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Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman: Recommendations to Improve the Quality in Extraordinary Ability and Other Employment-based Adjudications
"In this study, the Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (Ombudsman's Office) reviews U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' (USCIS) policy regarding the adjudication of certain employment-based immigrant petitions filed on behalf of individuals with extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics (EB-1-1); outstanding professors and researchers (EB-1-2); and exceptional ability professionals (EB-2) in the sciences, arts, or business. On March 4, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a decision, Poghos Kazarian v. US Citizenship and Immigration Services (Kazarian), reviewing USCIS' application of the regulations governing extraordinary ability petitions. This was the first circuit court decision following district court cases issued to clarify the standard for adjudications. On December 22, 2010, USCIS issued a policy memorandum entitled 'Evaluation of Evidence Submitted with Certain Form I-140 Petitions; Revisions to the Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 22.2, AFM Update AD11-14' (I-140 policy memo). This USCIS policy guidance applies the Ninth Circuit decision with respect to petitions filed for individuals with extraordinary ability, outstanding professors and researchers, and exceptional ability professionals. The USCIS policy guidance provides a two-part test to determine eligibility: (1) an evaluation of whether the petitioner provided the requisite evidence; and (2) a final merits determination."
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
2011-12-29
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Policy Memorandum: Revised Guidance on the Adjudication of Cases Involving Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility Grounds (TRIG) and Further Amendment to the Hold Policy for Such Cases
"This Policy Memorandum (PM) provides updated instruction to all U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) offices in adjudicating cases in which an applicant is inadmissible under one or more of the terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds (TRIG) set forth in Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This PM modifies existing hold guidance for cases involving TRIG to allow for the denial of some cases currently on hold in which a TRIG exemption would not be granted to the individual applicant even if an exemption were available."
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
2011-11-20
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Policy Memorandum: Revised Guidance for the Referral of Cases and Issuance of Notices to Appear (NTAs) in Cases Involving Inadmissible and Removable Aliens
"This Policy Memorandum (PM) establishes new USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration Services] guidelines for referring cases and issuing Notices to Appear (NTAs) in a manner that promotes the sound use of the resources of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice to enhance national security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system. This PM supersedes Policy Memorandum No. 110, Disposition of Cases Involving Removable Aliens, dated July 11, 2006."
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
2011-11-07
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Policy Memorandum: Implementation of New Exemption Under INA Section 212(d)(3)(B)(i) for the Provision of Material Support in the Form of Medical Care
"On October 13, 2011, following consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security (the Secretary), exercised her discretionary authority not to apply the material support inadmissibility ground to certain aliens who provided medical care to persons associated with terrorist activities or organizations. […] This Policy Memorandum (PM) guides U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicators on implementation of the Secretary's exemption. […] INA [ Immigration and Nationality Act ] section 212(a)(3)(B) renders inadmissible an alien who provides material support, including the provision of medical care, to a terrorist organization or to an individual the alien knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity."
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
2011-11-20
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Policy Memorandum: Extension of Validity of Medical Certifications on Form I-693; Adjudicator's Field Manual (AFM) Update AD 11-13, Chapter 40.1(c) Validity of Form I-693
"This Policy Memorandum (PM) temporarily extends the validity of civil surgeon endorsements on Form I-693 for adjustment of status applicants. [...] The endorsement of a civil surgeon on Form I-693, Report of Medical Examination and Vaccination Record, is generally valid for one year. Form I-693 is a requirement and is filed in conjunction with Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status; and Form I-687, Application for Status as a Temporary Resident Under Section 245A of the INA [Immigration and Nationality Act]. Some I-485 and I-687 applications remain pending for more than the one-year validity period of the Form I-693. In a policy memorandum dated December 16, 2010, USCIS [United States Citizenship and Immigration Service] extended the validity of the civil surgeon endorsement on Form I-693 until the I-485 application could be adjudicated. This policy was issued in consultation with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and it was limited to those applications where no Class 'A' or Class 'B' medical condition, other than a Class 'B' condition annotated in the Other Medical Conditions section, was certified. This policy is in effect until January 1, 2012."
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
2011-12-29
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Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and Other Control System Configurations Such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC):
"This document provides guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS). These ICS, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) are often found in the industrial control sectors. ICS are typically used in industries such as electric, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, transportation, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. DCS are generally used to control production systems within a local area such as a factory using supervisory and regulatory control. PLCs are generally used for discrete control for specific applications and generally provide regulatory control. These control systems are vital to the operation of the U.S. critical infrastructures that are often highly interconnected and mutually dependent systems. It is important to note that approximately 90 percent of the nation's critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated. Federal agencies also operate many of the ICS mentioned above; other examples include air traffic control and materials handling (e.g., Postal Service mail handling.) This document provides an overview of these ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Falco, Joe; Scarfone, Karen; Stouffer, Keith
2011-06
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Protecting Information and System Integrity in Industrial Control System Environments: Cybersecurity for the Manufacturing Sector
From the Executive Summary: "Many manufacturing organizations rely on industrial control systems (ICS) to monitor and control their machinery, production lines, and other physical processes that produce goods. To stay competitive, manufacturing organizations are increasingly connecting their operational technology (OT) systems to their information technology (IT) systems to enable and expand enterprise-wide connectivity and remote access for enhanced business processes and capabilities. Although the integration of IT and OT networks is helping manufacturers boost productivity and gain efficiencies, it has also provided malicious actors, including nation states, common criminals, and insider threats a fertile landscape where they can exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities to compromise the integrity of ICS and ICS data to reach their end goal. The motivations behind these attacks can range from degrading manufacturing capabilities to financial gain, and causing reputational harm. [...] To address the cybersecurity challenges facing the manufacturing sector, the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST's) National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE) launched this project in collaboration with NIST's Engineering Laboratory (EL) and cybersecurity technology providers. Together, we have built example solutions that manufacturing organizations can use to mitigate ICS integrity risks, strengthen the cybersecurity of OT systems, and protect the data that these systems process."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.); National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence
Powell, Michael; Brule, Joseph; Pease, Michael . . .
2022-03
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Avoiding the Paris Gun Trap: The Future of America's Strategic Artillery
From the Abstract: "In an attempt to end the stalemate on the Western Front during World War I, German scientists and engineers created a supergun capable of firing a 233-pound projectile over 75 miles to bombard the citizens of Paris, France. These weapons, The Paris Guns, possessed the potential to achieve an exponential military advantage for the German Military. The Germans' folly became clear as they developed a weapon without first considering its ability to achieve the effects they desired. Today, the United States Army seeks to develop superguns capable of exponentially increased range, the strategic long-range cannons. The United States Army has defined a role for these weapons in deterring in competition, and penetrating and dis-integrating anti-access and area denial networks in armed conflict. This study examines the history and effects of The Paris Guns at the strategic level. It then measures the accumulation of these effects across the operational variables. This study concludes that The Paris Guns achieved some strategic effects; these effects did not benefit the Germans. Additionally, this study concludes that the United States Army's pursuit of strategic long-range cannons is viable, provided the pursuit avoids the same strategic errors of The Paris Guns during World War I."
Army University Press (U.S.)
Grundhauser, Ian P.
2022-03
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Ukraine Conflict and Other Factors Contributing to High Commodity Prices and Food Insecurity
From the Executive Summary: "A number of factors have converged over the last 18 months to send global agricultural commodity prices to near-record levels. Russia's invasion of Ukraine - and the potential loss of Ukrainian exports - was the latest development to push commodity prices higher. Other factors affecting global markets, which date back to late 2020, include: increased global demand, led by China; drought-reduced supplies; tightening wheat, corn, and soybean stocks in major exporting countries; high energy prices pushing up the costs of fertilizer, transportation, and agricultural production; and countries imposing export bans and restrictions, further tightening supplies. As observed during the food price crises of 2008 and 2012, developing countries that are dependent on food imports are the most vulnerable to food insecurity. Such countries tend to respond to price signals by shifting consumption and trade patterns, while larger exporting nations respond by increasing production to meet demand. However, the geopolitical turmoil of a war between two major agricultural exporting countries, including the world's largest fertilizer exporter (Russia), adds additional uncertainty and concern to today's situation."
United States. Department of Agriculture; United States. Foreign Agricultural Service
2022-04
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Nuclear Security: Actions, Accountability and Reform, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, February 28, 2013
This is the February 28, 2013 hearing on "Nuclear Security" held before the House Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of Mike Rogers: "This subcommittee has responsibility for many big critical important issues, and we are going to get into one of them right now. Today's hearing is part of the committee's continuing oversight of the aftermath of the security breach at Y--12 National Security Complex in July of last year. At this point, the facts of the incident are well established so I won't repeat them. Needless to say, the intrusion was astonishing and completely unacceptable. Through its hearing and closed briefing last September, the subcommittee is aware of the immediate corrective actions taken by the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] and the DOE [Department of Energy]. Today's hearing is focused on the broader implications of the incident, including organizational leadership and structural failures that enabled it to occur. Reviewing the testimony from our first witness panel as well as the other reports on DOE nuclear security stretching back 15 years, I am deeply concerned that we have been identifying the same problem for more than a decade." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jim Cooper, Mike Rogers, C. Donald Alston, Sandra E. Finan, Gregory H. Friedman, Daniel B. Poneman, Neile L. Miller, and John Garamendi.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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Investigation of School Resource and Safety Programs Policy and Practice in Virginia
From the Executive Summary: "This study discerned a great deal of information from surveys, Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs), focus groups, and interviews. This executive summary will provide some of the top-level findings regarding School Resource Officer (SRO) and School Security Officer (SSO) programs in Virginia and direct the reader to where more detailed discussion of each finding can be found. Our survey of SROs their law enforcement supervisors (SRO Supervisors), administrators who work with them (School-Based Liaisons), and SSOs, and the School Safety Survey provided the foundation for much of the quantitative analysis. Based on the School Safety Survey, 58.6% of Virginia schools have an SRO and/or an SSO. SROs tended to be male (81.7%), Caucasian (80.7%), and an average age of 43 (range 24-70). SSOs however had much more diversity across the board, with 62% male and 51.9% African-American, and they were somewhat older, with an average age of 52[.]"
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (U.S.)
Lawson, Gerard; Welfare, Laura; Hori, Kazuki . . .
2020-04-07
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Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for Nuclear Forces and Atomic Energy Defense Activities, March 22, 2018
This is the March 22, 2018 hearing titled "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs," held before the House Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of John C. Rood: "Today, the United States faces an increasingly complex global security environment in which the central challenge to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition by revisionist powers in China and Russia. While they pose separate challenges with unique attributes, both China and Russia seek to reshape the world order and change territorial borders. Consequently, they pose increasing security threats to us, our allies, and partners. Long-term competition with China and Russia requires increased U.S. and allied military investment because of the magnitude of the threats they pose today and the potential that these threats will increase in the future. We must also simultaneously strengthen our efforts to deter and counter the clear and present dangers posed by rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran. The U.S. military remains the strongest in the world. However, our advantages are eroding as potential adversaries modernize and build up their conventional and nuclear forces. They now field a broad arsenal of advanced missiles, including variants that can reach the American homeland." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Terry Benedict, Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty, James Owendoff, Robin Rand, and John C. Rood.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2019
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Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs Before the Committee on Armed Service, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces Hearing on Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for National Security Space, March 15, 2016
This is from the March 15, 2016 hearing on "Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request for National Security Space" before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. The statements within this compilation begin by discussing a proposal for the construction of new Delta 4 and Falcon 9 rocket engines which will replace the existing Atlas 5 engine. However, the transition is estimated to cost one to one and a half billion dollars to build with possible additional costs. The discussion primarily surrounds the financial implications and impacts of developing sed engine on the Airforce Space Mission. Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: David J. Buck, Frank Cavelli, Robert Cardillo, John Hyten, Doug Loverro, and Dyke Weatherington.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2017
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Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Requirements Assessment, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, July 16, 2014
This is from the July 16, 2014 hearing on "Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Requirements Assessment," held before the U.S. House of Representative Committee on Armed Services. From the Introduction of Mark D. Andress: "The United States is a maritime nation with global responsibilities. Our Navy and Marine Corps' persistent presence and multi-mission capability represent U.S. power projection across the global commons. Navy and Marine Corps forces move at will across the world's oceans, seas and littorals, and they extend the effects of the sea-base deep inland. Naval Aviation provides our nation's leaders with 'offshore options' where needed, when needed. We enable global reach and access, regardless of changing circumstances, and will continue to be the nation's preeminent option for employing deterrence through global presence, sea control, mission flexibility and when necessary, armed interdiction. The Navy and Marine Corps provide an agile strike and amphibious power projection force in readiness, and such agility requires that the aviation arm of our naval strike and expeditionary forces remain capable in the future threat environment. UCLASS will enhance our Naval and Joint Force capabilities by providing the carrier air wing with organic persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) and precision strike capability." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Mark D. Andress, Shawn Brimley, Paul A. Grosklags, Joseph T. Guastella, Robert Martinage, Bryan McGrath, and Ronald O'Rourke.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2015
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Advancing the Science and Acceptance of Autonomy for Future Defense Systems, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, First Session, November 19, 2015
This is the November 19, 2015 hearing "Advancing the Science and Acceptance of Autonomy for Future Defense Systems," held before the House Committee on Armed Services. From the opening statement of subcommittee chairman Joe Wilson: "I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for today's hearing on advancing the science and acceptance of autonomy for future defense systems. The military necessity for autonomous systems is obvious. Many of us recognize that our military is not large enough, and it is not likely to grow sufficiently over the next few years to handle all the threats we face. On top of this, shrinking budgets will shrink our military, stretch our military men and women and platforms even further to be able to accomplish their ever-changing and challenging missions. The promise of autonomous systems is becoming more evident every day. From self-driving cars to smart buildings to increasing presence of robotics, the full potential of autonomous systems is nearly endless. What is less understood are the technical and policy challenges that must be identified and solved to make those visions a reality. Most of us are more likely to understand what is possible with examples provided from television and movies. So I am looking forward to having real experts shed light on what the actual state-of- the-art technology is, and what the path to acceptance looks like for the military services. And with this backdrop, we look forward to hearing from today's panel of witnesses who will educate members on many of the issues related to autonomy research and the development of increasingly autonomous systems." Statements, letters, and other materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Jonathan Bornstein, Frank Kelley, and Greg L. Zacharias.
United States. Government Publishing Office
2016
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Findings in Prison Classification and Risk Assessment
From the Document: "The past three decades have witnessed considerable changes to prison classification systems. Before 1980, only the California Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons used objective classification systems. Subjective classification, which relied heavily upon the judgment of a wide array of prison officials to determine where a prisoner would be housed, and under what forms of supervision and security, was used at that time by practically all of the state prison systems. Since 1980, virtually all 50 states as well as Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have fully implemented objective systems. [...] Out of the wide proliferation of objective classification systems has grown a body of literature that has helped to shape and modify the first generation of prison classification systems. Some of these classification studies have been conducted by state prison systems while others have been sponsored by federal agencies- in particular the National Institute of Corrections and the National Institute of Justice. The purpose of this report is to summarize the new information and knowledge learned. Based on these 'lessons learned,' suggestions are offered to show that credible and valid classification and risk assessment systems are needed now, more than ever, to improve correctional operations and performance while reducing costs and recidivism."
Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Prisons; National Institute of Corrections (U.S.)
Austin, James
2003-06-25
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Nuclear Weapons Complex Modernization, Hearing Before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, Second Session, July 17, 2008
From the statement of Ellen Tauscher: ""Today, we will consider the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons complex, what the NNSA calls its plan for a Complex Transformation. I want to welcome our first panel of distinguished witnesses, starting with the Administrator of the NNSA, Under Secretary Tom D'Agostino. It is a pleasure to have you back before the subcommittee, Under Secretary, and thank you very much for all the cooperation and all the great work you and the thousands of people that you represent do every day for the American people. Following the Administrator's testimony, we will be joined at the witness table by the team of experts that manage and operate the NNSA nuclear weapons complex, whom I will introduce at that time. This topic has not received the attention it deserves. The maintenance and modernization of the nuclear weapons complex is a prerequisite to the continuing success of the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Terry Everett, Gene Aloise, Thomas D'Agostino, Marylia Kelley, and C. Paul Robinson.
United States. Government Printing Office
2009
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What is the Price of Energy Security: From Battlefields to Bases, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Readiness of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held March 29, 2012
From opening statement of Madeleine Z. Bordallo: "Energy security is critical to the future of our military and our economy in the long run. Over the next three decades, the United States Department of Energy expects energy consumption to increase by 53 percent, which will create additional challenges and concerns to our economy and especially to our military. The Department of Defense accounts for approximately 80 percent of all Federal energy consumption, including both installation and operational energy needs. For example, energy costs increased about 25 percent from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011, yet consumption has declined. A significant factor in this increase was due to fuel costs. At a time of austere budgets, we need to make important investments in energy so that we can stabilize energy costs within the Department of Defense and allow those savings to be put back to supporting our warfighter in modernization, training, or other priorities." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Madeleine Z. Bordallo, J. Randy Forbes, Sharon Burke, Katherine Hammack, Jackalyne Pfannenstiel, Dorothy Robyn, Terry Yonkers, Silverstre Reyes, Roscoe Bartlett, Larry Kissell, Steven Palazzo, and Martha Roby.
United States. Government Printing Office
2012
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Y-12 Intrusion: Investigation, Response, and Accountability, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held September 13, 2012
This is the September 13, 2012 hearing on "Y-12 Intrusion: Investigation, Response, and Accountability," held before the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces. From the opening statement of Michael Turner: "I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on the recent security breach at the Y--12 National Security Complex. As we all know from the press accounts, in the predawn hours of Saturday, July 28, three nuclear disarmament activists trespassed onto the grounds of the Y--12 complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The activists, including an 82-year-old Catholic nun, who is present with us today, cut through several fences and entered the high-security 'Protected Area' surrounding the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility, HEUMF. The activists defaced an exterior building with spray paint, human blood, posters, crime scene tape, and other items before eventually being stopped and detained by members of the protective force. Reportedly, even once on the scene, the initial protective force member apparently did not respond with appropriate urgency. This level of intrusion in the perimeter of a supposedly highly secure nuclear weapons facility is unprecedented, and it is absolutely unacceptable. It is outrageous to think that the greatest threat to the American public from weapons of mass destruction may be the incompetence of DOE [Department of Energy] security." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Loretta Sanchez, Michael Turner, Neile L. Miller, and Daniel B. Poneman.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
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Research on Trauma and PTSD in the Aftermath of 9/11
This article on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) presents a review of trauma research related to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The article follows a timeline of research published on 9/11-related PTSD beginning with a report published within days of the event. From the article: "The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City and upon the Pentagon in Washington, DC were unprecedented in scope in the United States. Approximately 2,800 people were killed in the attacks, 16 times more people than died in the Oklahoma City bombing, previously the largest terrorist attack on US soil. The scope and nature of the attacks suggested that there would be substantial mental health problems in New York City after the attacks and that these problems would extend beyond the direct victims of the attacks. [...] Several epidemiological studies were conducted in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks that made use of standardized assessment measures that allowed for good comparability across studies and that included design variations that allowed for focus on different segments of the U.S. and New York area populations primarily. These studies provided fairly consistent results, identifying elevated prevalence of PTSD and consistent predictors associated with PTSD in the initial few months post-event. Future research should also incorporate more sophisticated assessment of a range of coping responses such as those assessed by Silver et al. (2002) and Schuster et al. (2001). Results of the repeated cross-sectional studies of the population in New York indicate the importance of attending to additional mental health and behavioral outcomes such as substance use that may persist over longer periods following events like the attacks that occurred on September 11th. The data also point to the resilience of those in this population in terms of symptoms of PTSD over time."
National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (U.S.)
Galea, Sandro; Kilpatrick, Dean G.; Resnick, Heidi S., 1957-
2004
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Crime-Related PTSD: Emphasis on Adult General Population Samples
This article on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) provides an overview of crime-related trauma incidents. From the article: "This article highlights general population studies of crime-related PTSD that provide descriptive characteristics of crime events and information relevant to the study of PTSD etiology. Following a brief overview of critical issues in research on crime and its effects, the article is divided into two major areas: Prevalence, descriptive characteristics, and risk factors for exposure to crime events; and Prevalence, and risk factors for PTSD. Given the critical role of event characteristics in the etiology of PTSD based on the combat trauma literature, it is important to recognize the need to study the detailed characteristics of different types of crime in-depth. Information about PTSD etiology can be gained from and/ or cross-validated using new populations other than combat veterans. The study of crime-related trauma permits examination of varied trauma and individual characteristics. Furthermore, crime is much more than an academic issue. Unfortunately, crime is an ongoing threat, both for individuals previously victimized who may continue to live in fear as well as for those who may falsely believe that they are invulnerable to crime. Thus, study of crime victims also allows us to look at individuals who have recently been exposed to extreme stressor events and to follow the course of PTSD and other outcomes over time."
National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (U.S.)
Kilpatrick, Dean G.; Resnick, Heidi S., 1957-
1994
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2000 National Victim Assistance Academy
This report discusses many domestic law issues. Some topics include: specific justice systems, victim rights, financial assistance, mental health needs, substance abuse, domestic violence, sexual assault, child victimization, homicide, drunk driving, victimization of the elderly, victimization of people with diabetes, financial crime, news media coverage, and innovative technologies.
United States. Office of Justice Programs. Office for Victims of Crime
Walker, Steven D.; Kilpatrick, Dean G.; Wallace, Harvey
2010-01
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Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology
"This document provides guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS). These ICS, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) are often found in the industrial control sectors. ICS are typically used in industries such as electric, water, oil and gas, transportation, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. DCS are generally used to control production systems within a local area such as a factory using supervisory and regulatory control. PLCs are generally used for discrete control for specific applications and generally provide regulatory control. These control systems are critical to the operation of the U.S. critical infrastructures that are often highly interconnected and mutually dependent systems. It is important to note that approximately 90 percent of the nation's critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated. Federal agencies also operate many of the ICS mentioned above; other examples include air traffic control and materials handling (e.g., Postal Service mail handling.) This document provides an overview of these ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks. Initially, ICS had little resemblance to traditional information technology (IT) systems in that ICS were isolated systems running proprietary control protocols using specialized hardware and software."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Falco, Joe; Scarfone, Karen; Stouffer, Keith
2007-09
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Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and Other Control System Configurations Such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC): Recommendations of the National Institute of Standards and Technology, Final Public Draft
"This document provides guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS). These ICS, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as skid-mounted Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) are often found in the industrial control sectors. ICS are typically used in industries such as electric, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, transportation, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.) SCADA systems are generally used to control dispersed assets using centralized data acquisition and supervisory control. DCS are generally used to control production systems within a local area such as a factory using supervisory and regulatory control. PLCs are generally used for discrete control for specific applications and generally provide regulatory control. These control systems are vital to the operation of the U.S. critical infrastructures that are often highly interconnected and mutually dependent systems. It is important to note that approximately 90 percent of the nation's critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated. Federal agencies also operate many of the ICS mentioned above; other examples include air traffic control and materials handling (e.g., Postal Service mail handling.) This document provides an overview of these ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks."
National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.)
Falco, Joe; Scarfone, Karen; Stouffer, Keith
2008-09
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Command Responsibility, Australian War Crimes in Afghanistan, and the Brereton Report
From the Introduction: "November 2020 Australia faced a reckoning with its recent past in Afghanistan. There had been growing disquiet for some time regarding rumored war crimes committed in Afghanistan by Australian special forces, corroborated by shocking footage screened on national television in 2017. On 19 November 2020 General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), released the summary of the final report of a long-running inquiry into those accusations. That report had been commissioned by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, an independent office outside the military chain of command. It is now widely known as the 'Brereton Report' after the head of the inquiry: Paul Brereton, a Justice of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and a major general in the Australian Army Reserves. Much of the report will remain redacted pending criminal proceedings before civilian courts. Its key finding is the identification of twenty-three incidents involving twenty-five Australian personnel resulting in thirty-nine killings which will be referred for prosecution. Critically, the report finds none of these killings occurred in heat of battle, nor 'in circumstances in which the intent of the perpetrator was unclear, confused or mistaken,' and that all persons involved understood the relevant law of armed conflict and rules of engagement. These were deliberate killings of unarmed persons, either 'hors de combat' or under Australian control, in circumstances where there could be no confusion as to their legal status or targetability. [...] This article examines the question of command responsibility for such crimes under international and Australian law, and how far such responsibility extends."
Naval War College (U.S.). International Law Studies
Guilfoyle, Douglas; Kyriakakis, Joanna; O'Brien, Melanie
2022
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Opportunities and Actions for Ocean Science and Technology (2022-2028)
From the Executive Summary: "As a maritime Nation, the United States relies heavily on healthy and resilient ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems. 'Science and Technology for America's Oceans: A Decadal Vision' identified pressing research needs and areas of opportunity within the Ocean science and technology (S&T) enterprise for the decade 2018-2028. Each of the goals identified relies on, and contributes to, three cross-cutting themes: (1) Climate Change, (2) Resilient Ocean S&T Infrastructure, and (3) a Diverse and Inclusive BlueWorkforce, all of which include connections to racial justice and equity. While the Decadal Vision lists a series of priorities to advance the U.S. Ocean S&T enterprise, this document includes additional priorities related to each of the three cross-cutting themes. The outlined priorities within each theme are intended to guide the development of future Federal ocean research implementation plans within each agency. This document also presents six immediate opportunities for ocean solutions and collaborative efforts: (1) Facilitate offshore wind energy development; (2) Coordinate coastal resilience efforts; (3) Conserve and protect critical ecosystems through the America the Beautiful initiative effort to conserve at least 30% of U.S. land and ocean by 2030; (4) Explore implementation of blue carbon solutions; (5) Support the National Ocean Mapping, Exploration, and Characterization (NOMEC) plan; and (6) Engage in the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development."
United States. Office of Science and Technology Policy
National Science and Technology Council (U.S.). Subcommittee on Ocean Science and Technology
2022-03
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Space Operations Command: Commander's Strategic Plan 2022
From the Foreword: "With Space Operations Command (SpOC) in our second year, this Strategic Plan augments our original Strategic Intent with the purpose of focusing our collective efforts and to inform the SpOC resourcing process. Specifically, this plan identifies our SpOC lines of effort for 2022 as well as our efforts to strengthen space warfighting for our intelligence, cyber, operations, and combat support units. This Strategic Plan is focused on the actions necessary to improve SpOC's warfighting posture. The stand-up of Space Systems Command (SSC) and Space Training and Readiness Command (STARCOM) in Summer 2021 means that SpOC is now 'down to our fighting weight', and able to bring our full attention to improving our warfighting mission. The majority of our time, attention, and efforts going forward must be focused on advancing our warfighting prowess, our readiness, and our partnerships. This plan demonstrates how we support the U.S. Space Force (USSF) Space Capstone Publication (SCP), the Chief of Space Operation's (CSO) Planning Guidance (CPG), and the Commander United States Space Command's (CDRUSSPACECOM) Strategic Vision."
United States. Space Force
2022-03-11?
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2022 Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion
From the Scope Note: "'Challenges to Security in Space' was first published in early 2019 to address the main threats to the array of U.S. space capabilities, and examine space and counterspace strategies and systems pursued primarily by China and Russia and, to a lesser extent, by North Korea and Iran. This second edition builds on that work and provides an updated, unclassified overview of the threats to U.S. space capabilities, particularly from China and Russia, as those threats continue to expand. [...] Since early 2019, competitor space operations have also increased in pace and scope worldwide, China's and Russia's counterspace developments continue to mature, global space services proliferate, and orbital congestion has increased. As a result, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] has published this new edition to: [1] Expand its examination of competitor space situational awareness (SSA), and command and control (C2) capabilities; [2] Detail the profiles of organizations operating space and counterspace systems based on new information; [3] Deepen our characterization of new space and counterspace systems deployed and in development; [4] Focus on China's and Russia's interests in exploring the Moon and Mars; [5] Provide a new section on the use of space beyond Earth orbit and its implications; [6] Widen our treatment on the threats posed to all nations' space operations from space debris." The original 2019 edition can be found at [https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=821726].
United States. Defense Intelligence Agency
2022-03
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U.S. Department of State: 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
"For the United States, indeed for the whole world, 2001 was a year in which the importance of universal human rights was brought sharply into focus by global terrorism. On September 11, 2001, the world changed. As President Bush declared in his State of the Union Address, 'In a single instant, we realized that this will be a decisive decade in the history of liberty, that we've been called to a unique role in human events. Rarely has the world faced a choice more clear or consequential. ...We choose freedom and the dignity of every life.' This choice reflects both U.S. values and the universality of human rights that steadily have gained international acceptance over the past 50 years. As the United States and our international partners commit resources to the fight against terrorism, we do so for all those who respect and yearn for human rights and democracy. […] There is, however, much more work still to be done. The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001 captures a world still reeling and reacting to the events of last September. Yet the Reports' central mission remains the same--to give voice to those who have been denied the freedoms and rights provided for in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Reports confirm that the battle of ideas between those who suppress democracy and human rights and those who would see them flourish remains far from over. Only through the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms can the international community be secure from the scourge of terrorism."
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
2002-03-04
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U.S. Department of State: 2005 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
"These reports describe the performance of 196 countries in putting into practice their international commitments on human rights. These basic rights, reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, have been embraced by people of every culture and color, every background and belief, and constitute what President Bush calls the 'non-negotiable demands of human dignity.' The Department of State published the first annual country reports on human rights practices in 1977 in accordance with congressional mandate, and they have become an essential element of the United States' effort to promote respect for human rights worldwide. For nearly three decades, the reports have served as a reference document and a foundation for cooperative action among governments, organizations, and individuals seeking to end abuses and strengthen the capacity of countries to protect the fundamental rights of all. The worldwide championing of human rights is not an attempt to impose alien values on citizens of other countries or to interfere in their internal affairs. The Universal Declaration calls upon 'every individual and every organ of society … to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance…' President Bush has committed the United States to working with other democracies and men and women of goodwill across the globe to reach an historic long-term goal: 'the end of tyranny in our world.'"
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
2006-03-08
