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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [September 29, 2010]"After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook several steps to enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, the Sunni-led government's efforts to maintain its tight grip on power have stirred new unrest among Bahraini Shiites in advance of October 23, 2010, parliamentary elections. That election, no matter the outcome, would not produce a new executive, but achievement of a Shiite majority in the elected lower house could give the opposition greater authority with which to challenge the ruling Al Khalifa family. In advance of the elections, the government has launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hardline Shiite leadership as fomenters of violence and tools of Iran. The crackdown has perhaps contributed to increasing Shiite popular protests in advance of the elections. [...] Bahrain has few external security options other than relying on some degree of U.S. security guarantee. Bahrain has tried to earn that guarantee by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has designated Bahrain as a 'major non-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally,' and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain. On other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia or other powers to take the lead in formulating proposals or representing the position of the Persian Gulf states, collectively. These areas of strong U.S.-Bahrain cooperation have caused some public criticism of successive U.S. Administrations, including by some in Congress, for muting criticism of Bahrain's human rights record in the interests of ensuring Bahrain's cooperation on security issues. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169)."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-09-29
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Mexican Economy After the Global Financial Crisis [September 9, 2010]"The state of Mexico's economy is important for U.S. policymakers for many reasons, most significantly because a prosperous and democratic neighboring country is in the best interest of the United States. The two countries have strong economic, political, and social ties, which have direct policy implications related to bilateral trade, economic competitiveness, migration, and border security. In May 2010, President Barack Obama hosted Mexican President Felipe Calderón at a meeting in the White House in which the two leaders discussed key issues affecting the two countries. They agreed to continue and reinforce cooperation on creating jobs, promoting economic recovery and expansion, and encouraging inclusive prosperity across all levels of society in both countries. The 111th Congress is likely to maintain an active interest in Mexico on issues related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other trade issues, economic conditions in Mexico, migration, border security issues, and counter-narcotics. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 and the U.S. economic downturn had strong adverse effects on the Mexican economy, largely due to its economic ties and dependence on the U.S. market. Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.6% in 2009, the sharpest decline of any Latin American economy. Mexico's reliance on the United States as an export market and the relative importance of exports to its overall economic performance make it highly susceptible to fluctuations in the U.S. economy. Most other Latin American countries are not as dependent on the United States as an export market. Economic reforms over the past 20 years and the government's responses to the effects of the global financial crisis have helped Mexico weather the economic downturn and improve conditions in 2010. However, sustained economic recovery will likely depend on the U.S. economic recovery and the ability to sustain this growth."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceVillarreal, M. Angeles2010-09-09
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [August 20, 2010]"The Obama Administration has adopted the long-standing assessment of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' This threat perception is generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-08-20
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Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law [March 26, 2010]From the Document: "Crime is usually territorial. It is a matter of the law of the place where it occurs. Nevertheless, a surprising number of American criminal laws apply outside of the United States. Application is generally a question of legislative intent, expressed or implied. In either case, it most often involves crimes committed aboard a ship or airplane, crimes condemned by international treaty, crimes committed against government employees or property, or crimes that have an impact in this country even if planned or committed in part elsewhere. Although the crimes over which the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction may be many, so are the obstacles to their enforcement. For both practical and diplomatic reasons, criminal investigations within another country require the acquiescence, consent, or preferably the assistance, of the authorities of the host country. The United States has mutual legal assistance treaties with several countries designed to formalize such cooperative law enforcement assistance. Searches and interrogations carried out jointly with foreign officials, certainly if they involve Americans, must be conducted within the confines of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. And the Sixth Amendment imposes limits upon the use in American criminal trials of depositions taken abroad."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceDoyle, Charles2010-03-26
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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues [April 19, 2010]"Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug trafficking-related violence claimed more than 6,500 lives in Mexico in 2009, and several Central American countries have among the world's highest homicide rates. Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) dominate the illicit drug market in the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs. […]. Congress has also monitored enforcement of Mérida's human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. Congress is playing a role in the design of post-Mérida security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin during its consideration of the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget request. For FY2011, the Administration has asked for $310 million in assistance for Mérida programs in Mexico, $100 million for CARSI, and $79 million for CBSI. Detailed strategy documents for CARSI and CBSI are not yet available, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a new strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation after a high-level meeting in Mexico City on March 23, 2010. The plan focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st-century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative and related assistance programs in Central America and the Caribbean, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the initiative and related programs."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceSeelke, Clare Ribando2010-04-19
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 11, 2010]"With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has occurred since alleged wide-scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition 'Green movement.' [...] Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. sanctions. New sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran's nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. [...] Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Each chamber in the 111th Congress has passed separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime's popularity even further."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-03-11
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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns [April 15, 2010]"For many years, the United States pursued a policy of 'selective engagement,' which limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions. In 2008, the United States and European Union changed tactics in their policy toward to Belarus. They moved to suspend some sanctions against the regime in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues. In October 2008, the EU suspended a travel ban on Lukashenko and other Belarusian leaders, and has extended the suspension several times since then. The United States has relaxed sanctions against several subsidiaries of the state-owned oil and petrochemicals firm Belneftekhim. Analysts have attributed the policy shift, in which the EU has played the leading role, to a variety of factors, including concerns about Russia's increasing assertiveness in its relations with neighboring countries, especially after Russia's military assault on Georgia in August 2008. In May 2009, Belarus was permitted to join the EU's Eastern Partnership program, which could provide Belarus with EU aid and other forms of cooperation. This EU opening toward Belarus has continued despite the fact that Belarus has failed to make progress on human rights issues and has even regressed in some areas."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceWoehrel, Steven J.2010-04-15
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 1, 2010]"The Obama Administration, as have the several previous Administrations, has articulated U.S. policy goals as ensuring that Iran does not become a nuclear armed state and reducing Iran's ability to undermine U.S. objectives and allies in the Middle East. The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has altered the U.S. approach to achieve those goals by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders a vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration has downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States is not directly or materially supporting the domestic opposition movement that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-04-01
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Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress [March 19, 2010]"The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, the Department) is to 'prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). [...] Today, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) consists of I&A [Intelligence and Analysis], two headquarters elements supported by I&A, and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department's intelligence component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR [Second Stage Review] reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. [...] This report provides an overview of the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHS IE is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues. This report may be updated."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceRandol, Mark A.2010-03-19
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States [March 22, 2010]"This report analyzes developments in Guinea, a poor West African country, following the death of longtime president and former military leader Lansana Conté in December 2008. It focuses on the military's seizure of power after Conté's death, U.S.-Guinea bilateral relations, and U.S. policy in the wake of the coup. It also provides background on Guinean history and politics. [...] On December 23, 2008, following the death of President Conté, a military junta calling itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD, after its French acronym) seized power. It named as interim national president a previously relatively unknown figure, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. [...] Following the coup in December 2008, the United States suspended some bilateral development aid and all security assistance to Guinea. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) governance and humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension, nor were U.S. contributions toward Guinea's electoral process. After the September 28 crackdown, the United States called for Dadis Camara to step down and announced targeted travel restrictions against CNDD members and selected associates. The African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and European Union (EU) imposed an arms embargo. The AU and EU also imposed additional targeted sanctions on CNDD members and associates. Legislation related to Guinea in the 111th Congress has included H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen); S.Res. 345 (Boxer); and H.R. 3288 (Olver), which was signed into law as P.L. 111-117 on December 16, 2009. This report will be updated as events warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas; Arieff, Alexis2010-03-22
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Liberia's Post War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance [May 25, 2010]From the Document: "This report covers developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African country. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November, a key step in a peace-building process following its second civil war in a decade. That war began in 1999, escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war also destabilized neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of the Taylor regime. [...] The next election is scheduled for 2011, and President Sirleaf has announced that she will seek reelection. Liberia's security situation is stable but subject to periodic volatility. Progress in governance under the interim government that preceded that of President Sirleaf was mixed; widespread corruption within it was widely reported. Liberia's economy and state structures remain devastated by war but, along with humanitarian conditions, are improving. Liberia has received extensive U.S. post-war reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. In March 2006, former President Taylor was arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war crimes charges. He was later transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands, where he is on trial by the SCSL. In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia's post-war peace and reconstruction processes, Congress has maintained a continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and in ensuring funding for the SCSL. Other legislation proposed in the 109th and 110th Congresses centered on immigration, debt, and tax haven issues, and the commendation of Liberia for successfully holding elections. Liberia-specific legislation introduced or acted upon in the 111th Congress has included H.R. 1105 (Obey); H.R. 3288 (Olver); S. 656 (Reed); H.R. 2258 (Kennedy); H.R. 2410 (Berman); H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen); S. 1434 (Leahy); and H.R. 2346 (Obey)."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas2010-05-25
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 11, 2010]"The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach for reducing the Iranian threat by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration has downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States did not materially support the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-06-11
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 24, 2010]"The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach for reducing the Iranian threat by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States did not directly or materially support the domestic opposition movement that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-05-24
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Securing America's Borders: The Role of the Military [June 16, 2010]"The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with preventing the entry of terrorists, securing the borders, and carrying out immigration enforcement functions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, has primary responsibility for securing the borders of the United States, preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States, and enforcing hundreds of U.S. trade and immigration laws. Within CBP, the U.S. Border Patrol's mission is to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens across the nearly 7,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international borders and 2,000 miles of coastal borders surrounding Florida and Puerto Rico. Although the military does not have primary responsibility to secure the borders, the Armed Forces generally provide support to law enforcement and immigration authorities along the southern border. Reported escalations in criminal activity and illegal immigration, however, have prompted some lawmakers to reevaluate the extent and type of military support that occurs in the border region. On May 25, 2010, President Obama announced that up to 1,200 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol. Addressing domestic laws and activities with the military, however, might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which prohibits use of the Armed Forces to perform the tasks of civilian law enforcement unless explicitly authorized."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMason, R. Chuck2010-06-16
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 3, 2010]"Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. [United Nations] sanctions and apparently have prompted the Defense Department to try to develop additional options for preventing or containing a nuclear Iran. New U.N. sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran's nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. Additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction]-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. In the 111th Congress, conference action is underway on separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime's popularity even further. Others believe such steps could help the regime rebuild its support by painting the international community as punitive against the Iranian people. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, 'Iran Sanctions', by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40849, 'Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy', coordinated by Casey L. Addis; and CRS Report RL34544, 'Iran's Nuclear Program: Status', by Paul K. Kerr."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-05-03
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Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 111th Congress [November 4, 2009]"The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader have pledged to take up comprehensive immigration reform legislation at some point in the 111th Congress. It is unclear what the components of any immigration reform proposals that Congress may consider will be. In the past, comprehensive bills have addressed border security, enforcement of immigration laws within the United States (interior enforcement), employment eligibility verification, temporary worker programs, permanent admissions and, most controversially, unauthorized aliens in the United States. The 111th Congress has considered various immigration issues and has enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It has passed legislation (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-9, P.L. 111-68, P.L. 111-83) to extend the life of several immigration programs--the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers--all of which are currently authorized until September 30, 2012. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by this Congress are refugees (P.L. 111-8) and border security (P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-32). This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, and, for the most part, are not covered here."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceEster, Karma; Bruno, Andorra; Haddal, Chad C.2009-11-04
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Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 111th Congress [October 2, 2009]"It is unclear what the components of any immigration reform proposals that the 111th Congress may consider will be. In the past, comprehensive bills have addressed border security, enforcement of immigration laws within the United States (interior enforcement), employment eligibility verification, temporary worker programs, permanent admissions and, most controversially, unauthorized aliens in the United States. The 111th Congress has considered various immigration issues and has enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It has passed legislation (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-9, P.L. 111-68) to extend the life of several immigration programs--the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers--all of which are currently authorized until October 31, 2009. With respect to these programs, the House-passed and Senatepassed versions of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 2892), include different provisions to further extend E-Verify. The Senate-passed bill also would extend the other three programs. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by this Congress are refugees (P.L. 111-8) and border security (P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-32). This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, and, for the most part, are not covered here. This report will be updated as legislative developments occur."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceEster, Karma; Bruno, Andorra; Haddal, Chad C.2009-10-02
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Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States [September 30, 2009]"This report analyzes developments since the military's seizure of power in December 2008, Guinea's relations with the United States, and U.S. policy in the wake of the coup. It also provides background on Guinean history and politics." More Specifically, "the junta appointed a civilian prime minister, promised to hold presidential and legislative elections, and stated that its members would not become candidates in those elections. In August 2009, however, the elections were postponed from late 2009 to early 2010 and Dadis Camara publicly suggested that he may run for president, contradicting his repeated previous pledges not to prolong his presidential tenure and the CNDD ban on its members running for office[...]. The United States condemned the coup and suspended some bilateral development aid and all security assistance to Guinea, signaling a hiatus in what had been a cordial bilateral relationship during much of the Conté period. Prior to the coup, [...]. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)'s governance and humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension. Both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea's membership in response to the coup, but did not place sanctions on the CNDD. There is disagreement within Guinean political circles and among members of the international community over the relative utility and effects of suspending aid and, more generally, about what policies should define foreign governments' and multilateral bodies' relations with the junta."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas; Arieff, Alexis2009-09-30
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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues [Updated August 21, 2009]"Policy issues that have emerged in consideration of Mérida include what levels and types of funding should be provided; how well U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts are implementing the Initiative; and the degree to which the nations involved are fulfilling their domestic obligations under Mérida . Congress has expressed a keen interest in enforcement of Mérida's human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the Initiative."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceSeelke, Clare Ribando2009-08-21
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 22, 2009]"President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort has begun to be put in practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through a growing number of invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Iran's nuclear program. […]. Before Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential elections, there was debate over whether the new approaches would yield clear results. The U.S. strategy has been further complicated by the allegations of a 'stolen election' by the challengers to declared election winner, incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the large protests held to demand a new vote. Administration officials say that U.S. goals have not been altered by the election and President Obama, while criticizing Iran's use of violence against protesters, has not announced any changes in policy toward Iran. Congress has passed resolutions that express solidarity with the demonstrators and condemn the regime's repression of them. The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2009-06-22
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Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress [May 27, 2009]"A primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, Department) is to 'prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States.' Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Following a major reorganization of the DHS (called the Second Stage Review, or '2SR') in July 2005, former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local, and private sector partners. As the Obama Administration fills key positions within DHS and I&A, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Department's intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHSI produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. In addition, this year, the Department will produce its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive assessment that outlines its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Department's programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The results of the QHSR will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for the Department."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceRandol, Mark A.2009-05-27
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 19, 2009]"President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration on Iran, but the Obama Administration is formulating strategies and approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor. According to President Obama, the Administration intends to expand direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort was put in practice with a message to the Iranian people by President Obama marking Persian New Year (Nowruz), March 21, 2009, and a statement on April 8, 2009 that the United States would regularly attend multilateral meetings with Iran on its nuclear program. The Administration also has deemphasized potential U.S. military action, although without ruling that out completely, and it is not emphasizing efforts to promote democracy in Iran. Yet, there is debate among experts over whether these shifts will yield clear results. The policy decisions come as Iran enters its run-up to June 12, 2009 presidential elections, in which some prominent reformists, including Mir Hossein Musavi, are candidates. This increases the possibility the election might produce a somewhat more moderate government in Iran. The Bush Administration characterized Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The U.S. approach was to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying multilateral economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2009-05-19
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 14, 2009]This CRS report discusses U.S. concerns and policy responses to Iran. "President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration on Iran, but the Obama Administration officials is formulating strategies and approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of the Bush Administration. First and foremost, according to President Obama, the Administration is looking for opportunities to expand direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This was put in practice with a message to the Iranian people by President Obama marking Persian New Year (Nowruz), March 21, 2009, and a statement on April 8, 2009 that the United States would consistently attend multilateral meetings with Iran on its nuclear program. His Administration also appears to be de-emphasizing potential U.S. military action, although without ruling that out completely, and is not promoting efforts to promote democracy in Iran. Yet, there is debate among experts over whether such shifts would yield clearer results. The policy decisions come as Iran enters its run-up to June 12, 2009 presidential elections, which, now that a key reformist, Mir Hossein Musavi has entered the race, might produce more moderate leadership in Iran."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2009-04-14
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [August 6, 2009]"President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. [...] The Administration's Iran policy is in flux because of the Iranian crackdown against protesters who alleged vast fraud in the June 12, 2009 presidential election, in which incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was declared the winner. [...] President Obama has criticized Iran's use of violence against protesters, but some in the Administration want to take advantage of Iran's internal weakness to obtain a compromise that curbs Iran's nuclear program. The Administration has indicated that, if Iran refuses to return to the nuclear bargaining table by September 2009 in earnest, it would return to working with allies to resume sanctioning and pressuring Iran. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline. Some of the measures contained in these bills have begun to advance as a consequence of the election-related violence.[...] The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2009-08-06
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [July 2, 2009]"President Obama has said his Administration shares the goals of the previous Administration to contain Iran's strategic capabilities and regional influence, but the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor--in particular through expanded direct diplomatic engagement with Iran. This effort has begun to be put in practice with messages to the Iranian people by President Obama, and through a growing number of invitations to and contact with Iranian diplomats at multilateral meetings, including those on Iran's nuclear program. [...] The Administration strategy on Iran is in some flux because of the allegations of a 'stolen election' by the challengers to declared winner of the June 12, 2009 presidential election, incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the crackdown against protesters who demanded a new vote. President Obama has criticized Iran's use of violence against protesters, and observers say that the Administration might try to take advantage of Iran's internal weakness to obtain a compromise that curbs Iran's nuclear program. If Iran refuses to return to the nuclear bargaining table, the Administration might focus, at an earlier than expected stage, on sanctioning and pressuring Iran. Bills in the 111th Congress, such as H.R. 2194 and S. 908, would tighten U.S. sanctions on Iran by amending the Iran Sanctions Act to penalize sales to Iran of gasoline and some of the measures contained in these bills have begun to advance as a consequence of the election-related violence. [...] The Obama Administration has not changed the previous Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2009-07-07
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [February 16, 2010]"The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has formulated approaches to achieve those goals that differ from those of its predecessor by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by downplaying discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities. With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has burgeoned since alleged wide scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition 'Green movement.' In December 2009, Administration statements shifted toward greater public support of the Green movement, but Administration officials appear to believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a low U.S. public profile on the unrest. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional attention to the plight of Iran's opposition and support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects. Iran's neighbors continue to engage the regime in normal trade and diplomatic exchange, although it is widely believed that many regional leaders, particularly the Persian Gulf states, are hoping for a regime collapse. At the same time, the Administration does not want to forego its diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-02-16
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Macedonia (FYROM): Post-Conflict Situation and U.S. Policy [Updated January 24, 2005]From the Document: "In early 2001, an eight-month conflict between ethnic Albanian insurgent forces and Macedonian police and security forces threatened to derail the country's fragile stability and lead to another extended conflict in the Balkans. Later that year, U.S. and European intervention led to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which outlined a package of political reforms to expand the rights of the ethnic Albanian minority while rebel forces were disarmed and disbanded under NATO supervision. Macedonia's current multi-ethnic government remains committed to the Ohrid process and seeks eventual membership in NATO and the European Union. Prospects for economic development remain modest and compromised by organized criminal activity. Some extremist political sentiment, mainly among opposition parties, point to ongoing risks to security and stability. However, an opposition sponsored referendum on November 7, 2004, intended to halt plans for decentralization and local governmental reforms called for under the Ohrid accords, failed due to low turnout. The unresolved status of neighboring Kosovo has affected perceptions of regional stability and any final outcome of the status issue in Kosovo is likely to have significant consequences for Macedonia."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKim, Julie2005-01-24
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 28, 2009]This CRS report discusses U.S. concerns and policy responses to Iran. "The Bush Administration characterized Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. The Bush Administration's approach was to try to prevent a nuclear breakout by Iran by applying coordinated international economic pressure on Iran while also offering it potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. The incorporation of diplomacy and engagement into the overall U.S. strategy led the Administration to approve the participation of a high-level State Department official at multilateral nuclear talks with Iran on July 19, 2008, although that meeting, and subsequent discussions, have not resulted in Iran's acceptance of the international offer of incentives. To strengthen its approach, the Bush Administration maintained a substantial naval presence in the Persian Gulf, which U.S. commanders insist would prevent any Iranian attempts to close the crucial Strait of Hormuz for any extended period."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2009-01-28
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [Updated September 24, 2008]This is an updated report from the Congressional Research Service about security threats from Iran and policy responses. "The Bush Administration characterizes Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated primarily by Iran's nuclear program and its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. […] The Bush Administration approach to contain the potential threat posed by Iran's nuclear program is to strengthen international economic pressure on Iran while also offering Iran potential cooperation should it comply with the international demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. […] A new U.N. Security Council resolution is being considered, although progress reportedly has been slowed by U.S.-Russia tensions over Georgia. A previous three U.N. resolutions (1737, 1747, and 1803) impose sanctions that ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related trade with Iran; freeze the assets of Iran's nuclear and related entities and personalities; prevent Iran from transferring arms outside Iran; ban or require reporting on international travel by named Iranians; call for inspections of some Iranian sea and airborne cargo shipments; and call for restrictions on dealings with some Iranian banks. […] The Administration strongly denies that it is planning to take military action against Iran, but has refused to rule it out if no other efforts to curb Iran's uranium enrichment program succeed."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2008-09-24
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China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States [Updated April 4, 2006]"China's developing relationship with Southeast Asia is undergoing a significant shift. This will likely have implications for United States' interests in the region. While the United States has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, China has been evolving its external engagement with its neighbors, particularly in Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, China was perceived as a threat to its Southeast Asian neighbors in part due to its conflicting territorial claims over the South China Sea and past support of communist insurgency. This perception began to change in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 when China resisted pressure to devalue its currency while the currencies of its neighbors were in free fall. Today, China's 'charm offensive' has downplayed territorial disputes while focusing on trade relations with Southeast Asia which are viewed by some as the catalyst for expanding political and security linkages. In November 2004, China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) agreed to gradually remove tariffs and create the world's largest free trade area by 2010. China is also beginning to develop bilateral and multilateral security relationships with Southeast Asian states."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceVaughn, Bruce, 1963-2006-04-04