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Latin America and the Caribbean: Key Issues for the 113th Congress [February 8, 2013]
"Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean region, with diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political and security concerns. U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration has focused on four priorities: promoting economic and social opportunity; ensuring citizen security; strengthening effective democratic institutions; and securing a clean energy future. There has been substantial continuity in U.S. policy toward the region under the Obama Administration, which has pursued some of the same basic policy approaches as the Bush Administration. Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has made several significant policy changes, including an overall emphasis on partnership and shared responsibility. U.S. policy toward the region is conducted in the context of a Latin America that is becoming increasingly independent from the United States. Strong economic growth has increased Latin America's confidence in its ability to solve its own problems. The region has also diversified its economic and diplomatic ties with countries outside the region. Over the past few years, several Latin American regional organizations have been established that do not include the United States. […] This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean, including the Obama Administration's priorities; examines changes in the region's economic and political environment that affect U.S. relations with the region; and analyzes U.S. policy toward the region and various recommendations made by policy analysts and think tanks. The report then examines the role of Congress and congressional interests in Latin America, looking at selected regional and country issues, including key issues that the 113th Congress could face."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Sullivan, Mark P.
2013-02-08
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [February 20, 2013]
"During the 2003-2011 presence of U.S. forces, Iraq completed a transition from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein to a plural political system in which varying sects and ideological and political factions compete in elections. A series of elections began in 2005, after a one-year occupation period and a subsequent seven-month interim period of Iraqi self-governance. There has been a consensus among Iraqi elites since 2005 to give each community a share of power and prestige to promote cooperation and unity. Still, disputes over the relative claim of each community on power and economic resources permeated almost every issue in Iraq and were never fully resolved. These unresolved differences-muted during the last years of the U.S. military presence-have reemerged since mid-2012 and threaten to return Iraq to a period of sectarian civil conflict."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2013-02-20
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests [April 12, 2005]
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free markets, and human rights) and energy development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nichol, James P.
2005-04-12
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests [January 21, 2005]
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free markets, and human rights) and energy development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nichol, James P.
2005-01-21
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests [March 18, 2005]
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free markets, and human rights) and energy development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nichol, James P.
2005-03-18
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests [November 12, 2004]
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support in countering Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union, and approved the Freedom Support Act and other legislation for this purpose. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic interests include internal reforms (democratization, free market economies, and human rights) and energy development."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nichol, James P.
2004-11-12
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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns [February 12, 2013]
"Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko snuffed out Belarus's modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy and created an authoritarian regime shortly after being elected as president in 1994. His regime is in rhetoric and policies a throwback to the Soviet era. Those advocating a stronger U.S. role in trying to bring democratic change to Belarus say that the country is important to the United States because Belarus is an obstacle to the U.S. goal of making Europe 'whole and free.' Another concern is Belarus's support for pariah regimes, including through arms sales. Relations between Belarus and the United States have been particularly poor since Lukashenko's brutal repression of the opposition after fraudulent presidential elections in December 2010. In response, the EU and United States have imposed strengthened sanctions against key Belarusian leaders, businessmen, and firms. Russia has taken advantage of this situation to increase its political and economic influence in Belarus."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woehrel, Steven J.
2013-02-12
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Border Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders [February 21, 2013]
"The United States confronts a wide array of threats at U.S. borders, ranging from terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction, to transnational criminals smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and work in the United States. Given this diversity of threats, how may Congress and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set border security priorities and allocate scarce enforcement resources? In general, DHS's answer to this question is organized around risk management, a process that involves risk assessment and the allocation of resources based on a cost-benefit analysis. This report focuses on the first part of this process by identifying border threats and describing a framework for understanding risks at U.S. borders. DHS employs models to classify threats as relatively high- or low-risk for certain planning and budgeting exercises and to implement certain border security programs. Members of Congress may wish to use similar models to evaluate the costs and benefits of potential border security policies and to allocate border enforcement resources. This report discusses some of the issues involved in modeling border-related threats. Understanding border risks begins with identifying key threats. At their roots, border-related threats are closely linked to the flow of people (travelers) and goods (cargo) from one country to another. Any smuggled item or individual hidden among the legitimate flows potentially constitutes a threat to U.S. security or interests."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Rosenblum, Marc R.; Bjelopera, Jerome P.; Finklea, Kristin M.
2013-02-21
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Immigration Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) [February 15, 2013]
"The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) includes provisions to assist foreign nationals who have been victims of domestic abuse. These provisions, initially enacted by Congress with the Immigration Act of 1990 and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994, afford benefits to abused foreign nationals and allow them to self-petition for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status independently of the U.S. citizen or LPR relatives who originally sponsored them. Congress reauthorized VAWA with the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, which also created the U visa for foreign national victims of a range of crimes--including domestic abuse--who assisted law enforcement. A second reauthorization in 2005 added protections and expanded eligibility for abused foreign nationals. Authorization for appropriations for the programs under VAWA expired in 2011. The 112th Congress passed two bills, S. 1925 and H.R. [House Resolution] 4970, reauthorizing most VAWA programs, among other provisions. Despite containing some related immigration provisions, H.R. 4970 differed in substantive ways from S. 1925. It did not extend protections to new groups to the same extent as S. 1925 and included more restrictions with the purpose of curtailing immigration fraud. Most notably, it maintained the annual number of U visas at its current limit of 10,000, in contrast with S. 1925 which would have increased the number to 15,000. To fund the increase in U visas, S. 1925 included a revenue provision that created a 'blue slip' procedural complication. Negotiations stalled between the chambers, and neither bill was enacted into law."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kandel, William
2013-02-15
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [December 6, 2011]
"After extensive sectarian conflict during 2006-2008, Iraq's political system is characterized by relatively peaceful political competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances. However, the dominant factions have, by several accounts, often exercised questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions to arrest or intimidate their opponents. This infighting is based on the belief of many factions that holding political power may mean the difference between poverty and prosperity, or even life and death. The schisms significantly delayed agreement on a new government following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic help, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions finally agreed on a framework for a new government under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is serving a second term. In recent months, with a complete U.S. withdrawal from Iraq approaching at the end of 2011, the relations among major factions have frayed. Sunni Arabs, facing a wave of arrests by government forces in October 2011, fear that Maliki and his Shiite allies will monopolize power. The Kurds are wary that Maliki will not honor pledges to resolve Kurd-Arab territorial and financial disputes. Sunni Arabs and the Kurds dispute territory and governance in parts of northern Iraq, particularly Nineveh Province. Some Iraqi communities, including Christians in northern Iraq, are not at odds with the government but have territorial and political disputes with and fear violence from both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. These splits have created conditions under which the insurgency that hampered U.S. policy during 2004-2008 continues to conduct occasional high casualty attacks."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2011-12-06
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Iraq: Politics, Elections, and Benchmarks [March 1, 2011]
"Iraq's political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances, although ethnic and sectarian infighting continues, sometimes involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting--and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities--significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. intervention, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. Their agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would serve another term, was implemented in the presentation by him of a broad-based cabinet on December 21, 2010, in advance of a December 25 constitutional deadline. The participation of all major factions in the new government is stabilizing politically and may have created political momentum to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. There may be early indications that the new government is acting on long-stalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil. Still, delayed action on improving key services, such as electricity, has created popular frustration that manifested as protests during February 2011, possibly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other Middle Eastern countries."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2011-03-01
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [January 24, 2012]
"Following the completion of the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq on December 18, 2011, relations among major political factions worsened substantially, threatening Iraq's stability and the legacy of the U.S. intervention in Iraq. After extensive sectarian conflict during 2006-2008, and with U.S. troops still present, Iraq's political system evolved into relatively peaceful political competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances. Sunni Arabs, always fearful that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki would seek unchallenged power for Shiite factions allied with him, accused him of an outright power grab as he sought to purge the two highest ranking Sunni Arabs from government (a deputy President and deputy Prime Minister). The Sunnis have sought to enlist the help of the Kurds to curb Maliki's perceived ambitions; the Kurds also distrust Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The apparent unraveling of the political consensus has created conditions under which the insurgency that hampered U.S. policy during 2004-2008 continues to conduct occasional high casualty attacks, including over a dozen near-simultaneous bombings on December 22, 2011, and several since then."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2012-01-24
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [August 8, 2011]
"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by uncertainty about Iran's intentions for its nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. As of mid-2011, U.S. officials are increasingly critical of what they say is stepped-up Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, who are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. To try to address the threat from Iran, the Obama Administration offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. However, after observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran's agreement to implement an October 2009 tentative nuclear compromise, the Administration worked during 2010 and 2011 to increase economic and political pressure on Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2011-08-08
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [August 29, 2011]
"Iraq's political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances. However, ethnic and sectarian political and sometimes violent infighting continues, often involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting--and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities--significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic help, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework ('Irbil Agreement') for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. The agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki is serving a second term, began to be implemented with the selection and confirmation of a broad-based cabinet on December 21, 2010. […] The Administration is hopeful that, as a U.S. drawdown or complete withdrawal proceeds, all factions will cooperate to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. The new government took action on some longstalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil. However, the lack of a broader and sustained focus on governance, or on improving key services, such as electricity, created popular frustration that manifested as protests since February 2011. The demonstrations were partly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other Middle Eastern countries, but were not centered on overthrowing the regime or wholesale political change."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2011-08-29
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Issues in Homeland Security Policy for the 112th Congress
"With the tenth anniversary of the September 11th terrorist attacks, many observers are making a fresh assessment of where America's homeland security enterprise stands today. In the wake of those attacks, Congress made extensive changes to the structure and function of many agencies, establishing a consolidated Department of Homeland Security and dedicating significant additional resources expressly to the security of the homeland. After the initial surge of activity, evolution of America's response has continued under the leadership of different Administrations, Congresses, and in a shifting environment of public opinion. This report outlines an array of homeland security issues that may come before the 112th Congress. After a brief discussion of the overall homeland security budget, the report divides the specific issues into five rough categories: 1) Counterterrorism and Security Management 2) Border Security and Trade 3) Immigration 4) Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 5) Departmental Management In each of those areas, you will find a survey of topics briefly analyzed by Congressional Research Service experts. The information included only scratches the surface on most of these issues. For more detailed information, you may choose to consult their more in-depth works or consult directly with the individual authors."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Painter, William L.
2011-09-22
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [September 28, 2011]
"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by uncertainty about Iran's intentions for its nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. As of mid-2011, U.S. officials are increasingly critical of what they say is stepped-up Iranian support for Iraqi Shiite militias that have attacked U.S. forces, who are scheduled to leave Iraq by the end of 2011. To try to address the threat from Iran, the Obama Administration offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West in exchange for limits to its nuclear program. However, after observing a crackdown on peaceful protests in Iran in 2009, and failing to obtain Iran's agreement to implement an October 2009 tentative nuclear compromise, the Administration worked during 2010 and 2011 to increase economic and political pressure on Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195)."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2011-09-28
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 15, 2011]
"The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran's intentions for its nuclear program-- heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report--as well as by Iran's support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria's leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. In October 2011, U.S. officials accused Iran of plotting to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2011-12-15
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Unaccompanied Refugee Minors [March 14, 2008]
"Since enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration and Nationality Act has contained a designation for a group of children defined as 'unaccompanied refugee minors' (URMs): refugee children in the United States under the age of 18, without a parent or close relative who is willing or able to care for them. The State Department identifies refugee children overseas who are eligible for resettlement in the United States but who do not have a parent or guardian. Once these URMs are admitted to the United States, the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS's) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) is tasked with caring for them until they are either reunited with their families or reach the age of 18. Since 1980, approximately 12,000 URMs have been handled by ORR. Once in ORR's custody, a URM will be placed in the agency's URM program, wherein ORR works with state and local service providers, as well as volunteer agencies, to provide URMs with foster placement, services, and any needed care. As a means of placing URMs, both ORR and the state and volunteer services they work with have a number of options at their disposal, including foster homes, group homes, independent living, semi-independent living, placement with a relative, and residential treatment facilities. The divide over URM policy in the United States generally falls between two groups: advocates of increased URM inflows and supporters of current levels."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Haddal, Chad C.
2008-03-14
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Gangs in Central America [Updated March 27, 2008]
"The 110th Congress maintains a keen interest in the effects of crime and gang violence in Central America and its spillover effects on the United States. Since February 2005, more than 1,758 alleged members of the violent Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) gang have been arrested in cities across the United States. These arrests have raised concerns about the transnational activities of Central American gangs, and governments throughout the region are struggling to find the right combination of suppressive and preventive policies to deal with them. […] An inter-agency committee worked together to develop a U.S. Strategy to Combat Criminal Gangs from Central America and Mexico, announced at a July 2007 U.S.-Central American Integration System (SICA) summit on security issues. The strategy, which is now being implemented, states that the U.S. government will pursue coordinated antigang activities through five broad areas: diplomacy, repatriation, law enforcement, capacity enhancement, and prevention. During the first session of the 110th Congress, several Members introduced immigration legislation -- H.R. 1645 (Gutierrez), S. 330 (Isakson), and S. 1348 (Reid) -- that included provisions to increase cooperation among the United States, Mexico, and Central America in the tracking of gang activity and in the handling of deported gang members, but none of those bills were enacted. […] The Consolidation Appropriations Act, FY2008 (H.R. 2764/P.L. 110-161), included the provision of $8 million to the State Department to combat criminal youth gangs, $3 million more than the Administration's request. During its second session, the 110th Congress may consider the Mérida Initiative, a new anticrime and counterdug aid package for Mexico and Central America introduced by the Administration in October 2007. […] This report describes the gang problem in Central America, discusses country and regional approaches to deal with the gangs, and analyzes U.S. policy with respect to gangs in Central America."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Seelke, Clare Ribando
2008-03-27
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated April 22, 2008]
"The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is compounded by Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan and to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. […]. To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has strongly denied widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some in the Administration believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, but the March 14, 2008 parliamentary elections in Iran do not suggest a critical mass in Iran for toppling President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or the regime, more generally."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-04-22
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Cyclone Nargis and Burma's Constitutional Referendum [May 9, 2008]
"Cyclone Nargis struck the coast of Burma in the evening of May 2, 2008 and cut a path of destruction across the southern portion of the country. […]. Some have speculated that the final number of dead could reach 100,000. Vital infrastructure was destroyed by the storm, severely limiting the ability to assess the loss of life and provide assistance to the survivors. In addition, much of Burma's most productive agricultural land has been severely damaged […]. Burma's ruling military junta quickly faced both domestic and international criticism for its response to Cyclone Nargis, including accusations that it failed to provide adequate warning, its slow emergency response, and its reluctance to allow international relief workers into the country. Even before Cyclone Nargis struck, the junta was already facing a highly controversial referendum on a proposed constitution scheduled for May 10, 2008 that could shape U.S. and other countries' policies toward Burma. As a consequence, the evolution and implications of the humanitarian crisis are inextricably linked to Burma's political situation and its relations with the international community. […]. In addition, some experts are speculating that Cyclone Nargis may precipitate major political change in Burma, including the destabilization of Burma's military regime. […]. This report examines the scope of and response to the disaster, as well as its links to Burma's political situation and U.S. policy."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Martin, Michael F.; Margesson, Rhoda
2008-05-09
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Homeland Security Department: FY2009 Request for Appropriations [May 6, 2008]
"This report describes the FY2009 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Administration requested a net appropriation of $38.8 billion in budget authority for FY2009. The requested net appropriation for major components of the department included the following: $9,487 million for Customs and Border Protection (CBP); $4,748 million for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); $4,057 million for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA); $9,071 million for the U.S. Coast Guard; $1,414 million for the Secret Service; $1,286 for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPP); $5,573 million for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); $151 million for US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS); $869 million for the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T); and $564 million for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). This report will be updated as legislative action occurs." "This report is a guide to one of the regular appropriations bills that Congress considers each year. It is designed to supplement the information provided by the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees on Homeland Security. It summarizes the status of the bill, its scope, major issues, funding levels, and related congressional activity, and is updated as events warrant."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Bea, Keith; Lake, Jennifer E.; Nunez-Neto, Blas
2008-05-06
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated May 6, 2008]
"The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' The Administration perception is generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program but is increasingly focused on Iran's military assistance to armed groups in Iraq, which is resulting in U.S. battlefield losses. Iranian aid to the Palestinian group Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah is also considered a key threat to U.S. interests. The threat assessment of some other governments was lessened by the December 3, 2007 key judgements of a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that indicates that Iran is likely not on a drive to develop an actual nuclear weapon, although Administration officials say that this finding was not the main thrust of the NIE, which judged Iran to be continuing uranium enrichment. The Bush Administration argues that the NIE at least partly validates its approaches to containing the potential threat posed by Iran-strengthening international economic and political isolation of Iran to compel it to comply with international demands that it end its enrichment of uranium. […] To strengthen its diplomacy, the Administration has maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The Administration has strongly denied widespread speculation that it plans military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed. Some believe that the Administration might take military action to curb Iran's 'malign' influence in Iraq. Others believe that only a change of Iran's regime would end the threat posed by Iran, although regime change is not currently a prominent feature of Administration policy toward Iran."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2008-05-06
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Foreign Students in the United States: Policies and Legislation [Updated April 28, 2008]
"More than six years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by foreign nationals-including several terrorists on student visas-the security concerns over foreign student visas are being weighed against competitiveness concerns. Potential foreign students, as well as all aliens, must satisfy Department of State (DOS) consular officers abroad and immigration inspectors upon entry to the United States that they are not ineligible for visas under the so-called 'grounds for inadmissibility' of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which include security and terrorist concerns. The consular officers who process visa applicants are required to check the consolidated Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) before issuing any visa. In part because of these security measures, student visa debates have expanded to include both security and market-based discussions. Higher education institutions in the United States are concerned over their ability to attract the numbers and quality of foreign students, and whether the post- September 11 security measures impede the entry of potential students into the U.S. education system. The fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) increasingly rely on foreign students, and these fields hold a top priority with most research institutions. Furthermore, the U.S. economy has a high demand for the skill-sets produced in these fields of study, and the STEM students often provide a major link between the academic community and the labor market. Consequently, many groups in higher education and the private sector are seeking to expand pathways for foreign students to emigrate to the United States."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Haddal, Chad C.
2008-04-28
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Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests [Updated May 7, 2008]
"After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States recognized the independence of all the former Central Asian republics, supported their admission into Western organizations, and elicited Turkish support to counter Iranian influence in the region. Congress was at the forefront in urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and other Eurasian states of the former Soviet Union. Soon after the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states offered overflight and other support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq, and Kazakhstan provided about two dozen troops for rebuilding. U.S. policy has emphasized bolstering the security of the Central Asian 'front-line' states to help them combat terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking. Other strategic U.S. objectives have included promoting free markets, democratization, human rights, and energy development. […] The second session of the 110th Congress is likely to continue to be at the forefront in advocating increased U.S. ties with Central Asia, and in providing backing for use of the region as a staging area for supporting U.S.-led stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Congress is likely to pursue these goals through hearings and legislation on humanitarian assistance, economic development, security issues, human rights, and democratization. The July 2006 U.S.-Kyrgyzstan agreement on the continued U.S. use of airbase facilities in Kyrgyzstan included U.S. pledges of boosted foreign assistance and other compensation, which are subject to regular congressional appropriations and oversight."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nichol, James P.
2008-05-07
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Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity [Updated January 10, 2008]
"Congress has broad plenary authority to determine classes of aliens who may be admitted into the United States and the grounds for which they may be removed. Pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended, certain conduct may either disqualify an alien from entering the United States ('inadmissibility') or provide grounds for his or her removal/deportation. Prominently included among this conduct is criminal activity. 'Criminal activity' comprises acts violative of federal, state, or, in many cases, foreign criminal law. It does not cover violations of the INA that are not crimes-most notably, being in the U.S. without legal permission. Thus, the term 'illegal alien'-an alien without legal status-is not synonymous with 'criminal alien.' Most crimes affecting immigration status are not specifically mentioned by the INA, but instead fall under a broad category of crimes, such as crimes involving moral turpitude or aggravated felonies. In addition, certain criminal conduct precludes a finding of good moral character under the INA, which is a requirement for naturalization and certain types of immigration relief. In certain circumstances, grounds for inadmissibility or deportation may be waived. In some cases, aliens facing removal may be allowed to remain in the United States-for example, when they are granted discretionary or mandatory relief from removal for humanitarian reasons, such as through asylum, withholding of removal, or cancellation of removal. Aliens facing removal may also be permitted to depart the United States voluntarily, and thereby avoid the potential stigma and legal consequences of forced removal."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Garcia, Michael John; Kim, Yule
2008-01-10
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Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law [February 15, 2012]
"Crime is ordinarily proscribed, tried, and punished according to the laws of the place where it occurs. American criminal law applies beyond the geographical confines of the United States, however, under certain limited circumstances. State prosecution for overseas misconduct is limited almost exclusively to multi-jurisdictional crimes, that is, crimes where some elements of the offense are committed within the state and others are committed beyond its boundaries. A surprising number of federal criminal statutes have extraterritorial application, but prosecutions have been few. This may be because when extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction does exist, practical and legal complications, and sometimes diplomatic considerations, may counsel against its exercise."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Doyle, Charles
2012-02-15
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Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors: An Overview of the Law Including Recently Enacted and Proposed Amendments [January 6, 2012]
"As a general rule, government agencies contract with the lowest-priced (or best-value) qualified responsible bidder or offeror. Debarment and suspension are among the techniques that government agencies use to ensure that they contract with only 'responsible' bidders or offerors. Debarred contractors are ineligible for government contracts for a fixed period of time, which can vary depending upon the authority under which the contractor is debarred and the seriousness of the conduct underlying the debarment; while suspended contractors are ineligible for the duration of any investigation into or litigation involving their conduct. Persons may be debarred or suspended (i.e., excluded) from federal contracting on procurement or nonprocurement grounds. This report focuses upon exclusions on procurement grounds. It surveys the authorities requiring or allowing federal agencies to debar or suspend contractors, due process and other protections for contractors, and recently enacted and proposed amendments to the laws governing exclusion."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Manuel, Kate
2012-01-06
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 2, 2012]
"The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran's intentions for its nuclear program-- heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report--as well as by Iran's support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria's leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran's late-December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world's oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz--a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran's vital exports of oil. The sense of imminent crisis with Iran--much of which has been brought on by Israeli threats to buck U.S. advice by acting militarily against Iran's nuclear program--follows three years in which the Obama Administration has assembled a broad international coalition to pressure Iran through economic sanctions while also offering sustained engagement with Iran. None of the pressure has, to date, altered Iran's pursuit of its nuclear program: Iran attended December 2010 and January 2011 talks with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no progress was reported at any of these meetings. However, since the beginning of 2012, as significant multilateral sanctions have been added on Iran's oil exports--including an oil purchase embargo by the European Union to go into full effect by July 1, 2012--there are growing indications that the regime feels economic pressure. Iran's leaders have responded not only with threats to commerce in the Strait of Hormuz, but also stated a willingness to enter into new nuclear talks without preconditions. At the same time, it has begun uranium enrichment at a deep underground facility near Qom. The Administration uses indicators such as Iran's economic deterioration and its willingness to engage in new talks as evidence that policy is starting to work and should be given more time before any consideration of U.S. or other country military options."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2012-03-02
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 30, 2012]
"The Obama Administration identifies Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests. This perception is generated by suspicions of Iran's intentions for its nuclear program- heightened by a November 8, 2011, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report-as well as by Iran's support for militant groups in the Middle East and in Iraq and Afghanistan. Tensions have been particularly elevated since Iran's late December 2011 threat to try to choke off much of the world's oil supplies by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz-a reaction to the imposition of significant sanctions against Iran's vital exports of oil. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of helping Syria's leadership try to defeat a growing popular opposition movement, and of taking advantage of Shiite majority unrest against the Sunni-led, pro-U.S. government of Bahrain. The sense of imminent crisis with Iran which greeted the beginning of 2012 follows three years in which the Obama Administration first offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement in exchange for limits to its nuclear program but, since 2010, has emphasized pressuring Iran through economic sanctions. Significant additional sanctions were imposed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Further measures intended to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). In late 2011, the Administration, Congress, and U.S. partners increased sanctions significantly by attempting to cut off transactions with Iran's Central Bank and through the European Union's January 23, 2012, imposition of an embargo on purchases of Iranian oil. The Administration also maintains a 40,000-50,000 troop military presence in the Persian Gulf, and it has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran's intentions."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Katzman, Kenneth
2012-01-30
