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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10: Biodefense for the 21st Century
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 10 outlines policy for Biodefense in the 21st century. "The United States has pursued aggressively a broad range of programs and capabilities to confront the biological weapons threat. These actions, taken together, represent an extraordinary level of effort by any measure. Based on these accomplishments, we conducted a comprehensive evaluation of our biological defense capabilities to identify future priorities and actions to support them. The results of that study provide a blueprint for our future biodefense program, Biodefense for the 21st Century, that fully integrates the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Specific direction to departments and agencies to carry out this biodefense program is contained in a classified version of this directive."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2004-04-28
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) [website]
"Since the inception of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) has developed the science critical to defend the nation against bioterrorism. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate is proud to have NBACC as the first laboratory built for DHS -- a national resource to understand the scientific basis of the risk posed by biological threats and to attribute their use in bioterror or biocrime events. The President and Congress have charged NBACC with research and development of technologies to protect the American public from bioterrorism. In November 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act in part to coordinate and advance homeland security research and development activities across the federal government. President Bush issued government-wide directives on biodefense research and development in April 2004. NBACC fills critical shortfalls in our scientific knowledge of the biological agents that could be used to cause harm to the American public. As we look to the future, our scientists are helping federal policy makers and leadership to answer critical questions for our nation's security. What new vaccines or therapies should be developed based on the risk posed by biological threats? Will existing countermeasures protect the public? What procedures can be employed to detect a planned or actual bioterror event and to identify the perpetrators of such events? How should the government prioritize biodefense research to ensure that countermeasures are in place and in sufficient quantities to respond to bioterror events? To answer these questions NBACC is focused on developing the right science to identify perpetrators of biological events and to help guide the nation's investments in vaccines, drugs, detectors, and other countermeasures."
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC); Battelle National Biodefense Institute
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Biodefense: The Nation Faces Multiple Challenges in Building and Maintaining Biodefense and Biosurveillance, Statement of Chris Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
"The nation's biodefense enterprise is the whole combination of systems at every level of government and the private sector that can contribute to protecting the nation and its citizens from potentially catastrophic effects of a biological event. It is composed of a complex collection of resources, programs, and initiatives, designed for different purposes and dedicated to mitigating various risks, both natural and intentional. In an era of rapid transit and global trade, the public health and agricultural industries, as well as natural ecosystems including native plants and wildlife, face increased threats of naturally occurring outbreaks of infectious disease and accidental exposure to biological threats. Also, threats of bioterrorism, such as anthrax attacks, highlight the continued need for biosurveillance systems that provide early detection and warning about biological threats to humans. This statement summarizes GAO's [Government Accountability Office] work on challenges to building and maintaining the nation's biodefense and biosurveillance. This statement is based on GAO work issued from December 2009 through March 2016 on various biodefense and biosurveillance efforts. GAO also reviewed the 2015 report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense for updates, but has not independently assessed the entirety of the conclusions, recommendations or methods. To conduct the prior work, GAO reviewed relevant laws, presidential directives, policies, strategic plans, and other reports; surveyed states; and interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Currie, Chris
2016-04-14
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S. Rept. 114-306: Biodefense Strategy Act of 2016, Report to Accompany S. 2967, August 30, 2016
"The purpose of S. 2967, the National Biodefense Strategy Act of 2016, is to require the President to develop and execute a comprehensive national biodefense strategy. In 2014, several high-ranking Government officials, including former Senator Joseph Lieberman and former Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Thomas Ridge, convened the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense to assess the state of our nation's biodefense capabilities and to recommend improvement measures. S. 2967 codifies key recommendations of this panel by requiring a holistic national strategy that aims to direct and harmonize all existing agency-specific strategies with respect to biodefense. This strategy would be required to be updated every five years. The bill also requires the President to establish and utilize a Biodefense Coordination Council, which consists of representatives from key Federal agencies in developing the strategy. The Council is directed to review, prioritize and align biodefense activities and spending across the Federal Government in coordination with the Office of Management and Budget. Finally, the bill requires the creation of an annual biodefense expenditures report that details amounts spent on biodefense activities by all Federal departments and agencies."
United States. Government Publishing Office
2016-08-30
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Biodefense: Federal Efforts to Develop Biological Threat Awareness, Report to Congressional Requesters
"Biological threats come from a variety of sources and can pose a catastrophic danger to public health, animal and plant health, and national security. Threat awareness, which consists of activities such as collecting and analyzing intelligence, developing risk assessments, and anticipating future threats , is vital to help federal agencies identify necessary biodefense capabilities and ensure investments are prioritized to make effective use of federal funds. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review how key federal agencies develop and share threat awareness information, and how that information informs further investments in biodefense. This report describes : (1) the types of actions that key federal agencies have taken to develop biological threat awareness, and how that information is used to support investment decisions; (2) the extent to which these agencies have developed shared threat awareness; and (3) how DHS's NBACC [National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center] determines what additional threat characterization knowledge to pursue. GAO analyzed federal policies, directives, and strategies related to biodefense, as well as agency documents such as threat assessments and modeling studies. We identified five key biodefense agencies based on review of the roles designated in these documents. GAO interviewed officials from these agencies about threat awareness activities, and reviewed prior GAO work and related biodefense studies. Each of the key agencies reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments that GAO incorporated as appropriate."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2017-10-11
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National Biodefense Strategy: Additional Efforts Would Enhance Likelihood of Effective Implementation, Report to Congressional Committees
From the Document: "GAO [Government Accountability Office] has reported on the inherent fragmented nature of the federal and nonfederal resources needed to protect the nation from potentially catastrophic biological threats. GAO called for a strategic approach to help the federal government better leverage resources and manage risk The White House issued the National Biodefense Strategy and the Presidential Memorandum on the Support for National Biodefense to promote a more efficient and coordinated biodefense enterprise. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included a provision that GAO review the strategy. This report addresses the extent to which the Strategy and implementation efforts are designed to enhance national biodefense capabilities and any implementation challenges that exist. GAO analyzed the Strategy, plans, and NSPM-14 [National Security Presidential Memorandum-14], and compared them to selected characteristics of GAO's work on effective national strategies, enterprise risk management, organizational transformation, and interagency coordination. GAO interviewed officials from the eight federal agencies that comprised the Biodefense Steering Committee to learn about early implementation."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2020-02
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NIAID Research Agenda for CDC Category A Agents Biodefense: Progress Report
"In February 2002, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases convened the first Blue Ribbon Panel on Bioterrorism and Its Implications for Biomedical Research. This panel of experts was brought together by NIAID to provide objective expertise on the Institute's future counter-bioterrorism research agenda for anthrax, smallpox, botulism, plague, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers, the pathogens commonly referred to as CDC Category A agents. As a result of this meeting and the deliberations of the panel, a research agenda was developed and widely distributed to the scientific community. This agenda described the recommendations of the panel and NIAID's priorities for research on the Category A agents of bioterrorism (agenda available at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/biodefense/research/biotresearchagenda.pdf). Tremendous progress has been made in the year since this report was released. A significant area of early emphasis for NIAID has been establishment of the research infrastructure necessary to support studies of biodefense pathogens, such as biosafety containment laboratories. In addition, NIAID has worked to attract the long-term interest and support of industry and academia in developing biodefense countermeasures...This progress report describes the progress that has been made toward addressing the immediate goals outlined in the research agenda. The first section of this report reviews progress on meeting the general recommendations made by the panel that apply to all areas of NIAID biodefense research. Research goals specific to each of the Category A pathogens are covered in individual chapters. Finally, the progress made thus far on immunology as it relates to biodefense is described in a separate chapter." - From Introduction
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.)
2003-08
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Summary of the NIAID Expert Panel on Immunity and Biodefense
"The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) recently published a Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research to address biomedical research needs in the areas of bioterrorism and emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. For guidance in implementing this plan, the NIAID convened several expert panel meetings of scientific leaders to provide objective expertise and comprehensive advice... An Expert Panel on Immunity and Biodefense was also convened by the NIAID in June 2002, to address the immunological aspects of biodefense preparedness research. A summary of this meeting is provided in the following pages. Panel members identified high priority research areas in immunology that would lead to improved biodefense strategies, and recommended methods by which these research goals might be achieved. The panel included internationally renowned immunologists from academia, industry, and the government with expertise in innate immunity, vaccine adjuvant biology, immune memory and vaccine development, immune epitope identification, and antibody and innate immune targets for therapy. The discussion focused on specific needs for research in these areas, as well as on logistical issues, such as research resource accessibility, industry-university-government collaborations, and increased training. Methods to facilitate the involvement of basic immunologists in biodefense research were also discussed, as well as methods to encourage immunologist-microbiologist-vaccinologist interactions, and to enhance the training of medical professionals in immunological research."
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.)
2002-06-17
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Toward a National Biodefense Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities: A Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research
The National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research convened a multi-day conference in May 2002 to assess the status of and prospects for a national biodefense strategy. The conferences was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint Staff and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and drew widespread participation from each of these and other DoD offices and other Federal agencies and from nongovernmental and industry specialists. This monograph is grounded in, but further elaborates on, the presentations and discussion conducted in that forum. The United States requires a national biodefense strategy designed to shape effective policies, guide and maximize investment, and balance competing objectives. Developing such a strategy is a major challenge since the biological threat is complex and highly dynamic. Traditional policy tools for preventing the proliferation of these weapons are lacking. There are significant scientific and technological hurdles to overcome in order to provide effective means of detecting, identifying, treating, and defeating biological agents used as either a weapon of terror or organized warfare. Any national strategy must take explicit account of the biological threat faced by the United States and its allies. Included among the many important issues addressed are: the role of treaties and threat reduction activities; the prospects for deterrence and interdiction; the role of industry in biodefense; preparedness and medical infrastructure; military force protection and installation preparedness; technical and scientific challenges of detection; treatment and forensics; and military operations in a BW environment. The threat posed by biological weapons, while not new, is evolving and does present a series of political, military, technological and psychological national security challenges. While some military and civilian organizations have substantial capabilities in place to help counter the BW threat, others are relative newcomers and have only recently begun to consider their roles in the national biodefense effort. Certainly, the fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States triggered an outpouring of resources and captured the attention of the Bush administration as well as the nongovernmental policy community, the media, and the public on BW threats. This monograph assesses the nature of the biological weapons threat and analyzes its broader implications for national security. It articulates the imperative for developing a cogent, robust, and integrated national biodefense strategy and highlights an important set of issues facing the policy, operational, intelligence, and public health communities. Finally, it offers a series of recommendations to understand the changing BW threat and for further developing appropriate responses.
National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation Research
2003-04
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H.A.S.C. No. 114-85: Outside Views on Biodefense for the Department of Defense, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, February 3, 2016
This is from the February 3, 2016 hearing on "Outside Views on Biodefense for the Department of Defense" held before the House Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of Joe Wilson: "This hearing will provide an overview of the findings and recommendations from the recent bipartisan report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. It is critical that the United States maintain a dynamic national defense against the growing threat posed by biological weapons and naturally occurring diseases. The Department of Defense plays a large role in the U.S. biodefense enterprise, contributing biodetection tools, medical countermeasures and protection, and decontamination technologies. The recent response to the Ebola outbreak illustrates the importance of the Department of Defense's biodefense contributions to broader government and global efforts. This hearing is especially timely in preparing for our subcommittee hearing next week with the Department of Defense on countering weapons of mass destruction policy and programs for the fiscal year 2017. The findings and recommendations discussed today will be important aspects of our review of the fiscal year 2017 Department of Defense biodefense enterprise." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Gerald W. Parker Jr., and Kenneth L. Wainstein.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2016-02-03
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Role of Veterans Affairs in Support of DOD in Biodefense
From the monograph abstract: "In 2001, the United States suffered from a bioterrorist anthrax attack. The US government recognized that it was unprepared to respond to such bioterrorist attacks. This monograph will argue that the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides robust biodefense support to the Department of Defense (DOD). Bioterrorist agents, like anthrax, are easily accessible and inexpensive weapons of mass destruction and may be highly favored by terrorist organizations. Given the dramatic expansion of terrorism in both Africa and Middle East, it is not a question of whether terrorists will attack the United States again, but when and how. Since 2001, the VA has instituted several biodefense strategies. However, the White House report on the VA has recently criticized agency leadership, which may conceivably render VA's current emergency preparedness process unsuitable to support the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in a future bioterrorist attack. This monograph proposes several ways to enhance VA's biodefense capabilities to provide proper support to the DOD and the DHS. In addition, VA can also use its network of facilities to conduct surveillance of imminent endemic of infectious diseases. Based on these findings, the monograph concludes that the VA can play a very important supportive role in DOD's biodefense program."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Low, Pui-Man Paul
2015-01
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Clear Lines of Responsibility Would Facilitate Implementation of the National Biodefense Strategy
From the Key Takeaways: "[1] There has been little discussion of the current National Biodefense Strategy, the foundation for the federal government's pandemic preparedness and response. [2] The biodefense enterprise is currently extremely fragmented and requires a herculean level of coordination at the higher levels of the federal government. [3] Now is the time for the Administration and Congress to create better budgetary visibility and better lines of authority over the federal biodefense enterprise."
Heritage Foundation (Washington, D.C.)
Bartels, Frederico; Brookes, Peter
2020-06-01
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BioDefense Fact Sheet
"President Bush has made strengthening the nation's defenses against biological weapons a critical national priority from the outset of the administration - investing over $10 billion since 2001. While significant progress has been made to protect America, President Bush instructed Federal departments and agencies to review their efforts and find new and better ways to secure America from bioattacks. The result of this review is Biodefense for the 21st Century, a presidential directive that provides a comprehensive framework for our nation's biodefense. Biodefense for the 21st Century builds on past accomplishments, specifies roles and responsibilities, and integrates the programs and efforts of various communities - national security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, agricultural and law enforcement - into a sustained and focused national effort against biological weapons threats. Other keywords and phrases in this review are: threat awareness, prevention and protection, surveillance and detection, and response and recovery."
United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary
2005-04-28
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [April 25, 2005]
"The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2005-04-25
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [January 5, 2006]
"The construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC), with an estimated construction cost of $128 million, will be the first Department of Homeland Security laboratory specifically focused on biodefense. Its programmatic contents and component organization are unclear, as conflicting information has been provided during each of the past three budget cycles. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues which may interest Congress include funding for the construction of the NBACC facility, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-01-05
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NIAID Biodefense Research Agenda for CDC Category A Agents: Progress Report, August 2003
In February 2002, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases convened the first Blue Ribbon Panel on Bioterrorism and Its Implications for Biomedical Research. This panel of experts was brought together by NIAID to provide objective expertise on the Institute's future counter-bioterrorism research agenda for anthrax, smallpox, botulism, plague, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers, the pathogens commonly referred to as CDC Category A agents. As a result of this meeting and the deliberations of the panel, a research agenda was developed and widely distributed to the scientific community (agenda available at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/biodefense/research
/biotresearchagenda.pdf). Tremendous progress has been made in the year since this report was released. This progress report describes the progress that has been made toward addressing the immediate goals outlined in the research agenda. The first section of this report reviews progress on meeting the general recommendations made by the panel that apply to all areas of NIAID biodefense research. Research goals specific to each of the Category A pathogens are covered in individual chapters. Finally, the progress made thus far on immunology as it relates to biodefense is described in a separate chapter.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2003-08
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NIAID Biodefense Research Agenda for Category B and C Priority Pathogens
On October 22 and 23, 2002, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) convened a Blue Ribbon Panel on Biodefense and Its Implications for Biomedical Research. This panel of experts was brought together to provide objective expertise on the Institute's future biodefense research agenda, as it relates to the NIAID Category B and C Priority Pathogens (Appendix 1). This Blue Ribbon Panel was asked to provide NIAID with the following guidance: Assess the current research sponsored by NIAID related to the development of effective measures to counter the health consequences of bioterrorism with a focus on the Category B and C priority pathogens; Identify research goals for the highest priority areas; Provide recommendations on the role of NIAID in achieving these priorities; and Provide recommendations on the current NIAID Category B and C Priority Pathogens list. NOTE: Although the NIAID list of Category A, B and C Priority Pathogens (Appendix 1) closely follows the CDC list of Category A, B and C Biological Diseases/Agents (Appendix 2), the NIAID list highlights specific pathogens identified as priorities for additional research efforts as part of the NIAID biodefense research agenda.
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National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.)
2003-01
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Privacy Impact Assessment for the Biodefense Knowledge Management System v. 2.0 (Supporting IC and LE Users)
"The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate's (DHS S&T) Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) developed and operates the Biodefense Knowledge Management System (BKMS). The current generation of the BKMS, version 1.0, enables approved users to access and analyze biological sciences topics and related biodefense information to assist with their efforts to better understand or characterize biological threats, by offering an integrated suite of tools for managing and indexing scientific documents and information. In BKMS 2.0, S&T intends to add a component to the system to include data derived from the intelligence community (IC) and law enforcement (LE)-sensitive data. S&T is conducting this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) because such an addition will allow for a new function of the system for selected BKMS users, who are authorized to explore IC/LE data (which may contain personally identifiable information (PII))."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2011-05-04
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S. Hrg. 114-639: Federal Perspective on the State of Our Nation's Biodefense, Hearing Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, April 14, 2016
This is from the June 29, 2016 hearing on "Federal Perspective on the State of Our Nation's Biodefense," before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. From the opening statement of Ron Johnson: "Today, we look forward to learning the perspective of federal agencies on the state of our nation's biodefenses. We hope to learn how key federal agencies are fulfilling their responsibilities in this area, and what steps they are taking to improve preparedness and response. To be fair, biodefense is an unwieldy topic. We face threats ranging from natural outbreaks of infectious diseases to accidental releases of high-risk pathogens, or purposeful, malicious attacks. Over the last two years, our nation -- and at times the entire world -- has faced several major biological incidents. Ebola certainly caught the nation off-guard. Our public health officials first told the nation that every community hospital could handle Ebola infections. Shortly thereafter, new cases were transferred to just a handful of specialized hospitals. There also were issues surrounding waste management, adequate supplies of personal protective equipment, and tracking travelers to countries in West Africa. In terms of animal health, last spring's spread of highly pathogenic avian influenza through the Midwest, including Wisconsin, revealed significant gaps in preparedness. There were staffing and equipment shortages, and a lack of understanding of the pathogen itself. The Zika virus now threatens the nation. A recent study concluded that dozens of major metropolitan areas across the southern half of the United States are at moderate to high risk of susceptibility to the Zika virus. As was the case with Ebola, officials have changed their tune from their initial approach. The deputy director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recently said, 'Everything we know about this virus seems to be a little bit scarier than we initially thought.'" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Richard J. Hatchett, Stephen C. Redd, Kevin Shea, Aaron M. Firoved, and Christopher P. Currie.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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U.S. Biodefense and Homeland Security: Toward Detection and Attribution
"American leaders face tough decisions about the role of biodefense in homeland security. Debate centers on U.S. preparedness for biological attack, but few if any have adequately defined "preparedness." This thesis defines bioterrorism preparedness in terms of detection and attribution. Through case studies of the 1984 Rajneeshee cult and 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, the thesis develops a notional model of biodefense that shows that nature of attack and the lethality or type of agent influence outbreak detection and biological weapons attribution. Because public health surveillance facilitates detection and interagency coordination facilitates attribution, there is a need to re-balance U.S. biodefense priorities by easing emphasis on current programs, and redirecting resources to simpler improvements in communication and organizational efficiency. Core limitations of the public health system that impede surveillance are discussed, and barriers between public health and law enforcement officials that hamper coordination are examined. Recommendations are provided to improve detection through better surveillance, and to enable attribution through better coordination and information sharing."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Bernett, Brian C.
2006-12
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NIAID Biodefense Research Agenda for Category A Agents
On February 4 and 5, 2002, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) convened the Blue Ribbon Panel on Bioterrorism and Its Implications for Biomedical Research. This panel of experts was brought together by NIAID to provide objective expertise on the Institute's future Biodefense research agenda, which is articulated in this document. Specifically, the panel was asked to provide the following guidance to NIAID: Assess the current research sponsored by NIAID related to the development of effective measures to counter the health consequences of bioterrorism; Identify goals for the highest priority areas for immediate, intermediate, and long-term research related to Biodefense; and Make recommendations on the role of NIAID in achieving these priorities. The content of the research agenda that follows reflects the panel's recommendations. Specific goals for each pathogen are articulated within each chapter and include priorities for immediate as well as intermediate/long-term research. The introduction includes general recommendations that are applicable for all areas of NIAID Biodefense research.
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (U.S.)
2002-02
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DHS Awards Management Contract for National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center [December 20, 2006]
This press release announces the selection of Battelle National Biodefense Institute to conduct scientific programs and operate the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBaCC).
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office
2006-12-20
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security Awards Design Contract for the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center [March 23, 2005]
In this pres release, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security announces another important step towards stronger biodefense capabilities by awarding an $11 million design contract for the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) facility at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, to architecture, design, and planning firm Perkins+Will, Inc. The NBACC facility, managed by Homeland Security's Science & Technology Directorate, will strengthen America's ability to defend against biological terrorism by delivering dedicated scientific research to better assess, anticipate, prevent, and mitigate biological threats.
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Press Office
2005-03-23
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated February 15, 2007]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities...Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2007-02-15
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated November 21, 2006]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities...Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-11-21
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Biodefense: The Nation Faces Long-Standing Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological Threats, Statement of Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Reform, House of Representatives
From the Document: "This statement discusses GAO [Government Accountability Office] reports issued from December 2009 through March 2019 on various biological threats and biodefense efforts, and selected updates to BioWatch recommendations made in 2015. To conduct prior work, GAO reviewed biodefense reports, relevant presidential directives, laws, regulations, policies, strategic plans; surveyed states; and interviewed federal, state, and industry officials, among others. [...] GAO has made numerous agency recommendations in its prior reports designed to address the challenges discussed in this statement. As of June 2019, agencies have taken steps to address many of these, and GAO is monitoring ongoing efforts."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Currie, Chris
2019-06-26
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National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center: Issues for Congress [Updated October 4, 2006]
"The mission of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is to understand current and future biological threats; assess vulnerabilities and determine potential consequences; and provide a national capability for conducting forensic analysis of evidence from bio-crimes and terrorism. The NBACC is operational, with a program office and several component centers occupying interim facilities. Congressional oversight of programs, especially those performed in federal facilities for homeland security purposes, is considered key to maintaining transparency in biodefense. Policy issues that may interest Congress include the operation of the NBACC facility as a federally funded research and development center, transparency and oversight of research activities performed through the center, and the potential for duplication of research effort between the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Shea, Dana A.
2006-10-04
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Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 5533: Biodefense and Pandemic Vaccine and Drug Development Act of 2006
"H.R. 5533 would create an office at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) called the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA). BARDA would oversee advanced research and development of products to defend against bioterrorism and pandemic influenza. The bill also would establish the National Biodefense Science Board, an advisory group that would provide scientific guidance to HHS on issues involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents. Additionally, the bill would require HHS to establish a team of experts at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to provide technical assistance to drug manufacturers when shortages of certain vaccines and drugs occur. H.R. 5533 also would clarify that Project BioShield, a program that provides incentives to companies to manufacture vaccines and drugs, covers certain products - so-called qualified and security countermeasures-that address public health threats caused by acts of terrorism. The bill would authorize the appropriation of $160 million for each of fiscal years 2007 and 2008 for activities related to the operation of BARDA. The bill also would authorize the appropriation of $1 million for each of fiscal years 2007 and 2008 for the National Biodefense Science Board. CBO estimates that $1 million a year would be necessary for FDA to implement activities outlined in the bill."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2006-09-20
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Biodefense Research Supporting the DoD: A New Strategic Vision
"The author examines the productivity of the Department of Defense's biodefense research program over the course of more than 35 years, coupled with changes in the global research environment since the events of September 11, 2001. Where the deployment of a biologic agent of mass destruction is largely an unpredictable risk, the outcome certainly could be catastrophic for an unprotected population. An urgent moral imperative is cast upon the federal government, then, to objectively assess the application and management of its biodefense research resources."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Martinez, Colleen K.
2007-04-11
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National Biodefense Strategy 2018
"It is a vital interest of the United States to manage the risk of biological incidents. In today's interconnected world, biological incidents have the potential to cost thousands of American lives, cause significant anxiety, and greatly impact travel and trade. [...] Biological threats--whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate in origin--are among the most serious threats facing the United States and the international community. [...] Health security means taking care of the American people in the face of biological threats to our homeland and to our interests abroad. [...] The health of the American people depends on our ability to stem infectious disease outbreaks at their source, wherever and however they occur. America's biodefense enterprise needs to be nimble enough to address emerging infectious disease threats, the risks associated with the accelerating pace of biotechnology, and threats posed by terrorist groups or adversaries seeking to use biological weapons. [...] This National Biodefense Strategy highlights the President's commitment to protect the American people and our way of life, laying out a clear pathway and set of objectives to effectively counter threats from naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate biological events. It is broader than a Federal Government strategy. It is a call to action for state, local, territorial, and tribal (SLTT) entities, other governments, practitioners, physicians, scientists, educators, and industry."
United States. Executive Office of the President
2018
