Advanced search Help
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Effect of Posse Comitatus Act on Proposed Detail of Civilian Employee to the National Infrastructure Protection Center: Memorandum for the General Counsel, Federal Bureau of Investigation [May 26, 1998]
"The proposed detail of a civilian employee of Department of Defense to the National Infrastructure Protection Center, a component of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is permissible under the Posse Comitatus Act. This memorandum responds to your request that the Office of Legal Counsel consider the effect of the Posse Comitatus Act ('PCA'), 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1994), on a proposed staffing and organizational arrangement whereby a civilian employee of the Department of Defense will be detailed to the National Infrastructure Protection Center ('NIPC') to serve in that office as a deputy chief. We conclude that the proposed arrangement is permissible under the PCA."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1998-05-26
-
National Guard and Challenges of 21st Century Defense
"America's National Guard has been an integral part of her defense for over 360 years. Coming into its own by law and extensive use during the 20th century, it now stands on the threshold of the 21st struggling again for its survival and the right to be a full partner with the Regular Army. Questioning its relevance in the modern concept of short, high-tech wars envisioned by the Army, the large combat formations remaining in the Guard, particularly its 8 divisions, are seen as too big, too hard to train, and too long to deploy to be of any use in projected war plans. This assertion, despite the huge increase in commitments of a drawn-down Army and the warnings of responsible authorities within and outside the military, is the crux of the debate now raging over the Guard's future. The premise of this paper is that America cannot afford to cut the National Guard combat capability. A sufficiently large and well-equipped combat reserve is necessary to counter threats to our national security and interests. While a smaller, high-tech Regular Army is postulated as the force of the future and able to handle any eventuality; what if it's not?"
Army War College (U.S.)
Little, Shelby K.
1998-05-24
-
Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63 [White Paper]
"This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on critical infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both the private and public sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures. Wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government."
United States. National Domestic Preparedness Office
1998-05-22
-
Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection [Audio, Part 1]
This is part one of an audio recording of the text of Presidential Decision Directive 63. This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services. Presidential Decision Directive 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection.
United States. White House Office
1998-05-22
-
Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure Protection [Audio, Part 2]
This is part two of an audio recording of the text of Presidential Decision Directive 63. This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services. Presidential Decision Directive 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.). Center for Homeland Defense and Security
1998-05-22
-
Presidential Decision Directive 63: [For Official Use Only]
This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services. Presidential Decision Directive 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection.
United States. White House Office
1998-05-22
-
Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63
This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on critical, infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both the, private and public sectors.
United States. Department of Energy
1998-05-22
-
Fact Sheet: Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62
President Clinton is determined that in the coming century, we will be capable of deterring and preventing such terrorist attacks. The President is convinced that we must also have the ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should such an attack occur. To meet these challenges, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 62. This Directive creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy. The Directive will help achieve the President's goal of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st century with the same rigor that we have met military threats in this century.
United States. White House Office
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1998-05-22
-
Presidential Decision Directive 62: Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas
From the Document: "In 1995, I reaffirmed and elaborated United States counterterrorism policy in PDD-39. [Presidential Decision Directive] That policy directive remains valid. Because of our military superiority, potential enemies, be they nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations, are increasingly likely to attack us in unconventional ways. Adversaries will be tempted to exploit vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructure, impede continuity of government operations, use weapons of mass destruction against civilians in our cities, disrupt our transportation systems, attack us when we gather as a community at special events, and prey on our citizens overseas. As this cluster of threats matures in the coming century, I am determined that we will be prepared to deter them, prevent them, or, if necessary, limit the damage they can inflict. Success requires that we recognize the common nature of these threats, the need for an integrated response, and, in the case of critical infrastructure protection, the importance of a public-private partnership."
United States. White House Office
1998-05-22
-
Intifada & the Blood of Abraham. 'Lessons in Asymmetrical Warfare--Written in Stone'
"A historical case study concerning the Israeli Army's response to the Palestinian 'Intifada' or uprising in the late 1980's and early 1990's provides instructive planning considerations for likely future application of U.S. military force in an asymmetrical threat environment. The monograph specifically analyzes the time period from the beginning of the uprising until the handshake of Rabin and Arafat on the White House lawn September 13th, 1993. Although the theoretical application of the case study is speculative of future environments, this paper attempts to link available historical data to anticipated trends in the international security environment and emerging concepts of operational art. The argument surrounding asymmetrical types of warfare leads into a discussion of the application of IDF [Israeli Defense Force] lessons learned that may be applied to future U.S. military scenarios."
Army War College (U.S.)
Randle, Lawrence L.
1998-05-21
-
Relationship among Tasks, Centers of Gravity, and Decisive Points
"At the operational and strategic levels, military planners use the concepts of centers of gravity and decisive points to assist them in determining the best ways for accomplishing assigned tasks. By identifying the enemy's center of gravity, the planner determines the enemy assets that must be defeated to gain victory. On the other hand, by identifying the friendly center of gravity, the planner has determined the friendly assets that must be protected to retain freedom of action to attack the enemy's center of gravity. Since it may not be possible to directly attack enemy centers of gravity, friendly forces attack formations, positions, or support structures that lead directly to the center of gravity. These are referred to as decisive points....This monograph discusses the military theory of centers of gravity and its relationship to assigned tasks and decisive points. United States' joint and individual service doctrines and historical examples frame the discussion of theory. This monograph seeks to clarify the relationship among assigned tasks, centers of gravity, and decisive points to assist commanders and planners in determining how to best accomplish assigned tasks."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Springman, Jeffrey A.
1998-05-21
-
National Guard and WMD Homeland Defense
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a new and significant threat to American security. The nation does not presently possess the ability to adequately deal with this threat. Congress has tasked DoD to develop capabilities to deal with this threat. In particular, DoD has undertaken programs to train those who will initially respond to a WMD attack (preparedness), and to form units with technical WMD skills to assist in a larger federal relief effort (response). DoD's present concept for preparedness and response is not adequate to provide a long-term, comprehensive defense. The preparedness program is narrow in focus and ignores necessary refresher training. Response is fundamentally the addition of small technical units added to the current disaster relief (DR) structure. The National Guard can, if properly structured, provide genuine WMD homeland defense. The National Guard should be tasked with the WMD homeland defense mission. It should reorganize its excess 8 combat divisions and 3 separate combat units into Homeland Defense Divisions. Combat forces should convert to combat support/combat service support (CS/CSS) units, with emphasis on WMD. As well as meeting the WMD threat, this change in capability will meet identified Army CS/CSS shortfalls. Divisions should be organized to coincide with FEMA's regions and be responsible for all military support operations within their regions. WMD homeland defense is a strategic opportunity for the National Guard The security of the nation and its ability to respond to disasters, natural and manmade, will be enhanced by the National Guard's return to its roots with a legitimate and comprehensive homeland defense.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Spiese, Melvin G.
1998-05-21
-
Counterterrorism and Operational Art
Can operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, be useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism? Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action. In conventional conflict, operational art enables a commander to best use the resources to accomplish the strategic objective. In the same respect, countering terrorism, which is beyond the capabilities of a single agency in the federal government, requires the most efficient use of limited resources to accomplish the strategic objective. This monograph investigates whether operational art is useful in countering terrorism. The United States' counterterrorism effort was examined to determine if operational art applies to this form of asymmetric conflict. First, the historical development and fundamentals of operational art are described to highlight the differences of a system based on unity of effort instead of unity of command. With these procedures in mind, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the nation's counterterrorist strategy, is explained to describe current interagency counterterrorist operations. Finally, operational art is used to analyze Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) to determine if it is as applicable to a terrorist asymmetrical threat as it is to a conventional threat. Specifically, PDD-39 was analyzed to see if the ends, ways, and means methodology and campaign design are feasible in linking strategic objectives to tactical action. This monograph concludes that operational art is useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism. PDD-39 has identified the interagency conditions, the ends, to accomplish the nation's strategic counterterrorist objectives. It used campaign design, the ways, to accomplish the ends, through the means of the various government departments and agencies.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Hickey, Christopher M.
1998-05-21
-
Changing the U.S. National and Defense Strategies and Other Initiatives to Combat Competitive Intelligence Operations Against the U.S.
To compete in this new economic prosperity era, nation states are resorting to the use of their nation's intelligence organizations through competitive intelligence operations to improve their economic position. The loss to America's economic development and security is resulting in the erosion of not only our industrial base, but more importantly, our relative military superiority. Since all DOD activities are a result of the US National and Defense Strategies, this monograph first examines these. It finds that they are focused on deterring and defeating threats based on military power equating to the ability of a nation state to influence by force the outcome of political choices. They fail to recognize the importance of economic power, the evolution to a global economy, and their resulting threats. The reasons why these changes have not been recognized is then discussed. The reasons included are the inability to think outside the normal military comfort zone; an inability to model and analysis the complex effects of economic power; focusing on partial or interim goals; and the inability to absorb and understand the far greater interdependency of accelerated change. Economic power and its relationship to political power continues to be a basic reason for world wide conflict. To help understand this, the importance of economic power and how it determines a nation state's military power, is defined. Economic power is then evaluated from a theoretical and historical perspective. Considering today's environment of dynamic complexity controlled by a nations economy it is determined that economic power should be added to Clausewitz's trinity of Army, People and Government.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Bolick, Joseph A.
1998-05-21
-
Search for Stabillty in Sub-Saharan Africa An American Perspective
The end of the Cold War changed the international security environment. It created an international environment plagued by wide spread human rights violations, the proliferation of violence, and an increase in the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, resulting in the increased involvement of the U.S. in the region. U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa has consisted of humanitarian assistance operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, security assistance, Joint Combined Exchange Training, Combined Medical Exercises, international Military Education and Training (IMET) , and Exercise-related Construction projects. This monograph measures the effectiveness of these programs against the degree to which they promote and develop stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. IMET programs must be linked to the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Failure to do so will result in a waste of Department of Defense resources. This monograph (1) defines the geographical area and its challenges to the U.S. military; (2) identifies and discusses the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa to include the identification of U.S. interest in the area; (3) provides a legislative overview of IMET programs; (4) identifies the combatant commands responsible for the region and what IMET programs they conduct; and (5) assesses the effectiveness of IMET programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Crawford, Anthony K.
1998-05-21
-
Terrorist and Intelligence Operations: Potential Impact on the U.S. Economy: Statement by Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Program Manager Battelle Memorial Institute before the Joint Economic Committee United States Congress
This statement before Congress is made by a biological weapons developer defector from the former Soviet Union. Remarks include: What are Biological Weapons; The USSR's Biological Weapons Program; Why am I Concerned About Biological Weapons in Russia Today; Proliferation of Russia's Biological Weapons Expertise; What is the Potential Impact of Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons; Our General Preparedness for Military and Terrorist Biological Attacks; Our Medical Preparedness for Military and Terrorist Biological Attacks; and Conclusions and Recommendations. Smallpox and anthrax are two of the key biological weapons discussed.
United States. Congress. Joint Economic Committee
1998-05-20
-
Infectious Diseases: Analysis of Eradication or Elimination Estimates, Statement of Benjamin F. Nelson, Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives
"We are pleased to be here today to discuss the results of our review of the World Health Organization's (WHO) estimates for eradicating or eliminating the following infectious diseases: dracunculiasis, polio, leprosy, measles, onchocerciasis, Chagas' disease, and lymphatic filariasis. These diseases exact an enormous cost on the developing world, killing almost 1.1 million people and afflicting millions of others with serious disabilities and deformities. Measles alone kills almost 1 million children each year, the vast majority of them in the least developed countries. In April 1997, WHO provided the House International Relations Committee with estimated costs and target dates for eradicating or eliminating the seven diseases. Subsequently, WHO revised some of the costs and time frames based on more recent information. We reviewed the estimates provided to us by WHO as of December 1997. WHO officials estimated that about $7.5 billion would be needed to eradicate or eliminate the targeted diseases. Today, we will discuss the soundness of WHO's cost and time frame estimates, U.S. spending related to these diseases in fiscal year 1997 and any potential cost savings to the United States as a result of eradication or elimination, other diseases that international health experts believe pose a risk to Americans and could be eventual candidates for eradication, and U.S. costs and savings from smallpox eradication and whether experts view smallpox eradication as a model for other diseases. We did not attempt to assess the cost-effectiveness of these initiatives as compared to other options such as improving primary health care delivery systems."
United States. General Accounting Office
Nelson, Benjamin F.
1998-05-20
-
Report from the Workgroup on Contingency Planning and Emergency Response to the National Coordinators, May 19, 1998
"On March 18, 1998, the Workgroup on Contingency Planning and Emergency Response met during the National Coordinators Meeting (NCM) in San Diego, California. The Workgroup discussed the accomplishments of the Workgroup since the last NCM and the goals for the present year. This document details those discussions."
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1998-05-19
-
Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Put State Department and FAA Operations at Risk, Statement for the Record by Gene L. Dodaro, Assistant Comptroller General, Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony for the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
"This testimony focuses on the results of recent reviews of the Department of State and the Federal Aviation administration (FAA). Significant computer security weaknesses at both these organizations threaten the integrity of their operations, numerous specific recommendations for improving State and FAAs information security posture have been made. Unfortunately, such weaknesses are typical at most federal agencies evaluated. However, good management practices and organizational discipline can do much to mitigate the risks all government agencies face from security threats. Accordingly, also highlighted are best practices identified in studying leading organizations that can be used by all agencies to protect sensitive information and computer systems."
United States. Government Accountability Office
1998-05-19
-
Road to Success in Military Operations Other Than War: Paved by the Synchronization of Conventional and Special Operations Forces
Today's global security environment of uncertainty and chaos due to ethnic strife and declining global resources will require greater emphasis for U.S. military forces at the other than war end of the conflict scale when dealing with the full range of military operations. With the current U.S. dominance in conventional military power, any potential future adversary will likely look for an unconventional or asymmetric means of engaging us. This will require the joint force commander (JFC) to fully understand the operating environment for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The synchronization of conventional and SOF, although crucial to the success of any military operation discussed in joint doctrine, is the most critical aspect of MOOTW. When the JFC first begins planning he must first understand how his military means are going to achieve his operational objectives. In order to accomplish this demanding task, he has to fully understand how best to integrate the full range of military options available and how to synchronize his conventional and SOF for mission accomplishment. The JFC has several doctrinal keys to successfully employ operational art in a MOOTW environment. Most important are the strategic estimate and the facets of operational art especially synergy, simultaneity and centers of gravity. Of the six MOOTW principles, the most important to the JFC are unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. This will ensure that the JFC really understands what the mission is and tailors the force to achieve the military and political objectives in the shortest time with the fewest casualties.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Schick, Howard P.
1998-05-19
-
Weapons of Mass Destruction a Network-Centered Threat
Battlespace dominance is more than the physical control of air, land, and sea. Under the network centric concept of operations, U.S. forces must be ready to control the infosphere in order to assure military objectives can be achieved. Perhaps the most effective information warfare (IW) weapon is a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), specifically a biological or nuclear weapon. Important questions should be answered about the ability to protect American information networks from the significant information disruption characteristics of WMD.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Diggs, D. G.
1998-05-18
-
Operational Logistics for OCONUS Consequence Management: A Joint-Interagency Challenge
The United States military logistician faces significant challenges in the current political-Military environment of peacetime engagement, under the rubric of military operations other than war (MOOTW). One of the most challenging new MOOTW missions to support logistically, is Consequence Management (CM), which involves joint-interagency assistance to mitigate the damage resulting from the intentional or accidental release of NBC contaminates. Primary emphasis is on disaster containment, preservation of life, and minimization of suffering. Executive direction has mandated a dynamic, supporting role for the Department of Defense (DOD) in CM operations. The CM mission requires extensive joint-interagency coordination, and operations are conducted in an NBC contaminated environment. For these reasons, CM portends unique considerations for the operational logistician. The importance of a rapid and competent CM response in the chaotic aftermath of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incident, with its inherent destruction, human suffering and political sensitivities, reveals the imperative for sound operational CM planning. CM logistics planning and preparation should involve familiarization with the CM operational scenario and concept of operations; planning for interagency coordination; determination of critical logistics requirements; identification of international resources; and synchronization of the theater logistics effort. Development of a generic CM concept of logistics will serve to focus planning efforts and streamline the logistics planning cycle. Operational logistics for CM is a joint-interagency challenge with truly strategic implications.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Johnson, William F.
1998-05-18
-
Theater Engagement Planning: An Interagency Opportunity
"The 1997 National Security Strategy's 'imperative of engagement' explicitly cites a range of interagency activities--from diplomacy to military exercises--as necessary to successfully shaping the international environment to deter conflict and promote peace. Accordingly, the Chairman has established the Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), a new type of deliberate plan designed to better focus and manage the U.S. military contribution to regional engagement. The TEP process will require each CINC to develop a strategic concept for regional engagement in his area of responsibility, and to annually update a detailed 5-year implementation program. The new TEP process offers an opportunity to institutionalize the participation of agencies and organizations outside of the Department of Defense into military operational planning. The TEP family of plans can be used to overcome differences between defense and non-defense agencies in modes of planning, measures of effectiveness, and lines of authority to encourage unity of effort. If supported by a standing National Security Council Interagency Working Group on Regional Engagement and a global interagency exercise program, the TEP process could simplify the management of crosscutting regional engagement responsibilities. Agency progress toward accomplishing crosscutting tasks identified and approved by the IAWG could be monitored through the strategic planning and performance-monitoring process mandated in Government Performance Results Act of 1993."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Scala, Mary L.
1998-05-18
-
Targeting for Peace Operations
"In virtually any forum where future missions for American military forces are discussed, one of the more distinctly possible Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) discussed is peace operations. The apparent contradiction between peace operations and targeting is a "gray area" for Joint Task Force Commanders. They will find little written in US Joint Doctrine to assist them in properly preparing for their potential targeting responsibilities in the peace operations arena. While restraint and political considerations are important aspects of peace operations, the Joint Force Commander cannot overlook the importance of having a plan for all contingencies, and a targeting plan should be one of them. Due to the complexity of peace operations, the proper balance of diplomacy and force is difficult to determine. It is time to recognize that targeting and peace operations are not mutually exclusive. A Joint Pub that clearly addresses all aspects of peace operations must be developed and targeting considerations should be included as a key planning factor."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Nelson, Chad F.
1998-05-18
-
Archipelagic Sea Lanes Designation: Considerations for Operational Level Planners
"This month, Indonesia will submit to the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) a compromise proposal for the partial designation of Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASLs) in accordance with Article 53 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The United States raised objections and blocked Indonesia's earlier proposals before the IMO based on national security concerns but has more recently worked very closely with Indonesia to craft a proposal that is both acceptable to the United States and expected to be acceptable to other concerned maritime powers. This paper provides a brief background of the issues surrounding ASL designation, reviews the current status of the Indonesian proposal, frames the United States' position on the designation of ASLs and discusses the operational limitations that will be imposed on military forces required to operate in designated sea lanes once they are approved by the IMO."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Wright, David K.
1998-05-18
-
Dominant Ground Maneuver at the Operational Level (and the Value of Speed)
"Technology is pulling the Army apart: we need to change, but don't know how. Joint Vision 2010 seems to point the way; the concept of 'dominant maneuver' for ground forces at the operational level should emerge from these rapid advances and opportunities in technology. Often overlooked, however, is the importance of 'speed,' the dominant characteristic of 'dominant maneuver'. To be truly dominant in maneuver, our ground forces must be able to maneuver faster in all dimensions of the battlespace. In the art of operational warfare, the picture of warfare in the next century is incomplete. The aspect of 'speed' is lost or not appreciated and it is unclear how ground forces are supposed to 'denominate' a concept they do not even understand. And so, in the misty early morning of the next century, the promise of new sunshine and ideas is slowly giving way to the hot sun of reality: America's Army needs to change. But how? What's wrong with us?"
Naval War College (U.S.)
Schorsch, Rusty
1998-05-18
-
OP Art to the Rescue: Fundamentals for a Hostage Crisis
"The objective of this paper is to underscore the importance of operational art in the planning and execution of a hostage rescue operation. With this form of asymmetrical threat, strategic and operational leaders are faced with a difficult challenge where political objectives are wholly dependent on a focused tactical action. The critical influence of the action and interaction of operational factors, in a highly charged political context, is vividly illustrated by comparing the 1980 U.S. operation in Iran with the 1976 Israeli operation in Entebbe. This comparison contrasts and highlights four areas: first, the political context and ensuing strategic guidance, second, factor space including hostage location, distance and weather; third, factor time and the impact on planning, intelligence, and training; and finally factor forces, where the effects and interdependence of readiness, operational security, command and control and force protection were decisive in the varied outcomes of the two operations."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Flora, Ed
1998-05-18
-
Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is Needed, Statement of Keith O. Fultz, Assistant Comptroller General, Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
In recent years, GAO and others have reported on vulnerabilities plaguing the nation's aviation system, the availability and limitations of explosives detection technologies used at airports, and efforts under way to improve aviation security. Terrorism was initially considered a possible cause of the 1996 crash of TWA Flight 800 and helped focus national attention on the system's vulnerabilities. The President formed the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security following the crash, and later congressional hearings highlighted continuing weaknesses in the U.S. aviation security system. Although terrorism has been since ruled out as a factor in the crash of TWA Flight 800, ensuing studies found that weaknesses persist. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), other government agencies, and the aviation industry are now implementing 31 of the Commission's recommendations on aviation security. Some of these recommendations are similar to legislative mandates that Congress enacted under the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. This report provides information on (1) the tracking, monitoring, and coordinating activities undertaken by the agencies responsible for implementing the Commission's recommendations and (2) FAA's progress in implementing eight of these recommendations, five of which are similar to mandates contained in the Reauthorization Act of 1996.
United States. General Accounting Office
1998-05-14
-
Executive Order 13083: Federalism
Executive Order 13083 aimed to guarantee the division of govenrmental responsibilities, embodied in the Constitution, between the Federal Government and the States that was intended by the Framers and application of those principles by the Executive departments and agencies in the formulation and implementation of policies.
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1998-05-14
-
Executive Order 13084: Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments
Executive Order 13084 aimed to establish regular and meanining consultation and collaboration with Indian tribal governments in the development of regulatory practices on Federal matters that significantly or uniquely affect their communities. It was revoked by EO 13175 in the year 2000.
United States. Office of the Federal Register
Clinton, Bill, 1946-
1998-05-14
