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• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 31, 2008]

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  "The Bush Administration has characterized Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach has been to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran's acceptance of the international offer of incentives. [...]. Amid widespread recognition that most U.S. goals on Iran have not been accomplished, the incoming Obama Administration, based on statements from President-elect Obama, is likely to shift toward more consistent engagement with Iran and to de-emphasize potential U.S. military action or efforts to promote democracy in Iran. Yet, there is a vigorous debate among experts over whether such shifts would yield clearer results. The policy decisions come as Iran enters its runup to June 2009 presidential elections, which most U.S. experts hope will produce change to more moderate leadership in Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-12-31
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated September 24, 2008]

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  This is an updated report from the Congressional Research Service about security threats from Iran and policy responses. "The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. […] The Bush Administration approach to contain the potential threat posed by Iran's nuclear program is to strengthen international economic pressure on Iran while also offering Iran potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. […] A new U.N. Security Council resolution is being considered, although progress reportedly has been slowed by U.S.-Russia tensions over Georgia. A previous three U.N. resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) impose sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. […] The Administration strongly denies that it is planning to take military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-09-24
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated October 8, 2008]

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  This is an updated report from the Congressional Research Service about security threats from Iran and policy responses. "The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. [...] The Bush Administration approach to contain the potential threat posed by Iran's nuclear program is to strengthen international economic pressure on Iran while also offering Iran potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. [...] A new U.N. Security Council resolution is being considered, although progress reportedly has been slowed by U.S.-Russia tensions over Georgia. A previous three U.N. resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) impose sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. [...] The Administration strongly denies that it is planning to take military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-10-08
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [July 23, 2010]

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  "The Obama Administration has continued the long-standing characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' This threat perception has been generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election. Iran's refusal to accept the details of an October 1, 2009, tentative agreement to lessen concerns about its nuclear intentions--coupled with its crackdown on the Green movement--caused the Administration, in 2010, to shift away from engaging Iran's leaders and toward building multilateral support for economic sanctions against Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  2010-07-23
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated June 16, 2008]

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  This Congressional Research Service report discusses the U.S. concerns and policy responses to Iran. "The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is increasingly focused on Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, which is resulting in U.S. battlefield losses, as well as on Iranian aid to two groups that threaten U.S. allies in the Middle East -- the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, but Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. The Bush Administration approach to contain the potential threat posed by Iran's nuclear program is to strengthen international economic pressure on Iran while also offering Iran potential cooperation should it comply with international demands that it end its enrichment of uranium. Three U.N. resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians, call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments, and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran. At the same time, there is increasing recognition in the Administration that sanctions alone have not compelled Iran to suspend uranium enrichment. In June 2008, the Administration and its partners presented an enhanced package of incentives that might encourage Iran to cooperate, but Administration skepticism that Iran would respond positively to inducements appears to have proved correct with Iran's apparent rejection of the plan."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-06-16
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated May 6, 2008]

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  "The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is increasingly focused on Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, which is resulting in U.S. battlefield losses. Iranian aid to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah is also considered a key threat to U.S. interests. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran-strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it end its enrichment of uranium. […] To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has strongly denied widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some believe that the Administration might take military action to curb Iran's 'malign' influence in Iraq. Others believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although regime change is not currently a prominent feature of Administration policy toward Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-05-06
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated April 22, 2008]

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  "The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is compounded by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. […]. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has strongly denied widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, but the March 14, 2008 parliamentary elections in Iran do not suggest a critical mass in Iran for toppling President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the regime, more generally."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-04-22
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated January 11, 2008]

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  "According to the Administration, Iran is a major national security challenge for the United States. The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is compounded by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran-strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it end its enrichment of uranium. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to suspend enrichment, further sanctions remain under discussion at the U.N. Security Council, although the sanctions now under discussion appear to be more modest than those considered before the NIE was released. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-01-11
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated February 26, 2008]

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  "According to the Administration, Iran is a major national security challenge for the United States. The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is compounded by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. […] Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. […] Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran. […] The Administration has strongly denied widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some legislation passed by the House in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400 and H.R. 957, would increase U.S. sanctions on Iran […] Other legislation, such as H.R. 1357, H.R. 2347 (passed by the House), and S.1430, promote divestment of companies that do business with Iran. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-02-26
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated January 30, 2008]

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  "According to the Administration, Iran is a major national security challenge for the United States. The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is compounded by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. […]To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has been strongly denying widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some in Congress seek to limit the President's authority to take unilateral military action against Iran. Some legislation passed by the House in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 1400 and H.R. 957, would increase U.S. sanctions on Iran -- both the U.S. trade ban and the Iran Sanctions Act that seeks to prevent foreign investment in Iran's energy sector. Other legislation, such as H.R. 1357, H.R. 2347 (passed by the House), and S.1430, promote divestment of companies that do business with Iran. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran. On October 21, 2007, the Administration named several Revolutionary Guard entities and personalities as proliferators and supporters of terrorism, and the Guard's 'Qods Force' as a terrorism supporter (but not as a foreign terrorist organization, FTO)."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2008-01-30
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated December 28, 2007]

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  "According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That Administration perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran -- strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it curb its program. Still, the NIE does not claim that Iran has complied with U.N. Security Council demands that it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)- related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to suspend enrichment, further sanctions remain under discussion at the U.N. Security Council, although the sanctions now under discussion appear to be more modest than those considered before the NIE was released."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-12-28
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated December 5, 2007]

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  "According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That Administration perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the threat perception of other governments might change following the December 3, 2007 release of key judgements from a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran -- strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it curb its program. Still, the NIE does not claim that Iran has complied with U.N. Security Council demands that it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)- related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on enrichment but apparently mostly cooperating with an August 2007 offer to reveal to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information on its past nuclear program, further sanctions, possibly including on civilian trade or financing, have been under discussion at the U.N. Security Council. […] Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-12-05
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [February 16, 2010]

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  "The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged wide scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition 'Green movement.' In December 2009, Administration statements shifted toward greater public support of the Green movement, but Administration officials appear to believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a low U.S. public profile on the unrest. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional attention to the plight of Iran's opposition and support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects. Iran's neighbors continue to engage the regime in normal trade and diplomatic exchange, although it is widely believed that many regional leaders, particularly the Persian Gulf states, are hoping for a regime collapse. At the same time, the Administration does not want to forego its diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2010-02-16
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 11, 2010]

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  "With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has occurred since alleged wide-scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition 'Green movement.' [...] Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. sanctions. New sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran's nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. [...] Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Each chamber in the 111th Congress has passed separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime's popularity even further."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2010-03-11
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 11, 2010]

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  "The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach for reducing the Iranian threat by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration has downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States did not materially support the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2010-06-11
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 3, 2010]

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  "Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. [United Nations] sanctions and apparently have prompted the Defense Department to try to develop additional options for preventing or containing a nuclear Iran. New U.N. sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran's nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. Additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction]-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. In the 111th Congress, conference action is underway on separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime's popularity even further. Others believe such steps could help the regime rebuild its support by painting the international community as punitive against the Iranian people. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, 'Iran Sanctions', by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40849, 'Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy', coordinated by Casey L. Addis; and CRS Report RL34544, 'Iran's Nuclear Program: Status', by Paul K. Kerr."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2010-05-03
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 24, 2010]

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  "The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach for reducing the Iranian threat by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States did not directly or materially support the domestic opposition movement that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2010-05-24
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 6, 2010]

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  "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a "profound threat to U.S. national security interests," a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. However, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged fraud in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a choice of whether to continue to engage Iran's government or to back the growing ranks of the Iranian opposition."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2010-01-06
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [October 5, 2009]

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  "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of previous Administrations to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence. The Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Obama Administration formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran and, prior to Iran's disputed June 12, 2009, presidential elections, put this outreach into practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings. Attempting to convince Iran that the Administration is not hostile to Iran, the Administration also downplayed Bush Administration policies to add international sanctions on Iran, to fund civil society activists there, and to openly discuss potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2009-10-05
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [August 6, 2009]

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  "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. [...] The Administration's Iran policy is in flux because of the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009 presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. [...] President Obama has criticized Iran's use of violence against protesters, but some in the Administration want to take advantage of Iran's internal weakness to obtain a compromise that curbs Iran's nuclear program. The Administration has indicated that, if Iran refuses to return to the nuclear bargaining table by September 2009 in earnest, it would return to working with allies to resume sanctioning and pressuring Iran. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline. Some of the measures contained in these bills have begun to advance as a consequence of the election-related violence.[...] The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2009-08-06
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [July 10, 2009]

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  "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort was put into practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Iran's nuclear program. The Administration also slowed or discontinued policies that Iranian eaders considered hostile including: ratcheting up international sanctions, efforts to promote democracy in Iran, and openly discussing the potential for U.S. military action. […]. The Administration has indicated that, if Iran refuses to return to the nuclear bargaining table by September 2009, it would return to working with allies to resume sanctioning and pressuring Iran. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline, and some of the measures contained in these bills have begun to advance as a consequence of the election-related violence[…]. The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2009-07-10
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [July 2, 2009]

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  "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort has begun to be put in practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through a growing number of invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Iran's nuclear program. [...] The Administration strategy on Iran is in some flux because of the allegations of a 'stolen election' by the challengers to declared winner of the June 12, 2009 presidential election, incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the crackdown against protesters who demanded a new vote. President Obama has criticized Iran's use of violence against protesters, and observers say that the Administration might try to take advantage of Iran's internal weakness to obtain a compromise that curbs Iran's nuclear program. If Iran refuses to return to the nuclear bargaining table, the Administration might focus, at an earlier than expected stage, on sanctioning and pressuring Iran. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline and some of the measures contained in these bills have begun to advance as a consequence of the election-related violence. [...] The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2009-07-07
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated October 29, 2007]

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  "According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently has held a series of bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad. […] To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf and has been arresting Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies the widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out. Some legislation passed in the 110th Congress, including H.R. 140 and H.R. 957, would increase U.S. sanctions on Iran -- both the U.S. trade ban and the Iran Sanctions Act that seeks to prevent foreign investment in Iran's energy sector. Other legislation, such as H.R. 1357, H.R. 2347, and S. 1430, promote divestment of companies that do business with Iran. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-10-29
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated October 9, 2007]

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  "According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently has held a series of bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad. The Bush Administration is pursuing several approaches to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis now is to strengthen international economic sanctions on Iran to compel Iran to comply with the U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 that have demanded it cease uranium enrichment. Two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran, freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply on enrichment but offering to reveal to the International Atomic Energy Agency additional information […], further steps are under discussion at the U.N. Security Council, although some Security Council members want to await the results of additional diplomacy before extending sanctions to civilian trade issues. "

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-10-09
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated September 5, 2007]

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  "According to the Administration's 'National Security Strategy' document released on March 16, 2006, the United States 'may face no greater challenge from a single country than Iran.' That perception continues, generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and intensified by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In part to direct regional attention to that view but also to engage Iran on an Iraq solution, the Administration attended regional conferences on Iraq on March 10, 2007, and May 3-4, 2007, both attended by Iran (and Syria), and subsequently held bilateral meetings with Iran in Baghdad on May 28 and July 24, agreeing in the latter meeting to form a working group on Iraq security issues, which met for the first time on August 6. The Bush Administration is pursuing several approaches to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis is now on multilateral economic sanctions on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. […] To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a consistent large naval presence in the Persian Gulf; arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-09-05
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated August 6, 2007]

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  "The Bush Administration is pursuing several approaches to attempt to contain the potential threat posed by Iran, but the U.S. emphasis is now on multilateral economic sanctions on Iran. Iran has not complied with repeated U.N. Security Council deadlines since August 2006 to cease uranium enrichment. That demand is encapsulated in two U.N. resolutions (1737 and 1747) that ban trade with and freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities, prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran, and require reporting on international travel by named Iranians. With Iran still refusing to comply, further steps are under discussion at the U.N. Security Council. Separate U.S. efforts, showing some success, have included trying to persuade European governments to curb trade, investment, and credits to Iran; and pressuring foreign banks not to do business with Iran. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has added components to efforts to contain Iran, including a naval buildup in the Persian Gulf; arrests of Iranian agents in Iraq. The Administration strongly denies it is planning on military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2007-08-06
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 14, 2009]

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  This CRS report discusses U.S. concerns and policy responses to Iran. "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration on Iran, but the Obama Administration officials is formulating strategies and approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of the Bush Administration. First and foremost, according to President Obama, the Administration is looking for opportunities to expand direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This was put in practice with a message to the Iranian people by President Obama marking Persian New Year (Nowruz), March 21, 2009, and a statement on April 8, 2009 that the United States would consistently attend multilateral meetings with Iran on its nuclear program. His Administration also appears to be de-emphasizing potential U.S. military action, although without ruling that out completely, and is not promoting efforts to promote democracy in Iran. Yet, there is debate among experts over whether such shifts would yield clearer results. The policy decisions come as Iran enters its run-up to June 12, 2009 presidential elections, which, now that a key reformist, Mir Hossein Musavi has entered the race, might produce more moderate leadership in Iran."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2009-04-14
• Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [October 26, 2011]

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  "Much of the debate over U.S. policy toward Iran has centered on the nature of the current regime. Some experts believe that Iran, a country of almost 70 million people, is a threat to U.S. interests because hardliners in Iran's regime dominate and set a policy direction intended to challenge U.S. influence and allies in the region. President Bush, in his January 29, 2002, State of the Union message, labeled Iran part of an 'axis of evil' along with Iraq and North Korea."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Katzman, Kenneth

  2011-10-26
• United States Department of Justice, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, December 8, 2011

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  From the opening statement of Lamar Smith: "While I am pleased to welcome back Attorney General Holder, I am disappointed in the Department's repeated refusal to cooperate with this Committee's oversight request. This lack of cooperation is evident in the Department's handling of inquiries related to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; Operation Fast and Furious; and the death of Border Patrol agent Brian Terry in December 2010. And inconsistent statements from the Department officials about who knew what and when have only raised more concerns. I am also disappointed in how the Department has responded to my oversight request regarding Justice Kagan's involvement in health care legislation and related litigation while she served as United States Solicitor General. Despite claims from Obama administration officials that then-Solicitor General Kagan was walled off from discussions regarding the President's health care law, recently released e-mails indicate there may be more to the story. To help clear up any confusion, I wrote the Justice Department to get additional documents and conduct staff interviews. It took nearly 4 months before the Department sent a one-page response that denied my request. […] The public has a right to know the extent of Justice Kagan's involvement with the legislation as well as any previously stated legal opinions about the legislation while she served as Solicitor General. If Justice Kagan was part of the Administration's team that put the health care mandate into play, she should not officiate when it comes before the Supreme Court. If the Department has nothing to hide, why not provide Congress with the requested information? The continued refusal to cooperate with legitimate oversight inquiries only heightens concerns that she may, in fact, have a conflict of interest. President Obama has promised an open and transparent government. Unfortunately we often see a closed and secretive Justice Department." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Lamar Smith, John Conyers, Jr., Darrell E. Issa, Robert C. Scott, Eric H. Holder, Jr., Sheila Jackson Lee, and Judith C. Appelbaum.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2012
• Is Secure Communities Keeping Our Communities Secure? Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration Policy and Enforcement of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, November 30, 2011

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  From the opening statement of Elton Gallegly: "Secure Communities grew out of a local law enforcement program that we established in the mid-1990's. In the 1996 illegal immigration reform bill, I included a provision that established a pilot program in Anaheim and Ventura County, California, that authorized local law enforcement officials to screen criminals in local jails prior to being arraigned. And in 1997, this program was expanded to jurisdictions throughout the United States. Today this program, which is now called Secure Communities, is supported by local law enforcement organizations across the Nation, including the Major County Sheriffs Association. Ultimately, Secure Communities assists local law enforcement with the identification and remove of criminal aliens, making it a vital tool for protecting the safety of our streets and neighborhoods. Yet, amnesty groups remain stubbornly opposed to it and claim that Secure Communities results in racial profiling. However, it is perplexing how a computer can racially profile when everyone who comes to the attention of law enforcement is checked through a database." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Elton Gallegly, Zoe Lofgren, Lamar Smith, Gary Mead, Julie Myers Wood, Sam Page, Arturo Venegas, Jr., Maxine Waters, and Steve King.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2012