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Terminal Blackout: Critical Electric Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Civil-Military Resiliency
"Threats to the electric grid (cyber, solar, non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse [NNEMP] and high-altitude nuclear electromagnetic pulse [HEMP]), as well as the potential consequences of significant damage to grid components by terrorists and other natural disasters, have increased incrementally since 2001; but details releasable to the public at the unclassified level were rare prior to 2008. Efforts by the Congressional 'Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse' (EMP Attack) to declassify data relevant to American society within their final 2008 report were successful (albeit limited, as much remains classified), and subsequently heralded during a major conference at Niagara Falls, sponsored by a new non-profit non-partisan organization, which hosted highly influential experts and proponents of critical electric infrastructure protection. Participants included sitting and retired Congressional members from both parties; former Directors of the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Nuclear Agency; counterterrorism analysts; commissioners; nuclear and electrical engineers; scientists; academics; and a wide variety of first responders."
Army War College (U.S.). Center for Strategic Leadership
Ayers, Cynthia E.; Chrosniak, Ken
2013-10
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Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare
This publication establishes doctrinal guidance on the use of electronic warfare (EW) in joint operations. Specifically, the following areas are within the scope of this publication: the fundamentals of EW; the staff organization and command relationships of EW in joint operations; planning procedures for joint EW; coordination of joint EW during operations; training and exercise considerations for EW in joint operations; and allied and coalition considerations in planning and conducting joint EW. This document provides an overview of electronic warfare; covers organizing for joint electronic warfare; discusses planning and coordination requirements in joint exercises; and covers multinational aspects of electronic warfare.
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2000-04-07
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Space Weather: An Overview of Policy and Select U.S. Government Roles and Responsibilities [Updated January 6, 2020]
From the Introduction: "Space weather refers to the dynamic conditions in Earth's outer space environment. This includes conditions on the Sun, in the solar wind, and in Earth's upper atmosphere. Space weather phenomena include [1] solar flares or periodic intense bursts of radiation from the sun caused by the sudden release of magnetic energy, [2] coronal mass ejections composed of clouds of solar plasma and electromagnetic radiation, ejected into space from the sun, [3] high-speed solar wind streams emitted from low density regions of the sun, and [4] solar energetic particles or highly-charged particles formed at the front of solar flares and coronal mass ejections. [...] This report provides an overview of federal government policy developed under the existing legislative framework, and describes the specific roles and responsibilities of select federal departments and agencies responsible for the study and mitigation of space weather hazards."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Lipiec, Eva; Humphreys, Brian E.
2020-01-06
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America's Achilles Heel: Defense Against High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse - Policy vs. Practice
From the Abstract: "This thesis examines the strategic level policies and practices of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) consequence management and how they translate down to the lowest echelon in the practices in addressing the potential second and third order effects. With the proliferation of nuclear devices and ballistic missile delivery systems, an EMP attack originating from a rogue or non-state actor is a potentially catastrophic threat that needs to be addressed. EMP has the potential to irrevocably damage electronics and electrical components over an extensive geographical area with some estimates of a grid outage lasting as long as 18 months. This is in part due to the current design limitations and vulnerabilities inherent in an aging infrastructure. Case study data from high altitude nuclear testing from the 1960s and EMP simulations are used to highlight the effects of EMP. The Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) mission of the military will be needed to bolster Department of Homeland Security efforts in a regionally widespread disaster area. Policies and legislation to address U.S. electrical grid vulnerabilities can take several years between milestones. Recommendations will address both governmental and private sector approaches to EMP damage mitigation and consequence management."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Bontea, Sirius T.
2014-02
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Army Role in Achieving Deterrence in Cyberspace
From the Summary: "This monograph is divided into three major sections. The first section addresses the question: What is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace? The discussion will include an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence found in professional literature. The second section examines the question: What are the Army's roles in cyberspace deterrence? It provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the deterrence efforts prescribed in the 'DoD Cyber Strategy,' as well as to broader DoD strategic deterrence efforts. The section addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict. The final section provides recommendations for changing or adapting DoD and Army responsibilities to better define and implement the evolving concepts and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic domain of cyberspace."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Caton, Jeffrey L.
2019-03
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Electromagnetic Defense Task Force 2.0: 2019 Report
From the Executive Summary: "In 2018, the Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF) was created to undertake an audacious effort to holistically understand challenges and opportunities facing militaries and societies in an age increasingly dominated by the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), a broad area of activity characterized by the visible and invisible movement of light and energy. The task force was a triage response to an enterprise-wide knowledge deficiency about the criticality of issues confronting the United States and its allies as every aspect of modern society becomes increasingly reliant on the EMS. [...] During the second summit held 29 April-1 May 2019, more than 220 fellows participated in a series of TTXs [tabletop exercise] (or war games) organized into four tracks: (1) electromagnetic spectrum operations (EMSO), (2) high-powered electronics and microwaves (HPEM)/DE [directed energy]/spectrum management, (3) EMP [electromagnetic pulse] and GMD [geomagnetic disturbance], and (4) quantum and 5G technologies. In total, 17 teams formed, including two special teams to address nuclear power station vulnerabilities and analyze commercial reports and data generated by the electric power industry."
Air University (U.S.). Press; Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education
Stuckenberg, David, 1981; Woolsey, R. James, 1941-; DeMaio, Douglas, 1969-
2019-08
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Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR) Procedures
"This manual standardizes techniques and procedures for spectrum interference resolution throughout the DOD. This manual provides detailed guidance to the DOD regarding standard EMI detection, identification, reporting and resolution procedures for space and terrestrial systems...The JSIR program addresses EMI events and electronic warfare affecting the Department of Defense. The program is coordinated and managed for the Joint Staff Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate (J-6) by the JSC, Annapolis, Maryland. The program itself is centrally managed; however, the execution process is highly decentralized. Each of the DOD components shares responsibility for successful execution of the JSIR program. The objective of the JSIR program is to report and assist with the resolution of EA and recurring EMI from cradle to grave. The resolution process for EMI events are broken into three steps: 1) identification, verification, characterization and reporting, 2) geolocation, analysis, developing courses of action and recommendations (corrective actions), 3) implementation, and notification to user(s) and final closure reporting. Resolution includes but is not limited to implementation of EMI corrective actions needed to regain use of the affected spectrum. However, some EMI events cease before corrective action is taken, and in other cases, the EMI corrections may not be feasible, affordable, or result in regaining the use of the spectrum."
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2002-11-08
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Incident Coordination Center GIS
This presentation suggests that the development of an Incident Coordination Center--Geographic Information Systems (ICC-GIS) will enable National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to more effectively fulfill its homeland security responsibilities.
United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Gilbert, Heather; Wright, Robb
2006
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Guide to the Technologies of Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging and Detection
The purpose of the Guide is to provide information that will help members of the law enforcement and corrections community, who are present or potential users and operators of CWCIDSs, better understand the operation, limitations, and applicability of CWCIDS technology to their specific application and to provide an overview of the state of development in the CWCIDS for the mutual benefit of all interested parties. Some of the CWCIDSs are still under development and are included here for completeness. This Guide focuses on CWCIDSs that are intended for use on humans; that is, for detection of contraband and weapons concealed on human bodies. Accordingly, this Guide contains a technical review and discussion only of the various technologies that are being used or developed for concealed weapon and contraband imaging and
detection on humans. A discussion of the limitations of these systems is provided, as are potential applications and general application-specific considerations. This discussion is also limited to the CWCIDS that use electromagnetic or acoustic phenomena for detection.
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
Paulter, Nicholas G.
2001-02
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Rhumb Lines: U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet Executing Global Operations, May 28, 2010
This issue of "Rhumb Lines" discusses the importance of the cyber domain in relation to military operations worldwide. From the document: "U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 10th Fleet serves as the operational authority for Navy cyber forces executing computer network and space operations, cyber warfare, electronic warfare, information operations, (IO) and signals intelligence missions across the cyber, electromagenetic and space domains in support of forces afloat and ashore." Included are the following sections: Cyber Warfare, Electronic Warfare, Information Operations, Cryptology/Signals Intelligence, Network Operations, and Space Operations. Sections on "Key Messages" and "Facts & Figures" are also included in this issue.
United States. Department of the Navy. Office of the Chief of Information
2010-05-28
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National Critical Functions
From the Document: "The National Critical Functions construct provides a risk management approach that focuses on better understanding the functions that an entity enables or to which it contributes, rather than focusing on a static sector-specific or asset world view. This more holistic approach is better at capturing cross-cutting risks and associated dependencies that may have cascading impact within and across sectors. It also allows for a new way to view criticality, which is linked to the specific parts of an entity that contribute to critical functions. By viewing risk through a functional lens, we can ultimately add resilience and harden systems across the critical infrastructure ecosystem in a more targeted, prioritized, and strategic manner."
United States. Department Of Homeland Security. Office Of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis
2019-04-30
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Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance, Roundtable Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixteenth Congress, First Session, February 27, 2019
This is the February 27, 2019 hearing on "Perspectives on Protecting the Electric Grid from an Electromagnetic Pulse or Geomagnetic Disturbance," held before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. From the Opening Statement of Ron Johnson: "The threats I believe this Nation faces with any kind of high-altitude nuclear explosion causing electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or a high-intensity solar storm in terms of geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) and the threat that poses to our infrastructure and literally our very way of life, it is just hard to overstate. [...] We have to find the areas of agreement to address what again would just be a cataclysmic-type event, either space weather or the growing threats from some of these rogue States that have probably the capability of detonating something that could cause a lot of harm." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Scott Aaronson, Nathan Anderson, George Baker, Caitlin Durkovich, Karen Evans, Brian Harrell, Randy Horton, Justin Kasper, Joseph H. McClelland, David Roop, and James Vespalec.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2019
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EMR-ISAC: InfoGram, Volume 19 Issue 5, February 28, 2019
The Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center's (EMR-ISAC) InfoGram is a weekly publication of information concerning the protection of critical infrastructures relevant to members of the Emergency Services Sector. This issue includes the following articles: "Solar Flares (Radio Blackout) Effects on Communications"; "Mendocino Complex Fire After Action Review and Lessons Learned"; "Webinar: Hospital-Based Incident Command Systems"; and "Tribal Emergency Management Summit Promotes Collaboration."
Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)
2019-02-28
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3320.01B: Joint Operations in the Electromagnetic Battlespace, March 25, 2006
" This manual provides planners, decision makers, and spectrum managers with spectrum management guidance for joint/coalition forces. This guidance is intended to aid and guide the joint force commander (JFC) when establishing a joint command, regardless of echelon in the planning, coordinating, and controlling use of the electromagnetic battlespace (EMB). […] Use of the electromagnetic spectrum is pervasive in military operations and in all-functional areas and echelons of command, often in competing ways. Therefore, an effective spectrum management structure is necessary not only to satisfy the spectrum needs of military users, but also to coordinate with host nations (HNs) to facilitate effective employment of this finite resource. […] The selection of a command organization to execute a contingency operation or crisis action depends primarily on the mission to be accomplished and the objectives to be attained. The use of a joint task force (JTF) is considered the most appropriate for short-notice, time-sensitive, contingency, crisis action, or special operations (relief, evacuation) expected to be of limited duration." This manual also contains charts, maps, and tables.
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
2006-03-25
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Report to the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Chairman's Report
"The United States critical national infrastructure faces a present and continuing existential threat from combined-arms warfare, including cyber and manmade electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, and natural EMP from a solar superstorm. [...] Protecting and defending the national electric grid and other critical infrastructures from EMP can be accomplished at reasonable cost and minimal disruption to the present systems that comprise our critical infrastructure; all commensurate with Trump Administration plans to repair and improve U.S. infrastructures, increase their reliability, and strengthen our homeland defense and military capability."
Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack
Graham, William Robert, 1937-
2017-07
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United States Army's Cyberspace Operations Concept Capability Plan 2016-2028
"The operational environment (OE) has changed dramatically. The technologic convergence of computer and telecommunication networks; astonishing rates of technologic advancements; global proliferation of information and communications technology (ICT) and its consequent effect in social networks and in society impact the OE. The diverse and wide arrays of agents who use or exploit this technological revolution pose a grave threat to U.S. critical infrastructure and operational missions. These agents range from traditional nation-states to noncombatants, transnational corporations, criminal organizations, terrorists, hacker unions, mischievous hackers, and the unwitting individual who intends no malice. Collectively, they combine to create a condition of perpetual turbulence without traditional end states or resolution. Unless otherwise noted in this document, the terms 'adversary' and 'adversaries' are used in this broad context. [...] Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (Pam) 525-7-8, The U.S. Army Concept Capability Plan for Cyberspace Operation (CyberOps) 2016-2028, takes a comprehensive look at how the Army's future force in 2016-2028 will leverage cyberspace and CyberOps. This pamphlet includes a conceptual framework for integrating CyberOps into FSO, thereby providing the basis for follow-on doctrine development efforts. This conceptual framework outlines how commanders integrate CyberOps to gain advantage, protect that advantage, and place adversaries at a disadvantage. This pamphlet also establishes a common lexicon for Army CyberOps, and describes the relationship between cyberspace, the other four domains (air, land, maritime, and space), and the EMS. Lastly, it explains how converging technologies will increasingly affect FSO and influence capability development, thereby enabling the Army to influence the design, development, acquisition, and employment of fully integrated cyber capabilities."
United States. Department of the Army
2010-02-22
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Serial No. 112-115: The EMP Threat: Examining the Consequences, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, September 12, 2012
This is the September 12, 2012 hearing on "The EMP Threat: Examining the Consequences," held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies. From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies will come to order. This subcommittee is meeting today to examine the electromagnetic pulse threat. I will now recognize myself for an opening statement. The Washington, DC area was recently impacted by a deadly, fast-moving storm, called a derecho--a word I had never heard of before until I found myself in the midst of it--which is one of the most destructive and deadly thunderstorm systems in North American history. It resulted in 22 deaths, widespread damage, and millions of power outages from the Midwest to the Middle Atlantic States. This derecho provided a glimpse of the kind of destruction--just a glimpse of the kind of destruction that would result from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack. Falling trees and the loss of electric power caused death and destruction from Chicago to Virginia. Fortunately, this power outage was short-term, which limited the human and economic consequences. An EMP is a burst of electromagnetic radiation typically generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion or a non-nuclear device. Nuclear weapon EMPs are most effective when detonated high in the altitude above the intended target. Depending on the yield of the weapon and the height of the explosion, nuclear EMPs can destroy large portions of the U.S. power and communications infrastructure, we are informed." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Yvette D. Clarke, Bennie G. Thompson, Laura Richardson, Trent Franks, Joseph McClelland, Brandon Wales, Michael A. Aimone, Chris Beck, and Nickolaus E. Leggett.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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Report of the Joint Defense Science Board/ Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force on the Nuclear Weapons Effects National Enterprise
This report is from the Joint Defense Science Board (DSB)/Threat Reduction Advisory Committee Task Force. According to the report nuclear weapons are still a serious threat to the security of the United States. The United States' ability to operate in a nuclear environment is in a state of decay. As a consequence of this deterioration the Department of Defense and the country are ill prepared to "deter, defend, and mitigate an attack." This report is an attempt to draw attention to the nation's nuclear weapons effect enterprise. The report offers recommendations for the present, short and long term. The report presents "recommendations for rebuilding critical capabilities, for improved collaborations throughout government stakeholders, and for enhanced attention at the leadership level.
United States. Department of Defense
2010-06
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Standardizing and Automating Security Incident Reporting in the Department of Defense: Feasibility Analysis
"The Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (Counterintelligence and Security) (DUSD [CI&S]) is responsible for overseeing information and personnel security programs in Department of Defense (DOD ) agencies and industry and has assumed responsibility for tracking and reporting security incidents to the Information Security Oversight Office. Currently, incident reporting varies greatly by agency and DUSD (CI&S) does not always get the information that it needs. DUSD (CI&S) tasked PERSEREC to investigate the feasibility of using of the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) for security incident reporting. The concept is for agencies to report their information and personnel security incidents through JPAS and store reports in a JPAS database. This would be a first step toward achieving a DUSD (CI&S) vision of (1) simplifying, automating, expediting, and standardizing incident reporting, (2) facilitating agency-specific analysis and problem-solving, and (3) supporting DUSD (CI&S) efforts to assess and improve security related policies. This report investigates the feasibility of reporting security incidents through JPAS. It describes the research methodology and presents research findings, agency reactions to the concept, and a set of recommendations."
Defense Personnel Security Research Center (U.S.)
Lang, Eric L.; Simpson, Henry
2007-07
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Joint Publication 6-0: Joint Communications System [March 20, 2006]
"This publication is the keystone document for the communications system series of
publications. This publication presents approved doctrine for communications system support to joint and multinational operations and outlines the responsibilities of Services, agencies, and combatant commands with respect to ensuring effective communications system support to commanders. It addresses how the communications system, in general, is to be configured, deployed, and employed to support the commanders of joint forces in the conduct of joint
operations. Recognizing the complexities of joint warfighting and the ongoing transformation to a network enabled environment, the communications system is placed in the context of the Department of Defense's Global Information Grid."
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
2006-03-20
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Characterization of Above-Baseline Physical Threats to Telecommunications Links
This report provides a characterization of above baseline physical threats to telecommunication links of public telecommunication networks (PTNs). These above baseline physical threats may lead to stresses that can affect the telecommunication links but which are not ordinarily protected against by telecommunications providers. The report will provide information for providers and users of telecommunications links to help in developing, where required, measures against above baseline physical threats. The above baseline physical stresses characterized in this report include the following: vibration; liquid penetration in optical fiber cables; radiation; temperature; wind and ice; construction threats; corrosion of above-ground links; corrosion of below-ground links; lightning and exposure to ac power; and telecommunications power.
National Communications System (U.S.). Office of the Manager
1997-11
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 5026: Grid Reliability and Infrastucture Defense Act
"H.R. 5026 would amend existing law regarding the regulation of electric power transmission facilities. Under current law, most of the standards governing the reliability of the bulk-power system are issued by the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), subject to approval and enforcement by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). This bill would set deadlines for FERC to issue standards regarding the security of computer networks used in electric power transmission (known as cybersecurity) and other risks to the electric power transmission grid, subject to certain conditions. In addition, both FERC and ERO would be directed to ensure that utilities maintain adequate supplies of large electrical transformers and implement measures to protect their systems against geomagnetic storms (incidents involving solar radiation). Other provisions would authorize a new technical assistance program related to grid security and establish terms and procedures for responding to emergencies, protecting information, and identifying strategically important electric facilities."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2010-05-19
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Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF): 2018 Report
"From 20-22 August 2018, Air University brought together leading subject matter experts from government, industry, laboratories, and academia to discuss vulnerabilities and threats, raise awareness, and explore mitigation strategies on an array of national security challenges in the EMS [electromagnetic spectrum]. The inaugural summit was attended by more than 135 military and civilian personnel representing more than 40 United States Department of Defense organizations, NATO, academia, and the private sector. During the summit, working groups focused on electromagnetic pulse (EMP), geomagnetic disturbance (GMD), lasers and optics, directed energy (DE), high-power microwaves (HPM), and EMS management. The summit was designed to challenge contemporary thinking and develop original thought about EMS and encourage actions to recover the technological initiative. Another priority was to immediately address the widening EMS threats to the United States and its allies. This report provides a summary of insights, conclusions, and recommendations developed during the inaugural summit"
Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education; Air University (U.S.). Press
Stuckenberg, David, 1981; Woolsey, R. James, 1941-; DeMaio, Douglas, 1969-
2018-11
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Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse and Policy Options to Protect Energy Infrastructure and to Improve Capabilities for Adequate System Restoration, Hearing Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, May 4, 2017
This testimony compilation is from the May 4, 2017 hearing, "Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse and Policy Options to Protect Energy Infrastructure and to Improve Capabilities for Adequate System Restoration" before the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. From the opening statement of Committee Chairman Lisa Murkowski: "Today we are here to examine the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse, better known as EMP, as well as policy options to protect energy infrastructure and provide for system restoration in the event of an EMP attack. The United States has recognized a potential EMP attack as a national security threat for decades, and our efforts to understand a potential EMP burst are certainly not new. The Department of Defense and our national labs have been grappling with these issues to one degree or another since we first started testing nuclear weapons. Extensive tests in the 1950s and 60s examined the potential impact of an EMP burst on both military and civilian infrastructure. However, today there is a renewed focus on understanding the effects of such an attack, and an increase in efforts directed at mitigating and recovering from such an event should it occur". Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Cheryl LaFleur, Newt Gingrich, Henry F. Cooper, Caitlin Durkovich, Robin Manning, and Kevin Wailes.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
2017-05-04
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EMR-ISAC: InfoGram 26-09 [July 2, 2009]
This edition of "The InfoGram" contains the following articles: "Independence Day Observances," "Electromagnetic Pulse," "Communications Unit Leader Training," and "'New Emergency Communications Governance Guide."
Emergency Management and Response-Information Sharing and Analysis Center (U.S.)
2009-07-02
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Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Protection and Resilience Guidelines for Critical Infrastructure and Equipment
From the Executive Overview: "This document provides guidelines to assist federal, state, and local officials and critical infrastructure owners and operators to protect mission essential equipment against electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threats."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
Baker, George H.; Radasky, William A.
2019-02-05
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Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
"This annex provides guidance and serves as a reference for federal agency planning efforts involving nuclear/radiological incidents. Other stakeholders (e.g., local, state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; nongovernmental organizations; voluntary agencies; and the private sector) engaged in their own planning will find this document useful in enhancing their understanding of how the Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex will be implemented and how their planning efforts can be complementary. [...] The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex is composed of a base document and three branch plans. The base document is applicable to all nuclear/radiological incidents, whereas the branch plans focus on suspected or actual deliberate attacks, inadvertent incidents, and international incidents, respectively, affecting the United States. The branch plans describe the unique response and recovery aspects of nuclear/radiological incidents and provide detailed information to assist with the implementation of the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The plans also detail the importance of establishing operational Figure 1- Annex Composition coordination with the Prevention Mission Area regarding the response to imminent nuclear/radiological terrorist threats or incidents. This annex is supplemental to, and not duplicative of, the Federal Interagency Operational Plans and other subordinate plans."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2016-10
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Serial No. 113-68: Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Threat to Critical Infrastructure, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, May 8, 2014
This is the May 8, 2014 hearing, "Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP): Threat to Critical Infrastructure" before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies. From the opening statement of Scott Perry: "EMP is simply a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from certain types of high energy explosions or from a suddenly fluctuating magnetic field. A frightening point is that EMP can be generated by nuclear weapons, from naturally-occurring sources such as solar storms, or specialized non-nuclear EMP weapons. Nuclear weapon EMPs are most catastrophic when a nuclear weapon is detonated at high altitude, at approximately 30 kilometers (20 miles), above the intended target. The consequences of such an attack could be catastrophic; all electronics, power systems, and information systems could be shut down. This could then cascade into interdependent infrastructures such as water, gas, and telecommunications. While we understand this is an extreme case, we must always be prepared in case a rouge state decides to utilize this technology. Currently, the nations of Russia and China have the technology to launch an EMP attack, and we have speculated that Iran and North Korea may be developing EMP weapon technology. This is why we must remain vigilant in our efforts to mitigate the effects of an EMP attack." Statements, letters, and materials submitted from the record include those of the following: Scott Perry, Michael McCaul, Trent Franks, Peter Vincent Pry, Michael J. Frankel, and Chris Beck
United States. Government Printing Office
2014
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Major Radiological or Nuclear Incidents: Potential Health and Medical Implications
"This ASPR TRACIE [Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness & Response Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange] document provides an overview of the potential health and medical response and recovery needs following a radiological or nuclear incident and outlines available resources for planners."
United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response
2018-07
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LLIS Best Practice: Mass Evacuation Reception Planning: Influx of Evacuees and Transportation Issues after a Nuclear Incident
"This Best Practice provides planners with information on the consequences of an unplanned influx of evacuees for jurisdictions adjacent to the nuclear incident area. This Best Practice also includes an overview of transportation networks' disruption and its consequences for receiving jurisdictions adjacent to an urban area after a nuclear incident."
Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS)
