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Report on Biological Warfare Defense Vaccine Research & Development Programs
Since 1998, senior leadership has amplified the focus on resolution of difficulties in securing a ready and reliable access to safe and effective vaccines for use against biological warfare agents. As part of the DoD's vaccine initiative, DoD contracted with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to select an independent panel of experts to assess the DoD acquisition of vaccine production programs and report their recommendations for improvement to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The panel prepared a report to reflect its independent opinions for consideration by DoD. This report (at Appendix B) discusses vaccine industry constraints and concludes that the size and scope of the DoD program is too large for either DoD or industry alone. It recommends the application of a combined, integrated approach by DoD and industry, coupled with better alignment with industry best practices. The Department is studying the Panel's recommendations.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-07
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Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering: Implications for the Development of New Warfare Agents
This report addresses the following issues and provides the basis for more detailed discussion of funding and program priorities, particularly in the area of medical biological defense research: the national security threats posed by such potential developments of new agents through advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering; recommendations related to reducing the impact of progress in these areas; the utility of increased emphasis on research and development of medical countermeasures related to mid-term or far-term biowarfare threat agents; and other measures that could reduce the threat of these technological advances and reduce the threat of biological agent and weapons proliferation.
United States. Department of Defense
1996
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Chemical and Biological Defense Primer
The following is a October 2001 document prepared by the DoD's Chemical and Biological Defense Program describing CBW Characteristics, chemical and biological warfare agents, and current CBW threats.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-10
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Department of Defense: Biological Defense Program Needs for Strategic Biotechnology Development
This presentation gives an overview of the principles of biological defense. Potential Biological Weapons Agents, a historical perpsective on the DoD CB defense program, biodefense vaccines, Homeland Security inititatives, and other issues concerning the development and use of BW and vaccines against BW are all outlined in this presentation. Evolving challenges related to this topic are as follows: supporting homeland security roles and missions, enhancing CB installation force protection, acceleration of CB defense technologies, maintaining current programs to respond to warfighter requirements, and cooperation/strategy with HHS on vaccine development and deployment.
United States. Department of Defense
2002-04-30
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Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare
"World events have conspired to increase the threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons. The end of the Cold War brought on unemployed and disenchanted weapons specialists and scientists from the former Soviet Union, the rise of religious fundamentalism in southwest Asia, state-sponsored terrorism, and blurring of the lines between terrorism and traditional warfare. As the threat of biological and chemical terrorism continues to evolve and the number of states which have the capability to develop biological and chemical weapons programs grows, both military and nonmilitary emergency response personnel must be prepared to respond to attacks involving biological and chemical weapons. The value of the Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, for civilian and military personnel alike, is the textbook offers a collection of protocols and practices the military has developed on the battlefield for responding to casualties resulting from biological and chemical attacks."
United States. Department of the Army. Office of the Surgeon General
2001-09-30
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Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, Report to Congressional Requesters
The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 and the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, along with the release of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway in 1995, have heightened concerns about terrorism in the United States. Local emergency responders, such as firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical personnel, will be the first to respond to a terrorist incident. The Departments of Defense and Justice and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are the principal federal organizations that provide weapons of mass destruction training to these first responders. Federal training programs on weapons of mass destruction are poorly coordinated, resulting in inefficiencies in the federal effort and concerns in the first responder communities. Efforts are under way to improve the federal government's role in weapons of mass destruction training, but actions are needed to eliminate duplicative training and improve the efficiency of programs offered by the Departments of Defense and Justice.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-21
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Nuclear Security: Improvements Needed in DOE's Safeguards and Security Oversight, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives
The Department of Energy (DOE), which is in charge of the nation's nuclear weapons program, owns several facilities that carry out classified weapons research and related activities. This report evaluates DOE's safeguards and security oversight at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. GAO discusses (1) the monitoring and tracking of findings resulting from DOE's oversight activities; (2) the correction, validation, and closing of findings resulting from such activities; and (3) the consistency of various DOE assessments of the laboratories' safeguards and security programs.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-02-24
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information Systems Protection
This document addresses the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, which was issued in January 2000. The plan calls for new initiatives to strengthen the nation's defense against threats to public and private sector information systems that are critical to the country's economic and social welfare, particularly those supporting public utilities, telecommunications, finance, emergency services, and government operations. As a preliminary document, the plan is intended to begin a dialogue on its proposals and lead to the development of plans for protecting other elements of the nation's infrastructure, including those pertaining to the physical infrastructure and specific roles and responsibilities for state and local governments and the private sector. Initiating this dialogue is vital since our nation's computer-based infrastructures are at increasing risk of severe disruption and, as recent audits have shown, many federal agencies have significant computer security weaknesses, ranging from poor controls over access to sensitive systems and data to nonexistent or weak continuity of service plans. This document also highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the plan.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-02-11
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, Statement for the Record by Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Government officials are increasingly concerned about computer attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intentions, including terrorists and nations engaging in information warfare. The dramatic rise in the interconnectivity of computer systems has compounded this threat. Today, massive computer networks provide pathways among systems that, if not properly secured, can be used to gain unauthorized access to data and operations from remote locations. The National Plan for Information Systems Protection calls for strengthening the defenses against threats to critical public and private-sector computer systems--particularly those supporting public utilities, telecommunications, finance, emergency services, and government operations. The Plan is intended to begin a dialogue and help develop plans to protect other elements of the nation's infrastructure, including the physical infrastructure and the roles and responsibilities of state and local governments and private industry. In GAO's view, the Plan is an important and positive step toward building the cyber defenses necessary to protect critical information and infrastructures. It (1) identifies the risks arising from the nation's dependence on computer networks for critical services, (2) recognizes the need for the federal government to take the lead in addressing critical infrastructure risks and to serve as a model for information security, and (3) outlines key concepts and general initiatives to help achieve these goals. Opportunities exist, however, to improve the plan and address significant challenges to building the public-private partnership necessary for comprehensive infrastructure protections. GAO believes that, rather than emphasizing intrusion detection capabilities, the plan should strive to provide agencies with the incentives and the tools to implement the management controls essential to comprehensive computer security programs. Also, the plan relies heavily on legislation and requirements already in place that, as a whole, are outmoded and inadequate as well as poorly implemented by the agencies.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-02-01
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs, Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform
In the last decade, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings has prompted Congress and federal agencies to launch new programs or expand existing ones to address these threats. Overall funding in these areas has risen significantly since 1996. Today, several civilian and military agencies are conducting research and development to counter these threats. Without effective coordination among the different agencies, however, their efforts might be unnecessarily duplicated and important questions may be overlooked. This testimony identifies similarities among nonmedical research and development programs and explains how coordination mechanisms could effectively address potential duplication, research gaps, and opportunities for collaboration. GAO focuses on the following four programs: (1) the Defense Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program, (2) the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Biological Warfare Defense Program, (3) the Department of Energy's Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program, and (4) the Counterterror Technical Support Program conducted by an interagency working group.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-22
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Nuclear Security: Security Issues at DOE and Its Newly Created National Nuclear Security Administration, Statement of Gary L. Jones, Associate Director, Energy, Resources, and Science Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Commerce, House of Representatives
In this report the General Accounting Office (GAO) provides its observations on the Department of Energy's (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) security programs to protect against theft, sabotage, espionage, terrorism, and other risks to national security at its facilities. Congress established NNSA on March 1, 2000, as a semi-autonomous agency within DOE with responsibility for the nation's nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation activities, and naval reactors programs. NNSA was established to correct long-standing management and security problems at DOE's nuclear facilities. GAO's testimony focuses on (1) oversight of safeguards and security programs at DOE and (2) security issues with NNSA. This testimony is based on GAO's numerous reviews of security at DOE--in particular, GAO's recently issued report to the full Committee entitled "Improvements Needed in DOE's Safeguards and Security Oversight" --and testimony presented earlier this month before the House Armed Services Special Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization. Sound management and independent oversight of security at DOE's nuclear facilities is critical to ensure that security problems are identified, raised to the attention of the highest levels in DOE, and corrected. DOE has recently made a number of improvements to its security oversight. However, GAO's February report to the Committee discussed several areas where security oversight could be further strengthened.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-14
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Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed: Statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta, Associate Director Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
This testimony draws on a recent GAO report on the management of federal medical stockpiles that would be used to treat civilians in a chemical or biological terrorist attack. (See GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 1999.) GAO highlights the problems that it found with the management of the stockpiles, discusses the results of its actual count of stockpiled supplies, and provides information on the progress made since GAO's last report was issued.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-08
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Trans-Alaska Pipeline: Ensuring the Pipeline's Security, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Water, Power, and Offshore Energy Resources, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System is responsible for transporting nearly a quarter of the nation's domestically produced crude oil. This report reviews the security of the pipeline. It discusses (1) what federal and state agencies have done to assess the vulnerability of the pipeline to terrorists and (2) what these agencies and the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company have done to protect the pipeline.
United States. General Accounting Office
1991-11-27
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Proactive Management of FAA's Security Program Needed, Statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Director, Transportation Issues Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the President's Commission on Aviation Security
GAO discussed the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) policies and procedures for preventing criminal acts against aviation. GAO noted that reviews of FAA domestic and international security programs identified major deficiencies in: (1) passenger screening, with airlines widely varying in screening effectiveness and lacking clearly defined performance expectations; (2) airport security controls, with airlines not complying with FAA standards and FAA inadequately monitoring airports' compliance, resulting in easy access to areas that should be secured; (3) security inspections, which did not include procedures or guidance on the extent of testing or verification needed to ensure the adequacy of security features; and (4) airline training requirements for security personnel, with the quality of training varying widely among airlines. GAO also noted that, although FAA has taken several steps to improve its aviation security programs, it should also consider: (1) establishing a quality assurance program capable of providing proactive, routine, critical assessments of its security programs; and (2) working with foreign governments to identify emerging security issues, such as how to ensure that foreign air carriers provide adequate security for U.S. citizens travelling abroad.
United States. General Accounting Office
1989-12-18
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Chemical Weapons: Physical Security for the U.S. Chemical Stockpile, Report to Congressional Requesters
"Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the adequacy of the Department of the Army's physical security measures to guard against attacks on chemical weapons storage and production facilities and against the diversion or theft of those weapons. GAO found that: (1) the Army only recently approved physical agility standards for guards; (2) the excessive overtime that some guards worked affected their proficiency; (3) at five of the nine storage sites visited, security guard fleets' vehicles had high mileage and were frequently out of service for unscheduled maintenance; (4) the Army transferred personnel who did not meet the requirements of the Chemical Personnel Reliability Program; (5) despite the 1986 Department of Defense (DOD) requirement that the Army conduct formal site vulnerability assessments, the Army did not issue its implementing regulation until 1989; (6) no uniform method existed to enable local commanders to make vulnerability assessments based on identical standards; and (7) there was no provision for considering the impact of the assessment results on the minimum standards."
United States. General Accounting Office
1991-05-15
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Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
Overall, military forces stationed overseas are better protected today, and commanders are better able to determine their vulnerability to terrorist attacks, than they were when GAO last reported in 1997. However, significant security and procedural antiterrorism/force protection problems persist at many installations. For example, some installations have not developed plans to deal with terrorist attacks; others have no way to stop unauthorized vehicles from entering the installation; and there is no comprehensive way to share solutions to common problems with other installations. Limited antiterrorism funding and trained staff have affected the ability of commanders to correct known vulnerabilities. Some overseas commands have repeatedly received less than half of the funding that they believe is necessary to correct or mitigate vulnerabilities. Although Congress requires DOD to provide information on proposed antiterrorist/force protection funding and projects, it does not require information on projects that still need funding.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-19
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Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
One of the major shortcomings in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the lack of linkage among the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources. Improvements are also needed in intergovernmental relations at the federal, state, and local levels. The reality is that the federal government cannot respond on its own to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The Gilmore Panel, which issued its first report last year, found may of the same problems that GAO has cited, including the need for (1) more rigorous analyses of the threat, (2) better management of federal programs, (3) stronger coordination with state and local officials, and (4) a national strategy to combat terrorism.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-04-06
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems, Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The unprecedented growth in use of the Internet has revolutionized the way much of the world communicates and conducts business. Without proper safeguards, this widespread interconnectivity poses enormous risks to America's computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. For example, hostile nations or terrorists could use cyber-based tools and techniques to disrupt military operations and communications networks. According to the National Security Agency, potential adversaries are developing a body of knowledge about U.S. systems and about methods to attack these systems. Information sharing and coordination among organizations are central to producing comprehensive and practical approaches and solutions to these threats. The "ILOVEYOU" virus is a case in point Because information sharing mechanisms were unable to provide timely warnings, many entities were caught off guard and forced to take their networks off-line for hours. Data on possible threats--viruses, hoaxes, random threats, news events, and computer intrusions--must be continually collected and analyzed. Appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated by strong partnerships to ensure that the right data are in the right place at the right time. Jointly designed, built, and staffed mechanisms among involved parties is most likely to obtain critical buy-in and acceptance. After determining what information to collect and report, guidelines and procedures must be established. At present, there is a shortage of persons with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to undertake these efforts.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-26
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber Security Information Act of 2000, Statement of Joel C. Willemssen, Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information Technology, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
H.R. 4246, the proposed Cyber Security Information Act of 2000, would remove barriers to information sharing between government and private industry. In GAO's view, the legislation would help build the meaningful private-public partnerships that are essential to protecting critical infrastructure assets. To successfully engage the private sector, however, the federal government itself must be a model of good information security. Today, it is not. Significant computer security weaknesses--from poor controls over sensitive systems and data to weak or nonexistent continuity of service plans--plague nearly every major agency. And, as seen in the recent "ILOVEYOU" computer virus, mechanisms already in place to ease information sharing among federal agencies about impending threats have not been working well. Moreover, the federal government may not yet have the right tools for identifying, analyzing, coordinating, and disseminating the type of information that H.R. 4246 envisions collecting from the private sector.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-06-22
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Governmental Reform, House of Representatives
During the last decade, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings have led Congress to boost funding for new and expanded initiatives to counter these threats. For example, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program appropriation has more than doubled from $388 million in fiscal year 1996 to $791 million. This testimony discusses whether a framework exists to monitor and evaluate the impact of increased funding on protecting soldiers from the effects of chemical and biological weapons.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-24
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Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources, Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
To develop sound programs to combat terrorism, the United States must develop a thorough understanding of the terrorist threat. U.S. intelligence agencies track and analyze terrorist threats, including the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In GAO's view, some public statements made about CBRN do not include important qualifications to the information they present. For example, terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor. Secondly, much federal effort to combat terrorism has been based on vulnerabilities and worst case scenarios rather than an analysis of credible risks. A threat and risk assessment can be used to develop a nationwide strategy and guide resource investments. Officials in five foreign countries GAO visited--Canada, United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, and France--said that because of limited resources, they make funding decisions for programs to combat terrorism on the likelihood of terrorist activity, not on the countries' overall vulnerabilities. These countries maximize their existing capabilities to address a wide array of threats, including emerging threats like CBRN, before they create new capabilities or programs to respond to such attacks.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-26
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: 'ILOVEYOU' Computer Virus Highlights Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Info Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
The "ILOVEYOU" computer virus is the latest in a series of events on the Internet that have seriously disrupted computer operations in both government and private industry. Although the federal government is working to implement mechanisms to help agencies ward off such an attack, it was not effective at detecting the virus early on and warning agencies about the threat. Consequently, most agencies were affected. Some incurred damage to systems and files, and many others spent countless staff hours fending off the attack and reestablishing e-mail service. Overall, however, once they learned of the virus, agencies responded promptly and appropriately. In addition to discussing the virus, this testimony addresses its impact on federal agencies as well as measures that can be taken to mitigate the effects of future attacks, which promise to be increasingly sophisticated and damaging and harder to detect.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-18
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Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs, Statement for the Record of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
GAO believes that H.R. 4210--the Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000--would address the fragmentation and duplication that GAO and others have found in programs to combat terrorism. The bill would create a new Office of Terrorism Preparedness to centralize leadership and coordination of federal programs to help state and local governments prepare for terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. However, the duties of the new office, as described in the bill, may overlap with some duties of the newly created National Domestic Preparedness Office. In GAO's view, success in achieving the bill's goals depends on the ability of the Office head to build consensus among the involved agencies. Also, the new office may take some time to accomplish its objectives presented in the bill.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-04
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DoD Directive 3025.15: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
This Directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for providing military assistance to civil authorities.
United States. Department of Defense
1997-02-18
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DoD Directive 1330.5: American National Red Cross
This Directive reissues DoD Directive 1330.5, September 27, 1954, to update its provisions with regard to Department of Defense support service authorized for Red Cross personnel and their dependents, including commissary store and exchange privileges, hospitalization and medical care, recreation facilities, dependent's schools, and Armed Forces postal services, and incorporate technical and editorial changes.
United States. Department of Defense
1969-08-16
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DoD Directive 3150.8: DoD Response to Radiological Accidents
This Directive replaces reference DoD directive 5100.52, "DoD Response to an Accident or Significant Incident Involving radioactive Materials, " December 21, 1989 and updates policy and responsibilities for responding to a radiological accident. Promulgates DoD policy and planning guidance to implement reference Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), "April, 1996. Authorizes publication of DoD 3150.8-M, "Radiological response Procedures, " in accordance with reference DoD 5025.1-M "DoD Directives System Procedures, " August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June 24, 1994.Continues to authorize publication of reference DoD 5100.52-M, "Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP)," September 1990, authorized by this Directive in accordance with reference DoD 5025-M, "DoD directives System Procedures, "August 1994, authorized by DoD Directive 5025.1, June 24, 1994.
United States. Department of Defense
1996-06-13
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DoD Directive 3150.5: DoD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents
This Directive update policies and procedures for the DoD response to IND incidents, to implement the DoD technical responsibilities, and to amplify the direction concerning law enforcement and other associated responsibilities.
United States. Department of Defense
1987-03-24
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DoD Directive 1400.31: DoD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution
This Directives reissues reference DoD directive 1400.31, "Mobilization Management of the DoD civilian Work Force, " September 9, 1986 to update and establish DoD policies, and assigns responsibilities for implementing this Directive under the statutory authority for emergency planning and preparedness, and management functions of the DoD civilian work force.
United States. Department of Defense
1995-04-28
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DoD Directive 3020.26: Continuity of Operations (COOP) Policy and Planning
This Directive updates responsibilities to ensure effective performance of critical DoD missions and continuation of mission-essential functions during emergencies.
United States. Department of Defense
1995-05-26
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DoD Directive 3005.7: Emergency Requirements, Allocations, Priorities, and Permits for DoD Use of Domestic Civil Transportation
This Directive updates DoD policy and guidance concerning emergency requirements, allocations, priorities, and permits governing DoD use of civil transportation within the continental United States (CONUS), except civil transportation provided by the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and related to civil works projects performed by the Corps of Engineers.
United States. Department of Defense
1985-05-30
