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Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives
"Over the past decade, the United States has responded to increased proliferation risks in Russia by providing $6.4 billion for Departments of Defense, Energy, and State programs in the former Soviet Union. The United States has made important progress in three areas. First, the Department of Defense helped destroy 463 Russian nuclear submarines, long-range bombers, and strategic missiles to support Russia's efforts to meet treaty requirements. Second, the Department of Energy installed security systems that helped protect 32 percent of Russia's weapons usable nuclear material. Third, the United States supplemented the income of thousands of Russian weapons scientists so they would be less inclined to sell their skills to countries of concern. However, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have consistently faced two critical challenges: (1) the Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs and (2) Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and biological sites. Regarding program costs, Russia did not pay, for example, its previously agreed-upon share of $275 million to design and build a nuclear storage site at Mayak. As of January 2003, the United States plans to spend $385 million for a scaled-down version of this site."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-03-05
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Civilian Control of the Military
"The United States has engaged in relatively few sustained military efforts since 1789. As a result, American public interest has focused primarily on domestic matters, while attention to foreign affairs and national defense has been sporadic. In general, public-opinion polls show that most Americans are relatively indifferent toward foreign policy matters, and only at times of international crisis is their interest heightened. One-third of the 18 enumerated powers in Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution deal with military and foreign policy matters. In constructing a new national government, the Founders understood the importance of establishing a government that could properly defend the country. The Founders had a genuine fear of the abuse of military power, a concern that a strong executive could, over time, degrade into dictatorship or demagoguery. History had taught them that this abuse was not infrequent. Thus, they believed it was necessary to demonstrate that under the new Constitution the military would be subject to civilian authority in order to protect democracy. This is the essential, and, after all, the only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the people which is attainable in civil society. The Founders recognized the importance of a standing army for protection and defense but believed that considerable care should be taken in order to preserve liberty and prevent abuses of power. Yet, like many principles in the Constitution, the details of civilian control are never clearly spelled out in the Constitution."
United States. Department of State. Bureau of International Information Programs
Cairo, Michael F.
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Federalism & Democracy
"The 2000 presidential contest was one of the most closely divided - and confusing - elections in American history. Not until a month after voters cast their ballots did it became certain that Republican candidate George W. Bush would claim the title of the nation's 43rd president. In the interim, the world watched as the fight for votes in Florida repeatedly bounced from local to state to federal courts and back again, before a U.S. Supreme Court decision settled the matter. What many foreign observers found puzzling was how voting standards could vary so much from place to place or how local officials could play such an important role in a national election. American citizens also may have been surprised by the differences in voting procedures from state to state, but the interplay of local, state, and national governments could scarcely have seemed unusual. Zoning, traffic control, sanitation, educational administration, street repair, and a hundred other services are all managed primarily by local officials, acting under a grant of authority from the state. State government controls much educational policy, criminal justice, business and professional regulation, public health, among a variety of other important areas. As colonists, the Founding Fathers had chafed under the authority imposed by the distant British imperial government and had come to view centralized power as a threat to their rights and liberties. This system of divided power, federalism, is widely acknowledged not only to be a unique American contribution to the theory of government but part of the genius of the American constitutional system itself."
United States. Department of State. Bureau of International Information Programs
Bodenhamer, David J.
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Guarding the United States and Its Outposts
This book is the second volume in a series on the United States Army in World War II specifically focusing on the outposts of the US in the western hemisphere. The title was originally published in 1964 and revised in 2000. "The reader will embark upon a long journey and become involved in a complex series of events, ranging from guarding inland waterways to fighting the Japanese, from rounding up one forlorn German on the coast of Greenland to battling German submarines, from conducting staff conferences with the Navy to negotiating with His Britannic Majesty's ministers, from withstanding the cold of the arctic or the heat of the tropics to overcoming the ever-present ennui of soldiers who wait for the stress of battle that never comes. Dealing often with the twilight between peace and war, it focuses upon problems of immediate relevance to the Army and the nation today. Then as now the nation found itself in a revolution in doctrine, weapons, and methods of defense. The way in which men caught in this revolution faced the situation can be a guide to those meeting similar circumstances today and in the future. This book highlights problems in unified command and contains excellent examples of military diplomacy, of how to get along, or fail to get along, with other armed forces of the United States and with our Allies. It contains authoritative accounts of several highly controversial events, especially the Pearl Harbor attack and the evacuation of the United States citizens of Japanese descent from the west coast of continental United States." -- Forward
Center of Military History
Conn, Stetson; Engelman, Rose C. (Rose Charlotte); Fairchild, Byron
2000
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Physical Security
This field manual (FM) sets forth guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel. It is intended to be a "one-stop" physical security source for the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of the Army (DA), and other proponents and agencies of physical security. Prevention and protection are the two primary concerns of physical security. Both serve the security interests of people, equipment, and property. These interests must be supported at all staff and command levels; and this support must be unified in joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Support to joint, multinational, and interagency operations relies on the fact that the Army will not conduct operations alone. Additionally, force-projection operations conducted by the military will involve the integration of war-fighting capabilities with stability and support operations. This manual's primary focus is the articulation of a balanced understanding of physical security for joint, multinational, and interagency operations throughout the environments of peacetime, conflict, and war (whether in the continental United States [CONUS] or outside the continental United States [OCONUS]). Physical security must integrate the various capabilities of joint, multinational, and interagency operations in pursuit of a seamless connection between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Physical security must also address an expanded range of threats that embraces not only traditional threat components of war, but also nontraditional threats generated by guerrillas, terrorists, criminals, and natural or man-made disasters. In addition, physical security must address the concept of Homeland Defense due to the aforementioned threats.
United States. Department of the Army
2001-01-08
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US National Security Strategy and the Imperative of 'Geopresence'
This article previews the changing face of global politics and reevaluates the way the US needs to think about foreign policy and national security. It discusses the imperatives for carefully designing and executing an appropriate strategy of overseas presence in order to provide our nation's leadership, as well as that of our allies and friends, with the most effective military options during any crisis response and outlines the methodology for doing so based on the following considerations: (1) the interests of the United States and its allies and friends that would justify the use of military forces; (2) the types of threats and areas of the world that would most likely require the use of military forces; (3) the contributions of allies and friends for use in concert with the application of US military forces; and (4) the number of simultaneous contingencies in which US forces would likely be employed. The author also examines the new National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) instated by President George W. Bush, discusses the foundations of this new security paradigm as a new strategy in a changed world, as well as, defining and explaining geopresence and assessing the role of geopresence during Operation Enduring Freedom.
United States. Department of the Air Force
Martin, Gregory S.
2003-06
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How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002
Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of section 3062, title 10, United States Code (USC), is a formidable task. The Army is a dynamic organization that must constantly change to adapt to changing threats to the Nation's security and to the assignment of new missions that promote our country's interests at home and abroad. The Army must be capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions ranging from domestic disaster relief through peacekeeping and peacemaking to winning major theater wars. There is no better or more recent example of why the Army must change to adapt to changing threats and missions, or of the complexities of effecting change, than the Army transformation effort that began in 1999 and will continue for a number of years to come. The goal is to transform itself into what is termed the Objective Force. The rapidity of change inherent in the Army Transformation Strategy will require intense and continuous management by force managers and leaders at all levels of the Army to minimize human and materiel costs and to ensure that the Army maintains its readiness to fight and win the Nation's wars. To accommodate this pervasive equipment modernization effort and concomitant changes in the Army's war fighting doctrine, extensive personnel and equipment changes were documented to virtually all of the tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) that provide the requirements and authorizations, respectively, for Army units.
Army War College (U.S.)
2002
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Investigation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's Citizenship USA Initiative
"This investigation by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) examined the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) 'Citizenship USA' initiative of fiscal year 1996. Beginning in 1993, the demand for naturalization began to increase at a staggering rate and application backlogs developed at INS offices throughout the country. By June 1995, INS was receiving applications for naturalization at a rate twice as high as it had the previous year. INS projected that without a serious effort to reduce this application backlog, by the summer of 1996 an eligible applicant would have to wait three years from the date of application to be naturalized as a U.S. citizen. On August 31, 1995, INS Commissioner Doris M. Meissner announced 'Citizenship USA' (CUSA), an initiative to reduce the backlog of pending naturalization applications to the point where an eligible applicant would be naturalized within six months of application. The goal of the initiative was to reach this level of processing 'currency' within one year. The effort focused on the workload in the five districts in the country--dubbed 'Key Cities' for CUSA--which then had the largest application backlogs: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Miami, and Chicago. To reach the CUSA goal, INS dramatically increased its naturalization workforce in the Key Cities, opened new offices dedicated to naturalization adjudication, and engaged new processing strategies in an effort to 'streamline' the naturalization process."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2000-07
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DoD IG Report to Congress on Section 324 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 - Review of DoD Guidelines on Considering Civilians for New and Contracted Functions
"Section 343 of the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act required DoD to issue guidelines and procedures for ensuring that consideration was given to Federal Government employees for work performed under DoD contracts. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) issued the guidance on July 27, 2007. The guidelines allowed the conversion of contracted activities or functions for up to 3 percent of a Component's authorizations coded as "commercial reviewable," required prior notification of the DoD Competitive Sourcing Official for actions that would exceed the 3-percent limit, and gave the DoD Competitive Sourcing Official authority to intervene or stop a section 343 action. As required by section 324 of the FY 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, on April 4, 2008, the Deputy Secretary of Defense canceled the section 343 guidance."
United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General
2008-07-23
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Producing Emergency Plans A Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning for State, Territorial, Local, and Tribal Governments, [Interim Version 1.0]
"This FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness Guide, CPG 101, continues the more than 50-year effort to provide guidance about emergency operations planning to State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Governments. Some predecessor material can be traced back to the 1960s-era Federal Civil Defense Guide. Long-time emergency management (EM) practitioners also will recognize the influence of Civil Preparedness Guide 1-8, Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans, and State and Local Guide (SLG) 101, Guide for All-Hazards Emergency Operations Planning, in this document. This Guide provides emergency managers and other emergency services personnel with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) best judgment and recommendations on how to address the entire planning process -- from forming a planning team, through writing and maintaining the plan, to executing the plan. It also encourages emergency managers to follow a process that addresses all of the hazards that threaten their jurisdiction through a suite of plans connected to a single, integrated emergency operations plan (EOP). Further, While CPG 101 maintains its link to the past, it also reflects the changed reality of the current emergency planning environment. Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake influenced the development of CPG 1-8. Hurricane Andrew and the Midwest floods shaped the contents of SLG 101. In a similar way, CPG 101 reflects the impacts of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and recent major disasters, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, on the emergency planning community. CPG 101 integrates concepts from the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework (NRF), and it incorporates recommendations from the 2005 Nationwide Plan Review. It also references the Target Capabilities List (TCL) that outlines the fundamental capabilities essential to implementing the National Preparedness Guidelines."
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
2008-08-01
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Remarks and Q&A by the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis & Chairman, National Intelligence Council Dr. Thomas Fingar, 2008 INSA Analytic Transformation Conference, Orlando, Florida, September 4, 2008
From the keynote address of Dr. Thomas Fingar: "I thank John Brennan and INSA for convening you and for giving us the opportunity to build upon the foundation we laid in Chicago and the subsequent meetings in Washington, to give reality to the term alliance, and the partnership between the intelligence community, and between those of you who serve and support from outside of the government. The opportunity, indeed the necessity, to combine what each of us know separately to form a larger body of more relevant and more timely information to keep our nation safe is one that we must not squander. My task this morning is to talk about customer relations on the eve of an administration change. I'm delighted for that even though I had no idea what the title meant when it was assigned to me because it provided an opportunity to think about three messages that I'd like to lay on you this morning and begin a dialogue. And I mean that sincerely. As we talk about the transition, the change of an administration, what are the things that we need to do that we may not have yet initiated? Or that we may not have told you about? What are the problems you think we need to be aware of as we go into a transition?"
National Intelligence Council (U.S.); United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Fingar, Thomas
2008-09-04
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National Incident Management System (NIMS)
This document published by the Emergency Response and Crisis Management (ECRM) Technical Assistance Center talks about the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and its relation to the safety efforts taken by our nation's schools. More specifically, "NIMS is the United States' uniform system for managing domestic incidents and is suitable for schools to implement in the four phases of their crisis planning: 1) prevention-mitigation; 2) preparedness; 3) response; and 4) recovery. The NIMS is a comprehensive approach to crisis planning and is a framework for federal, state, local and private agencies to effectively and collaboratively manage incidents using a core set of concepts, principles, procedures, processes, terminology and standards. The NIMS structure mirrors the measures schools currently take to ensure student and staff safety and provides formalized support to schools' safety efforts. Through the NIMS, schools are better prepared to handle major incidents and work with first responders. Established on March 1, 2004, by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the management of domestic incidents, the NIMS specifies the standardized methods all emergency responders should follow to plan, coordinate and carry out responses to a variety of incidents. It allows schools and local agencies to jointly manage incidents, regardless of their causes, sizes, locations or complexities. Reflecting proven practices of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Fire Administration and a host of other federal agencies, the NIMS provides flexibility and support for integrated, collaborative action by government agencies and private entities--including schools-- during a crisis."
United States. Department of Education
2006
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NIST NCSTAR 1-9A: Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Global Structural Analysis of the Response of World Trade Center Building 7 to Fires and Debris Impact Damage
"The objective of the work described in this report was to analyze the global response of WTC 7 to initial failure events due to fire and to analyze the resulting sequence of component and subsystem failures to determine the events that led to the global collapse. [...] As part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation into the collapse of World Trade Center (WTC) 7, NIST worked with Applied Research Associates, Inc. (ARA) under contract to conduct global collapse analyses of the WTC 7 building." Finally, while this report "documents the global collapse analysis for WTC 7, a summary report of the investigation into WTC 7 appears as NIST NCSTAR 1A, presenting the reconstruction of the collapse of WTC 7, the principal technical findings, and the NIST recommendations. A support document, NIST NCSTAR 1-9, presents the techniques and technologies by which these technical results were achieved."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Kirkpatrick, Steven W.; MacNeill, Robert; Peterson, Brian
2008-10
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NIST NCSTAR 1-9: Federal Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: Structural Fire Response and Probable Collapse Sequence of World Trade Center Building 7: Volume 2
"A principal part of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) investigation of the WTC (World Trade Center) disaster was the examination of the WTC 7 collapse. The specific objectives were to: 1.) Determine why and how WTC 7 collapsed; 2.) Determine all technical aspects of fire protection, occupant behavior, evacuation, and emergency response; 3.) Determine what procedures and practices were used in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of WTC 7; and 4.) Identify, as specifically as possible, areas in the current building fire codes, standards, and practices that warrant revision. This report describes the technical effort to meet these objectives. More specifically, "this report documents the Investigation findings regarding WTC 7 and the techniques and technologies by which these technical results were achieved. [...] NIST is a nonregulatory agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The purpose of NIST investigations is to improve the safety and structural integrity of buildings in the United States, and the focus is on fact finding."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Averill, Jason D.; Gann, Richard G., 1944-; McAllister, Therese P.
2008-10
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Surveillance for Illness and Injury After Hurricane Katrina - Three Counties, Mississippi, September 5 - October 11, 2005
"Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the U.S. Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, resulting in massive destruction from wind damage and storm surge. In Mississippi, the storm surge was an estimated 27 feet high at the Hancock County Emergency Operations Center and extended inland for 6--12 miles, causing extensive flooding in Biloxi and Gulfport and rendering approximately 80% of buildings in Waveland uninhabitable (1). The devastation was greatest in the coastal counties of Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson, where public infrastructure (e.g., electric power, communications networks, roads, sanitation systems, and water treatment plants) was severely disrupted. Multiple hospitals, health clinics, and public health facilities were either destroyed or nonfunctioning immediately after the hurricane. The Mississippi Department of Health (MDH) asked CDC to help conduct active surveillance at hospital emergency departments (EDs), federal Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)* operation sites, and outpatient health-care facilities in Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson counties. On September 4, a team of 17 CDC staff members was deployed to Mississippi to work with MDH and an Epi Strike Team from the Florida Department of Health to provide surveillance for injury and illness (2). This report describes those surveillance activities and their findings, which determined that no major outbreaks of infectious illnesses or clusters of preventable major injuries occurred after the hurricane. However, daily reports to MDH provided reassurance regarding outbreaks and data to help direct public health activities in the affected region."
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2006-03-10
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Science and Technology Directorate's Processes for Selecting and Managing Research and Development Programs.
This report by the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General
(DHS-OIG), "addresses the processes the DHS Science and Technology Directorate uses to select and manage research and development efforts and balance the funding between various types of research--basic, innovative, and transitional--and the entities that conduct it. The report also addresses how the directorate leverages research and development by external organizations and guards against duplicative work. It is based on interviews with key directorate officials and staff as well as senior leaders of other relevant agencies and institutions and a review of applicable documents."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2008-08
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State of Utah's Management of State Homeland Security Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006
This report by the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG), "presents the results of the audit of the State of Utah's Management of State Homeland Security Grants awarded during Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006." More specifically, "Williams, Adley & Company, LLP completed an audit of the Department of Homeland Security State Homeland Security Grants awarded to the State of Utah during Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006. The objectives of the audit were to determine whether the State Administrative Agency (1) effectively and efficiently implemented the state homeland security grants programs, (2) achieved the goals of the programs, and (3) spent funds in accordance with grant requirements. The audit included a review of approximately $55.6 million awarded by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to the State of Utah."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2008-08
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Fact Sheet: The Seventh Anniversary of 9/11 [September 10, 2008]
This White House fact sheet provides information regarding the seventh anniversary of 9/11.
United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary
2008-09-10
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Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of International Cartels
This document was presented by James M. Griffin at the 48th Annual American Bar Association Spring Meeting in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 2000. "I would like to talk to you this afternoon about some of the common characteristics of international cartels -- how cartels are initiated; how they operate; and how they attempt to conceal their activity from law enforcement. In order to do this, I am going to rely on some audio and video tapes of actual meetings involving members of the lysine cartel. These tapes were, of course, made covertly by the FBI with the consent and assistance of a cooperating witness. They were first shown publicly at the trial of three former top executives from Archer Daniels Midland Company (ADM). ADM and its co-conspirators from Europe and Asia conspired to fix prices and allocate sales volumes of the food additive citric acid and the feed additive lysine. ADM plead guilty before trial and was sentenced to pay a $100 million fine - which at the time was nearly seven times larger than the previous record fine in an antitrust case in the United States. The ADM executives were convicted at trial and were recently sentenced to fines of up to $350,000 and lengthy prison sentences ranging from 24 to 30 months."
United States. Department of Justice
2000-04-06
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Caught in the Act: Inside an International Cartel
This document was presented by Scott D. Hammond at the OECD Conference in Paris, France on October 18, 2005. "The focus of today's program is to examine how competition authorities and public prosecutors can work effectively together to deter, detect, prosecute, and punish hardcore cartels. Before addressing these challenging issues, it is important that we have a shared understanding of the tremendous harm caused by hard core cartels to businesses and consumers, and why it is vitally important to succeed in the fight against them. However, rather than simply preaching to you about the evils of hardcore cartel offenses, I am going to show you one so that you can judge the risks for yourselves."
United States. Department of Justice
2005-10-18
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Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (WARN): Tabletop Exercise Facilitator Guide
"The information presented in this document provides an example of how a tabletop exercise may be developed and conducted for a Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (WARN). This document is not intended to serve as guidance. […] The Water Sector (drinking water and wastewater utilities) has been developing intrastate mutual aid and assistance agreements, commonly referred to as Water/Wastewater Agency Response Networks (WARNs). The 'Utilities Helping Utilities' concept continues to evolve as newly formed WARNs work through development of their programs. While some are well-established and have responded to emergencies, other WARN programs are in the development stages and have not practiced implementation of their agreements. As a result, WARNs have requested a tool to exercise and validate their intrastate mutual aid/assistance operational plans and agreements in preparation for an actual emergency. This tool can help WARNs exercise the intrastate activation of their agreements and mutual aid/assistance operational plans."
United States. Environmental Protection Agency
2008-09
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Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges, Statement of Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure U.S. borders. One element of SBI is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) SBI program, which is responsible for developing a comprehensive border protection system through a mix of surveillance and communication technologies known as SBInet (e.g., radars, sensors, cameras, and satellite phones) and tactical infrastructure (e.g., fencing). The House Committee on Homeland Security and its Subcommittee on Management, Investigations, and Oversight asked GAO to monitor DHS progress in implementing CBP's SBI program. This testimony provides GAO's observations on (1) technology deployment; (2) infrastructure deployment; and (3) how the CBP SBI program office has defined its human capital goals and the progress it has ma2e to achieve these goals. GAO's observations are based on prior and new work, including analysis of DHS documentation, such as program schedules, contracts, and status reports. GAO also conducted interviews with DHS and Department of the Interior officials and contractors, and visits to sites on the southwest border where SBI deployment is under way. GAO performed the work from March to September 2008. DHS generally agreed with GAO's findings.
United States. Government Accountability Office
Stana, Richard M.
2008-09-10
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Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment, Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information Technology Architecture and System Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Secure Border Initiative (SBI) is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders through, among other things, new technology, increased staffing, and new fencing and barriers. The technology component of SBI, which is known as SBInet, involves the acquisition, development, integration, and deployment of surveillance systems and command, control, communications, and intelligence technologies. GAO was asked to testify on its draft report, which assesses DHS's efforts to (1) define the scope, timing, and life cycle management approach for planned SBInet capabilities and (2) manage SBInet requirements and testing activities. In preparing the draft report, GAO reviewed key program documentation, including guidance, plans, and requirements and testing documentation, interviewed program officials, analyzed a random probability sample of system requirements, and observed operations of the initial SBInet project."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Hite, Randolph C.
2008-09-10
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Costs Incurred for Rejected Temporary Housing Sites
This report by the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (DHS-OIG), "describes the results of Williams, Adley & Company, LLP's review of contract costs incurred by the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), on temporary housing rejected sites for the Hurricane Katrina relief effort. Rejected sites are sites such as parking lots or farm land that were initially identified as potential temporary housing unit group sites but were later rejected during the assessment, design, or development stage. The objectives of the review were to determine whether: 1.) FEMA implemented and enforced control procedures to ensure contractor compliance with the Individual Assistance -- Technical Assistance Contract Performance Work Statement and minimize the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. 2.) Contractors were in compliance with the Performance Work Statement requirements established through the Contract. 3.) FEMA effectively inspected, accepted, and paid for services."
United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General
2008-08
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Aviation Security: TSA Is Enhancing Its Oversight of Air Carrier Efforts to Screen Passengers Against Terrorist Watch-List Records, But Expects Ultimate Solution to Be Implementation of Secure Flight, Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, before the Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"Domestic air carriers are responsible for checking passenger names against terrorist watch-list records to identify persons who should be denied boarding (the No Fly List) or who should undergo additional security scrutiny (the Selectee List). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is to assume this function through its Secure Flight program. However, due to program delays, air carriers retain this role. This testimony discusses TSA's requirements for domestic air carriers to conduct watch-list matching, the extent to which TSA has assessed compliance with watch-list matching requirements, and TSA's progress in developing Secure Flight. This statement is based on GAO's report on air carrier watch-list matching (GAO-08-992) being released today and GAO's previous and ongoing reviews of Secure Flight. In conducting this work, GAO reviewed TSA security directives and TSA inspections guidance and results, and interviewed officials from 14 of 95 domestic air carriers. GAO is not making any recommendations related to air carriers' watch-list matching programs because TSA initiated actions in April 2008 to strengthen related requirements and its oversight of air carriers' implementation of these requirements. Regarding Secure Flight, GAO previously made recommendations to strengthen the program's development. TSA generally agreed."
United States. Government Accountability Office
Berrick, Cathleen A.
2008-09-09
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Gulf War Illnesses: Basic Questions Unanswered Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"Many of the approximately 700,000 Gulf War veterans have complained of illnesses since the war's end in 1991, and over 10 percent have completed health examinations through the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) or Department of Defense (DOD). Some are concerned they are suffering from chronic disabling conditions because of exposures during the war to agents with known or suspected effects on health. In response to this concern, the government has funded research, investigation, and information activities through various agencies, including DOD, VA, and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). These agencies participate in an interagency group, the Persian Gulf Veterans' Coordinating Board, which was established in 1994 to coordinate these activities. The Coordinating Board's Research Working Group, currently chaired by the Department of Veterans' Affairs, focuses on research planning, review, and dissemination, but it is not authorized to manage or distribute the Departments' research funds. In 1996, DOD established the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses to oversee DOD's efforts regarding illnesses being experienced by Gulf War veterans."
United States. General Accounting Office
Chan, Kwai-Cheung
2000-02-02
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Drug Control: DOD Allocates Fewer Assets to Drug Control Efforts Statement of Jess T. Ford, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"DOD faces obstacles in providing support to foreign government counterdrug efforts. Over the years, we have raised concerns about the limited capabilities of foreign military and law enforcement organizations to operate and repair the equipment and effectively use the training provided by DOD. For example, one concern we raised in our December 1999 report involved the capability of the Peruvian police to operate and maintain boats to be used for counterdrug river operations. Other concerns include human rights and intelligence sharing. DOD cannot give training support to some foreign military units nor can it share intelligence information with certain foreign counterdrug organizations because of their record on human rights abuses and evidence of corruption within these organizations."
United States. General Accounting Office
Ford, Jess T.
2000-01-27
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Department of Defense Directive 2005.02E: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Department of Defense
"This Directive [e]stablishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for MDA by which the Department of Defense: contributes to the effective understanding of the global maritime domain and its impact on the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States, disseminates MDA intelligence and other information in support of worldwide DoD missions, integrates MDA with awareness of the other operational domains to provide commanders, decision makers, and responders with near real-time all-domain awareness; Incorporates and cancels Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum (Reference (a)); Designates the Secretary of the Navy as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for MDA, in accordance with DoD Directive 5101.1 (Reference (b)); Designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) as Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) to oversee the activities of the DoD EA for MDA in accordance with Reference (b)."
United States. Department of Defense
2008-08-27
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ICE Investigations Mission Roles in Multi-Agency Areas of Responsibility
This U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) report discusses ICE investigations and its mission roles in multi-agency areas of responsibility. The following is taken from the executive summary of the report: "With the inception of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), many investigative functions formerly under the purview of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS) were merged to form U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). When taking its historic law enforcement origins into account, ICE is one of the oldest and most experienced federal law enforcement agencies in the United States. Such experience cannot be paralleled by any other agency. The mission of ICE is to protect America and uphold public safety by targeting the people, money and materials that support terrorist and other criminal activities. In partnership with local, state, national and international governments and agencies, ICE uses its immigration and customs authorities to address vulnerabilities and prevent violations that threaten national security and public safety. With the formation of ICE, law enforcement mandates and responsibilities previously handled by USCS and INS and their supporting statutory and legal regulations were examined with great scrutiny. With the merging of these federal authorities, ICE became one of the most diverse law enforcement agencies within the federal government. In fact, the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) found that 'the merging of customs and immigration functions into one investigative body created a potentially powerful enforcement mechanism.' ICE investigators have authority under Title 19, United States Code (USC), which permits them to pursue complex banking and financial misconduct cases, conduct searches without first obtaining a warrant and seize assets of criminal enterprises engaged in customs violations. In addition, ICE investigators have Title 8 authority to make arrests without a warrant for immigration violations. The melding of these customs and immigration law authorities allows ICE investigators to pursue both avenues with unique efficiency and thoroughness, making cases stronger and more likely to be accepted for prosecution with more significant penalties."
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
2007-08
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Creating Emergency Management Plans
This document published by the Emergency Response and Crisis Management (ECRM) Technical Assistance Center discusses the need for schools and school districts nationwide to "create comprehensive, multi-hazard emergency management plans that focus on the four phases of emergency management--prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. All-inclusive plans and well-executed processes will ensure the continuity of school and school districts' daily business operations in the face of natural and man-made disasters, criminal activity on campuses and outbreaks of infectious diseases. 'Schools must prepare for the expected to be prepared for the unexpected,' asserts Robert Laird, director of school safety at the Mississippi Department of Education. Most schools and school districts have established emergency management plans; however, they are often not comprehensive, practiced regularly or written in collaboration with the local community. It is highly recommended that schools and school districts adopt a comprehensive, multi-hazard approach to emergency management and work to ensure that their plans take into account the unique needs of the school, any procedures and processes already in place that could be improved and the benefits of adding structure to identified gaps."
United States. Department of Education
2006
