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Acquisition Reform: Impact of Conversion to Performance and Commercial Specifications/Standards on the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
"The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) was established to plan and execute the safe destruction of the nation's stockpile of unitary chemical weapons. The CSDP is unique in that it is not a weapon system production program but, a weapon system destruction program with a mandated completion date of December 31, 2004. Execution of the program requires that multiple public issues be addressed including the public's concern regarding safety and the environment. Cost growth and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permit delays have jeopardized on time completion within life cycle cost estimates. Another relevant issue is reform of the acquisition process, specifically the DoD requirement to convert military-unique specifications and standards to performance statements or commercial equivalents. This research provides evidence that acquisition reform initiatives on specifications and standards has had a positive influence on program costs with no overall program schedule delays. Continued efforts in this area should enhance the ability to demilitarize the nation's deteriorating stockpile of lethal chemical weapons within projected cost while maintaining or improving the quality and safety levels currently set by the EPA. The specific recommendations provided herein are intended to assist in improving program effectiveness and efficiency."
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Crisp, Sandra S.
1996-06
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Hands-off Frisking: High-Tech Concealed Weapons Detection
"The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) launched an initiative to fund and field test three concealed weapons detection technologies. Each technology employs different physical principles and each has situation specific strengths and weaknesses. NIJs National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center - Northeast, located near Rome, New York, provides technical and engineering support for the initiative. NIJ expects one or more of the new weapons detection technologies to be in commercial production within 3 years. The technologies, described in this document, include Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging, Low-Frequency Electromagnetic Radiation, and Magnetic Gradient Measurements."
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
1996-06
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Protecting Floodplain Resources: A Guidebook for Communities
"This guidebook has been written to introduce you, as officials and citizens at the local level, to a basic understanding of natural resources in floodplains, and to offer suggestions for creating strategies for wisely managing these important areas. As our scientific understanding of ecosystems grows, we increasingly recognize the importance of conserving and restoring the natural resources and functions of floodplains."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
1996-06
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Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of DoD War Game to Test Key Assumptions: Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives
This report reviews the objectives, methodology, and results of the Department of Defense's (DoD) war game Nimble Dancer, which assessed the ability of U.S. forces to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). It identified assumptions or data used in Nimble Dancer pertaining to several specific areas, such as readiness, threat, and force availability. This report, an unclassified version of a May 1996 classified report, presents observations on the objectives, methodology, and results of the exercise, and appendix I provides details on the specific areas of interest. In its October 1993 Bottom-Up Review of the nation's defense needs, DoD, among other things, judged that it is prudent to maintain the capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. In the review, DoD also determined the forces, enhancements to force capabilities, and funding necessary to execute this element of the national military strategy. Since the Bottom-Up Review, DoD has conducted various studies to examine the two MRC requirement. In an August 1994 memorandum, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized DoD to conduct the Nimble Dancer exercise. The primary objective of the exercise was to assess the capability of the programmed Bottom-Up Review force to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs during different time periods, and the secondary objective was to identify critical issues for further resolution or study. The Chairman's memorandum generally stated that the exercise would test the sufficiency of forces by examining various areas, such as lift, intelligence, and sustainment, and provide a forum for conducting sensitivity analyses.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-06
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Expeditionary Power Projection: An Operational Concept for the U.S. Navy
Operational concepts seek strategic effect from the use of force. An operational concept is essential for focusing planning, training, and exercises. It is critical in assisting other services and allies to understand how U.S. naval forces help to ensure success. It offers anchors for the development of force structure and organization necessary to implement it, and leads to better definition of challenges and to the of efforts to overcome them. This operational concept, expeditionary power projection, explores how naval forces provide special leverage at the operational level of war. Naval forces make major operational contributions to the attainment of security objectives through the application of expeditionary power projection, which consists conceptually of engaging in forward regions, striking and seizing targets ashore, dominating the and ensuring sustainment. Geography will ensure that naval forces will be important as along as the United States desires to remain a key global player. Thus, the capability to project expeditionary power will endure. For today, and for the next several decades, expeditionary power projection will underwrite the nation's security and help to shield U.S. friends and allies from the effects of an unstable and turbulent world.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Barnett, Roger W.
1996-06
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Rationally Constructed Measures for Predicting Security Risks: A Construct Approach
"This report focuses upon findings from a three year, nationwide data collection of law enforcement officials punished for committing acts of public trust betrayal. A subsample of 213 law enforcement officer (107 violators, 106 non-violators) were identified by their departments as either trust violators or non-violators who matched on gender, age, and ethnic background. Raw data from the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory (MMPI) was used to construct scales developed to tap trust betrayal constructs as well as the traditional validity and clinical scales. Rational scale construction methods yielded internally consistent and reliable scales similar to background data scales constructed for other populations. Initial findings suggest that the primary variables differentiating between the violators and non-violators are Social Desirability, or tendency to try and present a good impression, and a lack of Outcome Uncertainty. Violators are too concerned about creating the right impression. The findings from this subsample of the broader national sample indicate that the MMPI is severely limited in its usefulness for a screening device chiefly because of the high levels of positive self presentation bias in the sample."
Defense Personnel Security Research Center (U.S.)
Mumford, Michael D.; O'Connor, Jennifer; Gessner, Theodore L.
1996-06
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Transit System Security Planning Seminar: Participant Guide
"Upon successful completion of this seminar, the student will have acquired the following knowledge and skills: Understanding the concept of System Security; Understanding the elements of a dynamic System Security Program and application of systematic approach to identify threats and vulnerabilities; Understand the threat and vulnerability resolution process; Application of System Security to the mass transit environment; Implementation of a successful System Security Program; and Application of techniques used to identify threats and vulnerabilities and methods used to resolve them. This seminar outline will assist you in learning the concept and application of security program management. It is intended for your personal use; after you complete the outline, it and and the handouts can be used by you as a reference."
United States. Federal Transit Administration
1996-06
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Perspectives on Transit Security in the 1990s: Strategies for Success
"The purpose of this report is to document the state-of-the-practice in security at selected mass transit systems throughout the United States. This report examines both the changing nature of crime in the transit environment and the security practices currently used to reduce crime levels and patron perceptions of crime. A primary mission of all public transportation systems is to ensure, to the fullest extent possible, the security of passengers, employees, and system property. Each year, the country's mass transit systems provide more than 5 billion trips to commuters, students, tourists, and the elderly. The public transportation infrastructure, valued at more than $1 trillion, routinely serves many of the nation's most dangerous neighborhoods, benefiting transit-dependent populations in areas with high rates of violent crime, drug use, and gang activity. With each trip provided, the transit system must demonstrate its commitment to security. Transit agencies must address both actual crime committed on the system and patron perceptions of security. These two issues require different, and occasionally conflicting, security deployment and technology strategies. This report presents security strategies commonly used in the transit environment to address these issues."
United States. Federal Transit Administration
1996-06
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FinCEN Advisory: Funds Transfers: Questions and Answers, June 1996, Issue 3
The FinCEN Advisory "...is a recurring series designed for the financial, regulatory and law enforcement communities. Subsequent advisories will describe trends and developments related to money laundering and financial crime." In this issue of FinCEN: "The new Bank Secrecy Act recordkeeping rules for funds transfers and transmittals of funds became effective on May 28, 1996. The rules, issued jointly by the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Federal Reserve Board, are intended to institute uniform recordkeeping procedures for financial institutions that participate in such transfers and transmittals. The uniform recordkeeping procedures are intended to help law enforcement and regulatory authorities detect and investigate money laundering and other financial crimes by preserving an information trail about persons sending and receiving funds through the financial system."
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (U.S.)
1996-06
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Involvement of the Government Printing Office in Executive Branch Printing and Duplicating: Memorandum for Emily C. Hewitt, General Counsel, General Services Administration [May 31, 1996]
"You have asked us to analyze the constitutional implications of the involvement of the Government Printing Office ('GPO') in executive branch printing and duplicating under the authority of section 207(a) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-392, 106 Stat. 1703, 1719 (1992) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 501 note), which was recently amended by section 207(2) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-283, 108 Stat. 1423, 1440 (1994). You have also posed a more general question as to 'whether GPO may undertake any decision-making role in printing for the Executive Branch.' While we have previously expressed our tentative view that such legislative branch involvement in executive branch affairs would contravene separation of powers principles, we now face the issue in the context of a specific congressional enactment investing in the GPO the authority to control a significant proportion of executive branch printing and duplicating. See 44 U.S.C. § 501 note. We find that the GPO is subject to congressional control, and conclude that the GPO's extensive control over executive branch printing is unconstitutional under the doctrine of separation of powers. Finally, we make various observations about potential liability of contracting officers who act consistently with this opinion but contrary to the Comptroller General's view, which we reject."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-31
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Globalization, International Law, and Emerging Infectious Diseases
"The global nature of the threat posed by new and reemerging infectious diseases will require international cooperation in identifying, controlling, and preventing these diseases. Because of this need for international cooperation, international law will certainly play a role in the global strategy for the control of emerging diseases. Recognizing this fact, the World Health Organization has already proposed revising the International Health Regulations. This article examines some basic problems that the global campaign against emerging infectious diseases might face in applying international law to facilitate international cooperation. The international legal component of the global control strategy for these diseases needs careful attention because of problems inherent in international law, especially as it applies to emerging infections issues."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
Fidler, David P.
1996-06
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Systems Approach to Assessing the Vulnerabilities of U.S. Domestic Sea Ports to Acts of Sabotage and Terrorism
"The U.S. national security strategy provides for two, nearly simultaneous, major regional contingency (MRC) operations. The U.S. Armed Forces transport more than 85% of their required sustainment supplies by sea. Strategic mobility planners assume that U.S. port operations can support the required deployment schedule without experiencing degradation or damage. Given the inherent vulnerability of seaports in our free and open society, the real issue is to determine the extent to which the ports are vulnerable. No agency or armed service has clearly determined the degree of vulnerability of domestic ports and terminals. There is no existing methodology to accurately assess the overall vulnerability of a port, thus, the current, subjective evaluations fail to adequately analyze real-world vulnerability. This research systematically combines the individual components of port security assessment into one comprehensive approach that will aid commanders and port authorities in accurately identifying threat, vulnerability, and risk; thus, providing useful information with which to tailor port security operations. The primary focus is on the vulnerability assessment and prescribes two interrelated measures to enhance the accuracy and usefulness of a vulnerability assessment. The first measure provides recommended guidelines in the identification of critical assets. The second provides an objective, analytical method to assess the vulnerability of critical assets. The conclusion of this research is that a systems approach is required in order to accurately assess port security. The Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation, the two departments with key responsibilities for strategic mobility, must confirm or disprove the validity of the assumption concerning port security."
Industrial College of the Armed Forces (U.S.)
Hughes, Robert H.
1996-05-28
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Draft Report: Study of Inland Wind Effects of Hurricane Opal and Assessment of Inland Wind Model
"This report was conducted as an investigation to evaluate the damages resulting from inland winds associated with Hurricane Opal, verify and standardize the recorded wind data, compare wind information predicted by the Inland Wind Model with the recorded wind data, and ultimately assess the ability of the model to predict wind speeds accurately and support the prestorm estimation of expected damage levels."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
1996-05-24
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Study of Inland Wind Effects of Hurricane Opal and Assessment of Inland Wind Model (Draft Report)
This report evaluates the damages resulting from inland winds associated with Hurricane Opal, verifies and standardizes the recorded wind data for Hurricane Opal, compares wind information predicted by the Inland Wind Model with the recorded wind data, and ultimately assesses the ability of the Model to predict wind speeds accurately and support the pre-storm estimation of expected damage levels. Information about both wind and wind-induced damage was for the four-state area affected by Opal: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. Although emphasis was placed on inland communities, wind information was also obtained from several sources along the coast of the Florida Panhandle.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
1996-05-24
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Can the United States Be Involved in Simultaneous 'Contemporary Peacekeeping' Operations and Maintain the Flexibility to Respond to Two, Nearly-Simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs)
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines the impact of the United States likely future involvement in contemporary peacekeeping operations on its ability to successfully implement its national security and national military strategy. There are several potential shortfalls associated with this peacetime component of United States strategy when also considering the United States requirement to fight and win two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs [Major Regional Conflicts]. Possible shortfalls include force structure and force preparedness limitations and delays and logistics shortcomings in the areas of infrastructure, vital logistics components and strategic mobility assets. Although the potential problem areas are not new, how they influence the United States ability to execute its national military strategy has grown in magnitude as a result of a changed security environment. This change has required that contemporary peacekeeping forces be built from assets of major powers such as the United States--assets that will be needed in the initial stages of both MRCs. Therefore, as contemporary peacekeeping operations operationally fulfill the United States national military strategy, they may, in other ways, hinder the United States ability to respond to two, nearly-simultaneous MRCs."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Buchs, Todd A.
1996-05-23
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Counter-Proliferation Initiative: Managing Three Crises
This is a speech given by the assistnat secretary of defense for international security policy to the Conference on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Proliferation. If you think the U.S. government isn't combating terrorism and the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, you don't know what's going on -- but if you think it's enough, you don't know the gravity of the threat. Search We must never fail to remember that these weapons pose the most serious challenges to the security of the United States -- a fact that the ordinary citizen can easily overlook, since the headlines seem to be monopolized by other international security problems of fundamentally lesser importance. I also applaud the inclusion of chemical weapons and above all biological weapons in the scope of the conference. Nuclear proliferation justifiably receives a lot of attention. But to those of us who must plan against the threats that are clearly here and now, the existence of CW and BW programs in most theaters where U.S. forces would go into action and their ease of access to terrorists command equal attention. BW, in particular, is the great sleeping dragon.
Retrieved from: www.defenselink.mil
United States. Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office. Technical Support Working Group
Carter, Ashton B.
1996-05-23
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Assertion of Executive Privilege Regarding White House Counsel's Office Documents: [Letter from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to the President of the United States] [May 23, 1996]
"The confidential White House Counsel's Office documents for which privilege would be asserted are not contemporaneous documents concerning the White House Travel Office matter being investigated by the Committee, or even documents generated as part of the White House review of that matter, but rather were created in connection with other matters or the response of the White House to subsequent investigations of the Travel Office and other matters by the Committee and the Independent Counsel. Whatever may be the extent of Congress's authority to conduct oversight of the executive branch's response to oversight -- a question that must be viewed as unresolved as a matter of law in light of the requirement that there be a nexus to Congress's legislative authority -- it is clear that congressional needs for information in that context will weigh substantially less in the constitutional balancing than a specific need in connection with the consideration of legislation. As for documents concerning the White House response to an ongoing criminal investigation by an Independent Counsel, we can identify little, if any, legitimate legislative need for such information. In sum, based on the Office of Legal Counsel's review of the documents for which assertion of executive privilege has been requested, and conducting the balancing required by the case law, […] I do not believe that access to these documents would be held by the courts to be 'demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee's functions.' […] In conclusion, it is my legal judgment that executive privilege may properly be asserted in response to the Committee's subpoenas."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-23
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Force XXI: What Are the Risks of Building a High Tech, Narrowly Focused Army?
From the thesis abstract: "This monograph examines the doctrinal and acquisition focus of Force XXI in light of the projected future strategic environment. Despite its conceptual overtones, Force XXI is currently physically manifested in both a doctrinal publication and in the Army's modernization plans. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations, contains the Army's initial effort at defining the probable nature of the future strategic environment and the technological acceleration that is anticipated. It outlines the Army's concept for conducting war in the future, and provides a conceptual framework for the types of weapons and systems the Army will need to counter the diverse nature of future threats. Although cognizant of the requirements for modernization to meet threats throughout the spectrum of conflict, Force XXI is aimed at a very narrow portion of the upper end of that spectrum. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, while providing a comprehensive summary of the dangers emerging in the last part of this century, fails to adequately address how the Army will deal with the entire spectrum of conflict. The baffle dynamics explained in the text are centered on traditional, conventional warfare. OOTW [Operations Other Than War] is initially addressed, but its presence is marginalized in favor of discussion of conventional baffle. A review of programmed expenditures illustrates the Army's almost total dedication to the high end of the spectrum; the traditional form of combat that some critics assert is the least likely to occur in the near future. The concentration of resources on this very narrow slice of the spectrum of conflict does not come without a corresponding cost. Assessing that cost is the crux of the Army leadership's modernization dilemma. Judging where along the spectrum of conflict to accept risk is an infinitely difficult process."
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. School of Advanced Military Studies
Jones, Brian D.
1996-05-23
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Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director Defense Information and Financial Management Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Computer attacks at the Defense Department (DoD) pose increasing risks of access to highly sensitive information. Recent data suggest that DoD may have experienced as many as 250,000 attacks last year. These attacks are often successful, and the number of attacks is doubling each year as Internet use increases and hackers become more sophisticated. At a minimum, these attacks are a multimillion dollar nuisance to the Pentagon. At worst, they pose a serious threat to national security. Attackers have seized control of entire DoD systems, some of which control critical functions, such as weapons system research and development, logistics, and finance. Attackers have also stolen, modified, and destroyed data and software. The potential for catastrophic damage is great. The DoD is taking steps to address this growing problem but faces major challenges in controlling unauthorized access to its computer systems. Moreover, the DoD is now trying to react to successful attacks as it learns of them, but it has no uniform policy for assessing risks, protecting its systems, responding to incidents, or assessing damage. Training of users and system and network administrators is haphazard and constrained by limited resources. Technical solutions, such as firewalls, smart cards, and network monitoring systems, should help, but their success depends on whether DoD implements them in tandem with better policy and personnel measures.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-22
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Defense Information System Network and Connected Systems
This instruction establishes policy and delineates responsibilities for life-cycle management of the Defense Information System Network (DISN). It details policy for management and use of the DISN, DISN services, and connected systems. Specific policies governing the satellite component of the DISN are covered in CJCS MOP 37, 'Military Satellite Communications Systems.'...The DISC is DoD's consolidated worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure that provides the end-to-end information transfer network for supporting military operations.
United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1996-05-22
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Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks, Report to Congressional Requesters
Mounting evidence that attacks on Defense computer systems pose a serious threat to national security. Internet connections make it
possible for enemies armed with less equipment and weapons to gain a
competitive edge at a small price. As a result, this will become an
increasingly attractive way for terrorist or adversaries to wage attacks
against Defense. For example, major disruptions to military operations
and readiness could threaten national security if attackers successfully
corrupted sensitive information and systems or denied service from vital
communications backbones or power systems. In preventing computer attacks, Defense has to protect a vast and complex information infrastructure: currently, it has over 2.1 million computers, 10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance networks. Defense also critically depends on information technology--it uses computers to help design weapons, identify and track enemy targets, pay soldiers, mobilize reservists, and manage supplies. Indeed, its very warfighting capability is dependent on computer-based telecommunications networks and information systems.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-05-22
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NORAD Anti-Drug Network Standard Operating Procedures
The aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into North America is a threat to the national security of both the US and Canada. To counter this threat, the 1989 National Defense Authorization Act assigned Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead federal agency in the detection and monitoring of illegal airborne and maritime drug trafficking into the United States. To accomplish this mission, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) tasked the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (now CINCUSACOM), Commander in Chief, Forces Command (now Commander FORSCOM), Commander in Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC), Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) and Commander in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD) to conduct detection and monitoring operations within their respective areas of responsibility and/or operations. Authority for Canadian Forces to conduct CD operations resides in the NORAD Agreement and is also reiterated in the Department of National Defense (DND) publication Defense Development Planning Guidance 1995 (DDPG 95). To accomplish this mission, NORAD will conduct operations to detect and monitor aerial transit of drug trafficking aircraft into North America; coordinate with other federal, state and local agencies engaged in detecting, monitoring and apprehending aerial drug traffic; and integrate NORAD operations into an effective CD command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) network.
North American Aerospace Defense Command
1996-05-22
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Yemen and Stability in the Persian Gulf: Confronting the Threat from Within
"The author examines the recent eruption of hostilities between Yemen and its neighbor, Saudi Arabia. He describes how the two countries have come to be so alienated from each other, and suggests ways in which Yemen could be assisted economically and also how tensions between it and Saudi Arabia could be relaxed. If Yemen and Saudi Arabia were to get into a real shooting war, the author concludes, this could have significant adverse repercussions for the welfare of American strategic interests in the Persian Gulf."
Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute
Pelletiere, Stephen C.
1996-05-22
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Relocation Deadline Provision Contained in the 1996 Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act: Memorandum for David W. Burke, Chairman, Broadcasting Board of Governors [May 21, 1996]
"As your letter makes clear, because the Act was signed into law on April 26, 1996, almost one month after the date upon which OCB's [Office of Cuba's Broadcasting] headquarters must be relocated to south Florida under the literal terms of the provision's relocation deadline, these literal terms cannot be satisfied. For the reasons stated below, however, we conclude that USIA is at this time nevertheless entitled to spend funds appropriated under the provision. In addition, we conclude that the relocation of OCB's headquarters to south Florida is mandatory under the appropriation. Finally, we conclude that, despite USIA's inability to comply with the literal terms of the provision's relocation deadline, it may at this time access funds contained in the International Broadcasting Operations, Broadcasting to Cuba, and Radio Construction accounts in order to cover expenses associated with relocating OCB's headquarters to south Florida. These conclusions are premised on observance of the statutory mandate to relocate OCB's headquarters to south Florida. We decline to address at this time, however, the time period within which the relocation must be accomplished."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of Legal Counsel
1996-05-21
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Reunification of Korea: Bringing Back the South
Hypothetical advice provided by Chinese military advisor to North Korean leader on how to employ weapons of mass destruction to force South Korea to unify with the north on North Korean terms. Advice is provided in the context of operational art and principles of war.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Ford, John F.
1996-05-20
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Improving Theater Ballistic Missile Defense at the Operational Level of War
The proliferation of theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout developing nations is so widespread that over 20 states may have an operational capability to deliver WMD using TBMs by the turn of the century. As was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War, even cheap, unsophisticated, and militarily insignificant TBMs such as the Al Hussein (modified Scud-B) can pose a psychological impact so severe that a strategic center of gravity such as the cohesion of alliances and coalitions may be threatened. The enormity of this threat will rapidly exacerbate with improvements in the accuracy, range, and lethality of TBMs. In recognition of this emerging threat, Congress has drastically increased funding for the development of various robust systems for joint theater missile defense (JTMD). However, the first active defense systems and supporting space-based sensors that will provide a true area protection will be fielded no earlier than the middle of the next decade. Joint Force commanders (JFCs) cannot rely solely on Patriot to provide the desired level of operational protection. To defend against this escalating threat in the near-term, the JFC must integrate and coordinate the mutually supporting elements of JTMD: active defense, passive defense, attack operations, and supporting command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence. Each of these elements will be critically examined to reveal critical areas where the JFC can direct operational changes and provide guidance that will improve theater protection using resources that are available today.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Schlientz, Steven C.
1996-05-20
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Thinking the Unthinkable -- Facing a Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and the Means to Deliver (NBC&M) Adversary: An Integrated Planning Consideration for the Operational Commander
In today's volatile political, economic, religious and cultural environment, Nation-States aggressively pursue robust NBC&M capabilities as economic and force equalizers for asymmetric warfare advantage. Two thoughts follow. First, the odds indicate the United States will face a NBC&M capable and confident adversary in a future regional conflict. Second, although never publicly nor explicitly stated, the United States has indicated it may respond with nuclear weapons when confronted with NBC&M in a conventional war. However accurate, this exchange invites a compelling question: are we prepared to confidently integrate such Presidential tasks into a conventional environment? This paper seeks to provide some considerations to this question. It is not about telling the Operational Commander (CINC) how to execute Presidential tasks; it is about pulling together diverse, unclassified, operational considerations as a reasonable foundation for integrating a nuclear response into conventional operations.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Wong, Bruce S.
1996-05-20
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Foreign Internal Defense: The Art of Counter-Insurgency and the Combined Action Platoon Concept
"This paper examines the Marine Corps' Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in the Vietnam applicability to possible future counter-insurgency conflicts, as well as today's Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) doctrine. The CAPs of I Corps were established in order to 'clear and hold' selected villages or hamlets, improve the capabilities of the Popular Forces (PFs), conduct civic action, and foster the pacification effort at the grass roots level. The Marines who participated in the CAP program fought the war in the hamlets, while front line Army and Marine units all too often waged war on the hamlets. In comparison to other American units operating in the populated areas of South Vietnam, CAPs killed and captured proportionately more of the enemy at less cost to themselves and were successfully employed as an economy of force asset. CAPs were also able to neutralize the village guerrilla and bring a certain amount of confidence to the villagers and local government officials. There will always be a need to study the lessons of the CAP program and other counter-insurgency efforts. Policy- makers and CINC planners will often find relevance in some of the concepts and methods employed in the past. The U.S. military should retain counter-insurgency expertise in support of FID strategies that will provide the training and readiness required should the U.S. once again become involved in a counter- insurgency conflict."
Naval War College (U.S.)
Arminio, Thomas J.
1996-05-20
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Force Asymmetry in Low Intensity Conflict or How to Beat the Enemy at His Own Game
"The U.S. military will most likely be involved in numerous MOOTW [military operations other than war] and low intensity conflicts in the coming years. The operational commander will have to design an operational plan to counter smaller, weaker forces (relative to U. S. power) that posses the military and political advantage of fighting in their country, among their own people. To operate successfully, the weaker force will must subscribe to specific principles of war that have been successfully used by insurgents guerrillas in many low intensity conflicts. This paper analyzes these principles and proposes an operational strategy for the operational commander to counter the unique, deadly strategy of the insurgent. The Boer War between Great Britain and the South Africa republics of 1899-1902 and the Insurgent movement in China led by Mao Tse-Tung are used as examples of successful insurgent movements."
Naval War College (U.S.)
McCabe, Laurence L.
1996-05-20
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Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program [May 17, 1996]
"This planning guide was developed under the direction of the U.S. Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) which jointly coordinate and direct the development of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). It was produced to assist state, local, and Army installation planners in formulating and coordinating plans for chemical events that may occur at the chemical agent stockpile storage locations in the continental United States. This document provides broad planning guidance for use by both on-post and off-post agencies and organizations in the development of a coordinated plan for responding to chemical events. It contains checklists to assist in assuring that all important aspects are included in the plans and procedures developed at each Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP) location. The checklists are supplemented by planning guidelines in the appendices which provide more detailed guidance regarding some issues. […] In addition to this guidance, other location-specific documents, technical studies, and support studies should be used as needed to assist in the planning at each of the chemical agent stockpile locations to address the specific hazards and conditions at each location. These are other related documents are listed in Sect. 9, Related Documents."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of the Army
1996-05-17
