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Protect Pulp and Paper Production Chemicals from Use in a Terrorist Attack

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From the Document: "The pulp and paper industry uses a variety of chemicals throughout the manufacturing process of paper and paper products--from books and currency, to paper towels and food wrappers--that are indispensable to our modern way of life. In the wrong hands, however, some of these same chemicals can be used for great harm. In 2006, Congress authorized the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program. Managed by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the CFATS program identifies and regulates high-risk chemical facilities to ensure that security measures are in place that reduce the risk of certain chemicals being weaponized. [...] Pulp, paper, and paper conversion facilities--e.g., pulp mills, paper mills, paperboard mills, newsprint mills, and specialty paper manufacturers--that use COI are chemical facilities under CFATS and may be subject to its regulations."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Election Security Risk Profile Tool [website]

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From the Introduction: "This tool is intended to help identify and prioritize risk to a State or Jurisdiction's election infrastructure and to identify mitigation options. In order to provide this Risk Profile, the user should respond to the questions in each election component page. Responses across components are transferred to the 'Risk Profile' report which provides an overview of the component's high priority risk areas."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Election Assistance Commission
Threat Evaluation Working Group: Supplier, Products, and Services Threat Evaluation (To Include Impact Analysis and Mitigation), Version 3.0

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From the Executive Summary: "This latest report from the Threat Evaluation Working Group adds the assessment of Products and Services to include impacts and mitigating controls to each of the Supplier Threat Scenarios provided in the original version released in February 2020, and later augmented with impacts and mitigating controls in October 2020. These additional sections are included in Appendix C, Threat Scenarios, of this report. The Working Group (WG) chose to include these updates as a standalone report to benefit the audience without the need to include numerous references to the original reports."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-07
Kubernetes Hardening Guidance

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From the Executive Summary: "Kubernetes® is an open-source system that automates the deployment, scaling, and management of applications run in containers, and is often hosted in a cloud environment. Using this type of virtualized infrastructure can provide several flexibility and security benefits compared to traditional, monolithic software platforms. However, securely managing everything from microservices to the underlying infrastructure introduces other complexities. The hardening guidance detailed in this report is designed to help organizations handle associated risks and enjoy the benefits of using this technology. [...] This guidance describes the security challenges associated with setting up and securing a Kubernetes cluster. It includes hardening strategies to avoid common misconfigurations and guide system administrators and developers of National Security Systems on how to deploy Kubernetes with example configurations for the recommended hardening measures and mitigations."

United States. National Security Agency; United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-08
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Ransomware Awareness for Holidays and Weekends

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From the Summary: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) have observed an increase in highly impactful ransomware attacks occurring on holidays and weekends--when offices are normally closed--in the United States, as recently as the Fourth of July holiday in 2021. The FBI and CISA do not currently have any specific threat reporting indicating a cyberattack will occur over the upcoming Labor Day holiday. However, the FBI and CISA are sharing the below information to provide awareness to be especially diligent in your network defense practices in the run up to holidays and weekends, based on recent actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and cyberattacks over holidays and weekends during the past few months. The FBI and CISA encourage all entities to examine their current cybersecurity posture and implement the recommended best practices and mitigations to manage the risk posed by all cyber threats, including ransomware."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation

2021-08-31
Ongoing Cyber Threats to U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems

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From the Summary: "This joint advisory is the result of analytic efforts between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the National Security Agency (NSA) to highlight ongoing malicious cyber activity--by both known and unknown actors--targeting the information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks, systems, and devices of U.S. Water and Wastewater Systems (WWS) Sector facilities. This activity--which includes attempts to compromise system integrity via unauthorized access--threatens the ability of WWS facilities to provide clean, potable water to, and effectively manage the wastewater of, their communities. [...] To secure WWS facilities--including Department of Defense (DoD) water treatment facilities in the United States and abroad--against the TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] listed below, CISA, FBI, EPA, and NSA strongly urge organizations to implement the measures described in the Recommended Mitigations section of this advisory."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Environmental Protection Agency . . .

2021-10-14
Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: APT Actors Exploiting Newly Identified Vulnerability in ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus

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From the Summary: This joint advisory is the result of analytic efforts between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to highlight the cyber threat associated with active exploitation of a newly identified vulnerability (CVE-2021-40539) in ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus--a self-service password management and single sign-on solution."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Coast Guard. Cyber Command

2021-09-16
Protect Brewery Chemicals from Use in a Terrorist Attack

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From the Overview: "Most Americans may not think about chemicals when they open an ice-cold beer, but chemicals are critical to breweries. When used properly, chemicals assist in the production of beers, malts, and other beverages; sanitize and disinfect equipment; and keep refrigerators cold. In the wrong hands, however, some of these same chemicals can be used for great harm."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-08-12?
Insider Threat Mitigation Guide

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From the Document: "America's critical infrastructure assets, systems, and networks, regardless of size or function, are susceptible to disruption or harm by an insider, or someone with institutional knowledge and current or prior authorized access. This status makes it possible for current or former employees, contractors, and other trusted insiders to cause significant damage. Insiders have compromised sensitive information, damaged organizational reputation, caused lost revenue, stolen intellectual property, reduced market share, and even harmed people. Allowing America's critical infrastructure to be compromised by an insider could have a debilitating effect on the Nation's economic security, public health, or public safety. [...] This Insider Threat Mitigation Guide is an evolution in the series of resources CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] makes available on insider threats. This 'Guide' draws from the expertise of some of the most reputable experts in the field to provide comprehensive information to help federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments; non-governmental organizations; and the private sector establish or enhance an insider threat prevention and mitigation program. Moreover, this 'Guide' accomplishes this objective in a scalable manner that considers the level of maturity and size of the organization. It also contains valuable measures for building and using effective threat management teams. Through a case study approach, this 'Guide' details an actionable framework for an effective insider threat mitigation program: Defining the Threat, Detecting and Identifying the Threat, Assessing the Threat, and Managing the Threat."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-11
Emergency Communications Technical Assistance and Planning Guide: FY2021 Highlights and Offerings

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From the Foreword: "In a year of a global pandemic, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) remained resilient in providing coordination support to the national security and emergency response community to ensure the resiliency and security of our Nation. A key part of this was transitioning in-person technical assistance engagements to the virtual environment. Since the beginning of the pandemic, CISA's Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program (ICTAP) has delivered more than 100 virtual Technical Assistance (TA) engagements in 39 states and territories. This included Statewide Communication Interoperability Plan (SCIP) workshops, Cybersecurity, Alerts and Warnings, and Grants for Emergency Communications awareness webinars and Governance and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) updates and development. [...] This year's Guide includes several new or enhanced virtual TA and SCIP workshop options to accommodate the current social distancing requirements. CISA TA offerings are provided to all 56 states and territories and Native American and Alaska Native tribes at no cost and may be requested at any time throughout the year. The offerings can be utilized to address a variety of communications interoperability issues, to remain current in the understanding of new and emerging technologies, to revitalize and enhance governance policies and procedures, and to enrich the integrity of Communications Unit personnel training and resource management."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-01
Emergency Communications Systems Value Analysis Guide

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From the Introduction: "In a climate of heightened competition for public safety funding, leaders make difficult budgeting decisions while addressing a variety of state, local, tribal, and territorial needs beyond emergency communications. Agencies must be fully prepared to provide decision-makers with an explanation of mission critical communications costs and benefits to the community. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the 'Emergency Communications Systems Value Analysis Guide' to assist public safety agencies evaluate communications systems and equipment for cost effectiveness and value to its users. This document describes common systems and equipment, including considerations and features required by public safety agencies and emergency responders. It is intended to inform planning and cost estimation through the entire system lifecycle--beginning with initial capital investments, through ongoing maintenance and operations, replacement parts, and finally disposition and transition to new capabilities once a system has reached its useful end-of-life."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-04
Defending Against Software Supply Chain Attacks

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From the Introduction: "A software supply chain attack occurs when a cyber threat actor infiltrates a software vendor's network and employs malicious code to compromise the software before the vendor sends it to their customers. The compromised software then compromises the customer's data or system. Newly acquired software may be compromised from the outset, or a compromise may occur through other means like a patch or hotfix. In these cases, the compromise still occurs prior to the patch or hotfix entering the customer's network. These types of attacks affect all users of the compromised software and can have widespread consequences for government, critical infrastructure, and private sector software customers. This document provides an overview of software supply chain risks and recommendations on how software customers and vendors can use the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) framework and the Secure Software Development Framework (SSDF) to identify, assess, and mitigate risks."

National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.); United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-04
Potential Threat Vectors to 5G Infrastructure

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From the Executive Summary: "The fifth-generation (5G) of wireless technology represents a complete transformation of telecommunication networks, introducing a vast array of new connections, capabilities, and services. These advancements will provide the connection for billions of devices and will pave the way for applications that will enable new innovation, new markets, and economic growth around the world. However, these developments also introduce significant risks that threaten national security, economic security, and impact other national and global interests. Given these threats, 5G networks will be an attractive target for criminals and foreign adversaries to exploit for valuable information and intelligence. [...] The preliminary focus of the 5G Threat Model Working Panel was to explore and prioritize potential threat vectors that may be associated with the use of 5G non-standalone (NSA) networks. The working panel reviewed existing bodies of work to identify and generate an aggregated list of known and potential threats to the 5G environment, determined and developed sample scenarios of where 5G may be adopted, and assessed risks to 5G core technologies. This analysis paper represents the beginning of the Working Panel's thinking on the types of risks introduced by 5G adoption in the Unites States, and not the culmination of it. This product is not an exhaustive risk summary or technical review of attack methodologies and is derived from the considerable amount of analysis that already exists on this topic, to include public and private research and analysis."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. National Security Agency; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence

2021
Election Infrastructure Security Funding Considerations

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From the Executive Summary: "In 2018, Congress provided $380 million in funding under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to state and local election officials for activities to improve the administration of elections for Federal office, including to enhance election technology and make election security improvements. State and local election officials are utilizing the funds to reduce risk in the election infrastructure and to build resiliency in the election process. Congress recently provided an additional $425 million in funding to continue those efforts. Federal, state and local election organizations comprising the Election Infrastructure Subsector (EIS) Government Coordinating Council (GCC) have developed this document to provide suggestions for use of the investment for each of the following categories: [1] People; [...2] Products; [...3] Practices[.]"

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-03-12
DarkSide Ransomware: Best Practices for Preventing Business Disruption from Ransomware Attacks

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From the Document: "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are aware of a ransomware attack affecting a critical infrastructure (CI) entity--a pipeline company--in the United States. Malicious cyber actors deployed DarkSide ransomware against the pipeline company's information technology (IT) network. At this time, there is no indication that the entity's operational technology (OT) networks have been directly affected by the ransomware. CISA and FBI urge CI asset owners and operators to adopt a heightened state of awareness and implement the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, including implementing robust network segmentation between IT and OT networks; regularly testing manual controls; and ensuring that backups are implemented, regularly tested, and isolated from network connections. These mitigations will help CI owners and operators improve their entity's functional resilience by reducing their vulnerability to ransomware and the risk of severe business degradation if impacted by ransomware."

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2020-05-11
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders

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From the Summary: "The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assess Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors--also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT 29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium--will continue to seek intelligence from US and foreign entities through cyber exploitation, using a range of initial exploitation techniques that vary in sophistication, coupled with stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised networks. The SVR primarily targets government networks, think tank and policy analysis organizations, and information technology companies. On 15 April 2021, the White House released a statement on the recent SolarWinds compromise, attributing the activity to the SVR."

United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation; United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021-04-26
Leveraging Mobile Applications to Bolster Emergency Alerts and Warnings

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From the Introduction: "Emergency alerts and warnings provide the public with information that a significant event has occurred or is imminent requiring immediate attention and action(s) to take. As more people turn to their mobile devices for information, there becomes an increased need to develop innovative alerts and warnings technologies and enhanced capabilities. Through the development of new alerting systems that leverage databased, wireless technology, such as mobile applications, alerting authorities have the potential to increase public awareness and decrease alert notification times. The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) advocates for the continued integration of communication technologies, such as alerts and warnings, to support the interoperability of systems and services for information exchange among the responder and partner communities with the ultimate goal of ensuring the highest state of readiness. This spotlight examines three different mobile emergency alerts and warnings applications (apps) using cases and scenarios, demonstrating how the NECP's recommendations promote the development and adoption of new technologies that enhance communication capabilities."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021?
Cyber Incident Severity Schema

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From the Document: "The United States Federal Cybersecurity Centers, in coordination with departments and agencies with a cybersecurity or cyber operations mission, adopted a common schema for describing the severity of cyber incidents affecting the homeland, U.S. capabilities, or U.S. interests. The schema establishes a common framework for evaluating and assessing cyber incidents to ensure that all departments and agencies have a common view of the: [1] The severity of a given incident; [2] The urgency required for responding to a given incident; [3] The seniority level necessary for coordinating response efforts; and [4] The level of investment required of response efforts."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2016?
Leveraging Geographic Information Systems to Enhance Emergency Response

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From the Introduction: "The public safety community heavily relies on technology, software, and applications to receive, dispatch, and respond to requests for emergency assistance. The data produced by geographic information systems (GIS) helps to accurately identify an individual's location, resulting in quicker response times and improved situational awareness for responders. Unfortunately, public safety organizations often operate on outdated technology, computing software, and applications, resulting in inefficiencies and an inability to coordinate with other public safety agencies during a crisis. To assist local jurisdictions with preparing for natural disasters or man-made events, Emergency Communications Centers (ECCs) and Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs) must adopt tools that leverage real-time data and geographical information into their operations. The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) emphasizes the importance of accurately sharing information across the entire Emergency Communications Ecosystem, including the various functions and people that exchange information prior to, during, or after incidents and planned events. This spotlight will examine how Shelby County, Tennessee and San Jose, California leveraged GIS tools to improve their emergency response operations to meet mission-critical needs."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021?
Ensuring Interoperable Encrypted Communications

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From the Introduction: "Emergency responders rely on their radios every day to maintain communications with other agencies and jurisdictions. In life or death situations, it is critical that their communications are both reliable and secure. Encryption is one way public safety agencies are ensuring secure and effective radio communications in an increasingly digital environment. Encryption enables secure communication between parties by standardizing an encryption key across all radios assigned to a group. This key acts as a password that must be known to decrypt the call at the receiving end. While this protects critical information for tactical and operational security reasons, using encryption requires enhanced interoperability during joint emergency response efforts. First responders using encryption can achieve and maintain interoperability by having an encryption key management plan and ensuring coordination amongst surrounding jurisdictions. The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP) is the Nation's strategic plan to strengthen emergency communications and advocates for the incorporation of risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate disruptions to mission-critical communications. This spotlight will examine how emergency response agencies in the National Capital Region (NCR)--including multiple jurisdictions and agencies in Northern Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.--balance the need to protect critical information through encryption while also maintaining communications interoperability across jurisdictions. The region's efforts to develop the Public Safety Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Strategic Interoperable Encryption Plan (Encryption Plan) ensures radio interoperability locally, serving as an example of successfully implementing recommendations set forth in the NECP."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

2021?
Are Our Nation's Ports Secure? Examining the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, Hearing Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, May 10, 2011

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From the statement of John L. Mica: "[F]or nearly a decade now the federal government has struggled to produce a transportation worker identification credential. We've tried to produce a credential for airport and transportation workers. We've attempted to produce a pilot's license. And we've also attempted to produce a frequent airline traveler identification card. After spending years and nearly half a billion dollars, we have, unfortunately, missed the mark. We've spent nearly half a billion dollars, and unfortunately, we do not have a TWIC [Transportation Worker Identification Credential ] card that provides secure identification, as you'll hear from GAO [Government Accountability Office] today, and also that your committee staff has revealed in their report." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Frank R. Lautenberg, Jim DeMint, Roger F. Wicker, John S. Pistole, John L. Mica, Kevin S. Cook, Stephen M. Lord, Bill Nelson, Amy Klobuchar, Olympia Snowe, Mark Begich, John Boozman, and Kelly Ayotte.

United States. Government Printing Office

2011
Leveraging Mutual Aid for Effective Emergency Response, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, November 15, 2007

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From the opening statement of Henry Cuellar: "With this hearing we hope to examine how mutual aid works during an emergency and how it is managed both in an intrastate and an interstate level. This includes examining the effectiveness of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC, or how it can be improved. [...] This committee is very interested in the issue of mutual aid and in credentialing also. In fact, as part of the 9/11 Commission bill we passed earlier this year, we require that within 1 year of enactment, the credentialing and the resourcing-typing standards under development by FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] be finalized and provided to every Federal agency with responsibilities under the National Response Framework as well as State, local and tribal governments. [...] Finally, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses from the fire, EMS [Emergency Medical Services] and law enforcement communities on how they fit in the system. I would also be interested to hear how they feel we can make progress on the credentialing of first responders so that incident commanders can accurately verify the identity and qualifications of the emergency personnel responding to an incident." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Henry Cuellar, Charles W. Dent, Marko Bourne, Jim McPartlon, Kenneth Murphy, Michael Ronczkowski, Steven P. Westermann, Leroy D. Baca, and Richard L. Cashdollar.

United States. Government Printing Office

2009
Leveraging the Private Sector to Strengthen Emergency Preparedness and Response, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications, Preparedness, and Response of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, First Session, July 19, 2007

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From the opening statement of Henry Cuellar: "The [private] sector owns approximately 85% of the Nation's critical infrastructure and has been working closely with the Department in the development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Given its role in protecting critical infrastructure, the private sector can greatly support our country in times of crisis. While the Department has been working to improve its ability to coordinate efficiently during disasters, the subcommittee wants to ensure that it is truly incorporating best practices to enhance its preparedness. [...] The subcommittee wants to hear what the Department is doing to address the following areas that are important to the response and recovery process: logistics, donation management, credentialing of private sector officials and standards to create business continuity in the private sector. By strengthening public and private partnerships we can assure our communities that emergency preparedness and response at the local, State, and federal levels will be efficient and effective when a major disaster, terrorist attack, or other emergency takes place." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Henry Cuellar, Charles W. Dent, Donna M. Christensen, Marko Bourne, Alfonso Martinez-Fonts, Jr., Barry Dinvaut, Sr., J. Michael Hickey, and John Howard.

United States. Government Printing Office

2009
Global Challenges to Readiness and the Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Request, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 10, 2011

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From the opening statement of Madeline Z. Bordallo: "Today's hearing is the second part in a series that is investigating the readiness of our military to respond, in the context of the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, to the full spectrum of threats that are known and threats that are unknown. During the last hearing with the panel of outside witnesses, I stressed that assuming risk is expected in any budget, especially in our operation and maintenance budgets. And I think the key is to understand better where we assume risk and why this committee should accept that risk." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: J. Randy Forbes, Madeline Z. Bordallo, Daniel P. Bolger, Gerbert J. Carlisle, Bruce W. Clingan, Richard T. Tryon, Martin E. Dempsey, Vicky Hartzler, and Jon Runyan.

United States. Government Printing Office

2011
Missouri River Flood: An Assessment of the River Management in 2011 and Operational Plans for the Future, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, November 30, 2011

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From the opening statement of Bob Gibbs: "This hearing is for the Missouri River flood. It is an assessment of river management in 2011 and operational plans for the future. I would like to welcome everyone today in hearing the Missouri River flood and assessment, as I just said, and the operational plans for the future. At the dedication ceremony of the Oahe Dam in South Dakota in 1962, President Kennedy made the following statement: 'We take for granted these miracles of engineering. And too often we see no connection between this dam right here and our Nation's security and our leadership all around the world. The facts of the matter are that this dam and many more like it are essential to the expansion and growth of the American economy as a measure that Congress is now considering. And this dam and others like it are essential to our national strength and security, as any military alliance or missile complex.' I believe President Kennedy and his generation understood that public infrastructure is important to our economy, and a strong economy is vital to our national security. As we go through these difficult economic times, we must not forget that some Federal investments are valuable." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Bob Gibbs, Tom Latham, Rick Berg, Steve King, Lynn Jenkins, Vicky Hartzler, Kristi L. Noem, Emanuel Cleaver, Blaine Luetkemeyer, Jeff Fortenberry, Lee Terry, John R. McMahon, Kathy J. Kunkel, Tom Waters, Brad Lawrence, Richard Oswald, W. Todd Akin, Leonard L. Boswell, Russ Carnahan, Eddie Bernice Johnson, and Jeff Fortenberry.

United States. Government Printing Office

2012
Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic Disasters: How to Minimize Costs and Streamline Our Emergency Management Programs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, March 30, 2011

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From the opening statement of of Jeff Denham: "I am confident that each of you will do everything within your power to save lives and reduce suffering when disaster strikes. Yet in 2005, we saw how a confused chain of command, failed communications, and a host of other problems could thwart the efforts of thousands of responders. Since Hurricane Katrina, much has been done to correct those problems. Congress rewrote the disasters laws, we put FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] back together again and made it clear the administrator is responsible for managing disasters on behalf of the President. We expedited military assistance. The Red Cross revamped its disaster operations and will coordinate mass care operations. And we spent billions on planning, communications, and logistics at every level of government. According to the Department of Homeland Security's inspector general, FEMA has made moderate progress in most of the key preparedness areas. While this report is encouraging, there is significant room for improvement. The catastrophe in Japan is a stark reminder of how bad and unpredictable disasters can be. Japan essentially faces three major disasters: an earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear incident. Any one of these disasters would stretch our capabilities. But could we handle three at once? […] While it's not possible to prevent most disasters, proper preparedness will save lives, minimize cost, and ensure our response and recovery is not bogged down in bureaucratic red tape." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jeff Denham, Gary A. Christmann, W. Craig Fugate, James Hubbard, Brendan Murphy, Rob Rash, Charles S. Shimanski, Michael Weber, Timothy H. Bishop, Eleanor Holmes Norton, Mike Dayton, and Richard L. Hanna.

United States. Government Printing Office

2011
Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response [March 28, 2020]

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From the Document: "As the Nation comes together to slow the spread of COVID-19, on March 16th the President issued updated Coronavirus Guidance for America that highlighted the importance of the critical infrastructure workforce. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) executes the Secretary of Homeland Security's authorities to secure critical infrastructure. Consistent with these authorities, CISA has developed, in collaboration with other federal agencies, State and local governments, and the private sector, an 'Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce' advisory list. This list is intended to help State, local, tribal and territorial officials as they work to protect their communities, while ensuring continuity of functions critical to public health and safety, as well as economic and national security. Decisions informed by this list should also take into consideration additional public health considerations based on the specific COVID-19 [coronavirus disease]-related concerns of particular jurisdictions."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

Krebs, Christopher

2020-03-28
Guide to Vulnerability Reporting for America's Election Administrators

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From the Introduction: "America expresses itself through its elections. Citizens expect the same speed, security, and accuracy in voting as they expect in their communications. Even when we cast a paper ballot at a polling place, election officials rely on dozens of electronic data systems to bring the right ballots to each registered voter and to ensure they are accurately counted. Like other electronic systems, risk to election systems can be effectively managed, but vulnerabilities do exist. Election administrators should know that the cybersecurity research community can help ensure these systems are safe so that the choices of the voting public can be clearly heard. This Guide offers a step by step guide for election administrators who seek to establish a successful vulnerability disclosure program."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response [March 19, 2020]

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From the Document: "The attached list identifies workers who conduct a range of operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability, including staffing operations centers, maintaining and repairing critical infrastructure, operating call centers, working construction, and performing management functions, among others. The industries they support represent, but are not necessarily limited to, medical and healthcare, telecommunications, information technology systems, defense, food and agriculture, transportation and logistics, energy, water and wastewater, law enforcement, and public works. We recognize that State, local, tribal, and territorial governments are ultimately in charge of implementing and executing response activities in communities under their jurisdiction, while the Federal Government is in a supporting role. As State and local communities consider COVID-19 [coronavirus disease]-related restrictions, CISA [Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency] is offering this list to assist prioritizing activities related to continuity of operations and incident response, including the appropriate movement of critical infrastructure workers within and between jurisdictions. Accordingly, this list is advisory in nature. It is not, nor should it be considered to be, a federal directive or standard in and of itself."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

Krebs, Christopher

2020-03-19
Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce: Ensuring Community and National Resilience in COVID-19 Response [March 23, 2020]

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From the Document: "The attached list identifies workers who conduct a range of operations and services that are essential to continued critical infrastructure viability, including staffing operations centers, maintaining and repairing critical infrastructure, operating call centers, working construction, and performing management functions, among others. The industries they support represent, but are not necessarily limited to, medical and healthcare, telecommunications, information technology systems, defense, food and agriculture, transportation and logistics, energy, water and wastewater, law enforcement, and public works."

United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency

Krebs, Christopher

2020-03-23

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