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Limitless Battlespace: Operations in Cyberspace
Our nation is embarked on a new Cold War. This new war, unlike the conflict with the Soviet Union, has no territorial boundaries, can involve offensive operations from virtually any corner of the globe, can be conducted by nation-states, terrorist groups or high school hackers, and requires massive national expenditure to counter. It is a product of the Information Age. This war in a military context can be undertaken on its own or in concert with traditional employment of force. It can also be a force multiplier both for and against our nation. In the modern world, the territorial boundaries between adversaries and allies can be unrecognizable as in the case of non-State- sponsored terrorism, space, and cyberspace. For the operational commander, use of information technology including space systems will generally traverse networks within and possibly controlled by nations not involved in the conflict, and over which he has no control. In fact, his information may actually employ the adversary's assets en route to him. Such is the nature of "information operations" in modern society. As presented here, the advent of this technology presents unique capabilities as well as unique problems and vulnerabilities for military operations. This paper intends to address: (1) The unique nature of cyberspace; (2) Potential vulnerabilities to (specifically) command and control systems; (3) Measures for information management and protection; and (4) Challenges of information operations. While this paper does not endorse restricted use of the technology, it will attempt to raise the awareness of the operational commander regarding this new venue of war, and proposes a CINC-level organization to effectively operate in the information realm.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Lee, Carolyn J.
1999-05-17
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Threat of WMD: Will We Hold It at Risk, Or Be Held at Risk by It?
"American interests require the U.S. military to maintain a power projection capability to defend those interests. WMD can effectively hold the U. S. at risk - vice the U.S. holding such threatening actors at risk. The threat such weapons impose on U.S. national interest, American citizens, and to U.S. allies requires more than reliance on deterrence and U.S. non-proliferation (NP) efforts. More active options, such as a preemptive strike capability, offer a greater deterrent threat than the threat of retaliation. This capability is required in our counter-proliferation (OP) efforts, and should be utilized to reduce the threat to American forces (in the event deterrence fails). Operational commanders must have the capability to deny the adversary an ability to hold us at risk with WMD. We must develop, the necessary tools to conduct preemptive strike options (and refine and exercise these capabilities), before we again encounter the threat of utilization of WMD against our forces. Without the above requisite tools, we will limit our options to response only. Without the capability to preempt an adversary's threatened use of WMD, we will remain at risk, vice holding this threat at risk. In order to counter this threat, these shortfalls must be fixed. If we do not actively seek to deny our adversary his WMD threat, we will be locked into facing the threat of deploying, operating, and fighting in contaminated environments."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Steed, Michael T.
1999-05-17
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Force Protection of Sea Based Logistics, A Historical Perspective
"The United States is heavily reliant on sea based logistics shipping. Much of the United States military strategy involves using military supplies transported on CONUS based ships and prepositioned ships. This dependence on sea based logistics gives the U.S. great flexibility and mobility but is also a critical vulnerability. During World War II Japan was also a nation dependent on maritime shipping. Japan did not provide force protection for merchant shipping and the results were disastrous. Great Britain and the United States also experienced attacks on maritime shipping in both World War I and II. German submarines destroyed millions of tons of shipping before adequate resources were allocated and tactics developed to counter the threat. Today's operational commander should not forget the lessons of the past. Surprise, unity of effort/unity of command and coordinated air, surface and subsurface efforts are just as relevant today as they were in World War I and II. The United States has doctrine to protect maritime shipping but U.S. Naval force reductions and the lack of a credible threat make force protection a low priority issue. All maritime shipping is potentially at risk, but prepositioned ships loaded with critical military supplies are especially vulnerable. They are a high value, low risk target for a capable enemy. The results of such an attack could have severe consequences for United States forces and our ability to conduct military operations."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Siebe, Michael A.
1999-05-17
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Posse Comitatus: Some Thoughts on Loosening its Restrictions within the Department of Defense
Posse Comitatus law and/or service policies have prohibited DoD forces from becoming involved in domestic/civil law enforcement since the late 1870s. Focus upon the "war on drugs" during the 1980s generated new laws that significantly changed DoD's role in this long-term battle. Current National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) indicate ongoing involvement by DoD forces in the strategy to decrease demand, reduce availability of drugs, and reduce the number of young people who experiment with drugs. Posse Comitatus law does not apply outside of the United States, and the law only applies to the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force; however, Department of Navy officials have crafted their service policy to mirror Posse Comitatus restraints. 10 USC 375 (1988) provided clarification and restricted all DoD forces from becoming directly involved in law enforcement (search, seizure and arrest). It's time for another look at partially increasing DoD involvement in counterdrug operations (CD OPS). This paper presents a case for authorizing U.S. Navy combatants to board foreign vessels upon the high seas. Appendix A includes a detailed summary of Posse Comitatus law and its changes over the past century.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Neptun, Daniel A.
1999-05-17
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Chemical and Biological Warfare: Impact on Force Deployment
One of the seven principles of logistics identified in Joint Pub 4-0 is survivability or the capacity to prevail in the face of potential destruction. Civilian personnel who make the force deployment system function are high pay-off targets subject to chemical and biological warfare (CBW). Disrupting or deterring the United States ability to deploy forces can seriously undermine the CINC's ability to prosecute the mission. Assured availability of critical host nation, civilian, and contractor personnel is a significant feature in designing a "survivable" force deployment system. Consequently, providing CBW protection should be a priority for the CWC. Operational Commanders are likely to see a growing reliance on host nation and contractor support particularly in the theater distribution process. Greater reliance does not come, however, without risks and costs. Vulnerabilities in our force deployment system due to our current dependence on a non-military workforce presents the operational commander with significant challenges and a need to understand the requirements to provide chemical and biological protection to our host nation and civilian personnel.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Campbell, Sharon B.
1999-05-17
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Year 2000 Issues within the U.S. Pacific Command's Area of Responsibility: Host Nation Support to U.S. Forces Korea
"This report monitors DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. For a list of audit projects addressing the issue, see the year 2000 webpage on the IGnet at http://www.ignet.gov. The overall audit objective was to evaluate whether DoD adequately planned for and managed year 2000 risks to avoid disruptions to the U.S. Pacific Command's mission. Specifically, we evaluated whether year 2000 interface agreements or assurances of year 2000 compliance existed between U.S. Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea organizations providing host nation support. U.S. Forces Korea had not obtained year 2000 interface agreements or formal assurances of year 2000 compliance from Republic of Korea civil and military (government) organizations and commercially operated companies providing armistice and wartime host nation support. As a result, more needed to be done to minimize the risk of disruption - to the Republic of Korea and U.S. Combined Forces Command mission - to stabilize the international political situation on the Korean peninsula, plan for the defense of the Republic of Korea and, in the case of hostilities, direct Republic of Korea/U.S. combat forces to defeat enemy aggression."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
1999-05-17
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Sea Superiority Within the Littorals: Is the Enemy Better Prepared?
U.S. Navy doctrine demands that sea superiority be established to support the projection of power from the sea to influence events ashore within the littoral regions of the world. It is unlikely that adversaries within the near future will be able to contest seriously control of the seas using conventional naval forces. Therefore, the U.S. Navy will likely encounter asymmetric threats from its future enemies. The international arms market has made technologically advanced sea denial weaponry available to many potential adversaries. When these weapons are integrated within a coordinated coastal defense system, they could place U.S. platforms assigned to conduct sea control operations at risk. This is of particular concern while the Navy is transitioning its primary focus from a blue water threat to littoral operations. This paper analyzes the modern littoral threats to U.S. sea control operations, accesses current U.S. vulnerabilities, and provides recommended options to mitigate adequately the threat in order to achieve local sea superiority.
Naval War College (U.S.)
French, William D.
1999-05-17
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Selected Principles of War as They Apply to Counterdrug Operations
From a doctrinal perspective the Department of Defense has two distinct sets of principles for conducting operations, one for war and one for operations other than war. It is Cook's contention that in order to win the "War on Drugs" we need to apply a hybrid set of principles. He feels that the principles of unity of command, objective, offensive, surprise, security, and perseverance have the most utility in this war. This thesis will look at the historical background of the "War on Drugs", how it is currently being fought, and, with the application of this hybrid set of principles, how we can improve our counterdrug operations. Cook's thesis and recommendations will focus on the operational level of war with specific attention being paid to America's southwest border.
Naval War College (U.S.). Joint Military Operations Department
Cook, Edward R.
1999-05-17
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Report from the Workgroup on Contingency Planning and Emergency Response to the U.S./Mexico National Coordinators, May 13, 1999
On May 13, 1999, the Workgroup on Contingency Planning and Emergency Response convened to discuss the achievements and activities since the last Coordinator's meeting and future goals for the workgroup. Participants in the workgroup included representatives for contingency planning and emergency response. The workgroup discussion resulted in conclusions that are detailed in this report.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
1999-05-13
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Coalitions and Drug Demand Reduction - Pathway to a Better Tomorrow
General Barry McCaffrey, Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, stated that our National Drag Strategy is basically a demand reduction based strategy. As part of The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998, be and President Clinton directed that 14,000 community coalitions be established around our country to assist with the fight against drugs. Accepting the importance of this mission and the huge task it is, then we as a people and community, must draw our own lines in the sand, that will basically refocus much of our counterdrug efforts to assist in the establishment and support to coalitions within our 54 states and territories. Much the same as a helicopter must transition from a hover state to a flight mode, in order to fly, our counterdrug efforts must refocus as we move into the 21st century, to emphasize more of a demand reduction role. Now is the time to collectively redirect a much higher percentage of resources and effort, to support our people, our communities, and our coalitions. Many of our governor's outlines in their state counterdrug plans that drug demand reduction, and specifically, coalition development is a high priority. However, a close review of actual budgets, support, and personnel allotted to coalitions, reveal that this is not the case. Part of this support is our resources within the National Guard, as well as our entire national effort. This paper will examine where we should go with our support to coalitions, what is perceived, and what is reality. Within this great country in order to support the environment for our children to grow into good parents and raise their children in a drug free environment, we must act with decisiveness and commitment. If our national effort is truly a demand reduction based policy, then we must be honest enough with ourselves to support our next generation.
Army War College (U.S.)
Billingsly, Harold W.
1999-05-12
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USMS Obligation to Take Steps to Avoid Anticipated Appropriations Deficiency, Memorandum for the General Counsel, United States Marshals Service [May 11, 1999]
"Under the apportionment provisions of the Antideficiency Act, the United States Marshals Service has an affirmative obligation to take steps to avoid a deficiency in its Federal Prisoner Detention budget and any drastic curtailment of its prisoner detention services by reducing current expenditures and/or exploring alternative sources of funding that would not depend upon the receipt of additional funds from Congress."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1999-05-11
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Accountability for War Crimes: Progress and Prospects. Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One Hundred Sixth Congress, First Session, May 11, 1999
"Our hearing today will examine the principal forum where war criminals are being called to a camp of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia." Witnesses include: Nina Bang.Jensen, Coalition for International Justice; Jennifer Green, Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Law; and Dr. Paul R. Williams, American University.
United States. Government Printing Office
1999-05-11
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Oversight of the US Intelligence Community's Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and their delivery means poses a grave threat to global security. It is a pressing national security issue for which the US Intelligence Community has significant responsibilities and can make vital contributions. The purpose of this directive is to provide for leadership, oversight, and guidance to the US Intelligence Community in carrying out its responsibilities for combating proliferation, including support to nonproliferation and counter proliferation, and to provide an overall framework for US Intelligence Community contributions to the formulation and implementation of US policies for combating proliferation. This directive also sets forth the authorities and responsibilities of the Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation and the mission of the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC). This directive is not intended to abrogate or derogate the authorities and responsibilities of organizations in the US Intelligence Community contained in statute, Executive order, Presidential Directive, National Security
Council Intelligence Directive, or other lawful authority.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1999-05-07
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H. Rept. 106-130, Part 1: Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Report together with Additional Views to accompany H.R. 1555, May 7, 1999
"The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 1555) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2000 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass."
United States. Government Printing Office
1999-05-07
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Year 2000 Compliance of the Seawolf Class Submarine Combat System
This audit report assesses the status of Military Department and Defense agency mission critical systems identified by the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Forces Korea as being of particular importance to them in attaining compliance with year 2000 conversion requirements. Specifically, it reviews the progress of each system toward year 2000 compliance, testing and integration of modifications, and contingency plans. For this report, it reviews the Seawolf Class Submarine Combat System.
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
1999-05-03
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FBI Records: Columbine High School, Part 4 of 4
From the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) website: "On April 20, 1999, Eric Davis Harris (1981-1999) and Dylan Bennet Klebold (1981-1999) killed 12 students and one teacher at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado before committing suicide. The tragedy sparked national debates about school safety. The FBI assisted local law enforcement by investigating additional threats and Internet leads, conducting witness interviews, and processing physical evidence. The FBI's file details the initial investigation and contains witness interviews between April 21, 1999 and May 5, 1999."
United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation
1999-05-03
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Guide to Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit Installation and Operation
This handbook is designed to assist you in setting up and operating the reverse osmosis water purification unit (ROWPU). It discusses site selection and layout; major components associated with the unit; set up, operation and shutdown procedures and the more critical maintenance activities needed to keep the unit functional. When coupled with information contained in Technical Order 40W4-13-41, AFPAM 10-219, Vol. 5, Bare Base Conceptual Planning Guide; AFH 10-222, Volume 1, Guide to Bare Base Development; and instruction received at Silver Flag and 49th MMG training sites, personnel should be capable of effectively setting up a basic water plant and producing potable water under contingency conditions. Information in this handbook assumes the reader has a basic familiarity with the ROWPU. Refer to the unit's technical orders for a detailed description, parts breakdown, troubleshooting information, and current changes. Remember, there are different models of the ROWPU in use - be sure the technical order you are using matches the equipment. Also available for review is a computer-based Qualification Training Package (QTP) on the unit.
United States. Department of the Air Force
1999-05-01
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Director of Central Intelligence Annual Report for the United States Intelligence Community, May 1999
This 1999 report responds to the Congressional request for an annual report on the Intelligence Community. "Since its formal inception through the National Security Act of 1947, the Intelligence Community (IC) has invested in an intelligence business which has grown in size and in capabilities, encompassing not only a vast network of human assets, but also a fleet of satellites, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and sophisticated listening posts around the world. Our country has been well-served by this effort, but the world has changed and the IC must change along with it. To meet the challenges of an increasingly dangerous and complex world, intelligence consumers are demanding more timely, accurate, and actionable information to inform their decisions and to take preventive measures, if necessary. The IC continues to pursue better, more lucrative collection methods and inter-connectivity enabling analysts to share information quickly and produce more timely and accurate assessments. Throughout 1999, the IC provided vital information on issues ranging from support to military operations in former Yugoslavia to support for environmental disaster relief. The accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was a painful wake-up call. It reminded the Community of the critical importance of keeping databases current. The discovery of a listening device in the State Department and security challenges at nuclear weapons labs has reinvigorated attention on counterintelligence. The Community must improve its vigilance and take on the responsibility to prevent lapses in attention to these areas. Thousands of intelligence reports are produced each day. This report highlights a small sampling of the accomplishments of the Community over the past year."
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
Tenet, George J., 1953-
1999-05
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Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC Terrorism, May 1999
"Congress directed, in the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), that the Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) be established to review activities and programs related to countering proliferation within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Department of Energy (DOE), U.S. Intelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The high level national commitment to counter proliferation threats is reflected in the CPRC's membership. It is chaired by the Secretary of Defense and composed of the Secretary of Energy (as Vice Chair), the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CPRC is chartered to make and implement recommendations regarding interdepartmental activities and programs to address shortfalls in existing and programmed capabilities to counter the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. In the 1997 NDAA, Congress broadened the CPRC's responsibilities and specified that the CPRC also review activities and programs of the CPRC-represented organizations related to countering paramilitary and terrorist NBC threats. The findings and recommendations of the CPRC' 5 annual review for 1999 are presented in this, its sixth annual report to Congress."
United States. Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
1999-05
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Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams is Unclear, Report to Congressional Requesters
"In September 1997, we reported that many federal agencies had duplicative or overlapping capabilities and missions in combating acts of terrorism, including incidents involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Recently, the Department of Defense (DOD) approved the creation of 10 National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams to assist local and state authorities in assessing the situation surrounding a WMD emergency; advise these authorities regarding appropriate actions; and facilitate requests for assistance to expedite the arrival of additional state and federal military assets. As requested, we (1) obtained the views of federal, state, and local officials regarding the role of RAID teams in response plans; (2) determined whether there are other federal, state, or local government entities that can perform similar functions to the RAID teams; and (3) evaluated the RAID teams' roles and responsibilities and how the teams plan to meet these responsibilities. […] These issues further point to the need for a more focused and coordinated approach to the U.S. response to attacks involving weapons of mass destruction--an approach that capitalizes on existing capabilities, minimizes unnecessary duplication of activities and programs, and focuses funding on the highest priority requirements. Because of the differing views on the role and use of the RAID teams, the numerous organizations that can perform similar functions, and the potential operational issues that could impact the teams, we are recommending that the appropriate federal agencies determine the need for the teams."
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-05
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United States Attorneys' Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 1998
This annual report "summarizes the work and accomplishments of the United States Attorneys' offices during Fiscal Year 1998. The United States Attorneys, under the direction of the Attorney General, are responsible for investigating and prosecuting those who violate our nation's laws, and for asserting and defending the interests of the United States, its departments and agencies, through the conduct of civil litigation. The United States Attorneys, appointed to serve in the 94 federal judicial districts throughout the country, are charged with carrying out these prosecution and litigation responsibilities within their respective districts. Although there are 94 federal judicial districts, there are
only 93 United States Attorneys because one United States Attorney is appointed to serve in both the Districts of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. The 93 United States Attorneys direct and supervise the work of the Assistant United States Attorneys and support personnel located in each district's headquarters office and, as needed, in staffed branch offices. The United States Attorney system nationwide consisted of 94 headquarters offices and 121 staffed branch offices at the end of Fiscal Year 1998. The United States Attorneys' offices conduct most of the criminal prosecutions and civil litigation handled by the Department of Justice. They serve as the critical prosecutorial arm of the Department of Justice, responsible for ensuring that the investigative efforts of the law enforcement agencies are pursued, and as the nation's legal advocates and defenders in civil suits brought by and against the government. The range of their responsibilities is staggering--from prosecuting those individuals who commit violent or terrorist acts, to prosecuting corporations or individuals who commit fraud, to defending the nation against exorbitant civil lawsuits."
Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys
1999-05
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Active Component/Reserve Component Integration: A Slow Reality
From the thesis abstract: "Today's global security environment has caused America's military to make many adjustments and changes. It has caused us to relook our National Defense Strategy and devise a methodology commensurate with today's threat. The Army in particular is undergoing a complete overhaul. They are taking advantage of this peacetime era to renovate our components, the Active Army, Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. After 29 years, this renovation is slowly taking shape through a total integration program initiated as a result of the Total Force policy issued by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in August 1970. This policy specifically identifies the Reserve Components as the principle augmentation of active forces in emergencies. It was designed to offset reductions in the defense budget and to increase reliance on the Reserve Component forces. The policy directed consideration of the Total Force, Active and Reserve in planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve Forces."
Army War College (U.S.)
Jones, Carolyn
1999-05-01
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CSEPP Memorandum of Agreement and Memorandum of Understanding Guide (MOA/MOU) Guide
"The purpose of this Guide is to assist Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program participants in drafting and negotiating effective agreements to enhance their capability for response. It provides a summary of the many legal, technical, and practical considerations involved in developing such agreements."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
1999-05
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Information Security: Many NASA Mission-Critical Systems Face Serious Risks, Report to the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
"The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) relies on automated information systems to support a wide range of important and costly operations. In fiscal year 1998 NASA estimated that it spent $1.7 billion on information systems, including those critical to such activities as human space flight, scientific and technological development, and matters of international cooperation for the advancement of science. [...] Tests we conducted at one of NASA's 10 field centers showed that some of NASA's mission-critical systems at that center are vulnerable to unauthorized access. Although some of the systems we targeted had effective security mechanisms that prevented us from gaining access, we successfully penetrated several mission-critical systems, including one responsible for calculating detailed positioning data for earth orbiting spacecraft and another that processes and distributes the scientific data received from these spacecraft. Having obtained access to these systems, we could have disrupted NASA's ongoing command and control operations and stolen, modified, or destroyed system software and data."
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-05
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Comparisons of Conventional and Trunked Systems
"This report provides background information for public safety communications system planners to assist them in their evaluation of radio architecture options. Specifically, this document analyzes and compares conventional, trunked, and hybrid LMR systems and provides high-level definitions of the architecture alternatives associated with each option."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
Booz, Allen & Hamilton
1999-05
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DoD Strategy to Address Low-Level Exposures to Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs)
This report responds to the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (H. Rpt. 105-736, Sec 247: Chemical Warfare Defense, Public Law 105-261, 17 October 1998, p. 39 and p. 591), and provides our review of the policies and doctrines of the Department of Defense (DoD) on chemical warfare defense. Based on this review, DoD recommends no modifications to policies and doctrine to achieve the objectives set forth in the public law. This report also provides a plan to establish a research program for determining the effects of chronic and low-dose exposures to chemical warfare agents, as requested. Two reviews indicate that an extensive number of doctrinal publications and policies addressing operationally significant concentrations of chemical warfare agents for temporary and short-term exposures and that current operational guidance and doctrine focuses on temporary exposures, with some short-term exposure scenarios addressed.
United States. Department of Defense
1999-05
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Technical Guide: Short-Term Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel
This Technical Guide (TG) is a tool to assist deployed military personnel when assessing the potential health risks associated with chemical exposures. Specifically, this TG is designed to assist the military health services personnel in their efforts to determine the severity of these potential health risks within a framework that is consistent with other military risk management
decisions. Military health services personnel should, therefore, evaluate the information in this TG within the context of their own experiences in determining why, when, and how the information applies to a situation. This TG is designed to correspond with the Department of the Army's Field Manual (FM) 100- 14, Risk Management. Other services have similar military operational risk management guidance. FM 100-14 and the other military risk management guidance apply across a wide range of military operations. This guidance explains the principles, procedures, and responsibilities to successfully integrate the risk management process to conserve combat power and resources to allow individuals to make informed, conscious decisions to accept risks at reasonable levels. TG
230A allows such decisions to be made regarding health risks associated with chemical exposures.
United States. Department of Defense
1999-05
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NOAA: Hurricane Basics
This document published by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides general information about Hurricanes including their origin, life cycle and structure. "There is nothing like them in the atmosphere. Born in warm tropical waters, these spiraling masses require a complex combination of atmospheric processes to grow, mature, and then die. They are not the largest storm systems in our atmosphere or the most violent, but they combine these qualities as no other phenomenon does. [...]. Hurricanes cannot be controlled, but our vulnerability can be reduced through preparedness. Local decision makers must make difficult choices between public safety and possible economic losses when faced with a hurricane, but these decisions will be solid if they are based on an understanding of hurricanes, their hazards, the value and limitations of forecasts, and a good decision-making process."
United States. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
1999-05
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Evaluation of U.S. Department of Transportation Efforts in the 1990s to Address Operator Fatigue
"During the 1980s, the National Transportation Safety Board investigated several aviation, highway, and marine accidents that involved operator fatigue. Following completion of these investigations, the Safety Board in 1989 issued three recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) addressing needed research, education, and revisions to hours-of-service regulations. [...] This report provides an update on the activities and efforts by the DOT and the modal administrations to address operator fatigue and, consequently, the progress that has been made in the past 10 years to implement the actions called for in the three intermodal recommendations and other fatigue-related recommendations. The report also provides some background information on current hours-of-service regulations, fatigue, and the effects of fatigue on transportation safety. As a result of this safety report, the National Transportation Safety Board issued new safety recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Research and Special Programs Administration, and the United States Coast Guard. The Safety Board also reiterated two recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration."
United States. National Transportation Safety Board
1999-05
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Intermodal Cargo Transportation: Industry Best Security Practices
"Cargo-related crimes, including cargo theft, insurance fraud, drug trafficking, and the transportation of illegal immigrants into the United States, have all become dominant criminal issues on the national agenda. Concentrated government efforts attempt to combat cargo-related crimes; however, organized criminal activity continues to grow in both frequency and consequence. Increasing violence and criminal penetration of transportation operations and technologies significantly compromise the U.S. transportation infrastructure.[...] This report represents the results of research, interviews and on-site evaluations conducted to identify the issues related to security of cargo terminals to theft, smuggling, and other illegal activity. This report also provides industry best security practices for eliminating, mitigating, and controlling identified concerns within the security framework of cargo transportation. In keeping with the transportation infrastructure assurance philosophy, this report is not organized by mode (truck, rail, maritime, and pipeline), but rather provides an integrated discussion of all modes using cargo terminals with a special focus on intermodalism."
United States. Department of Transportation
1999-05
