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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [January 19, 2011]This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses U.S. concerns and policy responses to Iran. "The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010. [...] Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects, or, at the very least, to sharply increase international criticism of Iran's human rights practices. Some observers believe that initiatives in the 112th Congress are likely to focus on providing additional help to those in Iran who want to change the regime. However, Obama Administration officials say they believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a muting of U.S. public support for the opposition."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-01-19
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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns [February 1, 2011]"Congress has responded to the situation in Belarus with legislation. The Belarus Democracy Act (P.L. 108-347) authorized aid for pro-democracy forces in Belarus and funding for increased U.S.-sponsored broadcasting to Belarus. The bill supported sanctions on Belarus and top leaders of the Lukashenko regime until Belarus met specific democratic and human rights criteria. The bill also required the President to report to Congress on the sale by Belarus of weapons or weapons-related assistance to regimes supporting terrorism, and on the personal wealth of Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian leaders. The 109th Congress passed several resolutions criticizing human rights abuses and calling on Belarus to hold free and fair elections. In January 2007, President Bush signed the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act (P.L. 109-480), which reauthorized and updated the provisions of the original Belarus Democracy Act. On January 26, 2011, Representative Chris Smith introduced H.R. 515, which would reauthorize the Belarus Democracy Act."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceWoehrel, Steven J.2011-02-01
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 4, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. The Administration held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010. However, as of February 2011, the Administration may be shifting to increased support of the Green movement. No nuclear agreement appears within reach with Iran, the Green movement has reactivated in the wake of the February 2011 ousting of Egyptian President Mubarak by a youth-led democracy movement similar to the Green movement, and many in the 112th Congress believe the United States should support virtually all popular democracy movements in the Middle East, including in Iran."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-03-04
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Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests [May 11, 2011]"Kyrgyzstan is a small and poor Central Asian country that gained independence in 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The United States has been interested in helping Kyrgyzstan to enhance its sovereignty and territorial integrity, increase democratic participation and civil society, bolster economic reform and development, strengthen human rights, prevent weapons proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational terrorism and trafficking in persons and narcotics. The United States has pursued these interests throughout Central Asia, with special strategic attention to oil-rich Kazakhstan and somewhat less to Kyrgyzstan. The significance of Kyrgyzstan to the United States increased after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Kyrgyzstan offered to host U.S. forces at an airbase at the Manas international airport outside of the capital, Bishkek, and it opened in December 2001. The U.S. military repaired and later upgraded the air field for aerial refueling, airlift and airdrop, medical evacuation, and support for U.S. and coalition personnel and cargo transiting in and out of Afghanistan. The Kyrgyz government threatened to close down the airbase in early 2009, but renewed the lease on the airbase (renamed the Manas Transit Center) in June 2009 after the United States agreed to higher lease and other payments. Current President Roza Otunbayeva has declared that the interim government will support the continued presence of the transit center, although some changes to the lease may be sought in the future, in recognition that ongoing instability in Afghanistan jeopardizes Kyrgyzstan and wider regional security. In 2011, the Manas Transit Center hosted about 850 U.S. troops and 750 contractors and a fleet of KC-135 refueling tankers."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceNichol, James P.2011-05-11
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Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights [April 1, 2011]"Iraq's political system is increasingly characterized by peaceful competition and formation of cross-sectarian alliances, although ethnic and sectarian infighting continues, sometimes involving the questionable use of key levers of power and legal institutions. This infighting--and the belief that holding political power may mean the difference between life and death for the various political communities--significantly delayed agreement on a new government that was to be selected following the March 7, 2010, national elections for the Council of Representatives (COR, parliament). With U.S. diplomatic intervention, on November 10, 2010, major ethnic and sectarian factions agreed on a framework for a new government, breaking the long deadlock. Their agreement, under which Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki serves a second term, was implemented in the formation of a broad-based cabinet on December 21, 2010. The participation of all major factions in the new government was considered stabilizing politically and created some political momentum to act on key outstanding legislation crucial to attracting foreign investment, such as national hydrocarbon laws. The new government took action on some long-stalled initiatives, including year-long tensions over Kurdish exports of oil. However, the lack of a broader and sustained focus on governance, or on improving key services, such as electricity, created popular frustration that manifested as protests since February 2011. The protests were possibly inspired by the wave of unrest that has broken out in many other Middle Eastern countries but were not centered on overthrowing the regime or wholesale political change. Some force was used to suppress them, but the major effect was to renew tensions among and within major factions rather than to inspire new attempts to improve government performance."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-01
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 18, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Throughout its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. The Administration held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010. Without obtaining agreement from Iran to implement a compromise outlined on October 1, 2009, during 2010 the Administration worked to expand international economic sanctions against Iran. Major sanctions were imposed on Iran by U.N. Security Council (Resolution 1929), as well as related 'national measures' by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and other countries. Additional measures designed to compel foreign firms to exit the Iranian market were contained in U.S. legislation passed in June 2010 (the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, P.L. 111-195). Still, the Administration and its partners assert that these sanctions were intended to support diplomacy with Iran to limit its nuclear program. Iran attended December 6-7, 2010, talks in Geneva with the six powers negotiating with Iran, but no substantive progress was reported."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-04-18
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 9, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its materiel assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Throughout its first year, the Obama Administration offered Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. […] Others in and outside the 112th Congress believe that the U.S. focus should remain on pressing Iran economically and diplomatically. Sanctions, by some accounts, have slowed Iran's nuclear program directly and may be contributing to a widening schism between Iran's Supreme Leader and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad but have not evidently caused Iran to fundamentally rethink its nuclear negotiating position. The apparent slowing of Iran's nuclear program has, at least temporarily, quieted discussion in Israeli and U.S. expert circles about using military action to set Iran's nuclear program back. The Administration has stepped up arms sales to regional states that share the U.S. suspicions of Iran's intentions."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-06-09
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [February 14, 2011]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed any discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities or efforts to try to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that took place for the six months following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election but largely ceased in 2010."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2011-02-14
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Economics and National Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Policy [January 4, 2011]"As the world begins the second decade of the twenty-first century, the United States holds what should be a winning hand of a preeminent military, large economy, strong alliances, and democratic values. The nation's security should be secure. Yet the debate over national security seems to be both intensifying and broadening. The problem appears not only in the difficulty of finding a winning strategy in the long war against acts of terrorism but having to face economic constraints that loom large in the public debate. In addition, the global financial crisis and recession have highlighted the trade-off between spending to protect against external threats and spending to provide jobs and income for citizens at home. The United States has long been accustomed to pursuing a 'rich man's' approach to national security. The country could field an overwhelming fighting force and combine it with economic power and leadership in global affairs to bring to bear far greater resources than any other country against any threat to the nation's security. The economy has always been there both to provide the funds and materiel for defense and to provide economic security for most households. Policies for economic growth and issues such as unemployment have been viewed as domestic problems largely separate from considerations of national security."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceNanto, Dick Kazuyuki2011-01-04
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [December 22, 2010]"The Obama Administration views Iran as a major threat to U.S. national security interests, a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. Particularly in its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by offering Iran's leaders consistent and sustained engagement with the potential for closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent and respect for Iran's history and stature in the region, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election. [...] There is broad agreement that the U.S., U.N. [United Nations], and other sanctions enacted since mid-2010 are pressing Iran economically. However, because the sanctions have not and might not cause Iran to fundamentally alter its commitment to its nuclear program, some are pressing the Administration not to de-emphasize military action as a means of setting Iran's nuclear program back. The Administration has stepped up arms sales and engagement with regional states that might be helpful to contain Iranian power, were Iran's nuclear program to advance dramatically. Some believe that only a victory by the domestic opposition in Iran, which in late 2009 appeared to pose a potentially serious challenge to the regime's grip on power, can permanently reduce the multiplicity of threats posed by Iran's regime. Congressional resolutions and legislation since mid-2009 show growing congressional support for steps to enhance the opposition's prospects, or, at the very least, to sharply increase international criticism of Iran's human rights practices. However, Obama Administration officials say they believe that the opposition's prospects are enhanced by a muting of U.S. public support for the opposition."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-12-22
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States [November 24, 2010]"The past two years have seen a series of deep changes in Guinea's political landscape, a new experience for a country that had only two presidents in the first 50 years after independence in 1958. In June 2010, Guineans voted in the country's first presidential election organized by an independent electoral commission and without an incumbent candidate. A presidential run-off poll was held in early November, but provisional results have yet to be certified by the Supreme Court. The election is expected to bring an end to two years of military rule, which began after a junta seized power in December 2008 following the death of Guinea's long-time president, Lansana Conté. Many Guineans and foreign diplomats also expect the election to provide a stepping-stone toward reforming state institutions and implementing the rule of law, considered a prerequisite for greater private sector investment and increased respect for human rights. At the same time, the election has sparked incidents of ethnic violence and reported abuses by security forces that could threaten the political transition. [...] U.S. interests and associated policy challenges in Guinea center on democratization and good governance; counternarcotics issues; security sector reform; bilateral economic interests and relations; regional peace and stability; and socioeconomic and institutional development. The United States suspended some development aid and all security assistance to Guinea in the wake of the 2008 coup. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) governance and humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension; nor were U.S. contributions toward Guinea's electoral process. In response to a military crackdown on opposition supporters in September 2009, the United States called for Dadis Camara to step down and announced targeted travel restrictions against National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) members and selected associates. After a military-led transitional government was formed in January 2010, some U.S. restrictions on security assistance were rolled back, and bilateral aid is expected to increase if the transition to elected government is completed."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas; Arieff, Alexis2010-11-24
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Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 111th Congress [January 18, 2011]"The Speaker of the House and the Senate majority leader of the 111th Congress pledged to take up comprehensive immigration reform legislation, the most controversial piece of which concerns unauthorized aliens in the United States. Although the 111th Congress did not take up a comprehensive immigration bill, it did consider a narrower DREAM Act proposal to legalize the status of certain unauthorized alien students. On December 8, 2010, the House approved a version of the DREAM Act as an amendment to an unrelated bill, the Removal Clarification Act of 2010 (H.R. 5281). A cloture motion in the Senate to agree to the House DREAM Act amendment failed on a 55-41 vote on December 18, 2010. The 111th Congress also considered other immigration issues and enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It passed legislation (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-9, P.L. 111-68, P.L. 111-83) to extend the life of several immigration programs--the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers--until September 30, 2012. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by the 111th Congress were border security (P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-32, P.L. 111-83, P.L. 111-230, P.L. 111-281, P.L. 111-376), refugees (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-117), and Haitian migrants (P.L. 111-212, P.L. 111-293). This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R40642, 'Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations,' and, for the most part, are not covered here."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceEster, Karma; Bruno, Andorra; Lee, Margaret Mikyung2011-01-18
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Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy [September 29, 2010]"After experiencing serious unrest during the late 1990s, Bahrain undertook several steps to enhance the inclusion of the Shiite majority in governance. However, the Sunni-led government's efforts to maintain its tight grip on power have stirred new unrest among Bahraini Shiites in advance of October 23, 2010, parliamentary elections. That election, no matter the outcome, would not produce a new executive, but achievement of a Shiite majority in the elected lower house could give the opposition greater authority with which to challenge the ruling Al Khalifa family. In advance of the elections, the government has launched a wave of arrests intended to try to discredit some of the hardline Shiite leadership as fomenters of violence and tools of Iran. The crackdown has perhaps contributed to increasing Shiite popular protests in advance of the elections. [...] Bahrain has few external security options other than relying on some degree of U.S. security guarantee. Bahrain has tried to earn that guarantee by hosting U.S. naval headquarters for the Gulf for over 60 years and by providing facilities and small numbers of personnel for U.S. war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has designated Bahrain as a 'major non-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally,' and it provides small amounts of security assistance to Bahrain. On other regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, Bahrain has tended to defer to Saudi Arabia or other powers to take the lead in formulating proposals or representing the position of the Persian Gulf states, collectively. These areas of strong U.S.-Bahrain cooperation have caused some public criticism of successive U.S. Administrations, including by some in Congress, for muting criticism of Bahrain's human rights record in the interests of ensuring Bahrain's cooperation on security issues. In September 2004, the United States and Bahrain signed a free trade agreement (FTA); legislation implementing it was signed January 11, 2006 (P.L. 109-169)."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-09-29
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Mexican Economy After the Global Financial Crisis [September 9, 2010]"The state of Mexico's economy is important for U.S. policymakers for many reasons, most significantly because a prosperous and democratic neighboring country is in the best interest of the United States. The two countries have strong economic, political, and social ties, which have direct policy implications related to bilateral trade, economic competitiveness, migration, and border security. In May 2010, President Barack Obama hosted Mexican President Felipe Calderón at a meeting in the White House in which the two leaders discussed key issues affecting the two countries. They agreed to continue and reinforce cooperation on creating jobs, promoting economic recovery and expansion, and encouraging inclusive prosperity across all levels of society in both countries. The 111th Congress is likely to maintain an active interest in Mexico on issues related to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other trade issues, economic conditions in Mexico, migration, border security issues, and counter-narcotics. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 and the U.S. economic downturn had strong adverse effects on the Mexican economy, largely due to its economic ties and dependence on the U.S. market. Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 6.6% in 2009, the sharpest decline of any Latin American economy. Mexico's reliance on the United States as an export market and the relative importance of exports to its overall economic performance make it highly susceptible to fluctuations in the U.S. economy. Most other Latin American countries are not as dependent on the United States as an export market. Economic reforms over the past 20 years and the government's responses to the effects of the global financial crisis have helped Mexico weather the economic downturn and improve conditions in 2010. However, sustained economic recovery will likely depend on the U.S. economic recovery and the ability to sustain this growth."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceVillarreal, M. Angeles2010-09-09
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [August 20, 2010]"The Obama Administration has adopted the long-standing assessment of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests.' This threat perception is generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the previous U.S. approach by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and repeatedly insisted that it did not seek to change Iran's regime. It held to this position even at the height of the protests by the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-08-20
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Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law [March 26, 2010]From the Document: "Crime is usually territorial. It is a matter of the law of the place where it occurs. Nevertheless, a surprising number of American criminal laws apply outside of the United States. Application is generally a question of legislative intent, expressed or implied. In either case, it most often involves crimes committed aboard a ship or airplane, crimes condemned by international treaty, crimes committed against government employees or property, or crimes that have an impact in this country even if planned or committed in part elsewhere. Although the crimes over which the United States has extraterritorial jurisdiction may be many, so are the obstacles to their enforcement. For both practical and diplomatic reasons, criminal investigations within another country require the acquiescence, consent, or preferably the assistance, of the authorities of the host country. The United States has mutual legal assistance treaties with several countries designed to formalize such cooperative law enforcement assistance. Searches and interrogations carried out jointly with foreign officials, certainly if they involve Americans, must be conducted within the confines of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. And the Sixth Amendment imposes limits upon the use in American criminal trials of depositions taken abroad."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceDoyle, Charles2010-03-26
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Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: Funding and Policy Issues [April 19, 2010]"Increasing violence perpetrated by drug trafficking organizations and other criminal groups is threatening citizen security in Mexico and Central America. Drug trafficking-related violence claimed more than 6,500 lives in Mexico in 2009, and several Central American countries have among the world's highest homicide rates. Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) dominate the illicit drug market in the United States and are expanding their operations by forming partnerships with U.S. gangs. […]. Congress has also monitored enforcement of Mérida's human rights conditions, particularly with respect to Mexico. Congress is playing a role in the design of post-Mérida security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Basin during its consideration of the Obama Administration's FY2011 budget request. For FY2011, the Administration has asked for $310 million in assistance for Mérida programs in Mexico, $100 million for CARSI, and $79 million for CBSI. Detailed strategy documents for CARSI and CBSI are not yet available, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced a new strategy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation after a high-level meeting in Mexico City on March 23, 2010. The plan focuses on (1) disrupting organized criminal groups; (2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) building a 21st-century border; and (4) building strong and resilient communities. This report provides an overview of the funding provided for the Mérida Initiative and related assistance programs in Central America and the Caribbean, the status of Mérida implementation, and a discussion of some policy issues that Congress may consider as it oversees the initiative and related programs."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceSeelke, Clare Ribando2010-04-19
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [March 11, 2010]"With the nuclear issue unresolved, the domestic unrest in Iran that has occurred since alleged wide-scale fraud was committed in Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election has presented the Administration with a potential choice of continuing the engagement or backing the opposition 'Green movement.' [...] Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. sanctions. New sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran's nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. [...] Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. Each chamber in the 111th Congress has passed separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime's popularity even further."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-03-11
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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns [April 15, 2010]"For many years, the United States pursued a policy of 'selective engagement,' which limited ties to the regime while providing modest support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The United States and the European Union also imposed sanctions on Belarusian leaders. In March 2008, Belarus withdrew its ambassador from Washington and forced the United States to recall its ambassador from Minsk, in response to what Belarus perceived as a tightening of U.S. sanctions. In 2008, the United States and European Union changed tactics in their policy toward to Belarus. They moved to suspend some sanctions against the regime in exchange for very modest improvements on human rights issues. In October 2008, the EU suspended a travel ban on Lukashenko and other Belarusian leaders, and has extended the suspension several times since then. The United States has relaxed sanctions against several subsidiaries of the state-owned oil and petrochemicals firm Belneftekhim. Analysts have attributed the policy shift, in which the EU has played the leading role, to a variety of factors, including concerns about Russia's increasing assertiveness in its relations with neighboring countries, especially after Russia's military assault on Georgia in August 2008. In May 2009, Belarus was permitted to join the EU's Eastern Partnership program, which could provide Belarus with EU aid and other forms of cooperation. This EU opening toward Belarus has continued despite the fact that Belarus has failed to make progress on human rights issues and has even regressed in some areas."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceWoehrel, Steven J.2010-04-15
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [April 1, 2010]"The Obama Administration, as have the several previous Administrations, has articulated U.S. policy goals as ensuring that Iran does not become a nuclear armed state and reducing Iran's ability to undermine U.S. objectives and allies in the Middle East. The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. However, the Obama Administration has altered the U.S. approach to achieve those goals by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders a vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration has downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States is not directly or materially supporting the domestic opposition movement that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-04-01
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Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress [March 19, 2010]"The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, the Department) is to 'prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). [...] Today, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) consists of I&A [Intelligence and Analysis], two headquarters elements supported by I&A, and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department's intelligence component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR [Second Stage Review] reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. [...] This report provides an overview of the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHS IE is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues. This report may be updated."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceRandol, Mark A.2010-03-19
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Guinea: Background and Relations with the United States [March 22, 2010]"This report analyzes developments in Guinea, a poor West African country, following the death of longtime president and former military leader Lansana Conté in December 2008. It focuses on the military's seizure of power after Conté's death, U.S.-Guinea bilateral relations, and U.S. policy in the wake of the coup. It also provides background on Guinean history and politics. [...] On December 23, 2008, following the death of President Conté, a military junta calling itself the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD, after its French acronym) seized power. It named as interim national president a previously relatively unknown figure, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. [...] Following the coup in December 2008, the United States suspended some bilateral development aid and all security assistance to Guinea. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) governance and humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension, nor were U.S. contributions toward Guinea's electoral process. After the September 28 crackdown, the United States called for Dadis Camara to step down and announced targeted travel restrictions against CNDD members and selected associates. The African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and European Union (EU) imposed an arms embargo. The AU and EU also imposed additional targeted sanctions on CNDD members and associates. Legislation related to Guinea in the 111th Congress has included H.Res. 1013 (Ros-Lehtinen); S.Res. 345 (Boxer); and H.R. 3288 (Olver), which was signed into law as P.L. 111-117 on December 16, 2009. This report will be updated as events warrant."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas; Arieff, Alexis2010-03-22
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Liberia's Post War Development: Key Issues and U.S. Assistance [May 25, 2010]From the Document: "This report covers developments in Liberia, a small, poor West African country. Liberia held elections in October 2005, with a presidential runoff in November, a key step in a peace-building process following its second civil war in a decade. That war began in 1999, escalated in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups. The war also destabilized neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of the Taylor regime. [...] The next election is scheduled for 2011, and President Sirleaf has announced that she will seek reelection. Liberia's security situation is stable but subject to periodic volatility. Progress in governance under the interim government that preceded that of President Sirleaf was mixed; widespread corruption within it was widely reported. Liberia's economy and state structures remain devastated by war but, along with humanitarian conditions, are improving. Liberia has received extensive U.S. post-war reconstruction and security sector reform assistance. In March 2006, former President Taylor was arrested in Nigeria and transferred to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) to face war crimes charges. He was later transferred to The Hague, the Netherlands, where he is on trial by the SCSL. In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia's post-war peace and reconstruction processes, Congress has maintained a continuing interest in the status of Charles Taylor and in ensuring funding for the SCSL. Other legislation proposed in the 109th and 110th Congresses centered on immigration, debt, and tax haven issues, and the commendation of Liberia for successfully holding elections. Liberia-specific legislation introduced or acted upon in the 111th Congress has included H.R. 1105 (Obey); H.R. 3288 (Olver); S. 656 (Reed); H.R. 2258 (Kennedy); H.R. 2410 (Berman); H.R. 2475 (Ros-Lehtinen); S. 1434 (Leahy); and H.R. 2346 (Obey)."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas2010-05-25
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [June 11, 2010]"The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach for reducing the Iranian threat by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration has downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States did not materially support the domestic opposition 'Green movement' that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-06-11
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 24, 2010]"The Obama Administration has not changed the Bush Administration's characterization of Iran as a 'profound threat to U.S. national security interests,' a perception generated not only by Iran's nuclear program but also by its military assistance to armed groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the Palestinian group Hamas, and to Lebanese Hezbollah. In its first year, the Obama Administration altered the U.S. approach for reducing the Iranian threat by expanding direct diplomatic engagement with Iran's government and by offering Iran's leaders an alternative vision of closer integration with and acceptance by the West. To try to convince Iranian leaders of peaceful U.S. intent, the Obama Administration downplayed discussion of potential U.S. military action against Iranian nuclear facilities and has repeatedly insisted that the United States did not directly or materially support the domestic opposition movement that emerged following Iran's June 12, 2009, presidential election."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-05-24
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Securing America's Borders: The Role of the Military [June 16, 2010]"The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with preventing the entry of terrorists, securing the borders, and carrying out immigration enforcement functions. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), a component of DHS, has primary responsibility for securing the borders of the United States, preventing terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States, and enforcing hundreds of U.S. trade and immigration laws. Within CBP, the U.S. Border Patrol's mission is to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens across the nearly 7,000 miles of Mexican and Canadian international borders and 2,000 miles of coastal borders surrounding Florida and Puerto Rico. Although the military does not have primary responsibility to secure the borders, the Armed Forces generally provide support to law enforcement and immigration authorities along the southern border. Reported escalations in criminal activity and illegal immigration, however, have prompted some lawmakers to reevaluate the extent and type of military support that occurs in the border region. On May 25, 2010, President Obama announced that up to 1,200 National Guard troops would be sent to the border to support the Border Patrol. Addressing domestic laws and activities with the military, however, might run afoul of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), which prohibits use of the Armed Forces to perform the tasks of civilian law enforcement unless explicitly authorized."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceMason, R. Chuck2010-06-16
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses [May 3, 2010]"Even at the height of the Green movement protests, the Obama Administration did not forego diplomatic options to blunt Iran's nuclear progress and says it remains open to a nuclear deal if Iran fully accepts a framework Iran tentatively agreed to in multilateral talks on October 1, 2009. However, Iran did not accept the technical details of this by the notional deadline of the end of 2009, nor has it adequately responded to international concerns about possible work on a nuclear weapons program. These concerns have sparked renewed multilateral discussions of more U.N. [United Nations] sanctions and apparently have prompted the Defense Department to try to develop additional options for preventing or containing a nuclear Iran. New U.N. sanctions under negotiation would target members and companies of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is not only a pillar of Iran's nuclear program but is also the main element used by the regime to crack down against the protesters. Additional U.N. Security Council sanctions would build on those put in place since 2006. These sanctions generally are targeted against WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction]-related trade with Iran, but also ban Iran from transferring arms outside Iran and restrict dealings with some Iranian banks. Separate U.S. efforts to persuade European governments to curb trade with, investment in, and credits for Iran, and to convince foreign banks not to do business with Iran, are intended to compound the U.N. pressure. In the 111th Congress, conference action is underway on separate legislation to try to curb sales to Iran of gasoline, which many Members believe could help pressure Iran into a nuclear settlement or undermine the regime's popularity even further. Others believe such steps could help the regime rebuild its support by painting the international community as punitive against the Iranian people. For further information, see CRS [Congressional Research Service] Report RS20871, 'Iran Sanctions', by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R40849, 'Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy', coordinated by Casey L. Addis; and CRS Report RL34544, 'Iran's Nuclear Program: Status', by Paul K. Kerr."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceKatzman, Kenneth2010-05-03
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Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 111th Congress [November 4, 2009]"The Speaker of the House and the Senate Majority Leader have pledged to take up comprehensive immigration reform legislation at some point in the 111th Congress. It is unclear what the components of any immigration reform proposals that Congress may consider will be. In the past, comprehensive bills have addressed border security, enforcement of immigration laws within the United States (interior enforcement), employment eligibility verification, temporary worker programs, permanent admissions and, most controversially, unauthorized aliens in the United States. The 111th Congress has considered various immigration issues and has enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It has passed legislation (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-9, P.L. 111-68, P.L. 111-83) to extend the life of several immigration programs--the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers--all of which are currently authorized until September 30, 2012. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by this Congress are refugees (P.L. 111-8) and border security (P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-32). This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, and, for the most part, are not covered here."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceEster, Karma; Bruno, Andorra; Haddal, Chad C.2009-11-04
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Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 111th Congress [October 2, 2009]"It is unclear what the components of any immigration reform proposals that the 111th Congress may consider will be. In the past, comprehensive bills have addressed border security, enforcement of immigration laws within the United States (interior enforcement), employment eligibility verification, temporary worker programs, permanent admissions and, most controversially, unauthorized aliens in the United States. The 111th Congress has considered various immigration issues and has enacted a number of targeted immigration provisions. It has passed legislation (P.L. 111-8, P.L. 111-9, P.L. 111-68) to extend the life of several immigration programs--the E-Verify electronic employment eligibility verification system, the Immigrant Investor Regional Center Program, the Conrad State J-1 Waiver Program, and the special immigrant visa for religious workers--all of which are currently authorized until October 31, 2009. With respect to these programs, the House-passed and Senatepassed versions of the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (H.R. 2892), include different provisions to further extend E-Verify. The Senate-passed bill also would extend the other three programs. Among the other subjects of legislation enacted by this Congress are refugees (P.L. 111-8) and border security (P.L. 111-5, P.L. 111-32). This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have seen legislative action or are of significant congressional interest. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R40642, Homeland Security Department: FY2010 Appropriations, and, for the most part, are not covered here. This report will be updated as legislative developments occur."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceEster, Karma; Bruno, Andorra; Haddal, Chad C.2009-10-02
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Guinea's 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States [September 30, 2009]"This report analyzes developments since the military's seizure of power in December 2008, Guinea's relations with the United States, and U.S. policy in the wake of the coup. It also provides background on Guinean history and politics." More Specifically, "the junta appointed a civilian prime minister, promised to hold presidential and legislative elections, and stated that its members would not become candidates in those elections. In August 2009, however, the elections were postponed from late 2009 to early 2010 and Dadis Camara publicly suggested that he may run for president, contradicting his repeated previous pledges not to prolong his presidential tenure and the CNDD ban on its members running for office[...]. The United States condemned the coup and suspended some bilateral development aid and all security assistance to Guinea, signaling a hiatus in what had been a cordial bilateral relationship during much of the Conté period. Prior to the coup, [...]. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)'s governance and humanitarian assistance programs, which comprised a substantial portion of the U.S. aid budget in Guinea before the coup, were not affected by the suspension. Both the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) suspended Guinea's membership in response to the coup, but did not place sanctions on the CNDD. There is disagreement within Guinean political circles and among members of the international community over the relative utility and effects of suspending aid and, more generally, about what policies should define foreign governments' and multilateral bodies' relations with the junta."Library of Congress. Congressional Research ServiceCook, Nicolas; Arieff, Alexis2009-09-30