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Proposed Supplemental Guidance for the Department of Defense's Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan
This paper will argue that DoD's current policy and guidance in the area of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is not complete, and does not provide a systematic approach to accomplishing the program goals. Specifically, current guidance does not require subordinate CINCs and components to standardize and coordinate CIP planning. Because of the way DoD is structured, with the CINCs prioritizing CIP requirements along warfighting missions, and Service Components directing the budgets, CIP resource allocation decisions must be made at the DoD level. Current guidance does not provide for a feedback mechanism, so that in this time of uncertain DoD funding, our leaders can prioritize "top-down" funding allocation decisions. The current DoD CIP plan fails to provide this prioritization mechanism and therefore, our DoD leaders are not equipped to make the necessary strategic decisions. The paper recommends supplemental guidance for DoD to implement a prioritization and comparison system to justify the allocation of defense dollars to safeguard DoD operations and infrastructure from compromise or disruption. Clarification of terms and definitions, and the creation of a Critical Asset Master List (CAML) will provide "bottom-up" input in a standard manner to facilitate the DoD resource allocation feedback loop. This will allow our DoD leaders to provide timely and intelligent justification to their "top-down" funding allocation decisions. Additionally, it will ensure that the DoD CIP program goals to assure the readiness, reliability, and continuity of operations for all infrastructures supporting DoD missions are achieved.
Army War College (U.S.)
Koning, Thomas L.
2002-02-20
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New Mexico Army National Guard: A Tradition of Air Defense Ready for Change
The New Mexico Army National Guard has an Air Defense history. In the past thirty years the soldiers of the 111th Air Defense Brigade have diligently trained on the Duster, the Roland, the Chaparral, the Hawk, the Avenger and the Patriot systems. None of these units have been deployed to perform their wartime air defense mission. Due to the changing world climate, the Army is involved in a variety of missions around the world and at home. The New Mexico Army National Guard must become a relevant member of the team and transform part of its air defense organization to units that will meet their Country's call. The Army has a viable total force concept. It was the active and reserve components together that were successful in Desert Storm. Since that time this combined team has been deployed to numerous peace-keeping operations and domestic emergencies. Presently we are in a war against terrorism and our primary mission has become homeland security. The New Mexico Army National Guard has the responsibility to meet the full spectrum of missions. It has an opportunity to create a new type of Guard unit capable of deploying faster, training more efficiently and equipped to perform homeland security, domestic emergencies, peacekeeping operations and their war fighting mission. Times have changed and so should the New Mexico Army National Guard.
Army War College (U.S.)
Montoya, Kenny
2002-04-09
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Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense-National Security in The 21st Century, December 1997
The document focuses on the long-term issues facing U.S. defense and national security. It identifies the changes that will be needed to ensure U.S. leadership and the security and prosperity of the American people in the 21st century. It highlights the finding that to meet the identified challenges, the U.S. must undertake a broad transformation of its military and national security structures, operational concepts and equipment, and the Department of Defense (DoD) key business processes. The report recognizes that much is being done toward these goals but the pace of this change must be accelerated. The report builds on the findings of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) but looks further into the future and places much more emphasis on the transformation strategy that must be considered. The report begins by highlighting the world in 2020 in relation to geopolitical trends, demographic and social trends, economic trends and technology trends. Operational challenges to the military including those associated with power projection, information operations, space, urban operations, weapons of mass destruction and transnational threats and challenges are discussed. Specific concerns include: (1) terrorism, information operations, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, missile proliferation and a host of transnational dangers may play a more prominent role; (2) our ability to rapidly and effectively project and sustain U.S. military power to distant regions may be challenged; (3) our space system vulnerability is increasing; and (4) the need to prepare ourselves to conduct operations in urban environments is increasing.
US Army Medical Department Center and School
1998-08
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Redressing National Guard Personnel Shortages: Umanned Aerial Vehicles
The National Guard's mission is continually transforming and must do so to stay viable and meet the Nation's needs. The National Guard's mission of Homeland Security may include the war on drugs, defense against terrorism on high-value targets, and border security for our national, territorial, and state borders. In view of the tragedy on 11 September 2001, the National Guard's mission, under the auspices of homeland security, is continually expanding without significant additions in manpower or operating funds. Doing more with stable or decreasing resources requires innovative thinking to effectively perform these expanded missions. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and drones could provide state-of-the-art technology to offset the manpower drain. Further, because it has a stable workforce to provide research data, the Air National Guard is an ideal organization for testing unmanned aerial vehicles and drone surveillance technology.
Army War College (U.S.)
Gilbert, Ruth A.
2002-04-09
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Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence in a Changing Political World
This collection of selected documents from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) addresses the formidable issue of protecting the United States and its people from potential nuclear destruction. With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and, concomitantly, the end of the Cold War, new strategies for nonproliferation and deterrence must be devised and implemented. Potential threats from countries not previously seen as a danger, the escalation of regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are but a few of the considerations to be addressed. The authors of the following papers propose various plans and tactics to ensure United States national security and maintain world peace.
Defense Technical Information Center (U.S.)
Cupp, Christian M.; Levine, Phyllis; Lee, Catheryn . . .
1995-08
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Overcoming the ABM Treaty: Paths to National Missile Defense
Some of the most heated debates taking place on Capitol Hill surround a proposed American national missile defense system. The debate is not new. For twenty years, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its underlying acceptance of mutual assured destruction (MAD) enjoyed widespread support among U.S. leaders. Events of the early 1990s shook support for America's "no missile defense" posture to its very core. The fall of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile technology, and the Gulf War presented new challenges to existing strategic doctrine. As a result, a renewed push for a U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) system began in earnest, and a new round of debates began over the utility of the bilateral ABM Treaty in a multilateral post-Cold War international environment This thesis identifies four distinct paths which the United States could follow in addressing the NMD-ABM Treaty debate. Each path is characterized by distinct factors which historically have influenced past ABM system debates. The most likely path to NMD that the United States is following, based on these driving factors, is identified. The potential implications which this prevalent NMD path may have on U.S. Navy force structure and planning is also addressed. Understanding how the current NMD debate is structured and driven enables one to discern which path to NMD deployment the United States is on. This realization can help shape future force planning considerations.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Keenan, Joseph M., Jr.
1998-06
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FY96 Space and Missiles Technology Area Plan
"The specific technologies pursued in the Space and Missiles Technology area are driven by military needs as enunciated by the warfighter and embodied in the five Future Joint Wafighting Capabilities: 1. To maintain near perfect knowledge of the enemy and communicate that to all forces in near-real time. 2. To engage regional forces promptly in decisive combat, on a global basis. 3. To employ a range of capabilities more suitable to actions at the lower end of the full range of military operations which allow achievement of military objectives with minimum casualties and collateral damage. 4. To control the use of space. 5. To counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction' and future ballistic cruise missiles to the CONUS and deployed forces. We respond to these needs through the Air Force Space Command mission area plans, which describe these needs in terms of deficiencies and operational concepts to overcome the deficiencies. We focus technologies in the Space and Missiles Technology area to enable operational concepts either through technology development or rapid exploitation and transition of technological opportunities ."
Defense Technical Information Center (U.S.)
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Ohio)
1998-10-07
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Strategic Geography and the Greater Middle East
Occupying a pivotal position at the juncture of Europe, Africa, and Asia, the "Greater Middle East"; here defined as the sum of the core Middle East, North Africa, the African Horn, South Asia, and ex-Soviet Central Asia; likewise occupies a crucial position with respect to some of the major issue areas of the contemporary era. Those issue areas are energy sources and availability; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems; and the dangerous pairings involving Israel and the Arabs, Iran and Iraq, and India and Pakistan. Surely, this region in its aggregate has come to be viewed by the contending and aspiring world powers--the United States, Russia, a united Europe, China--as a strategic prize, maybe the strategic prize. The geographic aspects of these issues can be analyzed by moving from macro to micro, from grand strategy to operations and tactics (climate and terrain). The new missiles programs involving WMD do not easily fit within this framework but apply across issues.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Harkavy, Robert E.
2001
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Space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR), Is it the Right Solution
United States Commander in Chief Space (USCINCSPACE) has advocated the need to designate space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order for him to have the authority to fulfill his assigned responsibilities. However, upon examining the Unified Command Plan it becomes evident that designating space as an AOR provides USCINCSPACE no additional authority or ability to accomplish his assigned missions of space control, force protection, or conduct space operations. Designating space as an AOR would likely result in undesirable consequences. If space were designated an AOR it could be perceived by other countries as the U.S. intention of militarizing space, constituting a departure from decades old policy of using space for peaceful purposes. This action in turn could then instigate a space based weapons race or complicate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to space. U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) can best ensure space control by non-space based weapons. Use of these types of weapons would ensure space protection and access for the U.S. and be capable of denying space access to enemies when needed, while avoiding the perception of militarizing space. To enhance USCINCSPACE's ability to meet his responsibilities, he needs the authority to better manage space personnel and space assets. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) provides an ideal model that USSPACECOM should implement to achieve this. If implemented, it would give USSPACECOM the unique authority to manage space orientated personnel careers. It would also give him the authority to execute his own budget, providing increased authority to shape space forces, insure interoperability and provide the best possible space support to the war fighters.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Cudnohufsky, Aaron L.
1999-02-05
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Thinking about the Unthinkable: Unreasonable Exuberance?
Thinking about the unthinkable just isn't what it used to be. Such is the Cold Warrior's lament. The Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) process is slowly but thus far surely shrinking the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nuclear-capable bombers have been taken off day-to-day alert. Land-based and submarine-based intercontinental ballistic missiles have been "de-targeted." Nuclear modernization has been abandoned in favor of "stockpile stewardship." Throw-weight (payload) and circular-error-probable (accuracy) calculations, and nuclear net assessments more generally, have virtually fallen by the wayside. Nuclear duty assignments, which the armed forces once restricted to active-duty personnel, have been opened to members of the reserves and the National Guard. Now a retired four-star admiral, writing not in the pages of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists but in the Naval War College Review, proposes that the United States needs neither the 3,000-3,500 nuclear warheads allowed under START II or even the 2,000-2,500 warheads envisioned under a prospective START III, but only two hundred. There is more: those two hundred warheads, along with the two hundred nuclear warheads retained by each of the other seven members of a nuclear "condominium," would be placed in "strategic escrow," subject to international monitoring and verification. Implementation of the escrow scheme would, as intended, amount to the near abolition of nuclear weapons, to the further dismay, no doubt, of the ghost of General Curtis LeMay, who led the Strategic Air Command in its glory days.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Ross, Andrew L.
2001
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Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents
Issued on February 28, 2003 by President Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 serves the purpose to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system. This management system would cover the prevention, preparation, response, and recovery of terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The implementation of such a system would allow all levels of government throughout the nation to work efficiently and effectively together. The directive gives further detail on which government officials oversee and have authority for various parts of the national incident management system.
United States. Office of the Federal Register
2003-02-28
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Justification for Unilateral Action in Response to the Iraqi Threat: A Critical Analysis of Operation Desert Fox
This article addresses the legality of Operation Desert Fox in the context of the international legal system. The United Nations Charter, to which all parties involved in this conflict are signatories, prohibits the use of force except for two narrow exceptions. Part II of this article describes the events that resulted in American and British air strikes. Part III explains the international law as it pertains to the situation. Parts IV, V, and VI explain the theories for justification based on anticipatory self defense, reprisal, and material breach of Resolution 687, respectively. Finally, this article concludes with a discussion about the legality of the United States attack on Iraq. The first step in the analysis, however, is to understand the crisis and the events that lead the Clinton administration to believe military force was the best solution to deal with the Iraqi government.
Library of Congress. Federal Research Division
Condron, Sean M.
1999
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Man in Simulant Testing (MIST) of Domestic Preparedness Suits Kappler Model 42483 Responder CSM Level A Suit
Testing of the Responder CSM(registered) Level A suit ensemble was conducted according to MIST test guidelines promulgated by the Joint Services Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST) test working group. This testing was conducted with the chemical agent simulant methyl salicylate (MS) to determine the protective capability of the suit against chemical warfare agents (CWA). This testing was to fill in data gaps on commercial protective suits (they are not certified by either NIOSH or OSHA for CWA) so they can be used by emergency personnel at sites that have been infiltrated by terrorist assailants with unknown chemical and/or biological weapons of mass destruction. The testing showed that the Responder CSM(registered) suit, when worn in the Level A mode with self-contained breathing apparatus (SOBA), provided wearers with an overall protection factor of 1686.
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
1999-05
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After the Storm: The Growing Convergence of the Air Force and the Navy
Over the last decade, military reformers have argued that when it comes to developing joint warfare capabilities, the U.S. military services have routinely substituted overblown rhetoric for heartfelt commitment. The services may have redundant capabilities, critics complain, but they continue to stage knife fights over doctrine; they still have problems communicating with each other during actual operations; and they continue to squabble, quietly or not, over their "fair shares" of the defense budget. The answer to the first question, as this historically based article will demonstrate, has its roots in an expanding technological base; the centrifugal, go-it-alone behavior of the services in the late 1970s and 1980s; and the eventual march toward convergence, especially by the Navy and Air Force, since Desert Storm. The answer to what happens in the future may be a bit trickier, but we offer a hypothesis: joint operational capabilities will accelerate dramatically, because of ever-expanding technological capabilities, and because of the growing convergence between service visions and doctrines, particularly in the case of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Barry, John L.; Blaker, James R.
2001
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Strategic Importance of the US Army Veterinary Service in an NBC Environment
As the Department of Defense Executive Agent for Veterinary Services, the U.S. Army Veterinary Service has responsibility for providing support to all branches of the Department of Defense. That support includes food safety and quality assurance; zoonotic disease control and prevention; medical research and development; and medical care for all government owned animals, This paper reviews the role of the U.S. Army Veterinary Service in an NBC environment as it relates to food safety and quality assurance. The focus of the paper is to examine the current threat from weapons of mass destruction, our doctrine for subsistence and water operations in an NBC environment, and the current capabilities of US forces to detect NBC agents in subsistence and water. A recommendation for a course of action to address the current shortcomings in doctrine and equipment is developed.
Army War College (U.S.)
Record, Jeffrey W.
1999-04-01
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Concept for Advanced Expeditionary Fire Support C the System After Next
The purpose of this paper is to describe a concept for an advanced expeditionary fire support system that will provide flexible and responsive support for maritime maneuver warfare. Designed to meet the demands of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and its supporting concepts of Ship- to-Objective Maneuver (STOM) and Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), this concept addresses fire support requirements across the spectrum of conflict from devastating, lethal fires in Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA) to tailored, non-lethal fires in support of Other Expeditionary Operations (OEO) forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces provide the means for the National Command Authorities to respond rapidly to crises across the full spectrum of military operations. They must be capable of operating effectively in any environment against a wide range of potential adversaries. Many such adversaries, even those who are relatively unsophisticated, will be capable of employing modem weapons systems that are more capable in terms of range, accuracy, and lethality than those available today. Our adversaries may have little concern for such protocols as the Hague Convention, which seek to limit collateral damage and noncombatant casualties. Such considerations will always be a factor in the planning and execution of US military operations. Finally, we can never discount the possibility that an adversary will resort to the use of weapons of mass destruction. The Navy and Marine Corps are preparing to meet these challenges through implementation of our warfighting concepts. These concepts take full advantage of the maneuver space provided by the littoral environment by exploiting advances in operational and tactical mobility. The concept for expeditionary fire support addresses the system that will provide flexible and responsive fires in support of Marine forces.
United States. Department of the Navy
1999
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Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions
The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this biannual report in response to a Congressionally directed action in Section 721 of the FY97 Intelligence Authorization Act. At the DCI's request, the Nonproliferation Center (NPC) drafted this report and coordinated it throughout the Intelligence Community.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1997-06
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Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy
"The United States, in cooperation with other nations, controls the export of goods, technology, and software that have civilian applications but could also be used to make weapons of mass destruction or missiles to deliver them. Requiring licenses for the export of such dual-use items will continue to be one useful tool in U.S. nonproliferation policy. Although unlikely to stop a determined proliferant in the long run, export controls increase the cost and the difficulty of producing these weapons, and they may buy important time during which policymakers may bring other nonproliferation tools to bear. According to the OTA report Export Controls and Nonproliferation Policy, the difficult task for both Congress and the executive branch is to design an export control system that serves U.S. security interests but also takes due account of economic interests and fairness to regulated exporters. The task is made more difficult by the problems inherent in trying to estimate both the benefits and the costs of export controls."
United States. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment
1994-05-01
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Reducing The Nuclear Danger
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our national security. Reducing the nuclear danger is one of the primary goals of the United States national security strategy and it is a cornerstone of the Department's vision of the future. To meet this challenge, our Nation draws upon the same foundation of scientific and technological skills that helped bring a successful end to the Gold War. The Department, drawing upon many of the Nation's best and most innovative scientists, provides essential support for the changing global political climate that has guided the Department's adaptation to the new era. Reducing the global nuclear danger, responding with programs that build upon and enhance the strengths of the Department's complex and the National Laboratories, and emphasizing commitments to environment, safety, and health, are the essence of the Department's national security strategy. The nuclear danger is now defined differently than it was just five years ago. Initiatives to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, improve nuclear reactor safety, safeguard and dispose of nuclear materials and maintain confidence in our nuclear weapons deterrent without nuclear testing have surged to the forefront.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
1995-10
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Review of the FBI's Response to John Roberts' Statements on 60 Minutes
"This report describes the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) investigation of allegations that officials in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) retaliated against John Roberts, a Unit Chief in the FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), for comments he made on the television program 60 Minutes. On the October 27, 2002, 60 Minutes broadcast, Roberts made statements critical of the FBI's investigation and adjudication of employee misconduct, suggesting that there was a continuing double standard of discipline in the FBI. After the broadcast, allegations arose that senior FBI officials, including Robert Jordan, the newly appointed Assistant Director (AD) in charge of FBI OPR, engaged in a course of retaliatory conduct against Roberts. Allegedly, Jordan angrily confronted Roberts and chastised him for his statements on 60 Minutes, referred Roberts to the OIG for investigation because of his appearance on 60 Minutes, criticized Roberts during an FBI OPR all-employees meeting at which Roberts was not present, and selected another FBI OPR Unit Chief who had less experience than Roberts to be the FBI OPR Acting Deputy Assistant Director (DAD). Jordan and other FBI officials denied that they engaged in any retaliatory actions against Roberts for his statements on 60 Minutes."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2003-02
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Border Security: New Policies and Procedures are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process, Report to Congressional Requesters
Analysis indicates that the U.S. government has no specific written policy on the use of visa revocations as an antiterrorism tool and no written procedures to guide State in notifying the relevant agencies of visa revocations on terrorism grounds. State and INS have written procedures that guide some types of visa revocations; however, neither they nor the FBI have written internal procedures for notifying their appropriate personnel to take specific actions on visas revoked by the State Department. State and INS officials could articulate their informal policies and procedures for how and for what purpose their agencies have used the process to keep terrorists out of the United States, but neither they nor FBI officials had policies or procedures that covered investigating, locating, and taking appropriate action in cases where the visa holder had already entered the country. The lack of formal, written policies and procedures may have contributed to systemic weaknesses in the visa revocation process that increase the probability of a suspected terrorist entering or remaining in the United States. In a review of the 240 visa revocations, it was found that (a) appropriate units within INS and the FBI did not always receive notification of the revocations; (b) lookouts were not consistently posted to the agencies' watch lists of suspected terrorists; (c) 30 individuals whose visas were revoked on terrorism grounds entered the United States either before or after revocation and may still remain in the country;7 and (d) INS and the FBI were not routinely taking actions to investigate,8 locate, or resolve the cases of individuals who remained in the United States after their visas were revoked. On March 1, 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security became responsible for issuing regulations and administering and enforcing provisions of U.S. immigration law relating to visa issuance.11 Therefore, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conjunction with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to ensure that when State revokes a visa because of terrorism concerns, the appropriate units within State, Homeland Security, and the FBI are notified immediately and that the appropriate actions are taken. Homeland Security agreed that the visa revocation process should be strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and said that it looked forward to working with State and Justice to develop and revise current policies and procedures that affect the interagency visa revocation process.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-06
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Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act [January 22, 2003]
"The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) in the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) is an independent entity that reports to both the Attorney General and Congress. The OIG's mission is to investigate allegations of waste, fraud, and abuse in DOJ programs and personnel and to promote economy and efficiency in DOJ operations. The OIG now has jurisdiction to review programs and personnel in all DOJ components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, and other DOJ organizations. Enclosed is the report required by Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56. Section 1001 directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to undertake a series of actions related to civil rights or civil liberties allegations against Department of Justice employees and to report on these actions every six months to the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives. This report, our second under Section 1001, describes the OIG's activities in implementing these responsibilities for the six-month period from June 15, 2002, until December 15, 2002."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2003-01-22
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Bombs in Brooklyn: How the Two Illegal Aliens Arrested for Plotting to Bomb the New York Subway Entered and Remained in the United States
"In this report, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examines how two aliens, Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer (Mezer) and Lafi Khalil (Khalil), entered and remained in the United States before they were arrested on July 31, 1997, in a Brooklyn apartment for allegedly planning to bomb the New York City subway system. After their arrest, it was quickly discovered that both were Palestinians who were in the United States illegally. Mezer had been arrested three times in the previous thirteen months attempting to enter the United States illegally from Canada. The first two times, he was voluntarily returned to Canada. After the third apprehension, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began formal deportation proceedings against Mezer, but he was released on bond while the proceedings were pending. After his release, Mezer filed a political asylum application in which he claimed that he suffered a fear of persecution if he were returned to Israel, in part because Israeli authorities falsely believed he was a member of the terrorist organization Hamas. It was also discovered that Khalil was in the United States illegally, having entered on a tourist visa but having remained here after the visa expired."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
1998-03
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Army Water Transport Operations
"In a theater of operations, all modes of transport-air, motor, rail, and water move cargo from the water's edge in the communications zone (COMMZ) through the crops and into the division areas. This manual describes the transportation doctrine and organizational structures required for Army water transport operations in a generic theater.[...] This manual is primarily for unit and vessel masters, key personnel, higher headquarters staffs, theater planners, and commander's operational allied units. It covers roles, missions, and concepts of employment for individual craft, entire units, and groups of units."
United States. Department of the Army
1993-09
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U.S. Postal Service: Issues Associated with Anthrax Testing at the Wallingford Facility: Testimony of Keith Rhodes and Bernard Ungar Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform
At the Wallingford facility, it took four attempts before anthrax contamination was eventually identified. The first two attempts by U.S. Postal Service contractors collected samples at various places in the facility, using dry swabs, the least effective method for sample collection. The Postal Service nationwide sampling plan required that contractors use dry swabs to collect anthrax samples at more than 280 facilities, including Wallingford. But the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in commenting on the plan, had recommended that the Postal Service use other sampling methods. Nevertheless, the Postal Service did not revise its sampling plan. In the third attempt, CDC and the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry also found no contamination using wet swabs, but in the fourth attempt------using wet wipes and HEPA vacuums to collect the samples------they found contamination in samples from mail-sorting machines. In an April 2003 report, GAO found that the Postal Service's communication of test results to workers at the Wallingford facility generally appears consistent with its guidelines. But the decision not to release the first positive quantitative test results, after a worker's union requested them, was not consistent with OSHA's requirement to disclose requested results. The Postal Service said it did not release the December 2001 quantitative results because it could not validate them, as required by its guidelines.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-05-19
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Nuclear Regulation: Emergency Preparedness Issues at the Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Statementof Jim Wells, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
In 2001, we reported that, over the years, NRC had identified a number of emergency preparedness weaknesses at Indian Point 2 that had gone largely uncorrected. Consolidated Edison had some corrective actions under way before a February 2000 event raised the possibility that radioactively contaminated water would leak into the environment. In evaluating Consolidated Edison's response to this event, NRC found that critical emergency response personnel were not notified in a timely manner, which delayed the staffing and operation of the on-site emergency response facility. As a result, NRC found emergency preparedness problems similar to those it had identified before and during the event. Consolidated Edison reported that a release had occurred but posed no threat to the public, while county officials reported that no release had occurred. Consolidated Edison, the state, and the counties revised the plant's radiological emergency data form to more clearly show whether a release had occurred. As we also reported, county officials suggested changes to improve communications among NRC, FEMA, and non-state entities. In particular, county officials said that since they are responsible for radiological emergency preparedness for Indian Point 2, NRC and FEMA should communicate directly with them during non-emergency situations. Since our 2001 report, NRC inspection reports have continued to show emergency preparedness weaknesses. NRC officials said that they meet with state officials concerning emergency preparedness and have instituted various initiatives to improve public communication, in which local officials can participate. FEMA officials told us that it would continue to work with state and local governments on emergency preparedness.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-10
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Unemployment Insurance: States' Use of the 2002 Reed Act Distribution, Report to Congressional Requesters
The Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, administered by the U.S. Department of Labor in partnership with states, plays a critical role in ensuring the financial security of America's workforce. In fiscal year 2002, state UI programs paid benefits totaling $50.8 billion to 10.6 million unemployed workers. This report provides information on (1) the proportion of Reed Act dollars that states have spent, to date; (2) the proportion of total Reed Act dollars that remains in state UI trust funds and the effect this has had on employer UI taxes; (3) the proportion of those Reed Act dollars remaining in state UI trust funds that have been officially obligated to their trust funds or appropriated by state law for administering the UI, ES, or one-stop systems; and (4) the makeup of state UI advisory boards and any proposals they have made for using Reed Act dollars.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-06
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United States National Search and Rescue Supplement to the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual
This National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS), prepared under the direction of the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC), provides guidance to federal agencies concerning implementation of the National Search and
Rescue Plan (NSP). The NSS provides specific additional national standards and guidance that build upon the baseline established by the International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual. The IAMSAR
Manual is a three-volume set published jointly by both the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) for use by all countries. The NSS provides guidance to all federal forces,
military and civilian, that support civil search and rescue (SAR) operations.
United States. Coast Guard. Office of Search and Rescue
2000-05
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Civil Air Patrol Support for the President's National Strategy for Homeland Security
Civil Air Patrol (CAP) is uniquely positioned to conduct homeland security (HLS) operations in support of the Nation's homeland security initiatives. CAP was chartered six days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 under the Office of Civilian Defense. The purpose of CAP was to use general aviation pilots and aircraft to support the Nation's civil defense program. Upon entry of the United States into World War II, the mission of CAP expanded to include performing a wide variety of duties including coastal patrol for submarine activity, ships and personnel in distress, target towing for the armed forces, and courier flights for essential personnel and war materials. Due to its success in the wartime mission of anti-submarine coastal patrol, CAP was later transferred to the War Department in 1943. Congress chartered CAP as a non-profit corporation in 1946 so CAP could continue to provide services for the armed forces. In 1948, Congress designated CAP as the official civilian Auxiliary of the United States Air Force. CAP is a community-based, volunteer service organization with over 61,000 members and more than 1,700 units across the nation. The federally chartered CAP Corporation owns more than 530 light aircraft, and CAP members own hundreds of other aircraft that can be used to support assigned missions. Today, CAP has come full circle in the past 60 years, with a modern, well equipped fleet of aircraft and equipment that is utilized daily. Trained professional volunteers stand ready to meet the challenge by preparing, preventing, and responding to internal and external threats to the United States.
United States. Civil Air Patrol
2002
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Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic Facilities, Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
The State Department has done much over the last 4 years to improve physical security at overseas posts. State has constructed perimeter walls, anti-ram barriers, and access controls at many facilities; has obtained host government approval to close off nearby streets at many locations; and has implemented other measures. However, even with these new improvements, most office facilities do not meet security standards. Our analysis showed that as of December 2002, the primary office building at 232 posts lacked sufficient security because it did not meet one or more of State's five key standards. Moreover, at 81 posts, the primary building did not meet any of these standards. Only 12 posts have a primary building that meets all 5 standards. As a result, thousands of U.S. government and foreign national employees may be at risk. Security officials at the posts we visited are concerned that many of the buildings we observed are vulnerable to terrorist attacks. At least 96 posts have reported serious overcrowding. In addition to completing construction that is under way, State believes it needs to replace facilities at about 160 posts. State's timeline for completing this program will depend on the amount of funding it receives and how well it manages the program.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-20
