Advanced search Help
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Impact of September 11, 2001 Events on Substance Use and Mental Health in the New York Area
This report examines the potential effects of the September 11 events on substance use and substance abuse treatment, mental health problems and treatment, and religiosity in the New York area using data from the 2000 and 2001 NHSDAs. The primary focus is on two specific areas: New York City (NYC) and the New York Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area (NY CMSA). For comparison purposes, the report also looks at trends in a composite of several other Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (C-CMSA) consisting of the cities and surrounding areas of Los Angeles, Chicago, and Detroit. Of interest is whether the events of September 11 were associated with changes in the prevalence of substance use or mental health problems in these areas. Because the terrorist acts occurred just prior to the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2001, data collected in the first three quarters of 2001 can be combined and compared with data collected in the fourth quarter. To account for any seasonal effects on these within-year comparisons, the 2000 NHSDA is also used for comparison since the survey in 2000 was almost identical to the one fielded in 2001. Analyses were done by age and gender.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2003-01
-
Intrusion Detection Systems
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are software or hardware systems that automate the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network, analyzing them for signs of security problems. As network attacks have increased in number and severity over the past few years, intrusion detection systems have become a necessary addition to the security infrastructure of most organizations. This guidance document is intended as a primer in intrusion detection, developed for those who need to understand what security goals intrusion detection mechanisms serve, how to select and configure intrusion detection systems for their specific system and network environments, how to manage the output of intrusion detection systems, and how to integrate intrusion detection functions with the rest of the organizational security infrastructure. References to other information sources are also provided for the reader who requires specialized or more detailed advice on specific intrusion detection issues.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Mell, Peter; Bace, Rebecca Gurley
-
Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States
Over the years, the Soviet Union produced about 1,200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. U.S. efforts to help the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union better protect their stocks of this deadly material--which are vulnerable to theft and diversion because of antiquated security systems--got off to a slow start but are now gaining momentum. Many independent states lack modern equipment to detect unauthorized removal of highly enriched uranium and plutonium from nuclear facilities. Seizures of nuclear material in Russia and Europe have heightened concerns about a possible black market for this material. The Defense Department (DOD) has obligated $59 million and spent about $4 million during fiscal years 1991-95 for security improvements in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. Initially the program moved slowly because Russian officials had refused access to their facilities, and DOD projects at facilities in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus were just getting under way. The program gained momentum in January 1995 when U.S. and Russian officials agreed to upgrade nuclear materials controls at five high-priority facilities. The Energy Department plans to request $400 million over seven years to improve controls at nuclear facilities in the newly independent states. However, the expanded program faces uncertainties involving its overall costs and U.S. ability to verify that the assistance is being used as intended. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see; Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Materials Controls, by Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director for International Relations and Trade Issues, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Senate Committee on Government Affairs. GAO/T-NSIAD-96-119.
United States. General Accounting Office
1996-03-08
-
Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety: Uncertainties About the Implementation of U.S.-Russian Plutonium Disposition Efforts, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
The United States and Russia have accumulated huge stockpiles of plutonium, a key ingredient in the production of nuclear weapons. Disposing of excess plutonium from both countries' stockpiles, thereby precluding its reuse in nuclear weapons, is a major policy initiative of the Clinton Administration. The Energy Department's (DOE) disposition program seeks to decrease the risk of nuclear proliferation by reducing U.S. plutonium stockpiles by half--to about 50 metric tons over the next 25 years--and by influencing Russia to take reciprocal actions. However, Russia has yet to formally commit, along with the United States, to a program to reduce its plutonium stockpile. Moreover, it is unclear whether Russia agrees with the U.S. objective of reducing both countries' stockpiles to equivalent levels or whether Russia is willing to make the financial commitment to such a disposition program--which could cost up to $2 billion over the next 25 years. Because it is uncertain when such an agreement will be signed, Congress may wish to link DOE's future requests for program funding to assurances that Russia will take binding reciprocal actions.
United States. General Accounting Office
1998-01-14
-
Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program
Since 1994, the United States has appropriated $227 million to support two multilateral science centers in Russia and Ukraine. The science centers pay scientists who once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems for the Soviet Union to conduct peaceful research. By employing scientists at the science centers, the United States seeks to reduce the risks that these scientists could be tempted to sell their expertise to terrorists. This report examines the (1) selection procedures the State Department uses to fund projects that meet program objectives and (2) monitoring procedures the State Department uses to verify that scientists are working on the peaceful research they are paid to produce. GAO found that State lacks complete information on the total number and locations of senior scientists and has not been granted access to senior scientists at critical research institutes under the Russian Ministry of Defense. GAO also found that State has designed an interagency review process to select and fund research proposals submitted by weapons scientists to the science centers in Russia and Ukraine. The overall goal is to select projects that reduce proliferation risks to the United States and employ as many senior scientists as possible. The science centers were following their monitoring processes and were taking steps to address audit deficiencies.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-05-10
-
Policy Expression and Enforcement for Handheld Devices
The use of mobile handheld devices, such as Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and tablet computers, within the workplace is expanding rapidly. These devices are no longer viewed as coveted gadgets for early technology adopters, but instead have become indispensable tools that offer competitive business advantages for the mobile workforce. While providing productivity benefits, the ability of these devices to store and transmit corporate information through both wired and wireless networks poses potential risks to an organization's security. This paper describes a framework for managing user privileges on handheld devices. The approach is aimed at assisting enterprise security officers in administering and enforcing group and individual security policies for PDAs, and helping constrain users to comply automatically with their organization's security policy. Details of a proof-of-concept implementation of the framework are also provided.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Jansen, Wayne A.; Karygiannis, Tom; Korolev, Vlad
2003-04
-
Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain
Since 1992, Congress has authorized more than $3 billion for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to help Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, and Georgia secure and eliminate weapons of mass destruction. Concerned about proper oversight of equipment and services provided by the program, Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD) to report annually on whether the assistance was being used as intended. This report reviews (1) whether DOD's oversight procedures produce the necessary information to determine if the threat reduction assistance, including equipment provided and services furnished, is being used as intended and (2) whether DOD can improve its oversight. GAO found that DOD has procedures in place that reasonably ensure that at least 95 percent of the assistance is being used as intended and is adequately accounted for. Because of access restrictions imposed by the Russian government, a limited amount of equipment--less than five percent of the total value of assistance provided--is in locations where access by U.S. personnel is not permitted. DOD can enhance the quality of its program oversight by better targeting and expanding the scope of its formal audit and examination procedures.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-06-19
-
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Has Improved
The law requires the Defense Department (DOD) to report annually on cooperative threat reduction assistance provided to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. GAO must assess DOD's report within 30 days after it has been issued. This report discusses whether DOD's report (1) contains current and complete data on cooperative threat reduction assistance deliveries, including their location and condition; (2) presents the best available sources of information to show what assistance was accounted for and how it was used; (3) provides an overall determination of assistance use; and (4) lists planned audits and examinations for the coming year. GAO also follows up on DOD's implementation of recommendations GAO previously made to improve DOD's annual reports.
United States. General Accounting Office
1997-02-27
-
Director of Central Intelligence Directive: National Intelligence Council and the National Intelligence Officer
This report details the mission, size, and composition of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which are adjustable at the discretion of the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his needs as the principal intelligence
advisor to the President and as the senior leader of the US national
Intelligence Community. The NIC and NIOs are the DCI's primary instruments for
coordinating the substantive finished intelligence output of the Intelligence Community as a whole; that is, the intelligence products that pool the judgments of the agencies making up the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1992-06-01
-
SIGINT Committee
The mission of the SIGINT Committee is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA) in the discharge of their duties and responsibilities with respect to Signals Intelligence as specified in Executive Order 12333, to monitor and assist in coordinating within the Intelligence Community the accomplishment of objectives
established by the DCI, and to promote the effective use of Intelligence Community SIGINT resources.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1982-05-12
-
National Intelligence Collection Board
The National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB) will assist the Director of Central Intelligence in managing the overall intelligence collection requirements process, ensuring coordination among the major collection disciplines, and evaluating performance in satisfying consumer needs for information. The Board will act as a forum for integrating the efforts of the separate collection disciplines and issuing guidance to collectors, as appropriate.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1993-03-01
-
Community Personnel Coordinating Committee
The Committee will advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to human resource management functions within the Intelligence Community.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1992-06-01
-
Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
Physical security standards are hereby established governing the construction and protection of facilities for storing, processing, and discussing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) which requires extraordinary security safeguards. Compliance with this DCID 6/9 Implementing Manual (hereafter referred to as the "Manual") is mandatory for all Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) established after the effective date of this manual, including those that make substantial renovations to existing SCIFs. Those SCIFs approved prior to the effective date of this Manual will not require modification to meet these standards.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
2002-11-18
-
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. J. Res. 16: Compact of Free Association Amendments Act of 2003
"S.J. Res. 16 would amend the Compact of Free Association Act of 1988 and subsidiary agreements between the United States and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM). Certain provisions in the compact that authorized federal funding for RMI and FSM expired in 2001. S.J. Res. 16 would provide financial assistance for RMI and FSM for the next 20 years. The legislation would make several changes to the compact to increase monitoring of financial assistance, create a joint oversight committee, and establish trust funds to provide funds to RMI and FSM beyond 2023. S.J. Res. 16 also would provide $30 million a year for costs related to the migration of RMI and FSM nationals to other jurisdictions and about $25 million annually for additional education grants for RMI and FSM. CBO's baseline assumes that direct spending for grants to RMI and FSM will continue over the 2004-2013 period at an average annual cost of $157 million a year. CBO estimates that enacting this legislation would increase direct spending by $622 million above the amounts assumed in baseline projections over the 2004-2013 period. In addition, the legislation would extend the authority to appropriate funds for certain federal services for RMI and FSM for the next 20 years. The legislation also would authorize appropriations for grants to reimburse certain health care institutions for costs related to the migration of RMI and FSM nationals to other jurisdictions. CBO estimates that implementing those provisions of S.J. Res. 16 would cost $631 million over the 2004-2013 period."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2003-09-25
-
Oversight of the US Intelligence Community's Efforts to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Means of Delivery
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons) and their delivery means poses a grave threat to global security. It is a pressing national security issue for which the US Intelligence Community has significant responsibilities and can make vital contributions. The purpose of this directive is to provide for leadership, oversight, and guidance to the US Intelligence Community in carrying out its responsibilities for combating proliferation, including support to nonproliferation and counter proliferation, and to provide an overall framework for US Intelligence Community contributions to the formulation and implementation of US policies for combating proliferation. This directive also sets forth the authorities and responsibilities of the Special Assistant to the DCI for Nonproliferation and the mission of the DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC). This directive is not intended to abrogate or derogate the authorities and responsibilities of organizations in the US Intelligence Community contained in statute, Executive order, Presidential Directive, National Security
Council Intelligence Directive, or other lawful authority.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1999-05-07
-
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 2886: Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act
"H.R. 2886 would amend the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Homeland Security Act to require the President to appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to be confirmed by the Senate to oversee the financial accounting practices of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The legislation would require DHS to submit a performance and accountability report and to submit an audit of its internal financial controls to the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress. The legislation also would establish an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation in DHS and require the department to prepare a national homeland security strategy each year. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 2886 would cost $4 million annually, subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues. H.R. 2886 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. The legislation would codify current practices of DHS including the operations of the department's existing Program Analysis and Evaluation Office. Based on information from DHS, CBO estimates that the requirement to prepare an audit of the department's internal financial controls would cost $4 million a year.. In addition, H.R. 2886 would require DHS to develop and annually update a comprehensive national homeland security strategy. Because DHS is already developing such a future year security program and a homeland security funding analysis, CBO expects that the new reporting requirement would not add significant costs."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2003-11-10
-
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: S. 1567: Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act
"S. 1567 would amend the Chief Financial Officers Act and the Homeland Security Act to require the President to appoint a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) to be confirmed by the Senate to oversee the financial accounting practices of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In addition, DHS would be required to submit a performance and accountability report that incorporates a program performance report and, after fiscal year 2004, submit an audit of its internal financial controls to the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress. The DHS currently employs a CFO who has the same duties and responsibilities as CFOs in other agencies. According to DHS, it currently complies with the provisions of the Chief Information Officers Act. Based on information from DHS, we estimate that the requirement to prepare an audit of the department's internal financial controls would cost $4 million a year, subject to the availability of appropriated funds. Enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues. S. 1567 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2003-10-29
-
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 1416: Homeland Security Technical Corrections Act of 2003
"H.R. 1416 would make technical and clerical amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and conforming amendments to immigration laws. The legislation also would direct that any reports or notifications required to be submitted to the Congress under that act also be submitted to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. Finally, H.R. 1416 would clarify that nothing in the Homeland Security Act would confer any military authority on the Secretary of Homeland Security or limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense. CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 1416 would have no significant effect on the federal budget because it would not authorize any new activities for the Department of Homeland Security. Enacting the legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues. H.R. 1416 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. On April 2, 2003, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. 1416 as ordered reported by the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. The two versions of the legislation are similar, and our cost estimates are identical."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2003-10-24
-
Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers
The World Wide Web (WWW) is a system for exchanging information over the Internet. At the most basic level, the Web can be divided into two principal components: Web servers, which are applications that make information available over the Internet (in essence publish information) and Web browsers (clients), which are used to access and display the information stored on the Web servers. This document focuses on the security issues of Web servers. Unfortunately, the Web server is the most targeted and attacked host on most organizations' network. As a result, it is essential to secure Web servers and the network infrastructure that supports them. The purpose of this document is to present security guidance for the design, implementation, and operation of publicly accessible Web servers. This document should be used by organizations to enhance security on Web server systems, and to reduce the number and frequency of Web-related security incidents. This document presents generic principles that apply to all systems. In addition, specific examples are presented that address two of the more popular Web server applications: Apache and Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS).
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Tracy, Miles C.; Jansen, Wayne A.; McLarnon, Mark
2002-09
-
Procedures for Handling Security Patches
Timely patching is critical to maintain the operational availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information technology (IT) systems. However, failure to keep operating system and application software patched is the most common mistake made by IT professionals. New patches are released daily, and it is often difficult for even experienced system administrators to keep abreast of all the new patches. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in software that can be exploited by a malicious entity to gain greater access and/or permission than it is authorized to have on a computer. Not all vulnerabilities have related patches; thus, system administrators must not only be aware of vulnerabilities and patches, but also mitigate "unpatched" vulnerabilities through other methods (e.g. workarounds, firewalls, and router access control lists). To help address this growing problem, this document recommends that organizations have an explicit and documented patching and vulnerability policy and a systematic, accountable, and documented process for handling patches. This document provides principles and methodologies for accomplishing this. One of several possible techniques is through the creation of a patch and vulnerability group (PVG). This group would facilitate the identification and distribution of patches within the organization.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Tracy, Miles C.; Mell, Peter
2002-08
-
Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems
This document provides guidance for planning, establishing, maintaining, and terminating interconnections between information technology (IT) systems that are owned and operated by different organizations. The guidelines are consistent with the requirements specified in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Appendix III, for system interconnection and information sharing. A system interconnection is defined as the direct connection of two or more IT systems for the purpose of sharing data and other information resources. The document describes various benefits of interconnecting IT systems, identifies the basic components of an interconnection, identifies methods and levels of interconnectivity, and discusses potential security risks associated with an interconnection. The document then presents a "life-cycle management" approach for interconnecting IT systems, with an emphasis on security. Four phases of the interconnection life cycle are addressed with the document providing recommended steps for completing each phase, emphasizing security measures that should be taken to protect the connected systems and shared data. The document also contains guides and samples for developing an Interconnection Security Agreement (ISA) and a Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/A). The ISA specifies the technical and security requirements of the interconnection, and the MOU/A defines the responsibilities of the participating organizations. Finally, the document contains a guide for developing a System Interconnection Implementation Plan, which defines the process for establishing the interconnection, including scheduling and costs.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Grance, Tim; Hash, Joan S.; Peck, Steven
2002-08
-
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods and Techniques
This document specifies five confidentiality modes of operation for symmetric key block cipher algorithms, such as the algorithm specified in FIPS Pub. 197: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). The modes may be used in conjunction with any symmetric key block cipher algorithm that is approved by a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS). The five modes; the Electronic Codebook (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB), and Counter (CTR) modes, can provide data confidentiality. Two FIPS publications already approve confidentiality modes of operation for two particular block cipher algorithms. FIPS Pub. 81 specifies the ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB modes of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). FIPS Pub. 46-3 approves the seven modes that are specified in ANSI X9.52. Four of these modes are equivalent to the ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB modes with the Triple DES algorithm (TDEA) as the underlying block cipher; the other three modes in ANSI X9.52 are variants of the CBC, CFB, and OFB modes of Triple DES that use interleaving or pipelining. Thus, there are three new elements in this recommendation: 1) the extension of the four confidentiality modes in FIPS Pub 81 for use with any FIPS-approved block cipher; 2) the revision of the requirements for these modes; and 3) the specification of an additional confidentiality mode, the CTR mode, for use with any FIPS-approved block cipher.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Dworkin, Morris
2001-12
-
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate: H.R. 253: Two Floods and You Are Out of the Taxpayers' Pocket Act of 2003
"H.R. 253 would extend authority to operate the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) until 2008. Under current law, the program's authority expires on December 31, 2003. The bill also would establish a pilot program to give states and local communities financial assistance for mitigating severe repetitive loss properties. The bill would authorize the appropriation of $40 million a year over the 2004-2008 period for this new pilot program. H.R. 253 also would increase the amounts authorized to be appropriated for the existing flood mitigation program by $40 million a year over the 2004-2008 period. Finally, the bill would authorize the appropriation of an additional $10 million a year for mitigation of individual properties in states and communities that do not have the capacity to manage their own mitigation programs. Assuming appropriation of the authorized amounts, CBO estimates that implementing the bill would cost $315 million over the 2004-2008 period. Enacting H.R. 253 would affect direct spending, but CBO estimates that impact would be insignificant each year relative to the budget resolution baseline (which assumes the flood insurance program is extended). H.R. 253 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). State, local, and tribal governments may benefit from the grant program to reduce the number of claims made by certain property owners. Any costs associated with this program would be a condition of aid and thus would be incurred voluntarily."
United States. Congressional Budget Office
2003-09-03
-
CSPP - Guidance for COTS Security Protection Profiles
The purpose of CSPP is to provide the guidance necessary to develop "compliant" protection profiles for near-term achievable, security baselines using commercial off the shelf (COTS) information technology; giving those requirements which are generally applicable to such systems. CSPP is not intended to fully specify all possible systems. Additional functionality may be needed to capture specific needs; for example those related to (among others) network switching systems, role-based access control (RBAC), smart-cards, public key infrastructure (PKI), and sector-unique needs.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Stoneburner, Gary
1999-12
-
COTS Security Protection Profile - Operating Systems (CSPP-OS)
The purpose of CSPP-OS is to define, and specify the requirements necessary to solve, the security problem that COTS operating systems (perhaps with add-on packages) can be expected to address in the near-term. This PP is developed using the guidance from [CSPP].
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
2003-04
-
Password Usage
This document specifies basic security criteria for two different uses of passwords in an ADP system, (I) personal identity authentication and (2) data access authorization. It establishes the basic criteria for the design, implementation and use of a password system in those systems where passwords are used. It identifies fundamental ADP management functions pertaining to passwords and specifies some user actions required to satisfy these functions. In addition, it specifies several technical features which may be implemented in an ADP system in order to support a password system. An implementation schedule is established for compliance with the standard. Numerous guidelines are provided in the Appendices for managers and users seeking to comply with the standard.
United States. Department of Commerce
1985-05-30
-
Weapons of Mass Destruction: DoD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused
In response to the growing threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, the Pentagon announced its Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in 1993. The Initiative calls for the development of offensive and defensive capabilities--to include equipping, training, and preparing U.S. forces, in coalition with the forces of friends and allies--to prevail over adversaries who are capable of deploying weapons of mass destruction. This report describes the Defense Department's (DoD) efforts to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its organization, activities, and functions and identifies other steps that DoD can take to improve its implementation of the Initiative. GAO also examines the actions of the interagency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee to coordinate the research and development programs of DoD, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence community to identify and eliminate unnecessary duplication.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-26
-
Selected ATM/Internet Protocol (IP) Technical Interface Considerations
Connection-oriented and connectionless transport modes are the two fundamental types of service used to support the flow of information in today's communications networks. Each of the two transport modes is designed to support specific applications and meet specific quality of service (QoS) requirements. However, because of its capability to support high data rates, provide gains in bandwidth use efficiency, and accommodate a broad range of traffic from diverse sources, Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM)-a connection-oriented transport mode-is gaining broad acceptance as the preferred transport mode for both connection-oriented and connectionless communications services across multiple public networks. This report provides: (1) a general overview of salient features of connection-oriented ATM architectures and of the Internet Protocol (IP) used to support the connectionless transfer of data; and (2) selected technical interface considerations with potential impact on the transfer of IP data over ATM virtual connections.
National Communications System (U.S.). Office of the Manager
1998-01
-
Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence
This directive establishes a system of DCI Directives (DCIDs) and subsidiary issuances, provides a summary of DCI authorities and responsibilities, assigns responsibility for the execution of certain DCI authorities and responsibilities and provides for a process for the creation and coordination of DCI directives and subsidiary issuances. The goal of this system of directives is to enable the Director of Central Intelligence to provide timely, coordinated and clear guidance and direction to the Intelligence Community. The
process established is based on the authorities and responsibilities of the DCI as head of the US Intelligence Community, as assigned by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Executive Orders 12333, 12951, 12958, and other statutes, Presidential directives, and National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs).
United States. Central Intelligence Agency
1998-11-19
-
Bluetooth Area Network Technology
The National Telecommunications Act opened new public access to the ultra high frequency (UHF) and very high frequency (VHF) bands. As a direct consequence, wireless local area networking is becoming the communications standard for small and mobile corporations. Hybrid networks composed of fixed and wireless assets appear to be the next step. An important aspect of these new wireless networks is the integration of household (and business office) appliances, laptop computers, and personal communications service (PCS) devices. The facile connectivity promised but unrealized by infrared (IR) technology may now be available via embedded omni-directional transceivers based on breakthrough radio technology chips. This technology, called Bluetooth, seamlessly connects each intelligent appliance in a household or an office in a piconet wireless network. Bluetooth is an embedded, low-power, short-range, radio-frequency (RF) technology. Also, this mobile network technology is IR media-based with moderate bandwidth. It will be a network-ready unit that meets the radio link, protocol, profile, and information requirements in the emerging standards.
National Communications System (U.S.). Office of the Manager
Karty, Steven L.
2000-07
