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State and Local Perspectives on Federal Information Sharing, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence of the Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourteenth Congress, Second Session, September 8, 2016
This testimony compilation is from the September 8, 2016 hearing, "State and Local Perspectives on Federal Information Sharing," before the House Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. From the opening statement of Subcommittee Chairman Peter King: "While carrying out critical security and public safety missions, U.S. law enforcement is facing an increased threat environment. Since September 11, 2001, there have been 166 plots within the United States linked to Islamist terror groups with the vast majority occurring since 2009. In May, FBI Director Comey stated that the Bureau has over 800 open cases related to individuals in the U.S. with links to ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]. The terror group has called for attacks against law enforcement directly. In January 2015, a statement from the now deceased spokesman for ISIS, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, called on supporters to 'rise up and kill intelligence officers, police officers, soldiers, and civilians.' [...] Also troubling is the increase in domestic threats against law enforcement. In some tragic instances, these threats have turned into violence. The National Law Enforcement Memorial Fund website reports there have been 11 shooting ambush attacks on law enforcement in 2016 to date." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Richard Beary, Mike Sena, and Cedric Alexander.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security
2016-09-08
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More Interim Steps Could Be Taken to Mitigate Information Technology Supply Chain Risks
From the Document: "The President and Congress have expressed significant interest in and have taken steps to limit the Government's exposure to supply chain risks. In 2020, there was a significant supply chain incident in which software from the SolarWinds Corporation was breached giving hackers access to thousands of Government agency and private company systems using this software. This audit was initiated to evaluate the IRS's [Internal Revenue Service] efforts to identify, assess, and mitigate information technology supply chain risks."
United States. Department of the Treasury. Office of Inspector General
2022-02-02
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Budget Hearing: United States Capitol Police: Hearing Before U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, Second Session, March 24, 2014
This is a compilation of the March 24, 2014 testimonies on the budget of the United States Capitol Police. From the statement of witness Kim Dine: "My management team and I are aware that the fiscal situation in the Federal government requires that we manage ourselves and plan for our future responsibly and accurately. Having worked a large portion of my 38-year law enforcement career in local government, I can tell you that I have a first-hand understanding of the hardships faced by all levels of government and by average citizens in communities across the country. Therefore, I believe it is our responsibility to submit a budget request that is accurate, reasonable, responsible, and based on critical requirements necessary to mitigate and address both identified and emerging threats and risks. Our fiscal year 2015 budget request focuses on those critical mission requirements necessary for the Department to address the security of the Congress, so that it may conduct its Constitutional responsibilities in an open and safe manner without disruption from crime or terrorism." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of Kim Dine.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations
2014-03-24
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U.S. Capitol Police: FY2018 Budget, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Legislative Branch of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifteenth Congress, First Session, May 18, 2017
This testimony compilation is from the May 18, 2017 hearing, "U.S. Capitol Police: FY2018 Budget," before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Legislative Branch of the Committee on Appropriations. From the opening statement of Subcommittee Chairman Kevin Yoder: "Chief, your budget request for FY2018 is $426.6 million. This is approximately 8% increase
from the enacted level. We understand the importance of the critical mission and role the Capitol Police plays in ensuring the safety of all of us. I also understand that as the mission of the Capitol Police increases so do the required resources to fulfill the mission. To that point, in less than a month the O'Neill Federal Office Building will be transferred to the Legislative Branch and the Capitol Police will be charged with securing the building. Additionally, the department is working towards enhancing garage security and adding pre-screening capabilities all while maintaining current operations. However, our job is to scrutinize this requested increase and make informed funding decisions. In a tight fiscal environment many competing priorities exist across the Legislative Branch that must be raked and stacked in a holistic approach which this subcommittee will do over the coming weeks." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of Matthew Verderosa.
United States. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations
2017-05-18
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector-Specific Agencies Need to Better Measure Cybersecurity Progress, Report to the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "U. S. critical infrastructures, such as financial institutions, commercial buildings, and energy production and transmission facilities, are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, vital to the nation's security, economy, and public health and safety. To secure these systems and assets, federal policy and the NIPP [National Infrastructure Protection Plan] establish responsibilities for federal agencies designated as SSAs [sector-specific agencies], including leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of their designated critical infrastructure sectors. GAO's [Government Accountability Office] objectives were to determine the extent to which SSAs have (1) identified the significance of cyber risks to their respective sectors' networks and industrial control systems, (2) taken actions to mitigate cyber risks within their respective sectors, (3) collaborated across sectors to improve cybersecurity, and (4) established performance metrics to monitor improvements in their respective sectors. To conduct the review, GAO analyzed policy, plans, and other documentation and interviewed public and private sector officials for 8 of 9 SSAs with responsibility for 15 of 16 sectors."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2015-11-19
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Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Better Address Port Cybersecurity, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
From the Highlights: "U.S. maritime ports handle more than $1.3 trillion in cargo annually. The operations of these ports are supported by information and communication systems, which are susceptible to cyber-related threats. Failures in these systems could degrade or interrupt operations at ports, including the flow of commerce. Federal agencies--in particular DHS-- and industry stakeholders have specific roles in protecting maritime facilities and ports from physical and cyber threats. GAO's [Government Accountability Office's] objective was to identify the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders have taken steps to address cybersecurity in the maritime port environment. GAO examined relevant laws and regulations; analyzed federal cybersecurity-related policies and plans; observed operations at three U.S. ports selected based on being a high-risk port and a leader in calls by vessel type, e.g. container; and interviewed federal and nonfederal officials. GAO recommends that DHS direct the Coast Guard to (1) assess cyber-related risks, (2) use this assessment to inform maritime security guidance, and (3) determine whether the sector coordinating council should be reestablished. DHS should also direct FEMA to (1) develop procedures to consult DHS cybersecurity experts for assistance in reviewing grant proposals and (2) use the results of the cyber-risk assessment to inform its grant guidance. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2014-06
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Information Security: Better Implementation of Controls for Mobile Devices Should be Encouraged, Report to Congressional Committees
From the Highlights: "Millions of Americans currently use mobile devices--e.g., cellphones, smartphones, and tablet computers--on a daily basis to communicate, obtain Internet-based information, and share their own information, photographs, and videos. Given the extent of consumer reliance on mobile interactions, it is increasingly important that these devices be secured from expanding threats to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information they maintain and share. Accordingly, GAO [Government Accountability Office] was asked to determine (1) what common security threats and vulnerabilities affect mobile devices, (2) what security features and practices have been identified to mitigate the risks associated with these vulnerabilities, and (3) the extent to which government and private entities have been addressing the security vulnerabilities of mobile devices. To do so, GAO analyzed publically available mobile security reports, surveys related to consumer cybersecurity practices, as well as statutes, regulations, and agency policies; GAO also interviewed representatives from federal agencies and private companies with responsibilities in telecommunications and cybersecurity. […] GAO recommends that FCC [Federal Communications Commission] encourage the private sector to implement a broad, industry-defined baseline of mobile security safeguards. GAO also recommends that DHS and NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology] take steps to better measure progress in raising national cybersecurity awareness. The FCC, DHS, and NIST generally concurred with GAO's recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2012-09
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Federal Facility Cybersecurity: DHS and GSA Should Address Cyber Risk to Building and Access Control Systems, Report to Congressional Requesters
From the Highlights: "Federal facilities contain building and access control systems--computers that monitor and control building operations such as elevators, electrical power, and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning--that are increasingly being connected to other information systems and the Internet. The increased connectivity heightens their vulnerability to cyber attacks, which could compromise security measures, hamper agencies' ability to carry out their missions, or cause physical harm to the facilities or their occupants. GAO's [Government Accountability Office] objective was to examine the extent to which DHS and other stakeholders are prepared to address cyber risk to building and access control systems in federal facilities. GAO reviewed DHS's and other stakeholders' authorities to protect federal facilities from cyber attacks ; visited selected FPS [Federal Protective Service]-protected facilities to determine what stakeholders were doing to address cyber risks to these systems; and interviewed experts about the cyber vulnerability of building and access control system s and related issues. GAO also reviewed GSA's [General Services Administration] security assessment process and a sample of reports. […] GAO recommends that DHS (1) develop and implement a strategy to address cyber risk to building and access control systems and (2) direct ISC [Interagency Security Committee] to revise its Design-Basis Threat report to include cyber threats to building and access control systems. GAO also recommends that GSA assess cyber risk of its building control systems fully reflecting FISMA [Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002] and its guidelines."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2014-12
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Information Security: VA Needs to Address Identified Vulnerabilities, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "In carrying out its mission to ensure the health, welfare, and dignity of the nation's veterans, VA relies extensively on information technology systems that collect, process, and store veterans' sensitive information. Without adequate safeguards, these systems and information are vulnerable to a wide array of cyber-based threats. Moreover, VA has faced long-standing challenges in adequately securing its systems and information, and reports of recent incidents have highlighted the serious impact of inadequate information security on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of veterans' personal information. GAO was asked to review VA's efforts to address information security vulnerabilities. The objective for this work was to determine the extent to which selected, previously identified vulnerabilities continued to exist on VA computer systems. To do this, GAO reviewed VA actions taken to address previously identified vulnerabilities, including a significant network intrusion, vulnerabilities in two key web-based applications, and security weaknesses on devices connected to VA's network. GAO also reviewed the results of VA security testing; interviewed relevant officials and staff; and reviewed policies, procedures, and other documentation."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2014-11-13
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Observations on DHS Efforts to Identify, Prioritize, Assess, and Inspect Chemical Facilities, Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland Security and Justic, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "Facilities that produce, store, or use hazardous chemicals could be of interest to terrorists intent on using toxic chemicals to inflict mass casualties in the United States. As required by statute, DHS issued regulations establishing standards for the security of these facilities. DHS established the CFATS program to assess risk at facilities covered by the regulations and inspect them to ensure compliance. In February 2014, legislation was introduced related to several aspects of the program. This statement provides observations on DHS efforts related to the CFATS program. I t is based on the results of previous GAO reports in July 2012 and April 2013, with selected updates conducted in February 2014. In conducting the earlier work, GAO reviewed DHS reports and plans on the program and interviewed DHS officials. In addition, GAO interviewed DHS officials to update information."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2014-02-27
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity of the Nation's Electricity Grid Requires Continued Attention, Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittees on Energy and Research and Technology, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "The electric power industry--including transmission and distribution systems--increasingly uses information and communications technology systems to automate actions with the aim of improving the electric grid's reliability and efficiency. However, these 'smart grid' technologies may be vulnerable to cyber-based attacks and other threats that could disrupt the nation's electricity infrastructure. Several federal entities have responsibilities for overseeing and helping to secure the electricity grid. Because of the proliferation of cyber threats, since 2003 GAO [Government Accountability Office] has designated protecting the systems supporting U.S. critical infrastructure (which includes the electricity grid) as a high-risk area. GAO was asked to provide a statement on opportunities to improve cybersecurity for the electricity grid. In preparing this statement, GAO relied on previous work on efforts to address cybersecurity of the electric sector."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2015-10-21
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Information Security: Additional Actions Needed to Address Vulnerabilities That Put VA Data at Risk, Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director Information Security Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "The Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) relies extensively on information technology systems that collect, process, and store veterans' sensitive personal information. Without adequate safeguards, these systems and information are vulnerable to compromise. Further, VA has faced long-standing challenges in securing its systems, and reported incidents have demonstrated the impact of cyber-based threats on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of veterans' personal information. This statement summarizes the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) November 13, 2014 report on VA efforts to address previously identified information security vulnerabilities. For its review, GAO focused on efforts to respond to a network intrusion, address vulnerabilities in key web - based applications, and remediate weaknesses in devices connected to the department's network. To conduct its work, GAO reviewed the results of VA security testing; interviewed department officials; and reviewed policies, procedures, and other documentation. In its report, GAO made eight recommendations to VA to fully address weaknesses in incident response, web applications, and patch management. VA concurred with GAO's recommendations."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2014-11-18
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Cybersecurity: Continued Attention Needed to Protect Our Nation's Critical Infrastructure, Statement of Gregory C. Wilshusen, Director, Information Security Issues, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
From the Highlights: "Increasing computer interconnectivity, such as the growth of the Internet, has revolutionized the way our government, our nation, and much of the world communicate and conduct business. However, this widespread interconnectivity poses significant risks to the government's and the nation's computer systems, and to the critical infrastructures they support. These critical infrastructures include systems and assets--both physical and virtual--that are essential to the nation's security, economic prosperity, and public health, such as financial institutions, telecommunications networks, and energy production and transmission facilities. Because most of these infrastructures are owned by the private sector, establishing effective public-private partnerships is essential to securing them from pervasive cyber-based threats. Federal law and policy call for federal entities, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to work with private-sector partners to enhance the physical and cyber security of these critical infrastructures."
United States. Government Accountability Office
2011-07-26
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Safety and Security in the VA, Hearing Before the Subcommittee Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session, May 22, 1997
From the opening statement of Terry Everett: "Today's hearing by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations will examine the safety and security of our veterans and our valued 240,000-plus VA [Veterans' Affairs] employees. I've become increasingly concerned about personal safety issues at the VA after hearing about the tragic murder of Dr. Ralph Carter at the G.V. 'Sonny' Montgomery Veterans' Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, FL, this past February. I understand that this is the second violent assault at this facility in less than 2 years. Other incidents at VA facilities have also raised complex questions about the safety of veteran and VA staff alike. The VA's response has been to develop a pilot program to arm its hospital law-enforcement officers. The arming of VA police must be done at a very deliberate pace with stringent safeguards. Before going full-scale we must be confident that this is the right way to improve hospital security. We want to be reasonably assured that fire fights won't erupt in hospital lobbies, wards and parking lots. Standards for the VA should be no less than that for any other armed federal law-enforcement agency." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Terry Everett, James E. Clyburn, Lane Evans, Vic Snyder, John H. Baffa, Ernest W. Little, Richard P. Miller, John E. Ogden, Kenneth Faulstich, Charles F. Rinkevich, John Vitikacs, Joseph Wolfinger, Barbara Frango Zicafoose, and Frederick Roll.
United States. Government Printing Office
1998
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MMWR Early Release: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, February 4, 2022: Effectiveness of Face Mask or Respirator Use in Indoor Public Settings for Prevention of SARS-CoV-2 Infection -- California, February-December 2021
The Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) Series is prepared by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). [It] is the agency's primary vehicle for scientific publication of timely, reliable, authoritative, accurate, objective, and useful public health information and recommendations. This early release issue of MMWR contains the following article: "Effectiveness of Face Mask or Respirator Use in Indoor Public Settings for Prevention of SARS-CoV-2 [severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2] Infection -- California, February-December 2021." Notifiable Diseases and Mortality Tables from this issue can be accessed at the following link [http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/index2022.html].
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.)
2022-02-02
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Human Resources' Role in Preventing Insider Threats
From the Overview: "The insider is a dynamic, ever-evolving threat to an organization's personnel and critical information. Along with their security counterparts, Human Resources (HR) professionals play an integral role in developing and contributing to multi-disciplinary threat management teams to effectively detect, deter, and mitigate insider threats. As a central repository for personnel information, HR professionals are likely to identify patterns, behavior, and trends that will help mitigate potential harm to an organization and its employees. Depending upon the type and size of the organization, the financial and reputational losses associated with insider threats could cost millions annually. An insider threat may be a current or former employee, business partner, or contractor who intentionally or unintentionally attacks an organization and its personnel using either physical or cyber-based methods[.]"
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020-11-13?
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Complex Coordinated Attacks: Security Awareness for Soft Targets and Crowded Places
From the Document: "A Complex Coordinated Attack (CCA), also known as a Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack, is a violent assault or series of assaults by one or more individuals or groups using one or more type of weapons with the intent to inflict harm on large numbers of people. While these type of attacks often result from various motives including terrorist ideology, the continued proliferation of CCAs overseas and domestically demonstrates that CCAs remain a concern for the conceivable future."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2019-09-05?
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Assess: 'How to Navigate the Risk When Someone is Escalating'
From the Document: "This document describes activities and behaviors that may be concerning or indicative of impending violence. [...] The assessment process 'determines whether an emergency response is needed, if de-escalation is possible, or if a more formal assessment is needed'."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2021-09-21?
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Insider Threats 101: What You Need to Know
From the Overview: "Organizations of all sizes are vulnerable to an insider threat. An insider threat is the potential for an insider to use their authorized access or special understanding of an organization to harm that organization. This harm can include malicious, complacent, or unintentional acts that negatively affect the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the organization, its data, personnel, facilities, and associated resources."
United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
2020-11-18
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Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Available Resources
From the Document: "Malicious insiders pose a serious threat to organizations in the public and private sectors. Their authorized access or insider knowledge of critical assets offers them opportunities to compromise information, sabotage infrastructure, or inflict harm upon co-workers. A complacent or uninformed workforce can be equally as damaging by inadvertently allowing easy access to an external threat. Insider threats can be current or former employees, partners, contractors, or family and friends. Regardless of the actor, it is important for organizations to establish an insider threat program that can detect, deter, and prevent insiders from causing harm. Provided [herein] are some of the Department of Homeland Security resources to help organizations design a comprehensive program that protects against physical and cyber insider threats."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2018-09-12?
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Recovering from an Active Shooter Incident
From the Document: "In this dynamic threat environment, it is imperative that organizations not only prepare their staff to respond to a potential incident, but also determine the processes through which recovery takes place. Developing recovery plans and procedures support organizations in more effectively reconstituting services and providing employees with the necessary support following an incident. The Office of Infrastructure Protection's 'Active Shooter Recovery Guide' assists in the proactive implementation of policies and procedures that best position organizations to most effectively recover from an active shooter incident, while providing the best support structure for their employees, contractors, visitors, patrons, family members, and the community at large. The primary principles of the guide are provided [herein]."
United States. Department of Homeland Security
2017-08-09?
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Arctic Research Plan FY2017-2021
From the Executive Summary: "The United States is an Arctic nation--Americans depend on the Arctic for biodiversity and climate regulation and for natural resources. America's Arctic--Alaska--is at the forefront of rapid climate, environmental, and socio-economic changes that are testing the resilience and sustainability of communities and ecosystems. Research to increase fundamental understanding of these changes is needed to inform sound, science-based decision- and policy-making and to develop appropriate solutions for Alaska and the Arctic region as a whole. Created by an Act of Congress in 1984, and since 2010 a subcommittee of the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) in the Executive Office of the President, the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC) plays a critical role in advancing scientific knowledge and understanding of the changing Arctic and its impacts far beyond the boundaries of the Arctic. Comprising 14 Federal agencies, offices, and departments, IARPC is responsible for the implementation of a 5-year Arctic Research Plan in consultation with the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, the Governor of the State of Alaska, residents of the Arctic, the private sector, and public interest groups."
United States. White House Office
2016-12
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National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement [1996]
From the Introduction: "Our national security strategy is therefore based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and limiting a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world, particularly in countries of strategic importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper. [...] To that broad end, the three central components of our strategy of engagement and enlargement are: (1) our efforts to enhance our security by maintaining a strong defense capability and employing effective diplomacy to promote cooperative security measures; (2) our work to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth; and (3) our promotion of democracy abroad. It also explains how we are pursuing these elements of our strategy in specific regions by adapting and constructing institutions that will help to provide security and increase economic growth throughout the world."
United States. White House Office
1996-02
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Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy
From the Executive Summary: "Accelerating artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities will enable automation of some tasks that have long required human labor. These transformations will open up new opportunities for individuals, the economy, and society, but they have the potential to disrupt the current livelihoods of millions of Americans. Whether AI leads to unemployment and increases in inequality over the long-run depends not only on the technology itself but also on the institutions and policies that are in place. This report examines the expected impact of AI-driven automation on the economy, and describes broad strategies that could increase the benefits of AI and mitigate its costs."
United States. White House Office
2016-12
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National Security Strategy for a New Century [May 1997]
From the Preface: "This report, submitted in accordance with Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, sets forth a national security strategy to advance our national interests in this era of unique opportunities and dangers. It is premised on the belief that both our domestic strength and our leadership abroad are essential to advancing our goal of a safer, more prosperous America. Building upon America's unmatched strengths, the strategy's three core objectives are: [1] To enhance our security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win. [2] To bolster America's economic prosperity. [3] To promote democracy abroad. To achieve these objectives, we will remain engaged abroad and work with partners, new and old, to promote peace and prosperity. We can--and we must--use America's leadership to harness global forces of integration, reshape existing security, economic and political structures, and build new ones that help create the conditions necessary for our interests and values to thrive. "
United States. White House Office
1997-05
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Parameters Regarding the Iran's Nuclear Program
From the Document: "Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1 [UN Security Council's five permanent members (the P5); namely China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; plus Germany], the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months."
United States. White House Office
2015-04-02?
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Executive Order: Amending the Order of Succession in the Department of Homeland Security [August 13, 2007]
This document is the executive order amending the order of succession in the Department of Homeland Security.
United States. Office of the White House Press Secretary
2007-08-13
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National Security Directive 53: Interagency Review and Disposition of Export Control Licenses Issued by the Department of Commerce
In National Security Directive (NSD) 53, President H.W. Bush directs that "American exporters are entitles to prompt review of export license applications submitted to the United States Government. It is United States policy that there is a presumption of approval of such applications based on our commitment to an open international trading system and the need to ensure American competitiveness. Therefore, any U.S. agency that opposes an export license on national security grounds shall bear the burden to overcome this presumption of approval. At the same time, I want to emphasize that none of the changes set fourth in this directive are intended in any way to signal a lessening of our determination to weigh cautiously license applications raising potential nonproliferation or broader national security concerns."
United States. White House Office
1990-12-10
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National Security Directive 56: National Security Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Funding
In National Security Directive (NSD) 56, President H.W. Bush directs that "implementation and recurring costs for national level NESP [National Security Emergency Preparedness] telecommunications programs shall be shared by Defense and FEMA. Defense, as the Executive Agent for the National Communications System (NCS), shall fund all pre-implementations costs for national level NSEP telecommunications programs. Participation by federal agencies in the National Communications System will continue to be in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12472."
United States. White House Office
1991-04-30
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Department of Energy's Strategy for Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Policy, Health Care and Entitlements of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, First Session, March 19, 2013
This is the March 19, 2013 hearing on "Department of Energy's Strategy for Exporting Liquefied Natural Gas," held before the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. From the opening statement of James Lankford: "Today we are here to discuss the Department of Energy's [DOE] strategy and process in reviewing applications to export liquefied natural gas, LNG, specifically to non-free trade agreement countries. For countries with which we have a free trade agreement [FTA] covering the Natural Gas Act of 1938, and obviously amended multiple times since then, the Department of Energy is required to grant applications to export LNG. Such export is deemed to be consistent with the public interest and the authorization must be granted without modification or delay. For countries with which we do not have a free trade agreement covering natural gas, the Natural Gas Act presumes the Department of Energy will grant the application to export LNG unless the Department finds the proposed exportation will not be consistent with the public interest. The issue we are here to discuss today is not if we should export natural gas. The U.S. has exported natural gas via pipeline to Canada and Mexico since the 1930s. We are also not here to discuss if we should export liquefied natural gas. The U.S. has exported LNG from the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska since 1969. Again, by statute, the Department of Energy must approve LNG exports to FTA countries and the default position is it exports to non-FTA countries unless DOE finds that it is not consistent with the public interest. Finally, we are not here to discuss if we should export liquefied natural gas to non-FTA countries. Again, the U.S. has exported to Japan, which is not an FTA country, from Alaska since 1969. In the lower 48 in May 2011, the Department of Energy granted the first permit to export LNG to a non-FTA country. That facility is currently under construction in southwest Louisiana and will begin exporting LNG within two years." Statements, letters, and materials submitted for the record include those of the following: Tom Choi, Paul Cicio, Charles Ebinger, Chris Smith, Jim Jordan, James Lankford, Jackie Speier, and Elijah E. Cummings.
United States. Government Printing Office
2013
