Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: ALL (electromagnetic AND incident) in: full text and any metadata
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Collateral Damage to Satellites from an EMP Attack
"In support of The Commissions to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, this paper examines the potential damage to satellites from high altitude nuclear detonations not specifically targeting space assets. We provide and overview of representative classes of satellites, their orbits, and their economic and military importance to the U.S. lessons learned from atmospheric nuclear test of the late 1950's and early 1960's are presented. In particular, the STARFISH PRIME test of 1962 injected long-lived trapped energetic electrons into Earth's magnetic fields, causing the early demise of several satellites."
United States. Defense Threat Reduction Agency
Conrad, Edward E.; Gurtman, Gerald A.; Kweder, Glenn
2010-08
-
Programmatic Integration of Cyber into the Institutional Domain of Leader Development
"This thesis will assess the institutional domain of leader development in relation to cyberspace education and the implications of poorly integrating cyberspace into leader development. Cyberspace plays an integral role in communications, information, electricity, economics, and our nation's defense. Cyberspace is a great opportunity but it is also a threat. Cybersecurity is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation, but one that we as a government or as a country are not adequately prepared to counter. A cross case comparative analysis was used to identify what cyber leader development the Army's Training and Doctrine Command is currently implementing within Army learning institutions, and compare that emerging program to historical cases of other leader development programs created in response to technologies that changed how the Army developed its leaders in the past. The examination of curriculum from Army learning institutions like the Officer Basic Courses, Captains' Career Courses, Intermediate Level Education, and Pre-Command Courses showed that cyberspace has been integrated into Army education to the awareness level only."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Zimmer, Daniel T.
2015-06
-
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment
"The purpose of this concept is to describe 'naval operations in the littoral environment in light of emerging threats' in order to provide a unified framework for Navy-Marine Corps innovation. It places a renewed emphasis on fighting for and gaining sea control, to include employing sea-based and land-based Marine Corps capabilities to support the sea control fight. [...] This concept introduces ideas on how naval forces could be organized, trained and equipped to enhance their ability to operate in contested littoral environments. Included among those ideas are: additional, versatile force options; a wider application of existing doctrine; and the more flexible employment of current, emerging, and some potential capabilities. To confirm their integral merit, the ideas put forth in this concept require further testing and refinement through detailed wargaming, experimentation, and exercises. It is expected that these activities will invigorate and advance naval operational art and stimulate creativity on how to exploit the inherent synergy of integrated Navy and Marine Corps capabilities. Of particular importance, practical application of the concept during live exercises will allow naval forces to identify the inevitable seams and capability limitations that must be resolved."
United States. Department of the Navy; United States. Marine Corps
2017
-
WSTIAC: Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center Newsletter: Volume 4, Number 3
"This is the second of a triad of articles on Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). The first article by Mark Scott covered High Energy Laser (HEL) Weapons (Vol. 4, No.1, Spring 2003). In the current issue, we will review Radio Frequency (RF) DEWs, most often referred to as High Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons, which constitute the second largest R&D effort in the field. Since there are other possible types of DEWs, (such as Relativistic Particle Beams (RPBs), etc.), we will set forth a few definitions that can differentiate between them, especially with respect to their particular applications and target effects, which bound their usefulness to the warfighters and the platforms they must use for the whole battle space. The output parameter limits placed on the various technologies by the operational requirements and environments will, in turn, produce "design drivers" that will define the total integrated RF-DEW, or HPM, Weapon system. The various types of DEWs will be compared and their programs discussed. A subsequent article will review, what to this time may be called the "Achilles heel," of DEWs, i.e., the usually large and heavy Pulsed Power Systems that are necessary to provide the tremendous power and energy requirements of DEW systems, as well as the power conversion and conditioning components and subsystems between the prime power source and ultimate DEW source and radiator, whether it be laser, microwave or other type of DEW."
United States. Department of Defense
2003
-
System and Network Security Acronyms and Abbreviations
"This report contains a list of selected acronyms and abbreviations for system and network security terms with their generally accepted or preferred definitions. It is intended as a resource for Federal agencies and other users of system and network security publications. The capitalization, spelling, and definitions of acronyms and abbreviations frequently vary among publications. It is easy to understand why this happens. While some acronyms and abbreviations (e.g., WWW) have one universally recognized and understood definition within the domain of system and network security, others (e.g., IA, MAC) have multiple valid definitions depending upon the context in which they are used. Some acronyms bear little resemblance to their definitions, such as Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple DES Algorithm (TMOVS). Others use unexpected capitalization or spelling (e.g., Electronic Business using eXtensible Markup Language [ebXML] and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]). As a result, acronyms, abbreviations, and their definitions may be inaccurately or inconsistently defined by authors, perpetuating errors and confusing or misleading readers. This report is meant to help reduce these errors and confusion by providing the generally accepted or preferred definitions of a list of frequently used acronyms and abbreviations. The list does not include all system and network security terms, nor is it a compendium of every acronym and abbreviation found in system and network security documents published by NIST. Readers should refer to each document's list of acronyms and abbreviations (typically found in an appendix) for definitions applicable to that particular document."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Scarfone, Karen; Thompson, Victoria
2009-09
-
Testimony of General Victor E. Renuart, Jr., Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, July 19, 2007
This testimony of General Victor E. Renuart, Jr. before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs discusses the role of United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in homeland defense and civil support operations. The testimony outlines NORTHCOM and NORAD capabilities and highlights their relationship with the Department of Homeland Security.
United States. Department of Defense
2007-07-19
-
Risk of Using Past to Predict Future: A Case Study of Jamming RCIEDs
"The radio controlled improvised explosive device (RCIED) is one of the deadliest threats to military personnel supporting the global war on terrorism, and due to its success is expected to play a major role as a weapon of choice in future insurgencies. To mitigate the risk of a RCIED attack, electronic jamming devices are utilized to interrupt the communications between a remote control and the RCIED trigger. We consider two approaches to determine the optimal jamming strategy for the coalition force. First, we formulate a mixed integer program to find the optimal jamming strategy based on recent attack data of RCIEDs. Second, we formulate a two-person zero-sum game to determine the optimal mixed strategy for jamming. With a simulation study, we found that with the first approach the coalition force tends to be overly optimistic in predicting the outcome, and is likely to underperform. In addition, the first approach allows the possibility for smart insurgents to deploy RCIEDs to purposely mislead the coalition force on what they plan to do in the future. The second game-theoretic approach provides a robust jamming strategy no matter how Red chooses to deploy their RCIEDs."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Dayton, Jeffrey A.
2009-06
-
S. Hrg. 112-40: Cyber Security, Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session to Receive Testimony on a Joint Staff Discussion Draft Pertaining to Cyber Security of the Bulk-Power System and Electric Infrastructure and for Other Purposes, May 5, 2011
From the opening statement of Jeff Bingaman: "The safety of the North American power system is critical to the Nation's economy and to our security. Today that power system includes over 200,000 miles of high voltage transmission lines, thousands of generating facilities, millions of digital controls. Each year we upgrade and expand the system, adding more miles of transmission lines, new supply resources and control devices. As we upgrade and expand the Nation's electric system we are also modernizing that system. Information technology and communication systems have come to play a significant role in ensuring the reliability and security of the electric sector. While modernization allows us to achieve a variety of important economic and environmental objectives, it also introduces new security concerns. As this process unfolds, preserving and enhancing the cyber security of our electric infrastructure must be among our top priorities." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jeff Bingaman, Gerry Cauley, Patricia Hoffman, Joseph McClelland, Lisa Murkowski, David Owens, and William Tedeschi.
United States. Government Printing Office
2011
-
Joint Publication 6-0: Joint Communications System [June 10, 2015]
"A joint communications system is comprised of the networks and services that enable joint and multinational capabilities. The objective of the joint communications system is to assist the joint force commander (JFC) in command and control (C2) of military operations. Effective C2 is vital for proper integration and employment of capabilities. The Department of Defense's (DOD's) end-to-end communications system supporting the JFC is the Department of Defense information network (DODIN). The DODIN is the set of information capabilities, and associated processes to collect, process, store, disseminate, and manage information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel, whether interconnected or stand-alone, including owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services, and national security systems. Cyberspace operations (CO) include offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DODIN operations. This publication addresses primarily the DODIN operations mission and elements of the DCO mission within CO. It also includes reference to initial defensive cyberspace operations-internal defensive measures (DCO-IDM), as the same forces often coordinate the activities of both missions. The DODIN conceptually unifies DOD's information systems and networks into a real-time information system of systems that provides increased information capabilities to the joint force. Communications systems are more than electronic boxes, wires, and radio signals, and the DODIN is more than a collection of information networks. The interdependence of the parts, as well as the processes, policy, and data on those systems, permeate daily life, and preparation for and execution of operations. An effective communications system helps commanders maintain the unity of effort to apply their forces' capabilities at critical times and places to achieve objectives."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2015-06-10
-
Tool Kit for Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents: Interim Planning Guide for State and Local Governments
This document is a guide for state and local governments addressing the managing the emergency consequences of terrorist incidents. Areas discussed include: Developing the situation and assumption about a terrorist threat; Direction and control for terrorist incidents; Communicating during terrorist incidents; Disseminating warnings during terrorist incidents; Emergency public information; Taking protective action during a terrorist incident; Planning for mass care following a terrorist incident; Planning health and medical needs in a terrorist incident; Managing resources in a terrorist incident, and; Roles and responsibilities in a terrorist incident. Also included are informative appendixes on: Biological agents, Chemical agents, Radiological Incidents, Cyberterrorism, and Agriterrorism.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2002-07
-
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures [September 25, 2006]
"Since October 2001, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs, or roadside bombs) have been responsible for many of the more than 2,000 combat deaths in Iraq, and 178 combat deaths in Afghanistan. IEDs are hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with these bombs are becoming more numerous and deadly in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat includes vehicle-borne IEDs, in which extremists drive cars laden with explosives directly into a target. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever on patrol. IEDs are increasingly being used in Afghanistan, and DOD reportedly is concerned that they might eventually be more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Wilson, Clay
2006-09-25
-
Solid-State High Power Radio Frequency Directed Energy Systems in Support of USMC Force Protection Operations
From the thesis abstract: "Service members are often vulnerable conducting entry control point operations in support of force or critical infrastructure protection. Historical evidence and tests from emerging technology suggest that solid-state high power radio frequency directed energy systems emit enough power to disrupt vehicle electronic systems without costly collateral damage to people or property. This thesis builds on previous research toward adding non-lethal tools, in the form of directed energy systems, for service members to utilize as part of entry control points. A combination of literature review, limited modelling, and field experimentation is used to explore whether directed energy is a viable, non-lethal tool for USMC entry control points. After detailed descriptions of force protection, directed energy, and a thorough system of systems analysis of the contemporary operating environment, this thesis offers an example of an entry control point augmented with a high-power radio frequency array. Further, this research recommends exploration of additional uses for this type of directed energy including counter-piracy and electronic ambush operations that utilize ground, air, and sea-based platforms."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Simon, Michael D.
2015-06
-
Responding to the Unthinkable: A Nuclear Weapon Detonation in the Homeland
"The leadership of the United States has emphatically stated 'it's not a matter of if, but rather when another terrorist attack will occur.' Therefore, in the future, maybe distant or not so distant, the United States' political and military leadership may have to face actually responding to 'the unthinkable': a successful weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack by terrorists within the borders of the nation. This new and growing threat greatly complicates the defense of the homeland. With this changing security environment in mind, the United States Army War College conducted a focused workshop to explore the Army's potential roles associated with the possibility of the 'unthinkable' happening in the very near future. Over 100 participants from local, regional, state, and federal agencies and departments, as well as players from throughout the U.S. military came together at the Center for Strategic Leadership on Carlisle Barracks to review present plans, policies, procedures, and developing programs to respond to a hypothetical CBRNE attack within the borders of the United States. Three different attack scenarios were presented - one biological, one radiological and one nuclear. This paper addresses the workshop's findings related to response to a nuclear weapon attack."
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Kievit, James; McNary, Jeff
2004-10
-
Quick Reference: Radiation Risk Information for Responders Following a Nuclear Detonation
"This document supports the 'Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation' and was designed to provide responders with specific guidance and recommendations about the radiation risk associated with responding to an improvised nuclear device (IND) event, in order for them to protect themselves from the IND effects. It is intended to be part of preparation training with the 'Health and Safety Planning Guide For Planners and Supervisors For Protecting First Responders Following A Nuclear Detonation'. This provides basic information responders will need for the first 24 -72 hours after an extreme event -- a nuclear detonation. These guidelines are not designed to apply to other, less extreme, radiological events. Specific information/training should be sought for those. Some of this guidance will be counterintuitive to those trained in emergency response; however, it is critical that responders remain as safe and healthy as possible, not only for their own safety, but also to remain available for the ongoing mission of saving lives. Responders involved in an IND event need to be prepared to see numerous victims with serious traumatic injuries and illness including: severe burns, blindness, deafness, amputations, radiation sickness, etc."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Energy; United States. Department of Health and Human Services . . .
2016-12
-
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects Tests, Evaluation, and Simulation
"The Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Nuclear Weapon Effects (NWE) Test, Evaluation and Simulation was undertaken with the overall goal of providing a comprehensive evaluation of current and future Department of Defense (DoD) processes for assuring successful operation in nuclear environments. As directed by the Terms of Reference, we have assessed opponent capabilities and DoD processes for establishing and enforcing hardness goals. These assessments have considered the emergence of terrorism as a major threat to the U.S. homeland and deployed forces abroad, the asymmetric attractiveness of the use of nuclear weapons to offset U.S. conventional superiority, and the growing evidence of proliferation of nuclear-capable states. We have also evaluated the evolution of DoD and Department of Energy (DOE) modeling, simulation, and above-ground testing capabilities since the cessation of underground testing to understand our ability to qualify hardened systems. The results of this Task Force were developed independent of, but are highly consistent with, the findings and recommendations of the congressionally mandated Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Commission."
United States. Department of Defense
2005-04
-
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee: Cybersecurity Collaboration Report: Strengthening Government and Private Sector Collaboration Through a Cyber Incident Detection, Prevention, Mitigation, and Response Capability
"At the direction of the Executive Office of the President and following a comprehensive scoping effort, the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) established the Cybersecurity Collaboration Task Force in November 2008 to explore the need for and feasibility of creating a joint 24/7 public-private operational capability focused on improving the Nation's ability to detect, prevent, mitigate, and respond to significant cyber incidents. […]. Critical infrastructures such as banking and finance, communications, energy, information technology, and transportation are interdependent, with disruption of one having the potential to dramatically affect the others[…]. The Task Force's primary finding is that the integrated, operational information sharing and cyber response mechanisms needed to adequately address the cyber threat do not exist today. […]. Although a variety of strategic, policy, and legal issues are associated with our Nation's ability to safely and effectively operate in cyberspace, the most significant gap is the lack of an operational mechanism for the Government and private sector to collaborate and coordinate during cyber events. This recommendation proposes establishing a Government-sponsored Joint Coordinating Center (JCC) for public and private sector representatives from various critical infrastructures and key resources sectors following the aggressive, phased approach described in the report. Specifically, the JCC would initially build upon the current coordination/collaboration capabilities of the National Coordinating Center and the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, and incorporate other existing cyber incident monitoring and response public-private entities."
United States. President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee
2009-05-21
-
FEMA Weapons of Mass Destruction Study Course: Instructor Guide: Orientation and Exercise Course G 310.01
As part of its strategy to execute its mission, FEMA's Emergency
Management Institute (EMI) has developed a series of courses,
consisting of three sessions, which simulate the types of challenges
faced by local communities following a WMD terrorist incident. The sessions are designed to help you analyze, discuss and identify
your jurisdiction's needs. This course involves nuclear terrorism, as well as a radiological scenario and chemical scenarios (Sarin and and VX), and a biological (anthrax) scenario. The primary purpose of this course is to improve the ability of
local governments to prepare for, manage, and respond to mass
casualty terrorism incidents involving the use of WMD.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2001
-
Government Preparedness and Response to a Terrorist Attack Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, August 4, 2010
From the opening statement of Benjamin L. Cardin: "Our hearing today deals with Government preparedness and response to terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. [...] In today's hearing we will examine one piece of our Government's preparedness and response to a terrorist attack. Specifically, the Subcommittee will examine what would happen if the unthinkable happens: Terrorists are successfully able to launch an attack within the United States using a weapon of mass destruction. A weapon of mass destruction attack can occur through the use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Benjamin L. Cardin, Jon Kyl, James A. Baker, Steward D. Beckham, Glenn A. Fein, Michael J. Frankel, and Randall J. Larsen.
United States. Government Printing Office
2011
-
National Response Plan (Final) Full Version
"In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the President directed the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, alldiscipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. This approach is unique and far reaching in that it, for the first time, eliminates critical seams and ties together a complete spectrum of incident management activities to include the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major natural disasters, and other major emergencies. The end result is vastly improved coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations to help save lives and protect America's communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of incident management."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2004-12
-
National Response Plan
"In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the President directed the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, and all-hazards approach to domestic incident management. This approach is unique and far reaching in that it, for the first time, eliminates critical seams and ties together a complete spectrum of incident management activities to include the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major natural disasters, and other major emergencies. The end result is vastly improved coordination among Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations to help save lives and protect America's communities by increasing the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of incident management. The NRP represents a true 'national' framework in terms of both product and process. The NRP development process included extensive vetting and coordination with Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies, nongovernmental organizations, private-sector entities, and the first-responder and emergency management communities across the country. The NRP incorporates best practices from a wide variety of incident management disciplines to include fire, rescue, emergency management, law enforcement, public works, and emergency medical services."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2004-12
-
LLIS Best Practice: Radiological Dispersal Device Incident Response Planning: Incident Identification
"Emergency responders may not realize that radioactive material has been released at an incident scene during the early stages of emergency response operations. To address this challenge, emergency planners should consider developing RDD-specific [Radiological Dispersal Device] plans and standard operating procedures that enhance responders' ability to identify the radiological component of an RDD event. Responders should be trained to assume that radioactive material has been dispersed at an incident site after any explosion of unknown origin until proven otherwise. Emergency response organizations should ensure that personnel likely to respond to an RDD event possess appropriate radiation detection equipment. Jurisdictions might find it especially helpful to provide all first response fire vehicles with radiation detection instruments. Emergency responders also should be trained periodically to use radiation detection instruments as well as to recognize radiation exposure symptoms."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
-
Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, July 10, 2008
This is the July 10, 2008 hearing, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack," before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of Chairman Ike Skelton: "The potential damage that could be caused by an EMP attack on the United States is significant, and the House Armed Services Committee has long treated this matter seriously. It was this committee that pushed for the authorization of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from EMP Attack, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Committee Chairman Ike Skelton and William R. Graham, Chair, Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack.
United States. Government Printing Office
2010
-
Joint Publication 3-41: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management
"This publication provides joint doctrine for the military response to mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event or incident. […] This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2012-06-21
-
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management
"This publication provides joint doctrine for the military response to mitigate the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event or incident. […] This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2012-06-21
-
FEMA Interim Tool Kit 2002: Cyberterrorism
This document is Appendix D of the Toolkit for Managing the Emergency Consequences of Terrorist Incidents: Interim Planning Guide for State and Local Governments, issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 2002. The kit provides forms, checklists and charts to facilitate state and local planning for a terrorist incident. It includes a capability assessment survey, a checklist of functional responsibilities and emergency public information activities as well as tools for direction and control, managing resources and disseminating warnings. This appendix provides background information, checklists, and plans for cybersecurity.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2002-07
-
Geospatial Information: Technologies Hold Promise for Wildland Fire Management, but Challenges Remain, Report to Congressional Requesters
"Over the past decade, a series of devastating and deadly wildland fires has burned millions of acres of federal forests, grasslands, and deserts each year, requiring federal land management agencies to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to fight them. GAO [General Accounting Office] was asked to assess opportunities to improve the way agencies manage fires through the use of geospatial information technologies, specifically, to (1) identify key geospatial information technologies for addressing different aspects of managing wildland fires, (2) summarize key challenges to the effective use of geospatial technologies in managing wildland fires, and (3) identify national opportunities to improve the effective use of geospatial technologies."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-09
-
Detecting Concealed Weapons: Technology Research at the National Institute of Justice
Knowing what is being brought into a facility is critical to keeping that facility secure. Unfortunately, those attempting to bring contraband in are not particularly forthcoming about their efforts. They will hide, sneak and lie to get their packages through; and when the packages contain weapons, finding out may be a matter of life and death. Recognizing the severity of the threat that offenders with concealed weapons pose to corrections and law enforcement officials, as well as the public, President Clinton directed DOJ to develop better technologies and create standards and guidelines for available technologies. In response, DOJ, through the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), initiated the Infrastructure Protection Program to address this need. The program began in 1994 with a look at the problem of concealed weapons and has since expanded to study other types of weapons. This document identifies newly developed research and technologies into improved concealed weapons detections for use by corrections and criminal justice professionals.
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
Nacci, Peter L.; Mockensturm, Lee
2001
-
Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures [November 23, 2005]
"Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are responsible for many of the more than 2,000 deaths and numerous casualties suffered by U.S. and coalition forces since the invasion of Iraq. The bombs have been hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with IEDs are becoming more numerous and deadly. The threat has expanded to include vehicle-borne IEDs, where insurgents drive cars laden with explosives directly into a targeted group of service members. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever riding in vehicles in Iraq. DOD reportedly expects that mines and IEDs will continue to be weapons of choice for insurgents for the near term in Iraq, and is also concerned that they might eventually become more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide. This report will be updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Wilson, Clay
2005-11-23
-
Technical Information Working Group Technical Note 2006-1: Interoperable Communications in Tunnels
This document is an ICTAP technical note on, interoperable communications in tunnels. Physical, characteristics of propagation in tunnels and the, technical solutions available to ensure coverage are, discussed. Coverage does not guarantee, interoperability -- solutions adopted above ground, may need to be extended below ground. Planners, should be aware of these issues when designing a, public safety LMR solution in tunnels.
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Grants and Training
2006-04-14
-
National Electric Grid Security and Resilience Action Plan
"The 'Joint United States-Canada Electric Grid Security and Resilience Strategy' (Strategy) is a collaborative effort between the Federal Governments of the United States and Canada and is intended to strengthen the security and resilience of the U.S. and Canadian electric grid from all adversarial, technological, and natural hazards and threats. The Strategy, released concurrently with this 'National Electric Grid Security and Resilience Action Plan' (Action Plan), details bilateral goals to address the vulnerabilities of the respective and shared electric grid infrastructure of the United States and Canada, not only as an energy security concern, but for reasons of national security. The implementation of the Strategy requires continued action of a nationwide network of governments, departments and agencies (agencies), and private sector partners. This Action Plan details the activities, deliverables, and timelines that will be undertaken primarily by U.S. Federal agencies for the United States to make progress toward the Strategy's goals. The security and resilience of the integrated U.S. and Canadian electric grid is dynamic. New threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities emerge even as the two countries work to prevent, protect against, and mitigate their potential consequences and to improve their ability to respond to, and recover from, disruptive incidents. Secure and reliable electricity is essential for safe and continued operation of infrastructure owned by businesses, governments, schools, hospitals, and other organizations."
United States. White House Office
2016-12
