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South Asia: Back to Basics
South Asia, with a quarter of the world's population, a demonstrated weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, great economic potential, and chronic instability, can no longer be regarded as peripheral to U.S. global interests. Achieving peace and stability, particularly in and between India and Pakistan, is the overarching U.S. interest in South Asia, and we need a well- considered, long-term strategy to pursue it. The United States needs to avoid the episodic, single-issue pattern of its past interaction with South Asia. Sustained, broad-based engagement, based on a thorough review of U.S. interests and regional realities, will preserve and enhance U.S. interests. A presidential visit to all the major countries of the region could signal our commitment to long-term engagement focusing on Indo-Pakistani rapprochement, good governance, economic advancement, and sane management of the region's nuclear capabilities.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Lanpher, Edward G.
2000-03
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Maintaining Friendly Skies: Rediscovering Theater Aerospace Defense
As Pearl Harbor did in 1941, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks brought home the catastrophic consequences of an insufficient homeland aerospace defense. This is not a new issue. The history of the Cold War is replete with attempts to build effective aerospace defenses for the United States and Soviet Homelands as well as for the theater armed forces of both superpowers. Grau and Kipp chronicle this history and recommend steps for improving US theater and homeland aerospace defenses. The article contains ten key conclusions from the United States and Soviet Union theater-air-defense-systems experience applicable to future missile defense.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Kipp, Jacob W.; Grau, Lester W.
2002
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Attack Operations: First Layer of an Integrated Missile Defense
United States forces have a long history of conducting attack operations. The proliferation of theater and long-range ballistic missiles suggests that the concept should be adapted to support missile-defense operations. To do so, we must include missile-defense capabilities in air and space expeditionary force packages, mature technology and doctrine to accommodate such capabilities, and connect Air Force capabilities to joint doctrine and employment concepts. Author argues that, although current structures contain pieces of the puzzle, we must fully integrate those pieces within an overall theater missile-defense architecture that includes offensive capabilities.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Krause, Merrick E.
2003
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Reflections on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty and National Missile Defense
The United States announced its withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) in 2002. Major Ruse's examination of how the treaty restricted the development of our national missile defense system helps us understand what the withdrawal means for the future. The Treaty had been adopted during the Cold War, to avert a possible nuclear war and curb the nuclear arms race. Logic held that if each nation remained defenseless to a nuclear attack and if nuclear retaliation to a first strike were guaranteed, then neither nation would have any motivation to consider launching a nuclear strike. The treaty codified MAD, which prevailed until the fall of communism and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Against this brief background of the ABM Treaty, one needs to explore why it became such a hot issue after three decades. The answer lies within a framework of political and technological developments as well as a revised security environment. The Cold War is over, and the US must develop new legal, strategic, political, and technological means appropriate for today's global security environment. An NMD system does not yet exist, butt hopefully its inevitable deployment will spark fresh thinking about the strategic shape of our future world and contribute to a secure environment for future generations.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Ruse, Mark A.
2002
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Air and Space Nation is in Peril
The United States air forces protect economic security. This is especially true because military strategy has evolved so dramatically over the past decade. The basic factors that shaped our geopolitical environment during the Cold War have changed. It is essential that the US maintain strong public support for its actions. This in turn means we must be extremely careful about both inflicting and sustaining casualties. If such sterilized warfare is our goal, then certain types of strategies, tactics, and weapons are more desirable than others. Precision or nonlethal weapons delivered by air platforms - ideally either unmanned, unseen, or flying beyond the range of enemy fire - are the instruments of choice. It would be foolish for our leaders to think that air and space power could be effective in any crisis, but it has now become their weapon of first resort. Over the past few years, we have heard references to a crisis in the American air and space industry. Despite America's dominant position, concerns need to be addressed. First and foremost, we need to conduct a broad-based examination of all aspects of the air and space nation. The US must have a comprehensive plan to develop, improve, and coordinate the commercial and military aspects of our policy.
USAF Institute for National Security Studies
Meilinger, Phillip S., 1948-
2003
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Going Boldly - Where?: Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space
This article is taken from the Aerospace Power Journal, which regularly showcases discourse over the functional and organizational relationship between air and space. The future of air and space integration or separation is the subject of the congressionally andated Space Commission, whose final report was issued in January 2001. The authors observe inconsistencies in teh Air Force's approach to aerospace integration that may accomodate that service's bureaucracy but be perceived as "poor stewardship" of space. Major topics of the article include "Roots and Implications of the Aerospace Concept," "Unresolved Debates and Premature Questions," "Space Weaponization," "Space Commerce," "Space and Information," and "Aerospace Integration: An Unsatisfying Vision." Authors recommend that thee Air Force acknowledge the considerable limitations of the aerospace concept and AI; that greater rigor and consistency be incorporated in the development of Air Force vision statements; that the Air Force carefully address the human dimension of innovative approaches to nationial security space issues; and that a robust and comprehensive vision for United States space power be developed.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Hays, Peter L.; Mueller, Karl P.
2001
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Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century
This article unveils the recommended organizational structure for ourur nation's space assets by examining the changed frontier and the imperatives that demand change, and by using the already successful historical model of the US Coast Guard as a springboard for future success. The recommended organizational structure promises to free the Air Force to pursue its aerospace power vision and allow this nation to use space assets most effectively and exploit space successfully in the coming decades. Major topics discussed include The Changed Frontier, Cultural Tensions, Funding Tensions, Organizational Tensions, Imperatives for Change, and Organizing for Future Success.
United States. Department of the Air Force
McKinley, Cynthia A. S.
2000
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United Nations Sanctions Against Iraq and Iraq's Current Military Status
The United Nations Sanctions against Iraq from 1990 to 2000 have had little impact on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capabilities in researching and developing nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Iraq's previous use of chemical and biological weapons during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980's, as well as Iraq's resolve to manipulate the United Nations Weapons Team Inspectors by hiding key documents and equipment and submitting false reports shows the extent of what Iraq is capable of doing. Prior to the Gulf War in January 1991, Iraq implemented a crash program to expedite its nuclear weapons program; Iraq already maintained stockpiles of both biological and chemical weapons. After Iraq expelled the United Nations weapons team inspectors in September 1998, Iraq has had a clear opportunity to expand its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs.
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Brackett, Steven J.
2001-04
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Navy Force Structure Changes Required if Assigned the Role of National Missile Defense
The end of the Cold War has significantly reduced the threat of a large-scale battle between great powers and redefined the primary threats facing the U.S. One of these primary threats is the threat posed by intercontinental ballistic missile armed with weapons of mass destruction. To deal with this evolving threat, the Congress has mandated that a land based National Missile Defense system capable of defending the U.S. homeland be developed. However, many military analysts believed that the surface Navy already had the framework for accomplishing this mission. These analysts believed that upgrading existing Aegis surface ships would produce a limited sea-based National Missile Defense system that could be deployed cheaper, faster, and more flexible than the land based proposal. Analysis of the sea-based proposal identifies several reasons that the use of existing ships in not feasible. Today's Navy is smaller yet continues to perform the same traditional missions and roles as it performed during the height of the Cold War. The smaller force coupled with the significant technical and organizational changes that are required to accomplish the National Missile Defense Mission will significantly reduce the capability of the current surface Navy. Additionally, the current fleet is getting older and more outdated. For the surface Navy to assume the mission of National Missile Defense, the Navy must develop newer and more capable ships specifically designed to perform this mission. The acquisition of 10 ships built and designed solely for National Missile Defense would provide the Congress mandated defense of the U.S. homeland.
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (U.S.)
Hardy, Roger D.
2001-04
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Missile Defense: A New Media Campaign
The ballistic missile threat to the United States (US) is real and growing yet we are currently defenseless against ballistic missile attack. An attack, especially with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), could cause severe and irreparable damage to the US. We have the technology to deploy an effective ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. We have not fielded a system because of political and financial obstacles. These obstacles are the product of misinformation about the proposed system and our vulnerability to a ballistic missile threat, as well as the failure of the administration to advocate the need for MD. Given the facts, the public and their elected leaders will support if not demand fielding a BMD system. The current marketing plan is inadequate for engendering support for deploying a BMD system. This paper will focus on a new marketing strategy and plan. The arguments of opponents of MD, the threat, and a new strategy will all be discussed.
Army War College (U.S.)
Brown, Heidi V.
2002-04-09
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Inspection of The Department of Energy's Automated Export Control System
"The export of commodities and technologies by the United States is encouraged by both the private sector and the Federal Government. These exports help to improve our position in the global economy and are in the national interest of the country. However, exports of commodities and technologies, without regard to whether they may significantly contribute to the military potential of individual countries or combination of countries or enhance the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, may adversely affect the national security of the United States. The Federal Government, therefore, implements several laws, Executive Orders, and regulations to control the export of certain commodities and technologies, which require a license for export. The license applications are processed and tracked by numerous Federal agencies through various automated databases. Collectively, these databases are intended to enable an appropriate level of review and coordination for exports of these commodities and technologies."
United States. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General
2001-12
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U.S. Military Role in Countering the Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat: Attacking the Enemy's Will
One of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. military today in the post-Cold War Era is countering the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons (BCW). These weapons of mass destruction (WMD) not only pose a significant threat to our military forces but to global security as well. Known adversaries of the United States currently possess such weapons and will most likely employ them in future conflicts based on the perceived attractiveness associated with BCW. The U.S. military can and must play an active role in deterring the proliferation and potential employment of these horrific weapons. Attacking the adversary's will to possess or employ them is the singular, long lasting solution to a growing global crisis. The U.S. military's principal means of attacking this will is to negate the attractiveness of obtaining or already possessing a biological and chemical warfare capability. This can and must be accomplished in order to ensure global security and the protection of our forces today and into the future. Focusing our efforts otherwise is a recipe for disaster.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Kraft, James E., Jr
1998-02-13
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Impact of the JFACC and AADC on the Joint Force Commander's Flexibility in Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense
As a growing area of warfare, Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense (JTAMD) presents an environment that challenges the U.S. military to achieve unprecedented levels of force integration. As the ballistic and cruise missile threat continues to expand and include weapons of mass destruction, the Joint Force Commander must employ a force package capable of succeeding in any theater, regardless of its maturity level. Joint doctrine, and the roles and missions of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Area Air Defense Commander (AADC), play an integral part in his ability to execute JTAMD effectively and efficiently. The JFACC and AADC currently inhibit force effectiveness through disparities and overlap of missions, as well as frequent dual and triple hatting functional and service component commands. Resultant problems include inappropriate apportionment of resources, lack of focus on the objective, and inadequate staffing at the functional component command. All of these problems degrade force integration and reduce both effectiveness and efficiency. Solving these problems, primarily through more specific joint doctrine that provides distinct roles for the JFACC and AADC, will produce defense in depth, unity of effort and economy of force.
Naval War College (U.S.)
Williams, Charles F.
1998-02-13
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Joint Theater Missile Defense Interoperability
Global proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is directly tied to the rapid development of Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs) as both a political and military weapon of choice in developing nations. As such, the U.S. Joint Forces Commander (JFC) is faced with the issue of optimizing own-force Theater Missile Defense (TMD) assets as well as those of Coalition partners. Underpinning the issue of TMD resource allocation and employment are the issues of interoperability and integration of Joint Force, i.e., service component unique, Battle Management/Command, Control and Communications (BM/C3) systems into an information architecture that supports TMD. The problem of TMD BM/C3 interoperability is aggravated in coalition or multi-national warfare, where all TMD players do not have equal access to information. BM/C3 Tactical Data Processors (TDPs) have embedded data correlation or data fusion algorithms as the "brain" of the system used to develop a common picture of the battlespace. These data correlation algorithms may take the form of mathematical equations, "IF - THEN" statements or logical rules. The differences between data correlation algorithms is reflected as differences in the common picture displayed in a BM/C3 system among the various TMD players and the JFC. In order to improve multi-service and multi-national interoperability in the near term, the JFC commander may selectively alter the information architecture within a specific theater to optimize data correlation and better develop a single, common picture of the battlespace. In the long term, the JFC must advocate the joint acquisition of BM/C3 systems that not only "look alike," but "think alike. "
Naval War College (U.S.)
Neuenfeldt, Brian D.
1998-02-03
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Collective Behaviors: Mass Panic and Outbreaks of Multiple Unexplained Symptoms
The general public, the mass media, and many government officials believe that the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) will inevitably lead to mass panic and/or mass hysteria. However, studies of disasters and wars show that disorganized flight in the presence of a real or perceived danger (i.e., mass panic) is rare. On the other hand, in a real or perceived WMD scenario, outbreaks of multiple unexplained symptoms (i.e., mass psychogenic illness, mass sociogenic illness, mass hysteria, or epidemic hysteria) may be prevalent. Many of the symptoms (fatigue, nausea, vomiting, headache, dizziness/lightheadedness, and anorexia) are common in combat and after toxic chemical exposure, chemical weapon exposure, prodromal infectious illness, and acute radiation sickness.
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases
Pastel, Ross H.
2002-02-20
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Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DoD Responses to Transnational Threats, Volume II: Force Protection Report
Transnational actors have three advantages: 1) they can have ready access to weapons of mass destruction; 2) we cannot easily deter them because they have no homeland; and 3) they respect no boundaries, whether political, organizational, legal or moral. Further, warning may be short and attribution may be slow or ambiguous. Since the United States is now the dominant military force in the world, potential adversaries will be driven to asymmetric strategies to meet their objectives. As such, transnational threats represent an important national security problem. Notably, the Department of Defense has the capacity to mitigate these threats with its extensive capabilities, training and experience. In the attached report, the Task Force suggests a multi-faceted strategy for the DoD to address this increasingly important class of threats. This strategy involves the development of an end-to-end systems concept, investment in critical technology areas, and the leveraging of similarities between civil protection and force protection. The Task Force concludes that the Department also needs to increase its emphasis on responding to this threat by more clearly assigning responsibilities and by providing mechanisms for measuring its readiness to respond.
United States. Defense Science Board
Hermann, Robert; Welch, Larry
1997-10
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FY98 Space and Missiles Technology Area Plan
"Rapid and cost effective research, development and transition of advanced space technologies enables affordable and decisive military capabilities for US forces. The Space and Missiles Technology Area Plan is developing technologies that provide options for the warfighter that take maximum advantage of space as an operating environment. In the face of declining budgets and manning levels, constraints are placed on the S&T programs. We constantly strive to make technology investments in the high payoff areas. Our investment strategy emphasizes improved productivity at reduced cost. The need for affordability is a pervasive requirement that is emphasized throughout all aspects of the Space and Missiles Technology Area Plan. The breadth of technologies pursued in the Space and Missile Technology Area Plan is driven by specific military operational needs described in the Future Joint Warfighting Capabilities. These are: 1. To maintain near perfect knowledge of the enemy and communicate that to all forces in near-real time. 2. To engage regional forces promptly in decisive combat, on a global basis. 3. To employ a range of capabilities which allow achievement of military objectives with minimum casualties and collateral damage. 4. To control the use of space. 5. To counter the threat to the CONUS and deployed forces of future ballistic cruise missiles and other weapons of mass destruction."
Defense Technical Information Center (U.S.)
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Ohio)
1998
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Searching for Stable Peace in the Persian Gulf
The author examines America's dual containment policy for the Persian Gulf and shows how adherence to the policy has eroded. Key allies of the United States withhold support for military action against Iraq, despite evidence that the Iraqis are clandestinely producing weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, U.S. allies have concluded potentially lucrative deals with Iran to exploit central Asian oil resources, despite Washington's opposition to them. The author concludes with recommended courses of action the United States should follow to maintain its leadership role in the region.
Army War College (U.S.)
Katzman, Kenneth
2002-02-02
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces in the Post Strategic Arms Reduction Talk World: Is There a Future for Nuclear Deterrence
Following victory in the Cold War, the Soviet threat that shaped United States' nuclear deterrent strategy for the past 40 years, is gone. That defined, monolithic threat has been replaced by a diverse array of new challenges including proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) among regional powers, rogue states and non-state actors. In the face of this emerging WMD threat, the United States is dismantling its chemical and biological weapons stockpile and remains committed to further reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Can a reduced U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal provide a credible deterrent to the growing threat posed by proliferation of WMD? Finally, in light of the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), is it time to reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons and pursue other deterrent options?
Army War College (U.S.)
Filler, Robert J.
1998
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Information Age: An Anthology on Its Impact and Consequences
"Given the magnitude of change that the revolution in science and technology has potential to induce, it is vitally important that we understand how this revolution, has changed, is changing and will continue to change our world. This book undertakes this task for one major category of scientific and technical advances, information and communication technologies. Part One argues that three modern information and communication revolutions have occurred during the last century and a half, and presents an overview of the historical impacts that the information and communication technologies developed during the first two revolutions have had on humankind's activities and institutions, and on international affairs and on the international system. It identifies and analyzes several of the more important information and communication technologies that are part of the present information and communication revolution. Parts Two and Three, examine the impacts that the technologies of the third modern information and communication revolution are having and are likely to have on specific areas of human interactions. Areas of inquiry include the impact of new information and communication technologies on business, commerce, services, the government, and the military. In Part Four, projections are developed about the ways that the information and communication technologies identified earlier are being and might be assimilated and diffused by different state and non-state actors. Part Four also presents views about the ways in which international actors and the international systems are changing and may most likely change as a result of advances in information and communication technologies."
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Alberts, David S. (David Stephen), 1942-; Papp, Daniel S.
1998-09
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Report to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program: In Response to Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, Division M, Subsection 111(b): Detailed Information
The Terrorism Information Awareness (TIA) research and development program aims to integrate information technologies into a prototype to provide tools to better detect, classify, and identify potential foreign terrorists. This report to Congress addresses for TIA and high-interest TIA-related programs, program overview, program schedule, and the FY 2004 President's Budget.
United States. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
2003-05-20
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Surprise Hypothesis
The Unites States dominates the conventional battlefield, but this power might prove to be a nemesis. This power forces enemies to seek capabilities that level or change the playing fields. Weapons of mass destruction and mass effect are indeed one way for adversaries to level the playing field, but there is another, surprise. Surprise transcends technology and budgetary concerns. The horrific events of 11 September are a reminder. Yet how well does the U.S. Army understand surprise? Do planners know how to plan for surprise operations? Terrorists do. Do planners know how and why surprise works? Adversaries seem to. There is much more to this principle of war than what military doctrine portrays. Using the scientific method, this monograph combines the concepts of surprise and information superiority to create a hypothesis that explains the principle of war. The hypothesis rests on the belief that omniscience, a state of perfect information superiority, prevents surprise. Building on this theoretical extreme, the monograph presents a new definition of surprise, the components of surprise, a visual model of surprise and summarizes planning and execution procedures for deliberate surprise attacks. All of these hypothesis pieces are information superiority based. The monograph does not submit the hypothesis to sufficient testing to claim this to be a theory. This is a starting point. After rigorous testing and discussion, the hypothesis has the potential to drive changes in doctrine, the education system, training, and simulations. Furthermore, a mature version of this hypothesis may promote adjustments to current staff structures. At the very least, the monograph suggests that the current understanding of surprise can improve.
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Kneis, Mark J., II
2003
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Office of Management and Budget: 2003 Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism
This report provides funding and programmatic information on the executive branch's efforts to combat terrorist activity both domestically and overseas. Agencies categorized their funding data based on the six strategic mission areas defined in the National Strategy for Homeland Security, as discussed below. In addition, agencies identified activities from which reported funding supports efforts to defend against terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), improve critical infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts, or provide for federal continuity of operations (COOP) in the event of a national emergency. For classification purposes, we continue to combine the funding amounts for the Department of Defense and the intelligence community. This funding is labeled throughout the Report as Defense. Combating terrorism activities include both antiterrorism (defensive measures used to combat terrorism) and counterterrorism (offensive measures used to combat terrorism), both domestically and abroad. Combating terrorism is divided into two primary categories, homeland security (HS) and overseas combating terrorism (OCT), and encompasses all funding for defense against WMD, improvements to CIP, and provision for federal COOP. Homeland security programs focus on activities within the United States and its territories, or on activities in support of domestically-based systems and processes. The Homeland Security Council (HSC) coordinates these activities government-wide. Overseas combating terrorism focuses on activities outside the United States. The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates these activities government-wide. Together, the two areas comprise the overall combating terrorism budget for the federal government. The mission areas are Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation Security, Domestic Counterterrorism, Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, Defending Against Catastrophic Threats, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Combating Overseas Terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and Continuity of Operations.
United States. Office of Management and Budget
2003-09
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Fire and Arson Scene Evidence: A Guide for Public Safety Personnel
It is the intention of this Guide to acquaint a broad spectrum of public safety personnel with the fire investigation process, so they may understand their role in this important task and help identify, locate, and preserve evidence in its varied forms, to either assist a specialist investigator when one is needed or to adequately document and collect evidence when no assistance is needed or available. This Guide focuses on the documentation and collection of physical evidence at fire/arson scenes. Other issues of investigation--such as insurance inquiries, background information, fire deaths, the interpretation of fire dynamics and physical evidence, and case analysis and profiling--are not addressed in this document.
National Institute of Justice (U.S.)
2000-06
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State and Local Officials: Still Kept in the Dark About Homeland Security
America's safety demands that state and local officials, especially law enforcement and public safety professionals--our front line defenders--are fully engaged in the war against terrorism. Yet almost two years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Governmental Affairs Committee (GAC) Minority staff found that these officials are being asked to fight the war against terrorism with incomplete and unreliable access to one of the most potent weapons in the homeland security arsenal: information. State and local first responders and first preventers still do not systematically receive from the Bush Administration the information they need to prevent or respond to another catastrophic terrorist attack, nor does vital information flow effectively from them to the federal government. These information gaps pose a significant challenge for the federal government and leaves the American people at unacceptable risk. This report contains the results of a staff investigation conducted at the request of Senator Joe Lieberman, Ranking Member of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Senator Lieberman asked GAC Minority staff to review the information needs of state and local officials and assess the progress of the Bush Administration in meeting those needs. Staff interviewed officials on the front lines in the fight against terrorism, while also reviewing reports, hearings, and other public information.
United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs
2003-09-13
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Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons
This joint concept paper provides direction for the Department of Defense non-lethal weapons program. It does so by establishing a set of guiding principles for the development of non-lethal weapons core capabilities for application across the spectrum of military operations. This broad concept paper will serve as the foundation for decisions impacting joint capability development,
and a point of departure for experimentation and development and the common frame of reference for development of relevant doctrine, including tactics, techniques, and procedures.
United States. Department of the Navy
1998-01-05
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Statement By The Department of Health And Human Services Regarding Additional Options for Preventive Treatment
Many of those who were exposed to inhalational anthrax in the recent mail attacks are presently concluding their 60-day course of preventive antibiotic treatment. Some of these persons, especially those who may have been exposed to very high levels of anthrax spores, may wish to take additional precautions. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is providing two additional options beyond the 60-day antibiotic course, for those who may wish to pursue them: an extended course of antibiotics, and investigational post-exposure treatment with anthrax vaccine.
United States. Department of Health and Human Services
2001-12-18
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Information Warfare and Deterrence
This report documents the sixth in a series of workshops and roundtables organized by the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies (ACTIS). These meetings bring together operators, planners, researchers, and analysts to identify and examine those aspects of command and control and information warfare of contemporary interest. The results are used to increase the dialogue and understanding of the subjects and to develop Mission Capabilities Packages (MCP) that support U.S. Armed Forces in joint, combined, and coalition operations. Earlier workshops identified "information warfare and deterrence" as a subject that has strong command and control implications that need to be examined in light of our nascent understanding of IW. ACTIS combines the research and education resources of NDU by merging the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT) with the School of Information Warfare and Strategy (SIWS) under a single Directorate. This Directorate serves to improve the state of the art and practice of command and control and information warfare by undertaking selected research and analysis initiatives and by serving as a bridge between the operational, technical, analytical, and educational communities. The Center focuses on emerging requirements and mission areas where new concepts are needed. IW is clearly one of those areas.
National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies
Hayes, Richard E., 1942-; Wheatley, Gary F.
1996-12
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FAA Strategic Plan, January 2002
This Strategic Plan describes three aerospace goals derived from the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) mission and vision: safety, security, and system efficiency. These goals stem directly from the FAA's legal charter and the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Strategic Plan. The FAA has defined long term objectives and strategies and near-term Corporate Projects to achieve each goal. Annual Performance Objectives and Corporate Projects are discussed in detail in the companion FAA Strategic Plan Supplement. This year's update responds to three changes in the aerospace environment. The first change addressed is the September 11, 2001 attack on America and the subsequent legislation transferring FAA security functions to a new Transportation Security Administration. Security remains a key FAA goal as FAA makes a smooth transfer. The second change addresses the Air Traffic Organization (ATO), a Performance-Based Organization (PBO) within the FAA. ATO has primary responsibility for the FAA's System Efficiency goal. This Strategic Plan sets broad direction for ATO, whose planning must be closely linked to FAA's overall plans. The third change addressed relates to the General Accounting Office (GAO) May 2001 report, "Managing for Results: Federal Managers' Views on Key Management Issues Vary Widely Across Agencies". In this report, GAO surveyed 100 FAA managers and supervisors, then rated FAA low on leadership commitment to achieving results and employees receiving positive recognition for helping the agency accomplish its strategic goals. In response to the GAO's report, this plan addresses how ongoing FAA programs and activities contribute to achieving FAA's strategic goals.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
2002-01
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Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Law
The purpose of this document is to provide adequate protection against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation of hazardous material in commerce by improving the regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation.
United States. Department of Transportation. Research and Special Programs Administration
2002-11-25