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Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Warfare Agents
This report addresses the following issues and provides the basis for more detailed discussion of funding and program priorities, particularly in the area of medical biological defense research: the national security threats posed by such potential developments of new agents through advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering; recommendations related to reducing the impact of progress in these areas; the utility of increased emphasis on research and development of medical countermeasures related to mid-term or far-term biowarfare threat agents; and other measures that could reduce the threat of these technological advances and reduce the threat of biological agent and weapons proliferation.
United States. Department of Defense
1996
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Chemical and Biological Defense Primer
The following is a October 2001 document prepared by the DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program describing CBW Characteristics, chemical and biological warfare agents, and current CBW threats.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-10
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Department of Defense: Biological Defense Program Needs for Strategic Biotechnology Development
This presentation gives an overview of the principles of biological defense. Potential Biological Weapons Agents, a historical perpsective on the DoD CB defense program, biodefense vaccines, Homeland Security inititatives, and other issues concerning the development and use of BW and vaccines against BW are all outlined in this presentation. Evolving challenges related to this topic are as follows: supporting homeland security roles and missions, enhancing CB installation force protection, acceleration of CB defense technologies, maintaining current programs to respond to warfighter requirements, and cooperation/strategy with HHS on vaccine development and deployment.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-04-30
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, Statement for the Record by Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Government officials are increasingly concerned about computer attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intentions, including terrorists and nations engaging in information warfare. The dramatic rise in the interconnectivity of computer systems has compounded this threat. Today, massive computer networks provide pathways among systems that, if not properly secured, can be used to gain unauthorized access to data and operations from remote locations. The National Plan for Information Systems Protection calls for strengthening the defenses against threats to critical public and private-sector computer systems--particularly those supporting public utilities, telecommunications, finance, emergency services, and government operations. The Plan is intended to begin a dialogue and help develop plans to protect other elements of the nation's infrastructure, including the physical infrastructure and the roles and responsibilities of state and local governments and private industry. In GAO's view, the Plan is an important and positive step toward building the cyber defenses necessary to protect critical information and infrastructures. It (1) identifies the risks arising from the nation's dependence on computer networks for critical services, (2) recognizes the need for the federal government to take the lead in addressing critical infrastructure risks and to serve as a model for information security, and (3) outlines key concepts and general initiatives to help achieve these goals. Opportunities exist, however, to improve the plan and address significant challenges to building the public-private partnership necessary for comprehensive infrastructure protections. GAO believes that, rather than emphasizing intrusion detection capabilities, the plan should strive to provide agencies with the incentives and the tools to implement the management controls essential to comprehensive computer security programs. Also, the plan relies heavily on legislation and requirements already in place that, as a whole, are outmoded and inadequate as well as poorly implemented by the agencies.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-02-01
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Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed: Statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta, Associate Director Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
This testimony draws on a recent GAO report on the management of federal medical stockpiles that would be used to treat civilians in a chemical or biological terrorist attack. (See GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 1999.) GAO highlights the problems that it found with the management of the stockpiles, discusses the results of its actual count of stockpiled supplies, and provides information on the progress made since GAO's last report was issued.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-08
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Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
One of the major shortcomings in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the lack of linkage among the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources. Improvements are also needed in intergovernmental relations at the federal, state, and local levels. The reality is that the federal government cannot respond on its own to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The Gilmore Panel, which issued its first report last year, found may of the same problems that GAO has cited, including the need for (1) more rigorous analyses of the threat, (2) better management of federal programs, (3) stronger coordination with state and local officials, and (4) a national strategy to combat terrorism.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-04-06
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems, Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The unprecedented growth in use of the Internet has revolutionized the way much of the world communicates and conducts business. Without proper safeguards, this widespread interconnectivity poses enormous risks to America's computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. For example, hostile nations or terrorists could use cyber-based tools and techniques to disrupt military operations and communications networks. According to the National Security Agency, potential adversaries are developing a body of knowledge about U.S. systems and about methods to attack these systems. Information sharing and coordination among organizations are central to producing comprehensive and practical approaches and solutions to these threats. The "ILOVEYOU" virus is a case in point Because information sharing mechanisms were unable to provide timely warnings, many entities were caught off guard and forced to take their networks off-line for hours. Data on possible threats--viruses, hoaxes, random threats, news events, and computer intrusions--must be continually collected and analyzed. Appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated by strong partnerships to ensure that the right data are in the right place at the right time. Jointly designed, built, and staffed mechanisms among involved parties is most likely to obtain critical buy-in and acceptance. After determining what information to collect and report, guidelines and procedures must be established. At present, there is a shortage of persons with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to undertake these efforts.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-26
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Governmental Reform, House of Representatives
During the last decade, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings have led Congress to boost funding for new and expanded initiatives to counter these threats. For example, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program appropriation has more than doubled from $388 million in fiscal year 1996 to $791 million. This testimony discusses whether a framework exists to monitor and evaluate the impact of increased funding on protecting soldiers from the effects of chemical and biological weapons.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-24
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Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources, Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
To develop sound programs to combat terrorism, the United States must develop a thorough understanding of the terrorist threat. U.S. intelligence agencies track and analyze terrorist threats, including the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In GAO's view, some public statements made about CBRN do not include important qualifications to the information they present. For example, terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor. Secondly, much federal effort to combat terrorism has been based on vulnerabilities and worst case scenarios rather than an analysis of credible risks. A threat and risk assessment can be used to develop a nationwide strategy and guide resource investments. Officials in five foreign countries GAO visited--Canada, United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, and France--said that because of limited resources, they make funding decisions for programs to combat terrorism on the likelihood of terrorist activity, not on the countries' overall vulnerabilities. These countries maximize their existing capabilities to address a wide array of threats, including emerging threats like CBRN, before they create new capabilities or programs to respond to such attacks.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-26
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: 'ILOVEYOU' Computer Virus Highlights Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Info Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
The "ILOVEYOU" computer virus is the latest in a series of events on the Internet that have seriously disrupted computer operations in both government and private industry. Although the federal government is working to implement mechanisms to help agencies ward off such an attack, it was not effective at detecting the virus early on and warning agencies about the threat. Consequently, most agencies were affected. Some incurred damage to systems and files, and many others spent countless staff hours fending off the attack and reestablishing e-mail service. Overall, however, once they learned of the virus, agencies responded promptly and appropriately. In addition to discussing the virus, this testimony addresses its impact on federal agencies as well as measures that can be taken to mitigate the effects of future attacks, which promise to be increasingly sophisticated and damaging and harder to detect.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-18
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DoD Directive 3025.15: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
This Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for providing military assistance to civil authorities.
United States. Department of Defense
1997-02-18
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DoD Directive 1330.5: American National Red Cross
This Directive reissues DoD Directive 1330.5, September 27, 1954, to update its provisions with regard to Department of Defense support service authorized for Red Cross personnel and their dependents, including commissary store and exchange privileges, hospitalization and medical care, recreation facilities, dependent's schools, and Armed Forces postal services, and incorporate technical and editorial changes.
United States. Department of Defense
1969-08-16
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DoD Directive 3150.8: DoD Response to Radiological Accidents
This Directive replaces reference DoD directive 5100.52, "DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving radioactive Materials, " December 21, 1989 and updates policy and responsibilities for responding to a radiological accident. Promulgates DoD policy and planning guidance to implement reference Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), "April, 1996. Authorizes publication of DoD 3150.8-M, "Radiological response Procedures, " in accordance with reference DoD 5025.1-M "DoD Directives System Procedures, " August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June 24, 1994.Continues to authorize publication of reference DoD 5100.52-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," September 1990, authorized by this Directive in accordance with reference DoD 5025-M, "DoD directives System Procedures, "August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June 24, 1994.
United States. Department of Defense
1996-06-13
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DoD Directive 3150.5: DoD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents
This Directive update policies and procedures for the DoD response to IND incidents, to implement the DoD technical responsibilities, and to amplify the direction concerning law enforcement and other associated responsibilities.
United States. Department of Defense
1987-03-24
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DoD Directive 1400.31: DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution
This Directives reissues reference DoD directive 1400.31, "Mobilization Management of the DoD civilian Work Force, " September 9, 1986 to update and establish DoD policies, and assigns responsibilities for implementing this Directive under the statutory authority for emergency planning and preparedness, and management functions of the DoD civilian work force.
United States. Department of Defense
1995-04-28
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DoD Directive 3020.26: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning
This Directive updates responsibilities to ensure effective performance of critical DoD missions and continuation of mission-essential functions during emergencies.
United States. Department of Defense
1995-05-26
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DoD Directive 3005.7: Emergency Requirements, Allocations, Priorities, and Permits for DoD Use of Domestic Civil Transportation
This Directive updates DoD policy and guidance concerning emergency requirements, allocations, priorities, and permits governing DoD use of civil transportation within the continental United States (CONUS), except civil transportation provided by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and related to civil works projects performed by the Corps of Engineers.
United States. Department of Defense
1985-05-30
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DoD Directive 2000.15: Support to Special Events
This Directive supersedes references Assistant Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "DoD Defense Support to International Special Events, " August 12, 1993 through (g). Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for managing DoD support to international and national special events.
United States. Department of Defense
1994-11-21
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Public Switched Network Security Assessment Guidelines
The Public Switched Network (PSN) of the United States has undergone significant changes over the past decade as a result of new technologies, regulatory changes, and network consolidation. With the rash of new entrants, security measures applied to the infrastructure are more diverse and varied with respect to the technologies in use and the pervasiveness of their application.
As a companion to that primer, this assessment guide offers guidelines and methodologies for conducting a security assessment for service providers. This guide describes a risk assessment procedure to identify high-value, high-risk components of a service provider's network and information assets. The descriptions have been designed to drive a comprehensive review of these important pieces of a service provider's security program. The OMNCS and Telcordia Technologies created this publication in an effort to provide practical security measures for the protection of communications networks, which are one
of the Critical Infrastructures upon which the United States is dependent for its national security, as identified in Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63).
National Communications System (U.S.). Office of the Manager
2002-09
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DoD Hazardous Materials Information System Procedures
This manual provides the procedures for the operation of the DoD Hazardous
Materials Information System as prescribed in DoD Instruction 6050.5, Hazardous
Material Information System. The system provides the basic reference data necessary for use by DoD to comply with the more stringent regulatory controls established for hazardous materials. These include such areas as worker safety, transportation, and environmental considerations. The procedures contained herein are mandatory for use by the DoD components and for other Federal agencies that are participating
in this system.
United States. Department of Defense
1981-07
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Department of Defense Federal Hazard Communication Training Program Student's Workbook
This publication is issued under the authority of, and in accordance with DoD Instruction 6050.5, "Hazardous Material Information System" January 25, 1978. This publication, "Department of Defense Federal Hazard Communication Training Program, Student Workbook, " when used with "Department of Defense Federal Hazard Communication Training Program, Trainer's Guide" and the associated 90-minute videotape provides training resources to help DoD comply with the training requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's Hazard Communication Standard (29 C.F. R. 1910. 1200).
United States. Department of Defense
1988-04
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Apparatus of Lies: Saddam's Disinformation and Propaganda 1990-2003
In December 1998, when U.N weapons inspector Dr. Richard Spertzel became exasperated by Iraqi evasions and misrepresentations, he confronted Dr. Rihab Taha, the woman the Iraqis identified as the head of their biological weapons program and asked her directly, "You know that we know you are lying. So why do you do it?" She straightened herself up and replied, "Dr. Spertzel, it's not a lie when you are ordered to lie." Dr. Taha's brief reply is one symbol of a highly developed, well disciplined, and expertly organized program designed to win support for the Iraqi regime through outright deceit. Apparatus of Lies discusses the lies that Iraq has used to promote its propaganda and disinformation in four broad categories: crafting tragedy, exploiting suffering, exploiting Islam, and corrupting the public record. An important priority of Saddam's deception apparatus is to manipulate the televised images the world sees. The regime's most cynical strategy is to actually cause severe civilian hardship or even deaths and then exploit the Iraqi people's suffering by placing the blame on UN-imposed sanctions or other nations. Recent U.S. government reports, including A Decade of Defiance and Deception, have documented Saddam's deceit regarding UN resolutions and weapons inspections. In order to raise awareness of many of the regime's other forms of deception, particularly those likely to be repeated, Apparatus of Lies examines the facts behind Iraqi disinformation and propaganda since 1990. Given the nature and history of the regime, evidence of further deception is almost certain to come to light.
United States. White House Office
2003-01
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Press Conference on Iraq Declaration
"On November 8th, the United Nations Security Council responded to the challenge issued by President Bush in his 12 September speech to the United Nations General Assembly. On that day, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, requiring Iraq to disarm itself of its weapons of mass destruction and to disclose all of its nuclear, chemical, biological and missile programs. As Ambassador John Negroponte said earlier today, Saddam Hussein has so far responded to this final opportunity with a new lie. The burden remains on Iraq to cooperate fully and for Iraq to prove to the international community whether it does or does not have weapons of mass destruction. We are convinced they do until they prove to us otherwise.
Resolution 1441 calls for serious consequences for Iraq if it does not comply with the terms of the resolution. Iraq's noncompliance and defiance of the international community has brought it closer to the day when it will have to face these consequences. The world is still waiting for Iraq to comply with its obligations. The world will not wait forever. Security Council Resolution 1441 will be carried out in full. Iraq can no longer be allowed to threaten its people and its region with weapons of mass destruction. It is still up to Iraq to determine how its disarmament will happen. Unfortunately, this declaration fails totally to move us in the direction of a peaceful solution."
United States. Department of State
2002-12-19
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Towards Greater Democracy in the Muslim World
Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations by Richard N. Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff. Remarks include opportunities for strengthening democracy in the Muslim world. Sections included in the remarks are as follows: Muslim World Experiments, The Freedom and Democracy Deficit in the Muslim World, Ending the Democratic Exception, American Motives, Lessons Learned, and The Democratic Agenda and Beyond.
"... remarks tonight are obviously devoted to the question of democracy. Still, democratization can only be one aspect of U.S. policy. While the long-term forces of democratization work their magic, we still need to deal with other critical issues that come across our desks every day."
United States. Department of State
2002-12-04
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Designing for Security in the Nation's Capital: A Report by the Interagency Task Force of the National Capital Planning Commission
With the spread of terrorism in recent decades, security has become an inevitable feature of modern urban life, particularly for those who live and work in the Nation's Capital. Government is now obliged to take the appropriate precautions to protect against terrorist attacks of many sorts. The September 11, 2001 strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have only served to underscore the public's recognition that security has become a fundamental requirement of American life. This report by the Interagency Task Force offers concrete recommendations with regards to security in the Nation's capitol. The design, created shortly after September 11, provides transportation system redesigns that limits access to security vulnerabilities such a roads and entrances to the White House.
United States. National Capital Planning Commission
2001-10
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CANUSWEST: Annex I: A Plan for Response to Oil and Hazardous Material Spills Along the Inland Border Between British Columbia, Canada and the United States
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Environment Canada recognize that there is a high probability that there will be a spill or other release of oil or hazardous materials along the common border between Canada and the United States. In July of 1994 the Administrator of EPA and the Minister for the Department of Environment signed the Canada-United States Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan, which provides for co-operative measures for dealing with accidental and unauthorized releases of pollutants that cause or may cause damage to the environment along the shared inland boundary and that may constitute a threat to the public health, property or welfare. The Canada-United States Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan aims to provide an international coordination mechanism to ensure appropriate and effective cooperative preparedness, reporting, and response measures between Canada and the United States when a chemical accident occurs along the shared inland boundaries. The purpose of the plan is to specify the process, which would be used to activate federal government response on either side of the border, and to facilitate an effective joint response with state/provincial, local and where appropriate Tribal/Aboriginal people.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1998-06
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Canada-United States Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan
The Canada-United States Joint Inland Pollution Contingency Plan (the Inland Plan) provides for a cooperative mechanism for preparedness for and response to accidental and unauthorized spills and releases of pollutants that cause or may cause damage to the environment along the shared inland boundaries of both countries and that may constitute a threat to the public health, property, or welfare. It also allows for the provision of assistance when only one country is affected, but the spill or release is of such magnitude as to justify a request for assistance. The Inland Plan is intended to complement the Canada-United States Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, which provides a joint response mechanism for any oil or "noxious" substance pollution incident that threatens the waters or coastal areas of both countries. The implementation and maintenance of the Inland Plan is the joint responsibility of the Department of the Environment for Canada and the Environmental Protection Agency for the United States of America.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1998-03-03
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Progress Report: Study of Marking, Rendering Inert and Licensing of Explosives Materials
"In initiating this study (the Study), ATF reviewed the magnitude of the U.S. explosives industry; the events leading up to the pilot taggant program conducted between 1977-79; the Office of Technology Assessment analysis of that pilot program; and the existing Swiss program for tagging explosives. In addition, ATF forged a partnership with the explosives, chemical, fireworks, and fertilizer industries to ensure broad public input and support for solutions to an immensely complex problem. ATF capitalized on its 26 years of experience regulating the explosives industry and investigating bombings. In addition, it relied on the knowledge gained from the ATF-hosted 1995 International Explosives Symposium which addressed issues concerning the identification and detection of explosives, neutralizing common chemicals used in the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, and developing new and innovative ways to combat the criminal use of explosives. As a result of the Symposium, and in an effort to demonstrate an example of possible voluntary controls, ATF teamed with The Fertilizer Institute to design a program to alert the fertilizer industry to the issues of security, knowledge of purchasers, and the need to recognize thefts. The program, 'Be Aware For America,' has been a source of invaluable information on voluntary efforts."
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1997
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1996 Selected Explosives Incidents
This report contains data on incidents involving explosives that occurred during 1996. Data reported includes the number of fatalities, injuries and property damage, motives for bombings and types of bombs and/or explosives used. The data is considered highly representative and sufficient to permit valid chronological, geographical, and trend analyzes. Categories appearing in this publication are those used by ATF in its intra-agency tracking of explosives incidents.
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
1996
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Commerce in Explosives: List of Explosive Materials
This chapter covers not only explosives, but also blasting agents and detonators, all of which are defined as explosive materials in section 841(c) of title 18, U.S.C. Accordingly, the following is the 2002 List of Explosive Materials subject to regulation under 18 U.S.C. chapter 40. It includes both the list of explosives (including detonators) required to be published in the Federal Register and blasting agents. The list is intended to include any and all mixtures containing any of the materials on the list. Materials constituting blasting agents are marked by an asterisk. While the list is comprehensive, it is not all inclusive. The fact that an explosive material may not be on the list does not mean that it is not within the coverage of the law if it otherwise meets the statutory definitions in section 841 of title 18, U.S.C. Explosive materials are listed alphabetically by their common names followed, where applicable, by chemical names and synonyms in brackets. In the 2002 List of Explosive Materials, ATF has added five terms to the list of explosives, has further defined two explosive materials, and has made amendments to two explosive materials to more accurately reference these materials.
United States. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
2002-04-26
