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• Ensuring the Security of America's Borders through the Use of Biometric Passports and other Identity Documents, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, June 22, 2005

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  The purpose of this hearing is to examine the potential of using biometric passports and other identity documents as a way of ensuring the security of America's borders. Subcommittee Chairman Senator Daniel E. Lundgren made the following remarks in his opening statement, "The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the current and future use of biometric technology in travel documents. The issues of document integrity and identity verification are key to our national efforts to enhance border security and combat terrorist travel. Today's hearing provides an opportunity to examine progress made in this area by reviewing two recent announcements by the Department of Homeland Security: Number one, the changes in the passport requirements for Visa Waiver Program travelers and, two, the pilot program to test the use of contact with chips in passports." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lundgren, Loretta Sanchez, Christopher Cox, Bennie G. Thompson, Donna M. Christensen, Norman D. Dicks, James R. Langevin, John Linder, Zoe Lofgren, Stevan Pearce, Elaine Dezenski, Frank Moss, Martin Herman, C. Stewart Verdery, and Gregory Wilshusen.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2005
• Fiscal Year 2006 Budget: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, March 2, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "The Subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the DHS proposed fiscal year 2006 budget relating to the integration of homeland security screening operations…This Subcommittee has a vital role to ensure that our homeland security policies strengthen our nation and protect our economic as well as physical security. As we know, our terrorist enemies seek not only to kill Americans but also to weaken our economy and destroy our way of life. In the broader sense, this Subcommittee will lead the Committee's efforts in answering several fundamental homeland security questions: Which critical assets and infrastructure require protection, and how do we prioritize our investments in a world of finite resources? What are the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities of Federal, State and local governments?" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Christopher Cox, Tom Davis, Peter A. DeFazio, Norman D. Dicks, Zoe Lofgren, Bill Pascrell, Jr., Stevan Pearce, Loretta Sanchez, Carol DiBattists, Deborah J. Spero, Jim Williams, and Marc Rotenberg.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2005
• Solving the OTM Undocumented Alien Problem: Expedited Removal for Apprehensions along the U.S. Border: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, September 28, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Daniel Lungren: "The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on how the expedited removal program will enhance DHS's capabilities to detain and remove non-Mexican aliens from the U.S… We are here today to ensure that the appropriate resources and training exist within and across those agencies that are tasked with this important mission. Not only does the Border Patrol need to expand the use of expedited removal procedures, but there must also be adequate detention space to hold those who are apprehended. Necessary country clearances and travel documents must be obtained in a timelier fashion so that those undocumented aliens may be returned to their home countries more expeditiously…At a time in our nation's history when there are terrorists who wish to infiltrate our borders for the purpose of inflicting harm on any American, our own policies have created a system that apparently encourages more undocumented aliens to enter the U.S. illegally. It is my belief that it is this system of border security that the president intended us to reexamine in the post-9/11 world. It is also my belief that this system of border security allows potential terrorists to enter the U.S. between our ports of entry and slip into our society undetected, especially as we harden other legitimate means of entry." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Mark E. Souder, David V. Aguilar, Daniel W. Fisk, John Torres, and Sheila Jackson-Lee.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Developing a Public Safety Telecommunicator Job Description

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  From the Call to Action: "As a leader in an emergency communications center (ECC), it is most likely part of your responsibility to ensure the job descriptions that are released during the hiring process accurately reflect the roles and responsibilities of the telecommunicators you're looking to hire. This is an awesome and sometimes daunting responsibility as the job, we know, is ever-changing. With the migration to Next Generation 911 and the introduction of a multitude of technology that is present in an ECC, it seems nearly impossible to keep up. However, because of the 2018 decision by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) not to reclassify the 911 telecommunicator/dispatcher, we know it is essential to keep up with these job descriptions. During the last process, the industry banded together and made an emotional appeal for reclassification; however, the one thing that was not provided to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) was the required data that provides the necessary evidence to reclassify telecommunicators in the BLS as a federal statistical survey. This document, 'Guidelines for Developing a Public Safety Telecommunicator Job Description', is part one of a four-part toolkit that addresses the steps an ECC can take to prepare for the OMB reclassification efforts."

  United States. Bureau of Labor Statistics

  2021-12
• Reforming HAZMAT Trucking Security, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, November 1, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Daniel Lungren. "The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on reforming the HAZMAT trucking security program. I would like to welcome everybody to this hearing. Today, we will review the current TSA security program for transporting hazardous materials by truck and the impact of these regulations on the trucking industry. Four years ago, Congress mandated security threat assessments of all individuals who operate a motor vehicle under the Department of Transportation's HAZMAT program. It is extremely important that we prevent dangerous material that could be used in a terrorist event from falling into the wrong hands, and I am a strong supporter of this program. Yet I am concerned that the current approach is neither the most effective nor efficient manner to address this very real program. There are over 4,000 substances currently classified as a hazardous material for a variety of environmental, corrosive, health, safety or security reasons. They include items such as nail polish remover, corn syrup, dish detergent, and alcohol spirits." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Sheila Jackson-Lee, John Linder, Gary Brown, Michael Laizure, Scott Madar, Linda Lewis-Pickett, Stephen Russell, Robert McGuire, and Justin Oberman.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• CDM: Government Perspectives on Security and Modernization, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, March 20, 2018

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  This is the March 20, 2018 joint hearing on "CDM: Government Perspectives on Security and Modernization," held before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. From the opening statement of John Ratcliffe: "This is the second hearing this year that the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection has held on the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, or CDM, Program. That is because I see real value in the goals of CDM, not only for cybersecurity but also for improving the efficiency of the information technology across the board. To that end, I am pleased to be holding this hearing today jointly with my good friend from Texas, Congressman Will Hurd, who will be joining us shortly and who has been a leader on IT modernization issues as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Information Technology. I welcome our friends from the Oversight Committee to the CDM conversation today. I believe that DHS's CDM Program has great potential to drive progress on a number of cybersecurity issues, from network visibility to data-centric security and from the role of increased automation of security tasks to the role of artificial intelligence. So the question that I have for this panel today is what can Congress do to make sure CDM capabilities are being rolled out to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape?" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Max Everett, Scott Blackburn, David Garcia, and Kevin Cox.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2018
• H.R. 5695, Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2006, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, June 29, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Dan Lungren. "Today, we are going to be considering H.R. 5695, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act, which was introduced yesterday. By some accounts, chemical facilities across the Nation number close to 15,000. This industry employs some 5 million Americans. It is the largest exporting sector in the economy and the largest private investor in research and development. By one account, 96 percent of all manufactured goods directly involve the use of chemicals. Chemical facilities produce our medicine, they give us clean water, fertilize our farms, manufacture goods essential to our national defense and our modern way of life. As a result the chemical industry is critically important to our safety, our national defense and our economic vitality. It is our chemical dependence and the potential harm that a certain number of these chemicals pose to human life that makes these substances attractive as terrorist targets. In order to protect our citizens and ensure national and economic security, we need to secure America's chemical facilities against potential terrorist attacks. Any regulation of this industry must take into account the varying types of facilities such as agriculture, timber, paper products, food, mining, paints, pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals just to name a few." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Peter T. King, Bennie G. Thompson, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Stevan Pearce, David Moore, Michael A.L. Balboni, Phillip J. Crowley, Scott Berger, Martin J. Durbin, and Frank Pallone.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Front-Line Defense: Security Training for Mass Transit and Rail Employees, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, September 28, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Daniel Lungren. "The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss security training for mass transit and rail employees. And I would like to thank everyone for being here today, especially our witnesses. We meet today to discuss security training programs for rail and mass transit agencies. The importance of railroads and mass transit to our daily lives and national economy cannot be overstated. Mass transit commuter rail and freight rail are responsible for moving millions of people every day and for delivering thousands of freight shipments across the country. The subcommittee has looked at the security of these important systems in a variety of ways. Last year, in the aftermath of the London subway attacks, we looked at the vulnerabilities of soft targets, including public transportation, and the security measures being taken to protect them. We also looked at the various ways the DHS and our rail and transit agencies were working to prevent a terrorist attack from ever occurring. Today we address another important component of our security, and that is training. Thousands of employees have been trained in the years since 9/11 on security issues, and these include police officers, emergency responders, management security officers, and sometimes front-line employees." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Normal D. Dicks, James R. Langevin, William Fagan, Terry Rosapep, John Sammon, Edward Hamberger, Polly Hanson, John P. Tolman, and Ed Wytkind.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2008
• CDM, the Future of Federal Cybersecurity, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, January 17, 2018

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  This document is the January 17, 2018 hearing titled "CDM [Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation], the Future of Federal Cybersecurity" before the House Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of John Ratcliffe: "The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony regarding the implementation and future of DHS's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, or CDM, program. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. In providing effective cybersecurity, the ability of the Federal enterprise to monitor and assess the vulnerabilities and threats to its networks and systems in real time or as near real time as possible is paramount. This is what the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, or CDM, program at DHS is all about, understanding what and who is on Federal networks so that we can achieve true visibility into the Federal Government's digital ecosystem. Phase 1 of CDM is to provide visibility into Federal networks and information systems by working to identify what was on Federal networks. It was a simple question, really. What hardware and software was on the systems an agency or department was running? This was about taking stock of those internet-connected assets. As DHS has moved through Phase 1, they found an incredible amount of devices connected to our networks that agencies were not previously aware of. How can you protect what you cannot see? How can you modernize your technology if you do not even know what technology you have?" Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Frank Dimina, Dan Carayiannis, Gregg T. Mossburg, and A.R. ''Trey'' Hodgkins.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2018
• London Bombings: Protecting Civilian Targets from Terrorist Attacks Part I and II: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, September 7, 2005 and October 20, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Daniel Lungren: "This morning, the subcommittee will focus on the protection of civilian or soft targets against terrorist attacks. A soft target can be any place or thing whose destruction or impairment will cause a loss of life, economic damage or psychological trauma, which is difficult to protect or harden because it is a location that is accessible to the public. Soft targets would include schools, buses, trains, hotels, office buildings, restaurants, night clubs, apartment buildings, churches, mosques, synagogues or any place where many people can be found in close proximity. It is true that in a free and open society such as ours, there are an infinite number of such potential targets which a terrorist could choose to attack. Compounding our difficulties, terrorists have many advantages. They have the ability to choose what, where, when and how to execute an attack. As the President has said, we have to be right 100 percent of the time, while they only have to get lucky once." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Bennie G. Thompson, Norman D. Dicks, James R. Langevin, Sheila Jackson-Lee, John Linder, Bill Pascrell, Stevan Pearce, and Mark E. Souder.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Assessment of Risks at the Northern Border and the Infrastructure Necessary to Address Those Risks: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure, Protection, and Cybersecurity Joint with the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, August 8, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Dan Lungren: "As many of you may know, the issue of border security, the issue of immigration, the issue of the threat of terrorism and its implications for both of those first two subjects has garnered a lot of attention in the Congress and throughout the country. There are a number of hearings being held around the country on these subjects. Our Subcommittees believed it was important for us to ensure that the northern border not be left out, that we have an opportunity to look at the unique circumstances that we find on our northern border, that we understand in all of its facets the seriousness of attending to the issue of securing our border on the north, and at the same time trying to understand even better the relationship that exists between our country and our neighbors to the north and attempt to come up with solutions to the problems that are presented without, as we suggested, unduly interfering with the steady flow of commerce with our northern neighbors." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Marks Asmundson, Norman D. Dicks, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Dave G. Reichert, Thomas Hardy, Ronald Henley, Timothy J. Lowenberg, Dale Brandland, Martin Collacott, David B. Harris, Gregory Johnson, K. Jack Riley, Donald J. Alper, Maria Cantwell, Rick Larsen, Davis S. McEachran.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Improving Management of the Aviation Screening Workforce; Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, July 28, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Daniel Lungren: "The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony on improving the management of the aviation screening work force. I would like to welcome everybody to today's hearing. When Congress directed TSA to take over responsibility for airline security screening, we sought a system that would produce better trained screeners, thus increasing security. Directly following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, Transportation Secretary Norm Mineta set forth a goal of processing passengers within 10 minutes or less. Yet by all accounts TSA hasn't met this goal. Instead, according to the DHS inspector general, we have multibillion dollar enterprise that inefficiently targets and burdens children and the elderly. I might add, on the positive side, that TSA has recently changed its standard operating procedures, effective July 14th, to allow TSA supervisors at screening checkpoints the decision-making capability and authority to waive secondary screenings on passengers that are clearly under the age of 12. I appreciate that particular change. I am glad it is coming. And while I applaud TSA for this step forward, it is indicative of the overall problem that we ever had such a contrary position or policy in the first place and that it took so long and so many bad stories and hearings to force such common-sense action. There is, obviously, always room for more improvement. ." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Loretta Sanchez, Christopher cox, Bennie G. Thompson, Peter A. DeFazio, Norman D. Dicks, James R. Langevin, Bill Pascrell, and Steven Pearce.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2005
• Wassenaar: Cybersecurity and Export Controls, Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, January 12, 2016

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  This is the January 12, 2016 hearing on "Wassenaar: Cybersecurity and Export Controls," held before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Information Technology of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security. From the opening statement of John Ratcliffe: "To the issue at hand, we know that private industry in America is excellent at responding to consumer demands. Many companies, including some of those here today, pride themselves on guaranteeing the security of their customers' personal information. Others represented here exist solely to help in securing that information. They also secure vital sectors of society such as critical infrastructure and the financial sector. Their success hinges, in part, on their ability to guarantee their own security. Today, I hope to hear from our witnesses on how the Wassenaar Arrangement in its implementation would affect these objectives. The Wassenaar Arrangement was established 20 years ago to apply to conventional arms and dual-use goods and technology. Changes made in 2013 sought to extend export controls to cybersecurity intrusion and surveillance software and technology. These changes were motivated by a desire to prevent authoritative regimes from repressing their people. This intent is noble. If the administration's implementation effort resulted in unified dissent from the technology and cybersecurity industries, from academics and researchers, the energy and financial sectors also voiced deep concerns. And they were echoed by civil society groups who said that the proposal could make communicating about security vulnerabilities almost impossible in certain cases. The Federal Government engages in countless ways with the American people and our international partners. When proposing actions, the government should, at a minimum, not do harm to its own people. I'm interested to hear from our government witnesses how they believe this arrangement will successfully deter the accumulation of digital weapons, which aren't constructed in factories, which don't need physical space for storage, and which don't depend on traceable means of transport." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Vann H. Van Diepen, Kevin J. Wolf, Phyllis Schneck, Cheri Flynn McGuire, Iain Mulholland, Cristin Flynn Goodwin, Dean C. Garfield, and Ann K. Ganzer.

  United States. Government Publishing Office

  2017
• Future of Cyber and Telecommunications Security at DHS, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, September 13, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "Information and communications technology are a prime target for those intending to do us harm and a successful terrorist attack could cause immeasurable danger and damage to our everyday lives, for example, disrupt our electrical power supply or disrupt our ability to respond to emergencies. [...] We are concerned the department has not been as effective as possible in ensuring the security and resiliency of our information infrastructure or its efficient reconstitution in the case of an incident of national significance. We have been fortunate enough not to have suffered a debilitating information infrastructure incident, but we cannot rely upon good [fortune] alone. We must create a strong, focused organization to ensure our cyber assets our protected and to enable us to respond effectively to a cyber incident." Several organizational representatives, including those from the GAO, Cybersecurity Industry Alliance, the Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council, and the Telecommunications Sector Coordinating Council offer up perspectives and private sector expectations for coordinating the protection of America's information infrastructure. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Norman D. Dicks, Sheila Jackson Lee, Stevan Pearce, Mark E. Souder, George Foresman, David Powner, David Barron, Guy Copeland, Paul B. Kurtz, and William Pelgrin.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2008
• Future of TSA's Registered Traveler Program: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure, Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session, November 3, 2005

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  From the opening statement of Daniel Lungren: "The subcommittee is meeting today to continue its oversight of the Registered Traveler program and to assess what measures are needed to move it beyond its pilot phase to a truly nationwide system. I would like to welcome everybody to today's hearing. We have already met twice this year on the prospect of a Registered Traveler, or, as I prefer to call it, a trusted traveler program, being rolled out at our nation's airport. Some may wonder why a third hearing is necessary. Well, it is my belief that the successful implementation of an interoperable program for voluntary enrollment of frequent fliers will not only help focus TSA resources towards those passengers that perhaps pose the greatest risk, we will also reduce the burden and hassle often associated with air travel." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Peter T. King, Bennie G. Thompson, Peter A. DeFazio, Norman D. Dicks, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Mike Rogers, Kip Hawley, Charles Barclay, Steven Brill, Marc Rotenberg, Lawrence J. Zmuda, Alisa Arnold, EDS U.S. Government Solutions, Chris Witkowski.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• H.R. 4954, The Safe Port Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, March 16, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "We meet today to hear testimony on H.R. 4954, the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act, that is the SAFE Port Act of 2006. […] The Security and Accountability For Every Port, or SAFE Port Act, is a comprehensive proposal to strengthen the maritime transportation system through a layered security strategy that builds on already-existing initiatives to secure the supply chain from the point of origin to delivery in the United States. I believe the administration has established a foundation upon which we are building, but the building upon that foundation is urgent. This legislation focuses on improving security both at home and abroad by expanding capabilities, maximizing available resources, and pushing our borders outward. The legislation has three key ideas: first, enhancing security at U.S. ports by establishing a $400 million port security grant program with dedicated funding from custom duties; requiring terrorist watch list checks of all port employees with secure access at ports; and establishing additional joint operations centers and furthering the deployment of radiation detection equipment. Second, preventing threats from reaching the United States by authorizing and improving two Customs and Border Protection cornerstone security programs: the container security initiative and the customs trade partnership against terrorism. Third, tracking and protecting containers en route to the U.S. by improving our ability to detect high-risk containers through strengthening the automated targeting system; establishing container security standards; and supporting additional cargo security research and development, including reviving Operation Safe Commerce." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Loretta Sanchez, Bennie G. Thompson, Norman D. Dicks, and Sheila Jackson-Lee, Jayson Ahern, Brian Salerno, Eugene Pentimonti, and Noel Cunningham.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Science and Technology on a Budget: Finding Smarter Approaches to Spur Innovation, Impose Discipline, Drive Job Creation, and Strengthen Homeland Security, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, First Session, November 17, 2011

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  This is the November 17, 2011 hearing on "Science and Technology on a Budget: Finding Smarter Approaches to Spur Innovation, Impose Discipline, Drive Job Creation, and Strengthen Homeland Security," held before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies. From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine Science and Technology Directorate and its operations in the current fiscal climate. I want to begin this hearing by emphasizing my strong support for science and technology research and development. I think you will find that across both ends of the spectrum and both sides of the aisle. I believe scientific R&D [Research and Development] generates innovation, cutting-edge technologies, and new products to drive economic development and job creation. R&D is also a critical element of the Department's mission to strengthen America's security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative technology solutions to bolster our homeland defenses." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Yvette D. Clarke, Laura Richardson, Bennie G. Thompson, Tara O'Toole, David C. Maurer.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2012
• President's FY 2007 Budget: Risked-Based Spending at the Transportation Security Administration: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity of the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, February 16, 2006

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  From the opening statement of Daniel E. Lungren: "The annual budget process is an important ritual for both the administration and Congress. It is not, as some would believe, a means to secure higher funding levels for our pet projects. Instead, it represents an opportunity to step back, take a hard look at our priorities and refocus on our primary missions, understanding the successes and failures of the previous year as a key part of the resource management. The budget, as presented, asks for $6.3 billion for TSA, $4.7 billion of which would go toward aviation security. While I support the requested levels, I am concerned, as are others, that we may be spending too much on aviation relative to other homeland security priorities. We must do a better job driving down unnecessary costs and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger and baggage screening. Ultimately, I think we are all in agreement that TSA's airport screening operations are too labor-intensive. We need to move to a system that has more capital-intensive to drive up performance and drive down operating costs. I would like to hear more about the administration plans to fund new inline EDS systems." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Daniel E. Lungren, Peter A. DeFazio, Norman D. Dicks, Sheila Jackson-Lee, Edward J. Markey, Stevan Pearce, and Kip Hawley.

  United States. Government Printing Office

  2007
• Best Practices for Seizing Electronic Evidence, Version 2.0

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  "The purpose of this document is to develop a basic understanding of key technical and legal factors regarding searching and seizing electronic storage devices and media. Although technology brings forth with it new types of crimes and eventual passage of related laws, it is often only a vehicle or tool the criminal elements uses to assist in the commission of conventional crimes and terrorist acts. The misuse of technology affords suspects enhanced global access, intelligence/counter intelligence, anonymity, speed, distance and a mean for deploying booby traps."

  United States. Department of Justice; United States. Secret Service

  2004
• Unlikely Bright Spot: Networked Investigative Journalism in the Age of COVID-19

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  From the Document: "As the 2016 Panama Papers, 2017 Paradise Papers, 2017 Azerbaijan Laundromat, and 2020 Luanda Leaks have shown, collaborative investigative journalism initiatives are key to linking the complex pieces of information that help explain and expose transnational kleptocracy. While many traditional media outlets have struggled in recent years to adopt journalistic models capable of responding to the multifaceted nature of cross-border kleptocracy, the collaborative platforms have demonstrated their impact in this regard. When the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic hit in early 2020, investigative journalists all over the world launched efforts to track and expose potential avenues for corruption, given the vast amounts of aid to be disbursed in very short order to meet emergency public health needs. The potential for the conditions associated with the pandemic to turbocharge kleptocracy is considerable."

  National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.); International Forum for Democratic Studies

  Patrucic, Miranda

  2021-03
• Federal Judiciary: Improved Cost Savings Estimates Could Help Better Assess Cost Containment Efforts, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate

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  From the Highlights: "In March 2013, the President ordered spending reductions, known as sequestration, across the federal government. As a result, the federal judiciary's resources were reduced by about $346 million over the remainder of fiscal year 2013. The judiciary has been affected by decreasing federal resources, such as the sequestration, and has been implementing various cost containment initiatives. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to evaluate judiciary cost savings actions and the effects of the 2013 sequestration. This report examines, among other things, (1) judiciary actions to achieve cost savings and efficiencies, and the extent to which the judiciary has estimated cost savings; and (2) judiciary actions to implement the 2013 sequestration and any effects from these actions on judiciary personnel and operations. GAO analyzed relevant judiciary documents and collected information from and interviewed judiciary officials in all 12 regional circuit courts and the district court, bankruptcy court, and federal defender organization in four judicial districts, selected to obtain a diverse group of districts on the basis of funding level, among other factors. GAO recommends that the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) take the following two actions for major cost containment initiatives: (1) develop a reliable method for estimating cost savings achieved, and (2) regularly report estimated cost savings achieved. AOUSC said it will seriously consider GAO's recommendations."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-11
• Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: Preliminary Results of Undercover Testing of the Federal Marketplace and Selected State Marketplaces for Coverage Year 2015, Statement of Seto Bagdoyan, Director, Forensic Audits and Investigative Service, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives

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  From the Highlights: "Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) provides for the establishment of health-insurance marketplaces where consumers can, among other things, select private health-insurance plans or apply for Medicaid. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the cost of subsidies and related spending under PPACA at $60 billion for fiscal year 2016. PPACA requires verification of applicant information to determine enrollment or subsidy eligibility. In addition, PPACA provided for the expansion of the Medicaid program. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to examine application and enrollment controls for the marketplaces and Medicaid. This testimony provides preliminary results of undercover testing of the federal and selected state marketplaces during the 2015 open-enrollment period, for both private health-care plans and Medicaid. GAO submitted, or attempted to submit, 18 fictitious applications by telephone and online, 10 of which tested controls related to obtaining subsidized health-plan coverage available through the federal Marketplace in New Jersey and North Dakota, and through state marketplaces in California and Kentucky. GAO chose these four states based partly on a range of population sizes and whether the state had expanded Medicaid eligibility under terms of the act. The other 8 applications, among the 18 GAO made, tested marketplace and state controls under the marketplace system for determining Medicaid eligibility in these four states. The undercover results, while illustrative, cannot be generalized to the full population of enrollees. GAO discussed the results of its testing with CMS and state officials to obtain their perspectives."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-10-23
• Modeling the Employee Life Cycle to Address the Insider Threat

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  From the Abstract: "Within an organization, the employee population is the source of potential malicious insiders. To investigate the evolution of the insider within an organization, we are developing a model of the employee life cycle. In addition, the employee life cycle model is being applied to define and analyze interactions of the employee population with insider security protection strategies. The model was exercised for an example scenario that focused on human resources and personnel security activities, specifically, pre-hiring screening and security clearance processes. Additionally, we have developed and tracked through the model several case studies of malicious insider activity. This modeling effort provides a framework to understand important interactions, interdependencies, and gaps in insider protection strategies. This work is part of a larger effort to develop the basis for an integrated systems-based process for designing and evaluating effective insider security systems."

  Sandia National Laboratories

  Duran, Felicia A.; Conrad, Gregory N.; Duggan, David Patrick . . .

  2009?
• Weapon System Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Department of Defense's Portfolio Management, Report to Congressional Committees

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  From the Highlights: "DOD's weapon system acquisition programs have a total estimated acquisition cost of over $1.4 trillion. Portfolio management is an approach used by organizations to evaluate, select, prioritize, and allocate resources to projects that best accomplish strategic or organizational goals. In March 2007, GAO [Government Accountability Office] recommended that DOD implement a department-wide portfolio management approach for weapon system investments. Senate Report 113-44 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision that GAO review DOD processes for identifying duplicative and inefficient acquisitions. This report assesses the extent to which (1) DOD uses portfolio management to optimize weapon system investments; (2) DOD conducts integrated portfolio reviews; and (3) the military services conduct portfolio reviews. GAO compared DOD and military service policies and portfolio reviews with best practices and standards for portfolio management. GAO recommends that DOD update its portfolio management policy, designate a senior official responsible for its implementation; conduct annual portfolio reviews that integrate key information from the requirements, acquisition, and budget processes; and invest in analytical tools to support its portfolio management efforts. DOD partially concurred with the recommendations. However, as discussed in the report, DOD's planned actions will not fully address the issues GAO identified."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-08
• 401(K) Plans: Clearer Regulations Could Help Plan Sponsors Choose Investments for Participants, Report to the Honorable Elizabeth Warren, U.S. Senate

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  From the Highlights: "DOL [Department of Labor] created a regulatory 'safe harbor' in 2007 to limit plan sponsor liability for investing contributions on behalf of employees into default investments when employees do not otherwise make an election. In addition, DOL identified three default investments that, if selected by sponsors, would qualify a plan for safe harbor protection. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review certain aspects of these default investment types. This report examines: (1) which options plan sponsors selected as default investments and why; (2) how plan sponsors monitor their default investment selections; and (3) what challenges, if any, plan sponsors report facing when adopting a default investment for their plan. To answer these questions, GAO reviewed relevant federal laws and guidance; analyzed industry survey data on the prevalence of default investment use; analyzed nongeneralizable responses from 227 plan sponsors who voluntarily completed a GAO web-based questionnaire; and interviewed 96 stakeholders, including service providers, advocacy groups, and research organization representatives, as well as academicians"

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-08
• DOJ Civil Rights Division Travel: Division Strengthened Controls over Travel, but Additional Areas for Improvement Identified, Report to the Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate

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  In the context of this report, DOJ refers to the Department of Justice. "The sensitive nature of taxpayer-funded travel necessitates that federal agencies have strong internal controls in place to help ensure that travel complies with rules and regulations. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to review the Division's travel controls. This report examines the extent to which the Division effectively implemented internal controls and complied with travel policy in key areas, including appropriate (1) authorization and reimbursement of travel and (2) use of travel charge cards. GAO analyzed Division travel data for all trips associated with investigations resulting in a court case and completed investigations not resulting in a court case ('closed investigations'), and travel charge card use from October 2011 through June 2013, the most recent data available at the time of GAO's data request. GAO did not analyze travel data associated with ongoing investigations. GAO also analyzed a generalizable sample of travel documents for 105 of the 3,157 trips within the period of its review. GAO also reviewed relevant federal and agency-specific travel rules and interviewed officials. GAO recommends, among other things, that the Division strengthen controls related to prior authorization of travel and timely submission of vouchers, evaluate whether new controls for noncontract airfares are functioning properly, and improve how it documents oversight of delinquent travel card accounts. The agency concurred with GAO's recommendations."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-11-12
• U.S. Coins: Implications of Changing Metal Compostitions, Report to Congressional Requesters

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  From the Highlights: "The U.S. Mint, a bureau of the Treasury, produced about 13 billion coins in 2014. Since 2006, metal prices have risen to where the unit costs of a penny and nickel exceed their face value. The U.S. Mint was directed by statute to develop and evaluate the use of new metals that would reduce the costs of coin production while minimizing the impact on coin accepting equipment. Treasury is authorized to recommend coin changes to Congress based on the U.S. Mint's analysis and has not yet done so. GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to examine the U.S. Mint's efforts. This report examines (1) what is known about potential government savings from changes to the metal composition of coins; (2) what is known about potential industry costs from changes to the metal composition of coins; and (3) how potential coin composition options could affect government savings and industry costs. GAO reviewed legislative provisions and U.S. Mint estimates of government savings; compared the U.S. Mint's estimating process to best practices; and reviewed cost estimates from associations that represent selected businesses that submitted estimates to the U.S. Mint, such as the vending and laundry industries. GAO interviewed U.S. Mint officials and industry representatives to understand how their estimates were developed. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. In comments, the U.S. Mint questioned GAO's use of the 'Cost Guide' to assess the U.S. Mint's estimates. GAO continues to believe it is appropriate to use the 'Cost Guide' to assess the U.S. Mint's estimates."

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-12-10
• Defense Logistics: DOD Has Addressed Most Reporting Requirements and Continues to Refine Its Asset Visibility Strategy, Report to Congressional Committees

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  From the Highlights: "DOD's 2014 'Strategy' states that to achieve a seamless and effective supply chain, DOD needs to have end-to-end visibility of its assets from acquisition to disposal and all points between. The Fiscal Year 2014 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] required DOD to submit to Congress a comprehensive strategy and plans for improving asset tracking and in-transit visibility, including 11 statutory elements that were specified in the mandate. The NDAA also included a provision that GAO [Government Accountability Office] assess the extent to which DOD's strategy and accompanying implementation plans include the 11 statutory elements; incorporate industry best practices related to automated information and data-capture technology; effectively execute DOD's IUID [Item Unique Identification] policies; and contain initiatives that align with DOD's overarching goals and objectives, and that have been implemented. This report discusses the extent to which DOD's 'Strategy,' plans and other documentation address the items specified by the mandate. GAO assessed DOD's 2014 'Strategy' and accompanying implementation plans submitted to Congress in response to the mandate, interviewed cognizant officials, and reviewed DOD's October 2015 'Strategy.'"

  United States. Government Accountability Office

  2015-12-22
• Perfect Storm: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Transnational Kleptocracy

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  From the Document: "The COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic has exacerbated existing corruption risks worldwide while creating new opportunities for authoritarian regimes to repress political opposition, independent media, and civil society groups. An unprecedented global surge in public spending and procurement that has sidestepped important safeguards against abuse, combined with distraction and disarray in the international community, has created ideal conditions for transnational kleptocracy. Yet authoritarian regimes also are facing unprecedented challenges, as their populations grow less tolerant of the corruption that often undermines the pandemic response."

  National Endowment for Democracy (U.S.); International Forum for Democratic Studies

  Sibley, Nate

  2021-03
• Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress [April 1, 2022]

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  From the Introduction: "This report presents background information and issues for Congress concerning the Navy's force structure and shipbuilding plans. The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy's shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years. The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy's force-level goal, its proposed FY2022 shipbuilding program, and its longer-term shipbuilding plans. Decisions that Congress makes on this issue can substantially affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  O'Rourke, Ronald

  2022-04-01