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Voting in America: The Potential for Polling Place Quality and Restrictions on Opportunities to Vote to Interfere with Free and Fair Access to the Ballot, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Elections, Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, June 11, 2021 (Book 2 of 2)
This a continuation of the June 11, 2021 hearing on "Voting in America: The Potential for Polling Place Quality and Restrictions on Opportunities to Vote to Interfere with Free and Fair Access to the Ballot," before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Elections Committee on House Administration House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress. From the opening statement of G.K. Butterfield: "Today we will discuss changes in election administration and voting laws that reduce or consolidate or relocate polling locations that impact the ability of voters to access the ballot. [...] We will talk about long wait times at the polls and restrictions on opportunities to vote, all of which--all of which--can disproportionately burden minority voters. [...] There is no proof that these laws are necessary and no analysis to ensure that they are not discriminatory. Unfortunately, the evidence reveals plainly the very opposite. [...] Expanded opportunities to vote, such as early mail-in or curbside voting and access to drop boxes increase equal access to the ballot and can decrease these waiting times. We should provide more of these opportunities. Recent elections prove that if voters are given options for when and how to cast their ballot, participation in the electoral process will actually increase. [...] the Constitution is unambiguously clear: Congress has a clear role in protecting this right to vote and ensuring equal, equitable access to the franchise. And so, my friends, I look forward to hearing and learning from today's witnesses and working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to ensure we do just that." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Stephen Pettigrew, Jesselyn McCurdy, Kevin Morris, Mimi Marziani, and Donald Palmer.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2021-06-11
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Key Findings and Recommendations from the 'Joint Report of the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security on' Foreign Interference Targeting Election Infrastructure or Political Organization, Campaign, or Candidate Infrastructure Related to the 2020 US Federal Elections
From the Background: "This product provides a declassified overview of findings and recommendations from a classified joint report from the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security addressing the impact of activities by foreign governments and their agents targeting election infrastructure or infrastructure pertaining to political organizations, candidates, or campaigns used in the 2020 US federal elections on the security or integrity of such infrastructure. Pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13848, the joint report relied on the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) addressing foreign threats to the 2020 US elections."
United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of Homeland Security
2021
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Voting in America: The Potential for Voter ID Laws, Proof-Of-Citizenship Laws, and Lack of Multi-Lingual Support to Interfere with Free and Fair Access to the Ballot, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Elections, Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, May 24, 2021
This is the May 24, 2021 hearing on "Voting in America: The Potential for Voter ID Laws, Proof-Of-Citizenship Laws, and Lack of Multi-Lingual Support to Interfere with Free and Fair Access to the Ballot," held before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on House Administration. From the Opening Statement of G. K. Butterfield: "[T]oday's hearing is the third in a series of hearings this Subcommittee is conducting this year examining voting and election administration in America. Today, we will examine three types of State and local election administration laws: those requiring voters to present identification to vote, those requiring voters to provide documentary proof of citizenship in order to register to vote, and those governing the provision of multilingual voting support." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Lonna Rae Atkeson, Matthew L. Campbell, Nazita Lajevardi, Andrea Senteno, Lori Roman, Matt A. Barreto, Terry Ao Minnis, Kira Romero-Craft, and Harmeet Dhillon.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2021
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Foreign Cyber Interference in Elections
From the Introduction: "With the contentious U.S. 2020 elections having concluded, it is a propitious moment to examine the international law rules bearing on foreign interference by cyber means in this fundamental expression of democracy. As in 2016, 'President Putin and the Russian state authorized and conducted influence operations against the 2020 U.S. presidential election aimed at denigrating President Biden and the Democratic Party, supporting former President Trump, undermining public confidence in the electoral process, and exacerbating sociopolitical divisions in the US.' Russia did not, however, attempt to 'alter[ ] any technical aspect of the voting process, including voter registration, ballot casting, vote tabulation, or reporting results.' Instead, its 'online influence actors sought to affect US public perceptions of the candidates, as well as advance Moscow's longstanding goals of undermining confidence in US election processes and increasing sociopolitical divisions among the American people.' But Russia was not alone. According to the U.S. intelligence community, 'Iran carried out a multi-pronged covert influence campaign intended to undercut former President Trump's reelection prospects,' while 'a range of additional foreign actors--including Lebanese Hizballah, Cuba, and Venezuela--took some steps to influence the election.' Interestingly, China did not conduct operations designed to alter the outcome, although it did consider doing so. Despite counterfactual claims to the contrary by Trump, however, the United States successfully conducted the 2020 election."
Naval War College (U.S.). International Law Studies
Schmitt, Michael N.
2021
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Voting in America: The Potential for Polling Place Quality and Restrictions on Opportunities to Vote to Interfere with Free and Fair Access to the Ballot, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Elections, Committee on House Administration, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress, First Session, June 11, 2021 (Book 1 of 2)
This is the June 11, 2021 hearing on "Voting in America: The Potential for Polling Place Quality and Restrictions on Opportunities to Vote to Interfere with Free and Fair Access to the Ballot," before the Subcommittee on Elections Committee on House Administration House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventeenth Congress. From the opening statement of G.K. Butterfield: "Today we will discuss changes in election administration and voting laws that reduce or consolidate or relocate polling locations that impact the ability of voters to access the ballot. [...] We will talk about long wait times at the polls and restrictions on opportunities to vote, all of which--all of which--can disproportionately burden minority voters. [...] There is no proof that these laws are necessary and no analysis to ensure that they are not discriminatory. Unfortunately, the evidence reveals plainly the very opposite. [...] Expanded opportunities to vote, such as early mail-in or curbside voting and access to drop boxes increase equal access to the ballot and can decrease these waiting times. We should provide more of these opportunities. Recent elections prove that if voters are given options for when and how to cast their ballot, participation in the electoral process will actually increase. [...] the Constitution is unambiguously clear: Congress has a clear role in protecting this right to vote and ensuring equal, equitable access to the franchise. And so, my friends, I look forward to hearing and learning from today's witnesses and working with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to ensure we do just that." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Stephen Pettigrew, Jesselyn McCurdy, Kevin Morris, Mimi Marziani, and Donald Palmer.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2021
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Subversive Influence: Vulnerabilities of the United States and Its Elections to Russian Interference Campaigns
From the thesis Abstract: "The United States and its allies have been subjected to clandestine interference campaigns led by theRussian government for nearly a century. The targets and mechanisms of subversive Kremlin influence have varied over the decades, but themes such as seeking to tamper with electoral processes have seen refinement and renewed vigor in the 21st century. From the inception of the Soviet Union to the era of Vladimir Putin, this thesis investigates the targets and mechanisms of subversive Russian influence--with particular focus on election meddling--to identify the greatest U.S. vulnerabilities to such interference campaigns. We determined that the Kremlin possesses a wide variety of well-honed tools such as disinformation, cyberattacks, and forgeries that allow it to apply stress to democratic systems and exploit rival nations' internal divisions, and that it has had success in deploying such tools in a number of Western democratic elections since 2014. We find that significant damage to the credibility of elections and the U.S. government is a viable vulnerability for Russian interference campaigns, and that mounting defensive measures against and mitigation thereof must be a top priority for U.S. national and homeland security entities."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.); Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
McMasters, Daniel H.
2020-12
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S. Rept. 116-290: Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Report Volumes I-V Together with Additional Views
From the Introduction: "From 2017 to 2019, the Committee held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed intelligence related to Russian attempts in 2016 to access election infrastructure. The Committee sought to determine the extent of Russian activities, identify the response of the U.S. Government at the state, local, and federal level to the threat, and make recommendations on how to better prepare for such threats in the future. The Committee received testimony from state election officials, Obama administration officials, and those in the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the U.S. Government responsible for evaluating threats to elections."
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020-11-10
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Cyberattacks, Foreign Interference, and Digital Infrastructure: Conducting Secure Elections Amid a Pandemic
From the Introduction: "The coronavirus pandemic has introduced an additional layer of complexity into the already challenging task of conducting secure, democratic elections. Prior to the pandemic, many democracies were working to secure their elections from foreign adversaries, often with limited budgets. These challenges have only 'grown more acute' [hyperlink] because of the pandemic. Since the coronavirus arrived, much attention has, correctly, been focused on how to administer elections in a manner that reduces the likelihood of voters and pollworkers contracting the virus. However, after reviewing many elections held in Europe and the United States (hereafter referred to as the transatlantic region), including several during the pandemic, we believe that more can and should be done to secure human, physical, and cyber election assets. Both the pandemic and foreign interference threats show no signs of abating; meanwhile the pandemic creates further windows of opportunity for authoritarian regimes to interfere in elections. This paper is not directed at any one specific country or election. Instead, it seeks to help democratic actors, particularly those in the transatlantic region, conduct more secure elections during these unprecedented times."
German Marshall Fund of the United States. Alliance for Securing Democracy; International Foundation for Electoral Systems
Levine, David A.; Martin-Rozumilowicz, Beata
2020-10-08
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Conflicts and COVID-19: US Election Interference and More Cyber Security Strategy [audio]
From the Description: "In this episode of Policy, Guns & Money, Lisa Sharland speaks to Rob Malley, President and CEO [Chief Operating Officer] of International Crisis Group, about conflicts during Covid-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] and prospects for peace in Afghanistan. They also discuss Crisis Group's annual '10 Conflicts to Watch', including what's changed since the last edition, and what might feature in the next edition later this year. The Strategist's Brendan Nicholson and Anastasia Kapetas discuss the recently released US Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Russian Interference in the 2016 Election and foreign interference in the US. (Hint - there was plenty) Finally, Tom Uren and John Coyne continue the conversation on Australia's Cyber Security Strategy 2020, where it falls short, and the challenges for policing cyber criminals."
Australian Strategic Policy Institute
2020-08-20
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Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, July 24, 2019
This is the July 24, 2019 hearing on "Oversight of the Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election: Former Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III," held before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary. From the Opening Statement of Doug Collins: "The origins and conclusions of the Mueller investigation are the same things: what it means to be American. Every American has a voice in our democracy. We must protect the sanctity of their voice by combatting election interference. Every American enjoys the presumption of innocence and guarantee of due process. If we carry nothing--anything away today, it must be that we increase our vigilance against foreign election interference, while we ensure our government officials don't weaponize their power against the constitutional rights guaranteed to every U.S. citizen. Finally, we must agree that the opportunity cost here is too high." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Robert S. Mueller III.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020
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Road to 2020: Defending Against Election Interference, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Innovation of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, November 19, 2019
This is the November 19, 2019 hearing "Road to 2020: Defending Against Election Interference" held before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Innovation of the House Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of Cedric L. Richmond:"Today we will take a broad look at election security issues, including efforts from the private sector to protect election infrastructure and political campaigns against malicious actors." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Francis X. Taylor, Richard Stengel, Matt Blaze, and Ginny Badanes.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2020
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H. Rept. 116-246, Part 1: Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a Lasting Democracy Act, Report Together with Supplemental Views, to Accompany H.R. 4617, October 21, 2019
From the Purpose and Summary: "H.R. 4617, the 'Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a Lasting Democracy' or the 'SHIELD Act,' as amended, is comprehensive legislation to strengthen the resilience of our democracy and protect against foreign interference in elections, including by foreign governments. The SHIELD Act requires political committees to report foreign contacts that involve offers of unlawful campaign assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Federal Election Commission (FEC). The bill modernizes campaign finance law to uphold Americans' right to know who is behind election-related advertising and disinformation, including better disclosure of the sources of online political advertisements. It also closes gaps in the law that foreign nationals (including foreign governments) can exploit to influence elections."
United States. Government Publishing Office
2019-10-21
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 3501, Safeguard Our Elections and Combat Unlawful Interference in Our Democracy Act
This is the September 6, 2019 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate as ordered reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on July 17, 2019. From the Document: "H.R. 3501 would require the Administration to impose sanctions on foreign persons (individuals or entities) who interfered in U.S. elections. The bill also would require the Department of State to report to the Congress on its implementation of the bill. "
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2019-09-06
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1: Russian Efforts Against Election Infrastructure with Additional Views (Redacted)
From the Introduction: "From 2017 to 2019, the Committee held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed intelligence related to Russian attempts in 2016 to access election infrastructure. The Committee sought to determine the extent of Russian activities, identify the response of the U.S. Government at the state, local, and federal level to the threat, and make recommendations on how to better prepare for such threats in the future. The Committee received testimony from state election officials, Obama administration officials, and those in the Intelligence Community and elsewhere in the U.S. Government responsible for evaluating threats to elections."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2019-07-25?
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Attorney General William P. Barr Delivers Remarks on the Release of the Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election
From the Press Release: "On March 22, 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller concluded his investigation of matters related to Russian attempts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and submitted his confidential report to me pursuant to Department of Justice regulations. As I said during my Senate confirmation hearing and since, I am committed to ensuring the greatest possible degree of transparency concerning the Special Counsel's investigation, consistent with the law. [...] As you know, one of the primary purposes of the Special Counsel's investigation was to determine whether members of the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump, or any individuals associated with that campaign, conspired or coordinated with the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election. Volume I of the Special Counsel's report describes the results of that investigation. As you will see, the Special Counsel's report states that his 'investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.'"
United States. Department of Justice
Barr, William Pelham, 1950-
2019-04-18
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Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election
This document contains both Volumes I and II of the "Mueller Report". From the Introduction to Volume I: "As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second, a Russian intelligence service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities." From the Introduction to Volume II: "Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the ongoing investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. [...] This Volume of our report summarized our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President."
United States. Department of Justice
Mueller, Robert S., III, 1944-
2019-03
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Open Hearing: Policy Response to the Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, June 20, 2018
This is the June 20, 2018 hearing on "Policy Response to the Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections," held before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Richard Burr: "Today's hearing is the next step in our efforts to fully investigate and explain how Russia interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections, how we reacted, and more importantly, what we've learned." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Victoria Nuland and J. Michael Daniel.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2019
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Fake News, (Dis)information and Principle of Non-Intervention: Scope, Limits and Possible Responses to Cyber Election Interference in Times of Competition
From the Abstract: "In the era of asymmetrical conflicts, Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) play an essential role due to their importance in the manipulation and conditioning of public opinion. Several threats are linked to the use of ICT but, in terms of inter-state strategic competition, one of the main dangers is represented by so-called 'cyber election interference', i.e. cyber election meddling activities carried out by foreign States to influence the electorate of a target State through the diffusion of 'fake news' or 'alternative truths', principally via the media and social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.). The aim of this paper is to clarify whether and when this kind of interference constitutes a breach of international obligations, in particular of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a State, and also to envisage possible lawful responses under international law for States targeted by said interference."
Army Cyber Institute, West Point
Rotondo, Annachiara; Salvati, Pierluigi
2018-11-14
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H. Doc. 115-152: National Emergency with Respect to Foreign Interference in United States Elections, September 13, 2018
From the letter from the President Donald Trump: "Foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America's free and open political system. In recent years, the proliferation of digital devices and internet-based communications has created significant vulnerabilities and magnified the scope and intensity of the threat of foreign interference. To deal with this threat, I have directed the Director of National Intelligence to conduct regular assessments of any information indicating that foreign election interference has taken place. I have also directed the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security to conduct evaluations of the effects of any such interference that targeted election infrastructure or campaign-related infrastructure, and to provide updates and recommendations on appropriate measures to take in response."
United States. Government Publishing Office
2018-09-13
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Executive Order 13848: Imposing Certain Sanctions in the Event of Foreign Interference in a United States Election
"I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the ability of persons located, in whole or in substantial part, outside the United States to interfere in or undermine public confidence in United States elections, including through the unauthorized accessing of election and campaign infrastructure or the covert distribution of propaganda and disinformation, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. Although there has been no evidence of a foreign power altering the outcome or vote tabulation in any United States election, foreign powers have historically sought to exploit America's free and open political system. In recent years, the proliferation of digital devices and internet-based communications has created significant vulnerabilities and magnified the scope and intensity of the threat of foreign interference, as illustrated in the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment. I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with this threat."
United States. White House Office; United States. Executive Office of the President
Trump, Donald, 1946-
2018-09-12
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence [Unclassified Findings on Russian Interference with Elections]
"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) is conducting a bipartisan investigation into a wide range of Russian activities relating to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. While elements of the investigation are ongoing, the Committee is releasing initial, unclassified findings on a rolling basis as distinct pieces of the investigation conclude. The Committee has concluded an in-depth review of the Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) produced by CIA, NSA [National Security Agency], and FBI in January of 2017 on Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections; declassified version released January 6, 2017) and have initial findings to share with the American people."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
2018-07-03
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Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Election, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, May 8, 2017
This testimony compilation is from the May 8, 2017 hearing on "Russian Interference in the 2016 United States Election" before the Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The purpose of this hearing was to discuss "three key tactics - cyber espionage, propaganda, and the exploitation of personal or business relationships" that were employed by Russia to attempt to influence the 2016 election. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Sally Q. Yates and James R. Clapper.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
2017-05-08
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Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections, Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, June 21, 2017
This is the June 21, 2017 hearing "Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Elections" before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. From the opening statement of Richard Burr, "Today the Committee convenes its sixth open hearing of 2017, to further examine Russia's interference in the 2016 elections. This is yet another opportunity for the Committee and the American people to drill down on this vitally important topic. [...] Our witnesses are here to tell us more about what happened in 2016, what that tells us about Russian intentions, and what we should expect in 2018 and 2020. I'm deeply concerned that if we do not work in lockstep with the states to secure our elections, we could be here in two or four years talking about a much worse crisis. The hearing will feature two panels. The first panel will include expert witnesses from DHS and FBI to discuss Russian intervention in 2016 elections and U.S. government efforts to mitigate the threat. The second panel will include witnesses from the Illinois State Board of Elections, the National Association of State Election Directors, the National Association of Secretaries of States, and an expert on election security to give us their on-the-ground perspective on how Federal resources might be brought to bear on this very important issue." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Sam Liles, Jeanette Manfra, Bill Priestap, Connie Lawson, Michael Haas, Steve Sandvoss, and J. Alex Halderman.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election; Volume 2: Russia's Use of Social Media with Additional Views (Redacted)
From the Introduction: "In 2016, Russian operatives associated with the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) used social media to conduct an information warfare campaign designed to spread disinformation and societal division in the United States. [...] Masquerading as Americans, these operatives used targeted advertisements, intentionally falsified news articles, self-generated content, and social media platform tools to interact with and attempt to deceive tens of millions of social media users in the United States. This campaign sought to polarize Americans on the basis of societal, ideological, and racial differences, provoked real world events, and was part of a foreign government's covert support of Russia's favored candidate in the U.S. presidential election."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election; Volume 3: U.S. Government Response to Russian Activities (Redacted)
From the Introduction: "Senior U.S. Government officials in both the Executive and Legislative Branches believed they were in uncharted territory in the second half of 2016. They became aware of aspects of Russian interference in U.S. elections over the summer and fall, but these officials had incomplete information on the scope of the threat. In the fall, the Obama administration responded with several warnings to Moscow, but tempered its response over concerns about appearing to act politically on behalf of one candidate, undermining public confidence in the election, and provoking additional Russian actions. Further, administration officials' options were limited by incomplete information about the threat and having a narrow slate of response options from which to draw. After the election, President Obama took action to punish Moscow for its interference, including instituting sanctions, expelling Russian government personnel, and shuttering Russian diplomatic facilities inside the United States."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election; Volume 4: Review of the Intelligence Community Assessment with Additional Views (Redacted)
From the Findings: "[U] The Committee found the ICA [Intelligence Community Assessment] presents a coherent and well-constructed intelligence basis for the case of unprecedented Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. On the analytic lines of the ICA, the Committee concludes that all [...] analytic lines are supported with all-source intelligence, although with varying substantiation. The Committee did not discover any significant analytic tradecraft issues in the preparation or final presentation of the ICA."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
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Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election; Volume 5: Counterintelligence Threats and Vulnerabilities (Redacted)
From the Findings: "The Committee found that the Russian government engaged in an aggressive, multifaceted effort to influence, or attempt to influence, the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Parts of this effort are outlined in the Committee's earlier volumes on election security, social media, the Obama Administration's response to the threat, and the January 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA)."
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
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