of Defense (DOD) has strove to field improved capabilities but has consistently overlooked a major region of operations: near-space. Near-space provides a tremendous opportunity to provide persistent ISR. Operating at altitudes above 65,000 feet, near-space vehicles enjoy wide fields of view than can encompass an entire theater of operations such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Unlike low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites, which only briefly pass through the area of operations, near-space vehicles have the ability to loiter over the area of responsibility and provide the persistence necessary for current operations. Near-space airships, with the ability to host large payloads and loiter in near-space for months at a time, provide the solution to the DOD's problem of persistent ISR. Technology demonstrations have drastically reduced the technical risk of fielding near-space airships. With a unit cost similar to that of a Global Hawk Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), near-space airships improve support to the warfighter while substantially reducing long-term operational costs. The DOD needs to invest significant effort into developing near-space airships now to ensure it can meet the ISR needs of the future."
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College
Gulden, Ryan J.
2010-03
-
Antipersonnel Landmines Convention and the Evolving Politics of Arms Control
From the thesis abstract: "The setting and cast of characters involved in arms control have changed since the end of the Cold War. Changes in world dynamics occurring in tandem with globalization have brought about an increasing focus on human rights and human security. National borders and state sovereignty, still the foundation of our current international system, are declining in importance with these trends in globalization. This trend flowed into the arena of arms control in 1997 by banning a weapon stockpiled and used in almost every nation's military. This paper seeks to answer questions concerning these changes and about the implications of the 1997 Antipersonnel Landmine Convention as an example of a possible new framework for arms control. This paper seeks to answer the questions of whether or not the Ottawa Convention was an aberration or is likely to become a new way of doing business. It also seeks to understand the likelihood that certain weapon systems will become the target of such a future ban. From this analysis, this paper seeks to increase awareness of the Air Force and DoD with regard to international and domestic political contexts facilitating such a framework. The author provides general recommendations concerning U.S. policy approach with regard to conventional weapons and arms control negotiations."
United States. Department of the Air Force
Deam, Seth R.
2001-09
-
Draft Environmental Assessment: Town of Florence Communications Tower
"The Town of Florence, Arizona has a need to improve its public safety communications system in order to provide complete radio coverage to all areas of the town, particularly including the Anthem@Merrill Ranch development in the northern portion of the town. To assist the town in this effort, the Arizona Department of Homeland Security (AZDOHS), through FEMA [Federal Emergency Management], has provided grant funding to assist with the purchase and installation of a communications tower, a storage building, an emergency generator and related equipment. A review by FEMA of the Town's initial environmental submission has determined the need for an Environmental Assessment. The proposed tower site is located within the Anthem@Merrill Ranch development on the parcel set aside through a development agreement with the Town of Florence described as the Community Facilities parcel. This parcel is intended for the future location of a fire station and a public library, and perhaps other government facilities. Access to the parcel is from the Hunt Highway, which borders the parcel on the west side. The parcel, as well as all of the surrounding area, is typical Sonoran Desert terrain. Residential development has already occurred on the north side of the parcel and future development is planned for the east and south sides."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2011-09
-
Holy Jerusalem: The Key to Lasting Peace in the Middle East
From the thesis abstract: "This paper explores the Middle East Peace Process in terms of the historical and cultural attachment the three monolithic religions have toward the city of Jerusalem. Although conventional wisdom ascribes to four majors issues preventing a comprehensive settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians: namely borders, security, right of return and Jerusalem, it is actually only Jerusalem that is paramount. If the issue of Jerusalem's sovereignty can be solved a compromise solution for the other three will be found. Unfortunately, the common ground required for a negotiated settlement in regards to Jerusalem will never be found. Its religious value to Muslims, Jews and Christians alike have contributed to three millennia of monumental abuse, depravity and sacrifice, which acts as a limitless reservoir of cultural sunk costs no contemporary government can or will ignore. [...] This paper suggests a new international construct. Instead of the old Corpus Separatum proposed by the United Nations, more appropriate form would be a Corpus Universitas, or world city, where everyone is a citizen of Jerusalem. One where the city is administered under revocable power by a UN member nation not associated with any of the three monolithic religions, is sanctioned, supervised and legitimized by the United Nations and it legislated by a two-tier system controlled by a council equally represented by Jews, Christians and Muslims."
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College
Harness, Christopher D.
2009-05
-
Ill-Structured Militia Problem in Africa's Great Lakes Region
"The presence of armed illegal non-state actors in the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] continues to pose a security challenge not only to Uganda but also to the entire region. The study analyzes several of the militias that have established bases in the DRC. The militias to have dispersed to distant locations that make it hard for the military to counter them. The resulting insecurity has forced some communities to acquire arms for self-defense, which drives insurgency. Cross border, attacks have dragged the affected neighboring countries to intervene in the DRC. The DRC must build capacity to defeat the militias with the help of the regional partners, the international community, the restructured UN intervention force and the US in support and enabling roles."
Army War College (U.S.)
Nyarwa, Michael
2013-03
-
Borders in Cyberspace: Strategic Information Conflict Since 9/11
"Ancient ways of mobilizing power for force and using it to scatter foes have gained new reach and impact in the last two decades, both on the battlefield and for internal security. It lies beyond the scope of this paper to explain how these new means became subject, for the sake of efficiency, to automated logical programs sorting digitized data and new concepts of international law. What the paper narrates is how that very technology opened new avenues for force and extraordinary opportunities for surveillance, while new ideas of law ironically canalized conflict in a 'humanitarian' direction. The question of trust remained throughout, at the level of the leader, the commander, and the individual. Can you trust those with whom you would do business? Can you trust that your computer is guarding your data, or presenting you the truth? Can you trust that international law will protect your sovereignty -- or protect you from your government? Conflict endured as regimes and organizations that could not live at live at peace with their own citizens ultimately could not remain at peace with their neighbors. The liberal ascendancy that President Clinton described in 1993 thus brought not peace but a long struggle for survival on the part of dictators against the ostensibly universal appeal of liberal ideals. For the foreseeable future that struggle will proceed on physical, legal, and virtual battlefields, with the 'borders' between narratives and visions - and the questions of trust - cutting across geographic terrain and reaching into every nation."
Army Cyber Institute, West Point
Warner, Michael
2018-11-14
-
Drug Interdiction Along the Southwest Border: U.S. Counterdrug Policy, History and Future Implications
From the thesis abstract: "Drug trafficking, a central issue of dispute with Mexico and other source and transit nations, also threatens their sovereignty and U.S. security. U.S. border interdiction efforts, to include military, have had more political impact, than serious effect, on the cartels. Implementation of the NDCS [National Drug Control Strategy] is deficient, though current strategic focus is sound. Intelligence management and interagency efficiency is poor. DoD will be a part of the solution. [...] U.S. must seize initiative to protect own vulnerabilities and attack those of traffickers. National interest of counterdrug is important, but not the absolute highest priority. It is a major quality of life issue. U.S. concepts of defense are changing and federal infrastructure is slow to adapt. Opportunities abound to shift initiative from traffickers to U.S."
Marine Corps University (U.S.). Marine Corps War College
Cooney, J. J.
1998-05-13
