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Strategy for a Middle East Peace - Is the US Acting in Its Own Best Interest?
The United States is not acting in its best interest with respect to Israel and the Middle East peace. Congress and many government officials have stated that Middle East peace is a vital national interest, yet the legislative and executive branches of government act to undermine the peace process through unconditional support for Israel and its policies. This paper uses the National Security Strategy (May 1997) and the pronouncements of state Department officials to outline US interests in the Middle East. Actions taken or not taken to advance the peace are then examined as well as the stated rationale for these actions and policies. As the examination unfolds, two things become clear: the US is acting to undermine justice for the Palestinian and peace in the region, and Israelis a pariah nation that violates every value that is the ethos of America. Israelis what we teach our children to abhor; a country that practices genocide and has no respect for the basic human rights of others. Six national interests are examined in making this evaluation: 1) the free flow of oil at reasonable prices; 2) the security of Israel and our Arab allies; 3) stability in the region; 4) combating terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction; 5) promoting democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law; 6) and enhancing business opportunities for American companies. The United States has the ability to achieve each of these interests and also to secure these interests, but chooses to jeopardize them by allowing Israel unrestrained latitude in dispossessing the Palestinian Arabs. The United States acts to marginalize the international community who seeks to force Israel to act like a responsible member of the global family. In doing so, the United States compromises its national values, its global leadership and its vital interest in the Middle East.
Army War College (U.S.)
Phillips, Michael A.
1998
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NATO Advanced Research Workshop on the Optics of Cosmic Dust
Biological warfare (BW) agents are a prime concern to both military and civilian personnel because of both their lethality and the resulting terror they would inflict upon a population. Dc testing and identifying aerosols are a primary objective of the US DoD and many other institutions worldwide. Light scattering may provide an automated means of rapidly detecting and identifying potentially lethal aerosols real-time without the use of chemical reagents or expensive maintenance. Since organic particles tend to fluoresce, many detector systems have focused on measuring this property to identify potentially harmful particles to raise an alarm. However, because fluorescence signals tend to be weak and smooth, it is difficult to differentiate among species of biological particles. Natural backgrounds vary widely and may cause false alarms. For this reason, other information is needed about the particle system that may be gathered from the elastic scattering spectrum. One property of 3W agents is that when they are aerosolized, they tend to aggregate into clusters. From the scattering signal, it might be possible to characterize the individual spores making up the cluster to help in the identification. However, again it is essential to be aware of the natural background signals caused by dust, diesel fumes, pollen, etc. and to develop methods to distinguish between these particles and the particles of concern.
U.S. Army Research Laboratory
Videen, Gordon
2001-11
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Proceedings of the Symposium on Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Contamination Survivability (NBCCS): Developing Contamination-Survivable Defense
The 1994 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Contamination Survivability (NBCCS) Symposium was held on 15 June 1994 at the Edgewood Area Conference Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Sponsored by the Chemical division of the American Defense Preparedness Association, it was co-hosted by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and the U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM). The objective of the symposium was to provide exchange of information on how to successfully execute an NBCCS program within the context of the item/system development and fielding program. Key to this exchange was the participation of both U.S. Government and industry members of the research, development, and acquisition community. Also key was the participation of the Joint Department of Defense (DOD) services. Selection of presentations was designed to help others avoid 'reinventing the wheel' and to demonstrate that NBCCS can be achieved without 'killing' a program. The symposium demonstrated that significant progress has been made in the area of design and test for NBCCS of military systems. This process can be attributed to a strong government industry team effort that must continue if this aspect of survivability is to be achieved on the battlefield.
U.S. Army Research Laboratory
Braungart, Charles; D'Elicio, Loluis S.
1994-10
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Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors, Report to Congressional Requresters
In response to the concern that terrorists could smuggle weapons of mass destruction in ocean containers that arrive at U.S. seaports, the U.S. Customs Service (Customs) implemented the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to screen for high-risk containers at overseas ports and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) to improve global supply chain security in the private sector. In this report, GAO (1) describes the purpose and elements of these new programs, (2) examines Customs' implementation of CSI and C-TPAT during the first year, and (3) assesses the extent to which Customs has focused on factors critical to the programs' long-term success and accountability. GAO found that Customs' implementation of the CSI and C-TPAT programs evolved in response to challenges it encountered. Although Customs is preparing to devote significantly more resources to CSI and C-TPAT as it expands the programs, it has not taken adequate steps to incorporate factors necessary for the programs' long-term success and accountability. These factors include human capital planning, development of performance measures, and strategic planning. GAO found the following: (1) although CSI seeks to staff Customs officials at more than 30 overseas ports and C-TPAT expects to hire more than 150 additional staff, Customs has not devised systematic human capital plans to meet long-term staffing needs for both programs; (2) while Customs has created some performance measures to quantify operational activities and efforts, it has not developed measures to establish accountability and measure program achievement; and (3) in its efforts to rapidly implement the programs and enroll participants, Customs focused on short-term planning.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-07-25
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Test Results of Phase 2 Level A Suits to Challenge by Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents and Simulants: Executive Summary
Swatches from six commercially available Level A protective suits were challenged with liquid droplets of Sarih (GB) and mustard (HD) using modifications of the static difftision procedure described in TOP 8-2-501. The cumulative mass of each agent that permeated each swatch was determined over time, and the results for all swatches were used to determine a weighted-average cumulative mass for each suit. From these data, a breakthrough time was calculated for each Suit for comparison purposes. In addition, intact suits were challenged with corn-oil aerosol to simulate a biological aerosol. Protection factors were determined for each suit.
U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command
Lindsay, Robert S.
2001-10
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Information Terrorism
The information revolution has had a dramatic impact on every aspect of our lives. Commercial activities, all the way from the world's financial markets to the most basic purchases in stores, are driven by the changes in information technology. It is, therefore, not surprising that military operations are equally bound by these technologies which, at first glance, seem so remote from the world of troop movements and combat. But, in fact, these technologies are changing not only society but also our definition of war and the conduct of military operations. Throughout history, military doctrine, organization and strategy have continually undergone profound, technology-driven changes. Modern warfare, unlike that of past epochs, is "information intensive," meaning the conduct of effective military operations requires a greater accumulation of data than ever before. Today, access to information is just as crucial as possession of petroleum, oil, lubricants, and ammunition. Cyberwar refers to conducting military operations according to information-related principles. It means disrupting or destroying information and communications systems. It means trying to know everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself.
Defense Technical Information Center (U.S.)
Cupp, Christian M.; Levine, Phyllis
2000-03
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Analysis of Federal Airport and Air Carrier Employee Access Control, Screening and Training Regulations
Current Federal Aviation Regulations concerning civil aviation security are focused on countering the threat of a passenger hijacking a commercial airplane. Current media and government emphasis is focused on a passenger breaching security at an airport in the U.S. and not an employee breaching security. The security of the U.S. air travel industry from terrorist attacks hinges on an effective civil aviation security program. Government and aviation industry officials would greatly benefit from the revision of the current Federal Aviation Regulations concerning civil aviation security to address the issue of terrorism initiated by an employee. This thesis provides a thorough examination of current Federal Aviation Regulations parts 107 and 108 sections concerning airport and air carrier employee access control, screening, and training. Based upon field research of five U.S. airports, the work furthermore analyzes related issues and problems associated with these regulations and generates recommendations that serve to enhance security for the traveling public, air carriers, and persons employed by or conducting business at public airports.
Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)
Miller, Edward G.; Dover, Mark W.
1998-03
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Shaping the Future Security Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa
The nearly 40 year process of decolonization and the end of the Cold War have helped create major transformations in Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenges of extreme poverty, civil war, crime, cross-border interventionism, terrorism, outflows of refugees, environmental degradation and the spread of pandemic disease threaten the region's security environment and could threaten global stability. A contradiction exists between the United States government's stated foreign policy of engagement and its involvement in Africa. While stability is arguably its most important national interest, America does little to shape the security environment of this troubled region. If the United States is going to shape Africa's security environment, political leaders must become the visionaries of, and the advocates for, a more sophisticated foreign policy for the region. They must gain consensus on national interests in the region, and formulate a coherent set of policy objectives which will focus future engagement strategies. Through selective engagement the United States can help Africans solve African problems while shaping a security environment favorable to United States interests.
Army War College (U.S.)
Russell, Theodore S.
1998-03-01
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Preemption and Retribution: Precision-Guided Munitions to Counter Terrorist Threats
The development of the second generation of precision-guided munitions and stealth technology provides the United States National Command Authorities with a military option for prevention of and retribution for state- sponsored terrorist activities. This study examines the current U.S. policy on terrorism, the ways in which the U.S. has employed elements of national power against terrorist organizations, and determines whether the development of precision-guided munitions affords the U.S. leadership with effective means to conduct preemptive and retributive operations against these terrorist organizations.
Army War College (U.S.)
Seidel, Rodger F.
1998-04-01
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Next Enemy
"The Cold War offered military planners considerable strategic clarity the threat was known, and the problem was generating a force structure of sufficient size and sophistication to counter it. Today's military threats are varied and, for the most part, well below the level that even a shrinking U.S. force can handle comfortably. Threats ten to twenty years out, however, must be taken seriously because of the long time required to complete a major systems acquisition; to develop, test, and institutionalize new doctrine; and to accomplish the organizational innovations necessary to use both effectively. Future threats may be divided into four categories: peers, bullies, terrorism, and chaos. The threat environment twenty years hence is unlikely to be of one type. Nevertheless, framing the choices facing planners shows what the U.S. armed forces might look like if one or another type of threat were to become the predominant focus of the Defense Department."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Libicki, Martin C.
1995-07
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Seeing the Elephant: Consequence Management Policy for the Department of Defense
Consequence Management is a complex problem facing the US today. A subset of Homeland Security, Consequence Management is the post attack actions needed to prevent further suffering and restore basic government services. Consequence Management requires a symphony of effort from many federal agencies, including the Department of Defense. Because organizations are driving their actions based on misperceptions gleaned from the 1996 Sarin attack in Tokyo, many are moving in divergent directions. These divergent programs are often competing for the same resources, and siphon these resources away from the local response community. This monograph explores these common misperceptions and recommends a new direction, closer to the required capabilities, for the Department of Defense role in Consequence Management. The monograph recommends the elimination of specialized units for WMD response. An honest assessment of the time element of an event shows the folly of this approach. The second recommendation is the creation of a tiered response capability that balances time and tasks required for effective Consequence Management. The three response tiers allows the DoD to provide a predesignated level of support to the appropriate Federal and state agency. The first two tiers address the response required for toxic chemical events. The third tier is reserved for the actions required for the Consequence Management for a biological release.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Lee, Mark A.
2001-05-01
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Homeland Security: A Canadian Perspective
At the turn of the century, the attention of the U.S. security establishment has been drawn to the consideration of non-traditional and asymmetric threats to the continental United States. Consequently, there have been calls for the development of new strategies and structures aimed at assuring the defence of the 'homeland'. Several measures have been undertaken. Others are contemplated. Given the circumstances of North American geography and the nature of its relationship with its southern neighbour, this issue and these actions are of great interest to Canada. This paper examines the Canadian security environment with a view to determining to what extent such threats confront Canada. It concludes that significant threats - while perhaps less acute in certain dimensions - do indeed exist. What then is Canada's policy? What should it be? To answer these questions, this essay proposes an ends, ways and means based Canadian homeland security strategy.
Army War College (U.S.)
Selbie, J. J.
2001-04
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Analysis of Ballistic Missile Defense Policy in East Asia: Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations
The vital U.S. national interests of protecting the homeland, citizens abroad and deployed military forces are significantly threatened by current and emerging ballistic missile-capable nations, states of concern and other potentially hostile international organizations. The Asia-Pacific region is increasingly important to U.S. economic health and security. China's long-term goals may include regional hegemony and fierce competition with the United States. Chinese national interests could easily become the source of significant regional conflict in East Asia. Given the stated intent of the current administration to begin deployment of a national missile defense system and the continued development of several theater missile defense systems, the U.S. is at a critical security policy crossroad. Analysis of ballistic missile defense policy in the context of East Asia and the interests of the People's Republic of China will contribute to an understanding of the likely outcomes of the decision to deploy missile defenses.
Army War College (U.S.)
Moentmann, James E.
2001-04-10
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ROK Army's Role When North Korea Collapses Without a War with the ROK
This monograph examines the possibility of North Korea's collapse and course of action for a stability and support operation to deal with the collapse. North Korea seems fairly stable in terms of political, socio- ideological, military and diplomatic perspectives. However, the country needs to improve its economy to survive for an extended period. The only ways it can improve its economy is to open borders and engage with the rest of the world. North Korea also needs to do substantial market oriented reform to attract investment form outside and to encourage its people to work. The recent activities of the North, including the June 2000 summit can be understood in this regard. However, it will be facing the danger of exposing its people to information that is the most critical vulnerability of the regime. The collapse and subsequent stability and support operations is still possible. When the North collapses, the strategic interests of the world s major powers are centered around the stability and economic prosperity of Korea. They all want to get access to the new markets while don't want instability due to massive migration, spill over violence, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The best course of action to deal with the collapse of North Korea is the ROK Army to lead the multinational and interagency stability operation and support operation. The collapse and unification can happen much faster than expected. Once begun, there will be not much time to prepare. The ROK Army needs to be prepared to lead the stability and support operation in coordinate with the major powers to deal with North Korea s collapse. It must seize the initiative for unification while minimizing foreign intervention to prevent the repetition of the unpleasant history of the UN protectorate from happening.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Ryoo, Moo B.
2001
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Air National Guard: Past, Present, and Future Prospects
This article describes the history and status of the US Air National Guard. Guardsmen have a unique dual state-federal status grounded in the Constitution and America's system of divided political power between the states and the federal government. In peace-time, their commander in chief is the governor of their state or territory. The primary state missions of Guard members are to help deal with natural disasters and to restore law and order when civil authorities are unable to do so. If they volunteer or are mobilized for federal service, the president becomes their commander in chief. Air Guard members provide the federal government with a large, well-trained force equipped with modern weapons held in a high state of readiness for global military operations. Historically 75% are part-time airmen. Article documents history of the ANG, a product of WWII politics, since its inception in September 1947. With the Cold War's end and military downsizing, it appears that the US will be placing much more responsibility on the shoulders of its part-time warriors.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Gross, Charles Joseph
1996
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International Legal Implications of Information Warfare
This article examines the questions of how law of war and other international law limits the new form of information warfare, if at all. To answer the question, the article first explores the definition of the term "information warfare," then discusses the appropriateness of applying the law of war to information warfare techniques. Major topics outlined in the article include Definitions, the law of armed conflict, cyberspace versus land, sea, air, and space, principle of humanity and the principle of chivalry. Author concludes that for now we have only the existing law and must apply it as it makes best sense, working to fill the law's gaps as they are identified. The fast-moving world of the third wave will provide challenges in accomplishing this, but the ease and speed with which information can be exchanged may also facilitate the task.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Aldrich, Richard W., 1959-
1996
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Weapons of Mass Destruction a Network-Centered Threat
Battlespace dominance is more than the physical control of air, land, and sea. Under the network centric concept of operations, U.S. forces must be ready to control the infosphere in order to assure military objectives can be achieved. Perhaps the most effective information warfare (IW) weapon is a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), specifically a biological or nuclear weapon. Important questions should be answered about the ability to protect American information networks from the significant information disruption characteristics of WMD.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Diggs, D. G.
1998-05-18
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Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: Russian Military Dimensions
This article examines some little-addressed aspects of weapons proliferation - the phenomenon of widespread Russian military criminality and the extent to which the Russian military plays a role in the black and gray conventional arms market. In particular, while noting a pattern of systemic Russian armed forces criminality associated with conventional arms trafficking, the article addresses several Russian military organizations most closely involved with nuclear and chemical weapons and considers their roles as potential vectors for WMD diversion. Major topics addressed include The Russian Criminal Environment and the Armed Forces and The Russian Military and WMD Proliferation. The author concludes that the Russian military's role in weapons proliferation - and that of other lesser-examined FSU successor state militaries and security forces as well - will be a substantial consideration in the development of stability and peace in the Central Eurasian region and beyond. Of special importance, these developing military-criminal linkages may represent one of the greatest WMD proliferation dangers, a potential that increasing numbers of Russian official spokesmen are acknowledging.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Turbiville, Graham Hall
1996
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Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans
The performance of the Armed Forces has shown a marked improvement since its low point in the post-Vietnam era Military leaders have deliberately sought out and internalized lessons from each succeeding conflict The challenge for the next generation is learning the lessons of these past operations and building an even more effective, flexible force. The military cannot pick and choose its missions. Their political masters may well decide that national interests require the use of force for more nontraditional missions or in situations that may be less than ideally suited to military solutions. Force protection is critical; high rates of casualties can erode popular support and undermine the mission. On the other hand, excessive fear of casualties can erode the morale of the Armed Forces. The key is forging American leadership that understands the military risks involved. Commitments to our allies may draw us into conflicts where U.S. national interests are limited, but where American leadership is essential to the vitality of the alliance. Even a small operation conducted abroad requires an extraordinary range of well-trained forces, either highly deployable or already in theater. Despite successes, the Armed Forces must address a number of challenges: urban warfare, weapons of mass destruction, tracking and destroying mobile targets, the need for lighter, more deployable forces, and the burden of ongoing operations.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Skelton, Ike
2000-10
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South Asia: Back to Basics
South Asia, with a quarter of the world's population, a demonstrated weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, great economic potential, and chronic instability, can no longer be regarded as peripheral to U.S. global interests. Achieving peace and stability, particularly in and between India and Pakistan, is the overarching U.S. interest in South Asia, and we need a well- considered, long-term strategy to pursue it. The United States needs to avoid the episodic, single-issue pattern of its past interaction with South Asia. Sustained, broad-based engagement, based on a thorough review of U.S. interests and regional realities, will preserve and enhance U.S. interests. A presidential visit to all the major countries of the region could signal our commitment to long-term engagement focusing on Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, good governance, economic advancement, and sane management of the region's nuclear capabilities.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Lanpher, Edward G.
2000-03
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Maintaining Friendly Skies: Rediscovering Theater Aerospace Defense
As Pearl Harbor did in 1941, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks brought home the catastrophic consequences of an insufficient homeland aerospace defense. This is not a new issue. The history of the Cold War is replete with attempts to build effective aerospace defenses for the United States and Soviet Homelands as well as for the theater armed forces of both superpowers. Grau and Kipp chronicle this history and recommend steps for improving US theater and homeland aerospace defenses. The article contains ten key conclusions from the United States and Soviet Union theater-air-defense-systems experience applicable to future missile defense.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Kipp, Jacob W.; Grau, Lester W.
2002
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Attack Operations: First Layer of an Integrated Missile Defense
United States forces have a long history of conducting attack operations. The proliferation of theater and long-range ballistic missiles suggests that the concept should be adapted to support missile-defense operations. To do so, we must include missile-defense capabilities in air and space expeditionary force packages, mature technology and doctrine to accommodate such capabilities, and connect Air Force capabilities to joint doctrine and employment concepts. Author argues that, although current structures contain pieces of the puzzle, we must fully integrate those pieces within an overall theater missile-defense architecture that includes offensive capabilities.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Krause, Merrick E.
2003
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Reflections on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and National Missile Defense
The United States announced its withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2002. Major Ruse's examination of how the treaty restricted the development of our national missile defense system helps us understand what the withdrawal means for the future. The Treaty had been adopted during the Cold War, to avert a possible nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race. Logic held that if each nation remained defenseless to a nuclear attack and if nuclear retaliation to a first strike were guaranteed, then neither nation would have any motivation to consider launching a nuclear strike. The treaty codified MAD, which prevailed until the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Against this brief background of the ABM Treaty, one needs to explore why it became such a hot issue after three decades. The answer lies within a framework of political and technological developments as well as a revised security environment. The Cold War is over, and the US must develop new legal, strategic, political, and technological means appropriate for today's global security environment. An NMD system does not yet exist, butt hopefully its inevitable deployment will spark fresh thinking about the strategic shape of our future world and contribute to a secure environment for future generations.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Ruse, Mark A.
2002
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Air and Space Nation is in Peril
The United States air forces protect economic security. This is especially true because military strategy has evolved so dramatically over the past decade. The basic factors that shaped our geopolitical environment during the Cold War have changed. It is essential that the US maintain strong public support for its actions. This in turn means we must be extremely careful about both inflicting and sustaining casualties. If such sterilized warfare is our goal, then certain types of strategies, tactics, and weapons are more desirable than others. Precision or nonlethal weapons delivered by air platforms - ideally either unmanned, unseen, or flying beyond the range of enemy fire - are the instruments of choice. It would be foolish for our leaders to think that air and space power could be effective in any crisis, but it has now become their weapon of first resort. Over the past few years, we have heard references to a crisis in the American air and space industry. Despite America's dominant position, concerns need to be addressed. First and foremost, we need to conduct a broad-based examination of all aspects of the air and space nation. The US must have a comprehensive plan to develop, improve, and coordinate the commercial and military aspects of our policy.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948-
2003
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Going Boldly - Where?: Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space
This article is taken from the Aerospace Power Journal, which regularly showcases discourse over the functional and organizational relationship between air and space. The future of air and space integration or separation is the subject of the congressionally andated Space Commission, whose final report was issued in January 2001. The authors observe inconsistencies in teh Air Force's approach to aerospace integration that may accomodate that service's bureaucracy but be perceived as "poor stewardship" of space. Major topics of the article include "Roots and Implications of the Aerospace Concept," "Unresolved Debates and Premature Questions," "Space Weaponization," "Space Commerce," "Space and Information," and "Aerospace Integration: An Unsatisfying Vision." Authors recommend that thee Air Force acknowledge the considerable limitations of the aerospace concept and AI; that greater rigor and consistency be incorporated in the development of Air Force vision statements; that the Air Force carefully address the human dimension of innovative approaches to nationial security space issues; and that a robust and comprehensive vision for United States space power be developed.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Hays, Peter L.; Mueller, Karl P.
2001
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Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century
This article unveils the recommended organizational structure for ourur nation's space assets by examining the changed frontier and the imperatives that demand change, and by using the already successful historical model of the US Coast Guard as a springboard for future success. The recommended organizational structure promises to free the Air Force to pursue its aerospace power vision and allow this nation to use space assets most effectively and exploit space successfully in the coming decades. Major topics discussed include The Changed Frontier, Cultural Tensions, Funding Tensions, Organizational Tensions, Imperatives for Change, and Organizing for Future Success.
United States. Department of the Air Force
McKinley, Cynthia A. S.
2000
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United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq and Iraq's Current Military Status
The United Nations Sanctions against Iraq from 1990 to 2000 have had little impact on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities in researching and developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Iraq's previous use of chemical and biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's, as well as Iraq's resolve to manipulate the United Nations Weapons Team Inspectors by hiding key documents and equipment and submitting false reports shows the extent of what Iraq is capable of doing. Prior to the Gulf War in January 1991, Iraq implemented a crash program to expedite its nuclear weapons program; Iraq already maintained stockpiles of both biological and chemical weapons. After Iraq expelled the United Nations weapons team inspectors in September 1998, Iraq has had a clear opportunity to expand its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Brackett, Steven J.
2001-04
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Navy Force Structure Changes Required if Assigned the Role of National Missile Defense
The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the threat of a large-scale battle between great powers and redefined the primary threats facing the U.S. One of these primary threats is the threat posed by intercontinental ballistic missile armed with weapons of mass destruction. To deal with this evolving threat, the Congress has mandated that a land based National Missile Defense system capable of defending the U.S. homeland be developed. However, many military analysts believed that the surface Navy already had the framework for accomplishing this mission. These analysts believed that upgrading existing Aegis surface ships would produce a limited sea-based National Missile Defense system that could be deployed cheaper, faster, and more flexible than the land based proposal. Analysis of the sea-based proposal identifies several reasons that the use of existing ships in not feasible. Today's Navy is smaller yet continues to perform the same traditional missions and roles as it performed during the height of the Cold War. The smaller force coupled with the significant technical and organizational changes that are required to accomplish the National Missile Defense Mission will significantly reduce the capability of the current surface Navy. Additionally, the current fleet is getting older and more outdated. For the surface Navy to assume the mission of National Missile Defense, the Navy must develop newer and more capable ships specifically designed to perform this mission. The acquisition of 10 ships built and designed solely for National Missile Defense would provide the Congress mandated defense of the U.S. homeland.
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Hardy, Roger D.
2001-04
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Missile Defense: A New Media Campaign
The ballistic missile threat to the United States (US) is real and growing yet we are currently defenseless against ballistic missile attack. An attack, especially with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), could cause severe and irreparable damage to the US. We have the technology to deploy an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. We have not fielded a system because of political and financial obstacles. These obstacles are the product of misinformation about the proposed system and our vulnerability to a ballistic missile threat, as well as the failure of the administration to advocate the need for MD. Given the facts, the public and their elected leaders will support if not demand fielding a BMD system. The current marketing plan is inadequate for engendering support for deploying a BMD system. This paper will focus on a new marketing strategy and plan. The arguments of opponents of MD, the threat, and a new strategy will all be discussed.
Army War College (U.S.)
Brown, Heidi V.
2002-04-09
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Inspection of The Department of Energy's Automated Export Control System
"The export of commodities and technologies by the United States is encouraged by both the private sector and the Federal Government. These exports help to improve our position in the global economy and are in the national interest of the country. However, exports of commodities and technologies, without regard to whether they may significantly contribute to the military potential of individual countries or combination of countries or enhance the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, may adversely affect the national security of the United States. The Federal Government, therefore, implements several laws, Executive Orders, and regulations to control the export of certain commodities and technologies, which require a license for export. The license applications are processed and tracked by numerous Federal agencies through various automated databases. Collectively, these databases are intended to enable an appropriate level of review and coordination for exports of these commodities and technologies."
United States. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General
2001-12