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Assertion of Executive Privilege Regarding White House Counsel's Office Documents: [Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the President of the United States] [May 23, 1996]
"The confidential White House Counsel's Office documents for which privilege would be asserted are not contemporaneous documents concerning the White House Travel Office matter being investigated by the Committee, or even documents generated as part of the White House review of that matter, but rather were created in connection with other matters or the response of the White House to subsequent investigations of the Travel Office and other matters by the Committee and the Independent Counsel. Whatever may be the extent of Congress's authority to conduct oversight of the executive branch's response to oversight -- a question that must be viewed as unresolved as a matter of law in light of the requirement that there be a nexus to Congress's legislative authority -- it is clear that congressional needs for information in that context will weigh substantially less in the constitutional balancing than a specific need in connection with the consideration of legislation. As for documents concerning the White House response to an ongoing criminal investigation by an Independent Counsel, we can identify little, if any, legitimate legislative need for such information. In sum, based on the Office of Legal Counsel's review of the documents for which assertion of executive privilege has been requested, and conducting the balancing required by the case law, […] I do not believe that access to these documents would be held by the courts to be 'demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions.' […] In conclusion, it is my legal judgment that executive privilege may properly be asserted in response to the Committee's subpoenas."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-23
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Force XXI: What Are the Risks of Building a High Tech, Narrowly Focused Army?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines the doctrinal and acquisition focus of Force XXI in light of the projected future strategic environment. Despite its conceptual overtones, Force XXI is currently physically manifested in both a doctrinal publication and in the Army's modernization plans. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, contains the Army's initial effort at defining the probable nature of the future strategic environment and the technological acceleration that is anticipated. It outlines the Army's concept for conducting war in the future, and provides a conceptual framework for the types of weapons and systems the Army will need to counter the diverse nature of future threats. Although cognizant of the requirements for modernization to meet threats throughout the spectrum of conflict, Force XXI is aimed at a very narrow portion of the upper end of that spectrum. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, while providing a comprehensive summary of the dangers emerging in the last part of this century, fails to adequately address how the Army will deal with the entire spectrum of conflict. The baffle dynamics explained in the text are centered on traditional, conventional warfare. OOTW [Operations Other Than War] is initially addressed, but its presence is marginalized in favor of discussion of conventional baffle. A review of programmed expenditures illustrates the Army's almost total dedication to the high end of the spectrum; the traditional form of combat that some critics assert is the least likely to occur in the near future. The concentration of resources on this very narrow slice of the spectrum of conflict does not come without a corresponding cost. Assessing that cost is the crux of the Army leadership's modernization dilemma. Judging where along the spectrum of conflict to accept risk is an infinitely difficult process."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Jones, Brian D.
1996-05-23
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Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director Defense Information and Financial Management Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Computer attacks at the Defense Department (DoD) pose increasing risks of access to highly sensitive information. Recent data suggest that DoD may have experienced as many as 250,000 attacks last year. These attacks are often successful, and the number of attacks is doubling each year as Internet use increases and hackers become more sophisticated. At a minimum, these attacks are a multimillion dollar nuisance to the Pentagon. At worst, they pose a serious threat to national security. Attackers have seized control of entire DoD systems, some of which control critical functions, such as weapons system research and development, logistics, and finance. Attackers have also stolen, modified, and destroyed data and software. The potential for catastrophic damage is great. The DoD is taking steps to address this growing problem but faces major challenges in controlling unauthorized access to its computer systems. Moreover, the DoD is now trying to react to successful attacks as it learns of them, but it has no uniform policy for assessing risks, protecting its systems, responding to incidents, or assessing damage. Training of users and system and network administrators is haphazard and constrained by limited resources. Technical solutions, such as firewalls, smart cards, and network monitoring systems, should help, but their success depends on whether DoD implements them in tandem with better policy and personnel measures.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-22
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Defense Information System Network and Connected Systems
This instruction establishes policy and delineates responsibilities for life-cycle management of the Defense Information System Network (DISN). It details policy for management and use of the DISN, DISN services, and connected systems. Specific policies governing the satellite component of the DISN are covered in CJCS MOP 37, 'Military Satellite Communications Systems.'...The DISC is DoD's consolidated worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure that provides the end-to-end information transfer network for supporting military operations.
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-05-22
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Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Report to Congressional Requesters
Mounting evidence that attacks on Defense computer systems pose a serious threat to national security. Internet connections make it
possible for enemies armed with less equipment and weapons to gain a
competitive edge at a small price. As a result, this will become an
increasingly attractive way for terrorist or adversaries to wage attacks
against Defense. For example, major disruptions to military operations
and readiness could threaten national security if attackers successfully
corrupted sensitive information and systems or denied service from vital
communications backbones or power systems. In preventing computer attacks, Defense has to protect a vast and complex information infrastructure: currently, it has over 2.1 million computers, 10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance networks. Defense also critically depends on information technology--it uses computers to help design weapons, identify and track enemy targets, pay soldiers, mobilize reservists, and manage supplies. Indeed, its very warfighting capability is dependent on computer-based telecommunications networks and information systems.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-22
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NORAD Anti-Drug Network Standard Operating Procedures
The aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into North America is a threat to the national security of both the US and Canada. To counter this threat, the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act assigned Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead federal agency in the detection and monitoring of illegal airborne and maritime drug trafficking into the United States. To accomplish this mission, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasked the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (now CINCUSACOM), Commander in Chief, Forces Command (now Commander FORSCOM), Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC), Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) and Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) to conduct detection and monitoring operations within their respective areas of responsibility and/or operations. Authority for Canadian Forces to conduct CD operations resides in the NORAD Agreement and is also reiterated in the Department of National Defense (DND) publication Defense Development Planning Guidance 1995 (DDPG 95). To accomplish this mission, NORAD will conduct operations to detect and monitor aerial transit of drug trafficking aircraft into North America; coordinate with other federal, state and local agencies engaged in detecting, monitoring and apprehending aerial drug traffic; and integrate NORAD operations into an effective CD command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) network.
North American Aerospace Defense Command
1996-05-22
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Yemen and Stability in the Persian Gulf: Confronting the Threat from Within
"The author examines the recent eruption of hostilities between Yemen and its neighbor, Saudi Arabia. He describes how the two countries have come to be so alienated from each other, and suggests ways in which Yemen could be assisted economically and also how tensions between it and Saudi Arabia could be relaxed. If Yemen and Saudi Arabia were to get into a real shooting war, the author concludes, this could have significant adverse repercussions for the welfare of American strategic interests in the Persian Gulf."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Pelletiere, Stephen C.
1996-05-22
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Relocation Deadline Provision Contained in the 1996 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act: Memorandum for David W. Burke, Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors [May 21, 1996]
"As your letter makes clear, because the Act was signed into law on April 26, 1996, almost one month after the date upon which OCB's [Office of Cuba's Broadcasting] headquarters must be relocated to south Florida under the literal terms of the provision's relocation deadline, these literal terms cannot be satisfied. For the reasons stated below, however, we conclude that USIA is at this time nevertheless entitled to spend funds appropriated under the provision. In addition, we conclude that the relocation of OCB's headquarters to south Florida is mandatory under the appropriation. Finally, we conclude that, despite USIA's inability to comply with the literal terms of the provision's relocation deadline, it may at this time access funds contained in the International Broadcasting Operations, Broadcasting to Cuba, and Radio Construction accounts in order to cover expenses associated with relocating OCB's headquarters to south Florida. These conclusions are premised on observance of the statutory mandate to relocate OCB's headquarters to south Florida. We decline to address at this time, however, the time period within which the relocation must be accomplished."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-21
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Reunification of Korea: Bringing Back the South
Hypothetical advice provided by Chinese military advisor to North Korean leader on how to employ weapons of mass destruction to force South Korea to unify with the north on North Korean terms. Advice is provided in the context of operational art and principles of war.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Ford, John F.
1996-05-20
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Improving Theater Ballistic Missile Defense at the Operational Level of War
The proliferation of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout developing nations is so widespread that over 20 states may have an operational capability to deliver WMD using TBMs by the turn of the century. As was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War, even cheap, unsophisticated, and militarily insignificant TBMs such as the Al Hussein (modified Scud-B) can pose a psychological impact so severe that a strategic center of gravity such as the cohesion of alliances and coalitions may be threatened. The enormity of this threat will rapidly exacerbate with improvements in the accuracy, range, and lethality of TBMs. In recognition of this emerging threat, Congress has drastically increased funding for the development of various robust systems for joint theater missile defense (JTMD). However, the first active defense systems and supporting space-based sensors that will provide a true area protection will be fielded no earlier than the middle of the next decade. Joint Force commanders (JFCs) cannot rely solely on Patriot to provide the desired level of operational protection. To defend against this escalating threat in the near-term, the JFC must integrate and coordinate the mutually supporting elements of JTMD: active defense, passive defense, attack operations, and supporting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. Each of these elements will be critically examined to reveal critical areas where the JFC can direct operational changes and provide guidance that will improve theater protection using resources that are available today.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Schlientz, Steven C.
1996-05-20
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Thinking the Unthinkable -- Facing a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and the Means to Deliver (NBC&M) Adversary: An Integrated Planning Consideration for the Operational Commander
In today's volatile political, economic, religious and cultural environment, Nation-States aggressively pursue robust NBC&M capabilities as economic and force equalizers for asymmetric warfare advantage. Two thoughts follow. First, the odds indicate the United States will face a NBC&M capable and confident adversary in a future regional conflict. Second, although never publicly nor explicitly stated, the United States has indicated it may respond with nuclear weapons when confronted with NBC&M in a conventional war. However accurate, this exchange invites a compelling question: are we prepared to confidently integrate such Presidential tasks into a conventional environment? This paper seeks to provide some considerations to this question. It is not about telling the Operational Commander (CINC) how to execute Presidential tasks; it is about pulling together diverse, unclassified, operational considerations as a reasonable foundation for integrating a nuclear response into conventional operations.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Wong, Bruce S.
1996-05-20
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Foreign Internal Defense: The Art of Counter-Insurgency and the Combined Action Platoon Concept
"This paper examines the Marine Corps' Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in the Vietnam applicability to possible future counter-insurgency conflicts, as well as today's Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) doctrine. The CAPs of I Corps were established in order to 'clear and hold' selected villages or hamlets, improve the capabilities of the Popular Forces (PFs), conduct civic action, and foster the pacification effort at the grass roots level. The Marines who participated in the CAP program fought the war in the hamlets, while front line Army and Marine units all too often waged war on the hamlets. In comparison to other American units operating in the populated areas of South Vietnam, CAPs killed and captured proportionately more of the enemy at less cost to themselves and were successfully employed as an economy of force asset. CAPs were also able to neutralize the village guerrilla and bring a certain amount of confidence to the villagers and local government officials. There will always be a need to study the lessons of the CAP program and other counter-insurgency efforts. Policy- makers and CINC planners will often find relevance in some of the concepts and methods employed in the past. The U.S. military should retain counter-insurgency expertise in support of FID strategies that will provide the training and readiness required should the U.S. once again become involved in a counter- insurgency conflict."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Arminio, Thomas J.
1996-05-20
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Force Asymmetry in Low Intensity Conflict or How to Beat the Enemy at His Own Game
"The U.S. military will most likely be involved in numerous MOOTW [military operations other than war] and low intensity conflicts in the coming years. The operational commander will have to design an operational plan to counter smaller, weaker forces (relative to U. S. power) that posses the military and political advantage of fighting in their country, among their own people. To operate successfully, the weaker force will must subscribe to specific principles of war that have been successfully used by insurgents guerrillas in many low intensity conflicts. This paper analyzes these principles and proposes an operational strategy for the operational commander to counter the unique, deadly strategy of the insurgent. The Boer War between Great Britain and the South Africa republics of 1899-1902 and the Insurgent movement in China led by Mao Tse-Tung are used as examples of successful insurgent movements."
Naval War College (U.S.)
McCabe, Laurence L.
1996-05-20
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Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program [May 17, 1996]
"This planning guide was developed under the direction of the U.S. Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which jointly coordinate and direct the development of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). It was produced to assist state, local, and Army installation planners in formulating and coordinating plans for chemical events that may occur at the chemical agent stockpile storage locations in the continental United States. This document provides broad planning guidance for use by both on-post and off-post agencies and organizations in the development of a coordinated plan for responding to chemical events. It contains checklists to assist in assuring that all important aspects are included in the plans and procedures developed at each Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) location. The checklists are supplemented by planning guidelines in the appendices which provide more detailed guidance regarding some issues. […] In addition to this guidance, other location-specific documents, technical studies, and support studies should be used as needed to assist in the planning at each of the chemical agent stockpile locations to address the specific hazards and conditions at each location. These are other related documents are listed in Sect. 9, Related Documents."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of the Army
1996-05-17
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Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
"This document provides broad planning guidance for use by both on-post and off-post agencies and organizations in the development of a coordinated plan for responding to chemical events."
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
1996-05-17
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Use of Federal Employees for Olympic Security: Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Attorney General [May 17, 1996]
"Where the teams and delegations visiting the United States for the Olympic Games in Atlanta have been designated 'official guests' of the United States by the Secretary of State pursuant to §§ 112, 1116 and 1201 of the Criminal Code, those provisions authorize federal agencies to provide their employees to assist in security operations at the Atlanta Olympics upon request of the Attorney General. This responds to your request for our opinion whether the provisions of §§ 112(f), 1116(d), and 1201(f) of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. §§ 112(f), 1116(d), and 1201(f), authorize federal agencies, upon request of the Attorney General, to provide their employees to assist in security operations at the Atlanta Olympics. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude that they do."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-17
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High-Energy Storms Shape Puerto Rico
"Hugo arrived in mid-September 1989 as a category-four hurricane with sustained winds of 140 miles per hour. The eye of the hurricane passed over the eastern end of the island travelling west-northwest. Hurricane Hugo caused tremendous damage to the infrastructure of eastern Puerto Rico. Over 80 percent of the wooden structures on the islands of Culebra and Vieques were destroyed, and more than 30,000 people were left homeless. Property damage is estimated to exceed $1 billion. Despite the huge losses to infra-structure, the long-term effects of Hugo on the coastal environment are considered to be minimal. Within several months following the hurricane, U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) marine geologists cooperating with Duke University initiated a reconnaissance study to assess the impact of major storm events on coastal resources and coastal environments."
Geological Survey (U.S.)
1996-05-16
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Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act: Memorandum for Conrad Harper, Legal Adviser, Department of State from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General [May 15, 1996]
"You have sought our advice on section 609 of the Fiscal Year 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act (H.R. 3019), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 104 Stat. -- (the Act), which the President signed into law on April 26, 1996. That section purports to condition the use of appropriated funds to pay for the United States' diplomatic representation to Vietnam on the President's making a detailed certification 'within 60 days.' You have asked whether section 609 prohibits the use of appropriated funds for this purpose from the moment the Act was signed into law, unless the President, within 60 days thereafter, provides the requisite certification, and so enables diplomatic relations between the two countries to resume. At the very least, section 609 does not require a cutoff of funds until the President makes the certification. Rather, the use of appropriated funds for maintaining diplomatic representation to Vietnam remains lawful and proper during the sixty days after enactment, so that the President, during that period, may gather and assess the facts needed to enable him to decide whether or not to provide the certification, without disrupting the United States' existing diplomatic relations with Vietnam in the interval. This construction follows the natural meaning of the language of the section, comports with the rational and efficient use of government resources, and reduces the likelihood of unnecessary diplomatic friction."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
Dellinger, Walter E.
1996-05-16
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S. Rept. 104-269: To Reauthorize the Hate Crime Statistics Act, Report to Accompany S. 1624, May 13, 1996
From the Purpose: "The purpose of the proposed legislation is to reauthorize permanently the Hate Crime Statistics Act, which requires the Attorney General to establish reporting guidelines for the collection of, and to collect, data about crimes which manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity or disability. Reauthorization of the Act is necessary to require the Attorney General to continue the collection of data on hate crimes and to publish annual summaries of the acquired data, thereby providing information which can help local law enforcement agencies and local communities combat hate crimes more effectively by identifying over time their frequency, location, and other patterns."
United States. Government Printing Office
1996-05-13
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Grand Strategy for Information Age National Security
"Current national security strategy is obsolete. Based upon industrial age threats and defenses with limited information-age applicability, it fails to defend against structured information attacks threatening U.S. centers of gravity, and relies upon DoD as sole provider of national defense in the information dimension. U.S. technology dependence presents a strategic threat to the information systems that control key aspects of our national power. Future competitors may undermine our national will to fight by exploiting our reliance upon information systems, our present technological vulnerability. This threat would be most effective in situations where U.S. forces application is discretionary, and the desirability of employment is not obvious. The study proposes a strategic framework demonstrating the potential strategic effects of information weapons employment and conceptualizing both offensive and defensive information campaigns, highlighting shortfalls in present policies by suggesting accessibility of U.S. centers of gravity and limitations of protecting against employment of information weapons. It recommends that certain information systems, as strategic national security assets, require protection and demonstrates how strategic warfare's scope expands into the broader information dimension of conflict. Information assurance should be the theme for US defensive grand strategy, giving priority to the systems most essential to our national information infrastructure and systems that permit command and control and employment of military forces. A strategic plan for information assurance is offered."
Army War College (U.S.)
Lawlor, Bruce M.; Kennedy, Kevin (Kevin John), 1955-; Nelson, Arne J.
1996-05-12
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Negating North Korea's Nukes: The Political Use of Military Power
The North Korean case demonstrates how diplomatic, economic, and military instruments of power can be integrated in a political-military strategy designed to address a significant threat to US and international security. This experience also shows how important it is to balance military action and restraint in such a crisis. Specifically, this analysis suggests that the political use of military power was necessary to persuade North Korea to accept the concessions it made in the October 1994 Agreed Framework, thereby enabling the US to achieve its political objectives. In addition, certain quasi-military measures taken by the US may also have more directly helped turn the tide in North Korea's decision to accept a negotiated solution. Without detracting from the deterrent, such measures as withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the ROK, nuclear assurances to North Korea, and cancellation of Team Spirit provided carrots for good DPRK behavior and it cost the US very little politically or militarily. Indeed, all three US political objectives were achieved in the case of North Korea. First, North Korea will stay put in the NPT and be subject to IAEA inspections, eventually including special inspections and the dismantling of its existing graphite-based nuclear program, thus serving the objective of nonproliferation. Second, the muted use of military power, carefully balancing enhancements to our deterrent with abstaining from measures that might have provoked the unpredictable DPRK, avoided a military conflict. Finally, accomplishment of the first two objectives and the enhanced evidence of US commitment to their security provided clear assurances to the key allies in the region, the ROK and Japan, which in turn contributed to nonproliferation by reducing any perception on the part of these allies that they might need nuclear weapons.
National War College (U.S.)
Davis, M. Scott
1996-05-09
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Passports and Visas: Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives
Technical problems and the failure of overseas consular staff to comply with internal management controls have hampered State Department efforts to modernize its visa and passport operations and make them less vulnerable to fraud. After initial delays, State has made steady progress in installing its machine-readable system--the primary initiative for eliminating visa fraud--and provided all visa-issuing posts with automated access to its global database containing the names of persons ineligible for visas. Operational problems, however, have diminished the effectiveness of these efforts. Meanwhile, State's modernization program to reduce passport fraud is behind schedule. State originally planned to install a new wide-area network, develop a system to print a digitalized passport photograph, and install a system to verify the multiple issuance of passports by December 1995. However, only the installation of the wide-area network, upon which the other two projects depend, has been completed. Full implementation also depends on modernizing the passport production system, which according to State depends on funding availability.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-09
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Placing of United States Armed Forces Under United Nations Operational or Tactical Control: Memorandum for Alan J. Kreczko, Special Assistant to the President and Legal Adviser to the National Security Council [May 8, 1996]
"Proposed funding restriction generally prohibiting the President from placing United States Armed Forces under the operational or tactical control of the United Nations in U.N. peacekeeping operations would unconstitutionally constrain the President's exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief and unconstitutionally undermine the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of diplomacy. Granting the President the authority to waive the prohibition if he provides a certification and report to Congress would not remove the funding restriction's constitutional defect, because Congress cannot burden or infringe the President's exercise of a core constitutional power by attaching conditions precedent to the exercise of that power. This memorandum responds to your request for our views as to the constitutionality of H.R. 3308, a bill that would limit the President's ability to place United States armed forces under the United Nations' ('U.N.') operational or tactical control."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-08
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Protective Assertion of Executive Privilege Regarding White House Counsel's Office Documents: [Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the President of the United States] [May 8, 1996]
"You have requested my legal advice as to whether executive privilege may properly be asserted in response to a subpoena issued to the Counsel to the President by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight of the House of Representatives. The subpoena covers a large volume of confidential White House Counsel's Office documents. The Counsel to the President notified the Chairman of the Committee today that he was invoking the procedures of the standing directive governing consideration of whether to assert executive privilege, President Reagan's memorandum of November 4, 1982, and that he specifically requested, pursuant to paragraph 5 of that directive, that the Committee hold its subpoena in abeyance pending a final Presidential decision on the matter. […] Based on these circumstances, it is my legal judgment that executive privilege may properly be asserted with respect to the entire set of White House Counsel's Office documents currently being withheld from the Committee, pending a final Presidential decision on the matter. This would be a protective assertion of executive privilege designed to ensure your ability to make a final decision, after consultation with the Attorney General, as to which specific documents are deserving of a conclusive claim of executive privilege."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-08
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Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress: Memorandum for the General Counsels of the Federal Government [May 7, 1996]
"This memorandum provides an overview of the constitutional issues that periodically arise concerning the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. Although that relationship is shaped in part by the policy and political concerns of the President and Congress of the day, the political interaction between the President and Congress takes place within an enduring constitutional framework that confers powers and responsibilities on both elected branches. In this memorandum we discuss the general principles underlying separation of powers analysis, and we address certain specific questions that have arisen in the past. Any set of examples is necessarily illustrative rather than exhaustive, however, and the Office of Legal Counsel is always available to assist in reviewing legislation or other congressional action for potential separation of powers issues."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-07
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Anniston Community Exercise 1996 (ACE 96): Exercise Report
"The Anniston Community Exercise 1996 (ACE 96) provided the opportunity to demonstrate the emergency response capabilities of the Anniston Community and to validate correction of findings identified during the Anniston Community Exercise 1995 (ACE 95), March 15, 1995."
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
1996-05-06
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Mission Need Statement for the Deepwater Capability Replacement Project
Since 1790 the U.S. Coast Guard has maintained a high seas capability which represents the very essence of the Service. All Coast Guard roles--Maritime Law Enforcement, Maritime Safety, National Defense, and Marine Environmental Protection--are performed in the Deepwater arena, which is defined as that area beyond the normal operating range of single-crewed shore-based small boats, where either extended on scene presence, long transit distances, or forward deployment is required to perform the mission. This paper documents a continuing need for surface and aviation assets, utilizing various sensors and C4I capabilities, to prosecute Coast Guard future missions in the Deepwater environment.
United States. Coast Guard
1996-05-03
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Deepwater Capabilities Project: Mission Need Statement
"The Coast Guard's ability to prosecute missions effectively falls short in two primary areas: resource capabilities and resource availability. Our assets do not have the capabilities to perform as efficiently as they should. When compared with functional requirements generated for each mission, the capabilities of our present assets show their age. Of greater concern is the undeniable fact that as assets reach the end of their service lives, the Coast Guard will not have the platforms necessary to meet future employment needs. The 'Deepwater Mission Analysis Report' underscores the importance of maintaining our core capabilities into the Twenty-first Century. It is imperative that the Coast Guard continue its alignment with national priorities by developing innovative resource allocation and asset mixes, leveraging technologies, and establishing new performance standards and measures. This commitment to achieve economical and environmentally sound policies while attaining high public service standards are cornerstones in our goal of maintaining the Coast Guard as the world's premier maritime service."
United States. Coast Guard
1996-05-03
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Environmental Policy Memo No. 3: Policy for Projects Initiated Without Environmental Review Required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
"This memorandum, which reissues Environmental Policy Memo #3, maintains the original policy but includes clarifications recommended by the Council on Environmental Quality. Occasionally [the Federal Emergency Management Agency] FEMA funding is requested for an action that has been initiated and/or completed prior to environmental review and documentation as required by [the National Environmental Policy Act] NEPA and outlined in 44 CFR Part 10, FEMA's Environmental Considerations. Often when these actions occur, the applicant has already requested and attained local, state and Federal permits required for such actions. However, due to lack of prior Federal involvement, the full NEPA environmental review process has not been followed in which reasonable alternatives and their impacts are fully investigated and documented before the action takes place. There is minimal guidance in FEMA's regulations on how to address such situations, and this memorandum is intended to clarify policy and procedures for such actions.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
1996-05-03
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Department of Defense Instruction 4715.2: DoD Regional Environmental Coordination, May 3, 1996
This document implements policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the establishment and operation of a program for regional environmental coordination within the Department of Defense. The document contains a detailed list of updated responsibilities, procedures and definitions.
United States. Department of Defense
1996-05-03
