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• Serial No. 108-117: Stolen Passports: A Terrorist's First Class Ticket: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, June 23, 2004

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  From the opening statement of Henry J. Hyde: "In today's world, when countries are tightening up their border controls due to terrorism concerns, what could be more valuable than a first class ticket to travel anywhere in the world? A stolen passport may be worth more than its weight in gold. As we will hear today, travel document fraud represents a growing concern of law enforcement around the world. Certainly, here in the U.S., it is viewed as a serious threat to national security. Last month, the State Department announced a new program that would contribute to the security of our Nation. The U.S. will now participate in Interpol's stolen document database, which is available to border authorities worldwide. Not only will this sharing of vital information curb the movements of organized criminals and terrorists, but it will significantly reduce identity theft problems, as well. We laud the efforts of Interpol in taking the initiative by assembling a very useful tool to be used by the international community. I believe it will substantially contribute to the level of security that all nations desire to achieve. I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses today in order to gauge the level of a problem which exists both in the U.S. and on a worldwide basis, and to assess our efforts in curbing the theft of travel documents." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Clark Kent Ervin, Frank Moss, James M. Sullivan, Henry J. Hyde, and Joseph R. Pitts.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2004
• S. Hrg. 108-536; Serial No. J-108-63: Securing Our Borders under a Temporary Guest Worker Proposal: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, April 1, 2004

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  From the opening statement of Saxby Chambliss: "This is the second in our series of guest worker hearings to lay the groundwork for reform. President Bush began this process by announcing his temporary guest worker principles on January 7 of this year. In the President's comments, he said the first priority is that America must control its borders, which includes improving information-sharing; identifying terrorists, criminals and immigration violators; and working with the Canadian and Mexican governments to increase border security. This is what we are here today to discuss... Under a guest worker system, stopping criminals at the border will remain a mighty challenge. The Department of Justice Inspector General recently issued a report calling on the Border Patrol and the FBI to improve their information-sharing efforts in order to access criminal records of people caught illegally at the border. This demonstrates how we must have the necessary policies and procedures in place to get the right information out of the right people." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Saxby Chambliss, John Cornyn, Dianne Feinstein, Edward M. Kennedy, Patrick J. Leahy, Robert C. Bonner, Donna A. Bucella, Daniel Griswold, Margaret D. Stock, C. Steward Verdery, Jr., Vibiana Andrade, and Thomas G. Wenski.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2004
• S. Hrg. 108-570; Serial No. J-108-70: State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: Evaluating a Unified Approach for Stopping Terrorists: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, April 22, 2004

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  From the opening statement of Saxby Chambliss: "This is an important topic that covers both our anti-terrorism efforts and the changes needed in our immigration system. In the post-9/11 world, it is critical for us to think about immigration and national security with a consistent approach. I think there is a consensus that our immigration laws are in dire need of reform and today's hearing is another step towards a comprehensive review. The system we have in place today lacks incentives for immigrants to come to the United States following the legal process in place. It also lacks enforcement against those who choose not to follow the legal process. It is my hope that we may continue the open dialogue that the President has initiated and all Senators will continue to work on the policy we have been addressing so far in this Congress." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Saxby Chambliss, John Cornyn, Orrin G. Hatch, Edward M. Kennedy, Patrick J. Leahy, Jeff Sessions, David A. Harris, Kris W. Kobach, Michelle Malkin, E.J. Picolo, Joan Hueter, Grover G. Norquist, Bob Barr, David Keene, David Schaefer, Marvin Nathan, D. Margaret Drury, James R. Edwards, Jr., Nihad Awad, John M. Douglass, Sandalio Gonzalez, Craig Nelsen, James Jay Carafano, Alison Parker, Wendy Patten, Mark Krikorian, Gabriela Lemus, Katherine Culliton, Ronald Miller, Larry E. Naake, Michele Waslin, Donald J. Borut, Leslye E. Orloff, and Thomas P. Walters.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2004
• Serial No. 108-188: Transforming the National Guard: Resourcing for Readiness: Hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, April 29, 2004

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  From the opening statement of Christopher Shays: "The committee convenes today to discuss important issues raised by plans to transform and modernize the National Guard to meet the demands of a growing set of domestic and global missions. We captioned the hearing Resourcing for Readiness, because Members need to know Guard units will be equipped and trained to perform both the Homeland Security and global defense tasks assigned them. In the past, the total force, the operational union of Active Duty and Reserve component units, didn't always add up. National Guard units too often languished at the end of the supply chain with limited training on hand-me-down equipment. At the national level, significant strides have been made reshaping military capabilities to meet an uncertain world of lethal threats at home and asymmetrical warfare overseas. But much more needs to be done to clarify the operational and physical implications of new military missions within the sovereign borders of the States, where National Guard members can be called to duty by both the Governor and the President. Federal mobilization of National Guard units can draw heavily from local first responder ranks, degrading domestic readiness." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Paul McHale, Thomas F. Hall, H. Steven Blum, John A. Love, George E. Pataki, Janet A. St. Laurent, Wayne D. Marty, Timothy J. Lowenberg, Bruce F. Tuxill, Marsha Blackburn, Tom Davis, Katherine Harris, Carolyn B. Maloney, C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger, and Christopher Shays.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2004
• Serial No. 78: How Would Millions of Guest Workers Impact Working Americans and Americans Seeking Employment? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, March 24, 2004

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  This hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims on March 24, 2004 considers the impact that mass guest worker programs could have on American workers and unemployed Americans. "There has recently been much discussion of the creation of an expansive new guest worker program to meet the needs of employers for low-skilled workers. A number of plans have been proposed that would allow the employers of the estimated 5.7 million illegal aliens working in the U.S. to sponsor the aliens for guest worker status. In addition, the plans would allow employers to import, as guest workers, an unlimited number of aliens living outside the U.S. who could work in any occupation as long as they were paid at least the minimum wage." Critics of such programs argue that a continuing inflow of immigrant workers has created more competition at the bottom of the market, where low-skilled workers and teenagers are already having difficulty finding employment. A guest worker program would allow employers to fill every job vacancy in America with aliens as long as they could find prospects abroad who would accept the minimum wage. Proponents argue that with meaningful enforcement, guest worker programs could be structured to deal with situations where there are key labor shortages and provide protections that ensured employers were not incentivized to hire guest workers. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those from the following: John N. Hostettler, Howard L. Berman, Jeff Flake, John Conyers, Chris Cannon, Steve King, Linda T. Sanchez, Lamar Smith, Sheila Jackson Lee, Mark Krikorian, Frank Morris, Roy Beck, and Muzaffar Chishti.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2004
• Central Asian Drug Trafficking Dilemma

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  Tajikistan, a state that is completely landlocked, consists of very rough terrain that is comprised of mountains, cliffs and glaciers. There are very few transportation links through the area that gives Tajikistan limited access to neighboring countries. Security problems resulting from the increasing flow of narcotics illegally smuggled across the 1200 km Tajikistan- Afghanistan border have become critical in understanding the nature of political instability within Central Asia. This thesis focuses on the growing trend of drug trafficking and use throughout Afghanistan and Tajikistan and the porous border the two countries share. It establishes why the northern route in Afghanistan has gained importance and why drug trafficking is reaching all time level highs. Russia provides the border security in Tajikistan through the use of its Federal Border Service. Unfortunately, corruption within the government has not allowed the country to overcome its drug trafficking and use dilemma. The United States provides little assistance to the region and does not have any plans to assist in the near future. The thesis concludes that Central Asia, Russia and the United States need to cooperate and help stabilize the region in order to slow the transit of drugs through the region.

  Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)

  McGowen, Richard S.

  2003-12
• U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Performance and Annual Report - Fiscal Year 2003

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  "This report highlights Customs and Border Protections major initiatives, performance goals, and mission accomplishments, and presents related financial management information that represents an on-going effort to provide useful information to internal and external customers. The figures shown for FY 2003 program operations and performance measures in the Management Discussion and Analysis Section of the report are those that were available as of October 31, 2003. This was a transition year for the agency, with five months under the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and seven months under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).The financial statements presented here provide the financial position and results of legacy Customs operations through both periods, and are prepared pursuant to the requirements of 31 U.S.C. The budget resource obligations also refer to legacy Customs operations during the 12-month period. Many of the performance measures discussed were originally used by legacy Customs."

  U.S. Customs and Border Protection

  2004
• Fact Sheet: US-VISIT

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  "US-VISIT is a top priority for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security because it enhances security for our citizens and visitors while facilitating legitimate travel and trade across our borders. US-VISIT helps to secure our borders, facilitate the entry and exit process and enhance the integrity of our immigration system while respecting the privacy of our visitors. US-VISIT is part of a continuum of security measures that begins outside U.S. borders and continues through a visitors arrival in and departure from the United States. It incorporates eligibility determinations made by both the Departments of Homeland Security and State."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2004
• Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at a Customs and Border Protection Press Conference [November 20, 2003]

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  This transcript includes the November 20, 2003 remarks of Tom Ridge at a Customs and Border Protection Press Conference in which he discusses strengthening Homeland Security while ensuring the free flow of goods and commerce across our borders and through our seaports and airports. The question/answer session with the press is included.

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

  2003-11-20
• Department of Homeland Security Announces Cargo Security Initiative [November 20, 2003]

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  "The Department of Homeland Security today released final rules which will allow U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to collect cargo information necessary to identify high-risk shipments which could threaten the safety and security of the United States. The final rules for cargo security address the timeline of presentation for electronic advance manifest information."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

  2003-11-20
• Opening Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at Press Availability With Mexican Minister of Governance Secretary Santiago Creel [November 12, 2003]

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  This transcript includes the November 12, 2003 remarks of Tom Ridge at a press availability with Mexican Minister of Governance Secretary Santiago Creel in which they discuss their Binational Commission meeting. The Binational Commission includes the United States, Canado, and Mexico. "Together, we are working to protect the infrastructure on our borders and secure the flow of goods and people across it, hundreds of thousands of crossings each and every day. We certainly want to improve security, but we also want to do it in a way that we facilitate the legitimate flow of goods and people across our borders. And with more than 2,000 miles of border to cover, that's not an easy task. But it is one toward which I believe we have taken concrete steps and we are making some very real progress."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

  2003-11-12
• Final Supplemental Enviromental Assessment for Infrastructure within U.S. Border Patrol Naco-Douglas Corridor, Cochise County, Arizona, November 2003

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  "This environmental analysis supplements the current and future alternatives analyzed in the Final EA for Infrastructure within U.S. Border Patrol Naco-Douglas Corridor, Cochise County, Arizona, herein referred to as the Corridor EA. This Supplemental Environmental Assessment (SEA) addresses the potential for effects, beneficial and adverse, of proposed infrastructure construction and improvements along the U.S.-Mexico border by the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)."

  U.S. Customs and Border Protection

  2003-11
• Keeping Terrorists Out of America By Unifying Terrorist Watch Lists: Ten Requirements for an Effective Terrorist Screening Center

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  The lack of an integrated terrorist watch list has long been described as a critical shortfall in homeland security and the war against Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Unfortunately, in the two years following September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration has failed to demonstrate effective leadership in developing a unified terrorist watch list system that can be used across agencies and by local law enforcement and border control officers. Even before September 11, 2001, information on terrorist suspects was disorganized and poorly used. Two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al- Hazmi, should have been placed on watch lists on at least three occasions.1 The effective use and dissemination of accurate watch lists information would likely have allowed authorities to prevent these two from boarding American Airlines flight 77, which was flown into the Pentagon. Effective use of this important tool could have curtailed the destruction witnessed by the entire world on that terrible day. Promptly and fully implementing a robust, agile, and comprehensive terrorist screening capability is critical to our national security. The men and women on the front lines of border protection must have the ability to determine if the individual they are inspecting is a suspected terrorist. They must know this before the individual enters the country, and must be advised on what action to take. Officials at our embassies reviewing visa applications; customs and immigration inspectors at air, land, and sea ports of entry; and law enforcement officials patrolling our streets need prompt access to terrorist watch list information. Any time that our government is not able to provide this basic national security function is a time when America is at greater risk than it should be from the threat of global terrorism.

  United States. Congress. House. Select Committee on Homeland Security

  2003-11
• Nationwide Environmental Assessment US-VISIT Implementation at Passenger Cruise Ship Ports of Entry

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  "The primary goals of the US-VISIT Program are to: secure our nation; ensure the integrity of the immigration system; facilitate legitimate travel and commerce; strengthen international cooperation; and respect U.S. privacy laws and policies. As part of this effort, US-VISIT will provide government officials with specific information about who is entering the country and who is staying past their period of authorized admission. To this end, DHS, through its US-VISIT Program, is proposing (Proposed Action) to modify both entry and exit processing of Non-Immigrant Visa holders (NIV) at fifteen (15) passenger cruise ship terminals (Table 5-1). The Proposed Action will include a new arrival and departure process for twelve (12) of the fifteen (15) passenger cruise ship terminals and a new pre-inspection arrival process for three (3) terminals located in British Columbia, Canada. As capability increases, these procedures may be expanded to include additional foreign traveler groups, but the overall technology and process will remain the same during initial deployment at the passenger cruise ship terminals. In addition, cargo terminals were not evaluated in this Environmental Assessment (EA) due to the functional differences in processing passengers and cargo at these terminals. In addition to the biographical information already captured through the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) arrival inspections and the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) submission by the sea carriers, the US-VISIT program is proposing to collect biometric information for NIVs entering and exiting the U.S. through passenger cruise ship terminals, beginning in early January 2004."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2003-11
• Letter From Susan M. Collins and Joseph I. Lieberman to Asa Hutchinson, [October 28, 2003 ]

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  Port security and container transportation are seen as critically important for the safety and security of every person living in the United States, as well as being highly beneficial to economic stability. The increasingly forgotten realm of ports as a security concern has caused increasing alarm, and has continually pressed the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to react. This letter requests a detailed description of what CBP has done, and plans to do in the future in regards to understanding where additional work is needed.

  United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs

  Collins, Susan, 1952-; Lieberman, Joseph I.

  2003-10-28
• Secretary Ridge Announces Significant Steps in Enhancing Maritime Security [October 23, 2003]

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  "U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge today announced approval and publication of the final maritime industry security rules which are designed to significantly improve protection of America's ports, waterways, and ships from a terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security developed the final rules with a team from the Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration. These DHS and DOT teams held public meetings around the nation over the past year in New Orleans, Cleveland, Seattle, San Pedro, CA, Jacksonville, New York City, St Louis, and Washington DC to ensure broad input from the maritime industry on port issues. During these sessions DHS solicited and considered acceptable alternatives from the private sector to meet specific security measures, which included the receipt and evaluation of over 2,000 comments and recommendations."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security

  2003-10-23
• Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense, Statement by Nancy R. Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research, and Methods, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives

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  "Each year, millions of visitors, foreign students, and immigrants come to the United States. Visitors may enter on a legal temporary basis--that is, with an authorized period of admission that expires on a specific date--either (1) with temporary visas or, in some cases (2) as tourists or business visitors who are allowed to enter without visas. Significant numbers of foreign visitors overstay their authorized periods of admission. This has heightened attention to issues such as (1) the extent of overstaying, (2) weaknesses in our current overstay tracking system, and (3) how the tracking system weaknesses and the level of overstaying might affect domestic security. Because of unresolved weaknesses in DHS's current system for tracking arrivals and departures there is no accurate list of overstays. Two new tracking initiatives are intended to address these weaknesses. NSEERS, the National Security Entry and Exit Registration System, does not cover most visitors. US-VISIT, the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology, a more comprehensive, automated program, is being phased in. Evaluating US-VISIT against the weaknesses GAO identifies here would increase its potential for success. The current tracking system's weaknesses limit control options and make it difficult to monitor potential terrorists who enter the country legally. Like other illegal immigrants, overstays obtain jobs with fraudulent identity documents, including jobs at critical infrastructure locations, such as airports. Thus, tracking issues can affect domestic security. Improving the tracking system could work with intelligence, investigation, information-sharing, and other factors to help counter threats from foreign terrorists."

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-10-16
• Summary of Meeting - Public Session: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Advisory Council, the Marriott Renaissance Center, Detroit, Michigan, October 3, 2003

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  "This summary describes the discussions and actions of the second meeting of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). The meeting was held on Friday, October 3, 2003 at the Marriott Renaissance Center in Detroit, Michigan. The HSAC met in Detroit for the purposes of: (1) Welcoming and swearing in new members of the HSAC; (2) discussing current HSAC projects, including a proposed Homeland Security award and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Lexicon project; (3) touring DHS facilities at the United States/Canada border; (4) receiving briefings from DHS staff on Departmental initiatives; and (5) holding roundtable discussions with and among HSAC members. Members received briefings from the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson, and U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and 9th District Commander, Ronald Silva. Michigan's Homeland Security Advisor, Colonel Michael McDaniel and Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick also addressed members. HSAC staff member Jeff Gaynor provided a briefing on the Department's proposed Lexicon project. HSAC staff member Mike Miron provided a briefing on the Department's proposed Homeland Security Award. At the end of each briefing HSAC members entered into deliberations."

  President's Homeland Security Advisory Council (U.S.)

  2003-10-03
• Introductory Remarks of Secretary Tom Ridge to the Homeland Security Advisory Council Meeting [October 3, 2003]

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  This transcript includes the October 3, 2003 remarks of Tom Ridge to the Homeland Security Advisory Council Meeting. "You will see, today, and the Colonel alluded to it, the incredible challenges we have on the northern border to balance security and commerce. I think it's -- I think there's been estimates that about one-tenth of the Canadian Gross Domestic Product probably flows through those bridges and tunnels right over in here because of the nexus between the automobile industry and the integration of manufacturing at our borders, and that's across the northern border. So - and I will also tell you that I think it's good for the men and women of Homeland Security to see that their Advisory Group, a very busy group of professionals, take the time out to see what they're doing. And we want you to see the people, see the technology, and better appreciate, I think you will, better appreciate the challenges that we have when we talk about we have to be right a couple of million times every day or over a billion times a year but terrorists don't have to be right once. And so we really lean on individual co-workers around the country and around the world to do the right thing on a day-today basis. So we did want to get you closer, and that's obviously one of the reasons we have you out."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

  2003-10-03
• Security: Counterfeit Indentification Raises Homeland Security Concerns, Testimony by Ronald D. Malfi, Director, Office of Special Investigations, before the Committee on Homeland Security

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  GAO testified about how homeland security is vulnerable to identity fraud. Today, counterfeit identification is easily produced and used to create fraudulent identities. Tests GAO has performed over the past 3 years demonstrate that counterfeit identification documents can be used to (1) enter the United States; (2) purchase firearms; (3) gain access to government buildings and other facilities; (4) obtain genuine identification for both fictitious and stolen identities; and (5) obtain social security numbers for fictitious identities. In conducting these tests, GAO created fictitious identities and counterfeit identification documents. GAO's work leads to three basic conclusions: (1) government officials and others generally did not recognize that the documents presented were counterfeit; (2) many government officials were not alert to the possibility of identity fraud and some failed to follow security procedures and (3) identity verification procedures are inadequate. The weaknesses found during this investigation clearly show that border inspectors, motor vehicle departments, and firearms dealers need to have the means to verify the identity and authenticity of the driver's licenses that are presented to them. In addition, government officials who review identification need additional training in recognizing counterfeit documents. Further, these officials also need to be more vigilant when searching for identification fraud.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-10-01
• From 'Defending Forward' to a 'Global Defense-in-Depth': Globalization and Homeland Security

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  In July of last year, the Bush administration published the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) which, while commendable in many ways, failed to take into account the effects of globalization in planning for the nation's security. Safeguarding America's homeland in an era of globalization requires a more comprehensive approach based on a "global defense-in-depth." The NSHS amounts to little more than a strategic directive for the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS), rather than a national strategy. It focuses principally on activities that take place within the nation's borders, making only a brief genuflection to the need for international cooperation. Other than a passing reference to Northern Command and its envisioned responsibilities in civil support, the NSHS fails to address the roles that the U.S. military's combatant commands should play. Finally, the NSHS fails to incorporate newly emerging technologies into an overarching strategic concept, or way, that would contribute to keeping Americans safe.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Echevarria, Antulio Joseph, 1959-; Tussing, Bert B.

  2003-10
• Integrated Emergency Management: The Roles of Federal, State, and Local Government with Implications for Homeland Security

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  History, tradition, and necessity have established the roles of the federal, state, and local governments in Integrated Emergency Management. Disasters and emergencies have frequently tested the system in real world situations. However, new challenges will demand even greater levels of performance from all levels of government. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, changed the face of Integrated Emergency Management in fundamental ways. Before then, those concerned with dealing with disasters focused primarily on relatively familiar natural or environmental disasters. The nation had become comfortable with its ability to deal with disasters. In the wake of 9/11, Americans can no longer take for granted their security, invulnerability, health, and safety within the borders of the United States. Terrorist organizations have demonstrated their ability to strike U.S. shores, using innovative techniques and weapons. The collective efforts of the federal, state, and local governments across the United States can work together effectively and efficiently to meet this new threat. Integrated Emergency Management would provide the framework to allow government and non-government organizations to work together to prepare for, combat, and recover from terrorist attacks as well as other disasters. This concept allows for the unique competencies of each level of government to come to bear to respond effectively to disasters.

  Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute

  Lord, Albert F., Jr.

  2003-10
• Protecting the Food Supply: Fact Sheet on FDA's New Food Bioterrorism Regulation: Interim Final Rule- Prior Notice of Imported Food Shipments

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  "The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (the Bioterrorism Act) requires that FDA receive prior notice of food imported into the United States, beginning on December 12, 2003. Most of the prior notice information required by the interim final rule is data usually provided by importers or brokers to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) when foods arrive in the United States. Now, the Bioterrorism Act requires that this information also be provided to FDA in advance of an imported food's arrival to the United States. FDA will use this information in advance of the arrival to review, evaluate, and assess the information, and determine whether to inspect the imported food. FDA and CBP have collaborated on the implementation of the prior notice interim final rule. Nearly all of the current imported food shipments can comply by using CBP's Automated Broker Interface of the Automated Commercial System (ABI/ACS)."

  United States. Food and Drug Administration

  2003-10
• Departments of State, Homeland Security Reach Agreement on Visa Oversight Rule to Better Secure America's Borders [September 29, 2003]

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  "Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and Secretary of State Colin Powell have signed a memorandum of understanding, signaling their commitment to work cooperatively to create and maintain an effective, efficient visa process that safeguards the United States. The document describes the respective roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) in order to secure America's borders from external threats while ensuring that these borders remain open to legitimate travel and commerce."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office

  2003-09-29
• Crime Control: The Federal Response [Updated September 23, 2003]

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  "Federal crime control efforts traditionally have been directed at problems transcending state boundaries concerned, with maintaining law and order in areas subject exclusively to federal jurisdiction or of national concern. During the 107th Congress, authorities of the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), were enhanced to deal with homeland security and anti-terrorism problems arising from the September 11, 2001 attacks. Provision made in the USA Patriot Act, P.L. 107-56, was one of the first federal responses to the war on terrorism after the attack. Congress also heightened the authority to secure the Nation's lands and borders through the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 on November 25, 2002."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  O'Bryant, JoAnne

  2003-09-23
• Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed: Report to Congressional Committees

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  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) plans to establish a program to strengthen management of the pre-entry, entry, status, and exit of foreign nationals who travel to the United States. The goals of the program, known as the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), are to facilitate legitimate trade and travel, enhance national security, and adhere to U.S. privacy laws and policies. GAO was asked to determine, among other things, whether the plan satisfies these conditions and to provide observations about the plan and DHS's management of the program. DHS's fiscal year 2003 US-VISIT expenditure plan and related documentation partially satisfied the conditions imposed by the Congress, which include meeting the capital planning and investment control review requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). GAO also identified 10 factors affecting US-VISIT and concluded that the program is a very risky endeavor. Some risk factors are inherent to the program, such as its mission criticality, its size and complexity, and its enormous potential costs. Others, however, arise from the program's relatively immature state of governance and management. Because of the risk factors, GAO concluded that it is uncertain that US-VISIT will be able to measurably and appreciably achieve DHS's stated goals for the program. Further, DHS's near-term investment in the program is at risk of not delivering promised capabilities on time and within budget and not producing mission value commensurate with investment costs.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-09-19
• Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, Statement of Robert F. Dacey, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development and the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives,

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  This document only contains prepared testimony from Robert F. Dacey, GAO ("Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues [GAO-03-1165T]), Denise Swink, Acting Director of the Office of Energy Assurance, Department of Energy, Robert Liscouski, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection Acting Director, National Cyber Security Division Department of Homeland Security, and Colonel Michael McDaniel, Assistant Adjutant General for Homeland Security, State of Michigan.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-09-17
• Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts, Statement of Peter Guerrero, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate

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  "The attacks on September 11, 2001, illustrate the threats to and vulnerabilities of the transportation system." GAO examined the challenges in securing the transportation system and the federal role and actions in transportation security and concluded that securing the nation's transportation system is fraught with challenges. The transportation system crisscrosses the nation and extends beyond our borders to move millions of passengers and tons of freight each day. The extensiveness of the system as well as the sheer volume of passengers and freight moved makes it both an attractive target and difficult to secure. Addressing the security concerns of the transportation system is further complicated by the number of transportation stakeholders that are involved in security decisions, including government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels and thousands of private sector companies. Further exacerbating these challenges are the financial pressures confronting transportation stakeholders. It will take the collective effort of all transportation stakeholders to meet existing and future transportation challenges. Since September 11, transportation stakeholders have acted to enhance security. TSA has recently focused more on the security of the maritime and land transportation modes and is planning to issue security standards for all modes of transportation. DOT is also continuing their security efforts. However, the roles and responsibilities of TSA and DOT in securing the transportation system have not been clearly defined, which creates the potential for overlap, duplication, and confusion as both entities move forward with their security efforts.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-09-09
• Information Security: Challenges in Using Biometrics: Testimony by Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Applied Research and Methods, before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Census, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives

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  One of the primary functions of any security system is the control of people into or out of protected areas, such as physical buildings, information systems, and our national border. Technologies called biometrics can automate the identification of people by one or more of their distinct physical or behavioral characteristics. Last year, GAO conducted a technology assessment on the use of biometrics for border security. GAO was asked to testify about the issues that it raised in the report on the use of biometrics in the federal government, and the current state of the technology. Biometric technologies are available today that can be used in security systems to help protect assets. However, technology and people must work together as part of an overall security process. GAO found that three key considerations need to be addressed before a decision is made to design, develop, and implement biometrics into a security system: (1) decisions must be made on how the technology will be used; (2) a detailed cost-benefit analysis must be conducted to determine that the benefits gained from a system outweigh the costs; and (3) a trade-off analysis must be conducted between the increased security, which the use of biometrics would provide, and the effect on areas such as privacy and convenience. Security concerns need to be balanced with practical cost and operational considerations as well as political and economic interests.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-09-09
• Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise Security Concerns, Testimony by Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director, Office of Special Investigations, before the Senate Committee on Finance

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  This testimony summarizes some of our recent investigations that demonstrate security vulnerabilities that exist because counterfeit identification can be easily produced and used to create fraudulent identities. It is based in part on the recently issued restricted report Security: Vulnerabilities Found in Driver's License Applications Process. This also encompasses results from security tests GAO has performed over the past 3 years. These tests revealed security weaknesses at federal buildings and other facilities, airports and our nation's borders, and exposed identity fraud vulnerabilities in both the Social Security number (SSN) application process and in the administration of federal gun control laws. A number of these problems have been addressed by the responsible agencies. In summary, GAO found that (1) government officials generally did not recognize the documents presented as counterfeits, (2) some government officials failed to follow security procedures and were not alert to the possibility of identity fraud, and (3) identity verification procedures are inadequate. GAO's investigations revealed that homeland security is vulnerable to identity fraud and, unless action is taken, individuals who intend to cause harm can easily exploit these vulnerabilities. Additionally, identify fraud has a range of other consequences including potential fraud in voting, obtaining credit and federal benefits, and in many other areas.

  United States. General Accounting Office

  2003-09-09