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Defense Forum FoundationDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech at the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, DC on Friday, October 18, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz talk about Iraq during his speech at the Rayburn House. Deputy Wolfowitz said "Over the last 12 months, President Bush and his advisers have been weighing very carefully the risks of the various courses of action. While everything possible is being done to reduce those risks, no one is discounting them. The fundamental question is how to weigh the risks of action against the risks of inaction, and to weigh the risks of acting now against the risks of acting later, and doing so inevitably requires making judgments about things that are fundamentally uncertain. The search for evidence is understandable; the search for facts on which to pass those judgments is absolutely necessary. But at the end of the day, we are trying to judge what will happen in the future along different courses that we might take".United States. Department of DefenseWolfowitz, Paul2002-10-18
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On IraqDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave at speech at the Fletcher Conference in the Ronald Reagan Building on October 10, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz gave his speech on Iraq. Deputy Wolfowitz said "I want to talk to you today about an extremely important subject and a complicated subject which is the question, how do we weigh the risks of a possible use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq? Let me underscore at the outset that word possible. The President has not made any decision to use force and, to the contrary, he is exercising strenuous efforts to try to find a peaceful resolution to this serious threat that would allow us to avoid the use of force. But that possibility is in front of us. It's being debated. It was obviously debated vigorously when the Congress passed its important resolution last week. So I'd like to share some of my thinking with you. And since it is a complicated subject, and since some of you at least are from Fletcher and you're used to 50-minute segments, this may be a little long. Be patient".United States. Department of DefenseWolfowitz, Paul2002-10-16
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Association of Old Crows Annual Symposium and ConventionDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Nashville, TN, Monday, October 28, 2002 to the Association of Old Crows. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The real issue we face, though, is how to weigh the risks of using force, should we have to do so, and that's what I'd like to talk about briefly this afternoon. Those risks are very real. As President Bush has demonstrated over and over again, he takes those risks extremely seriously, as does everyone in his administration. That's why the President has made it clear that he will do everything possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that resolves this issue that resolves this danger to our country and the world, if possible, without the use of force".United States. Department of DefenseWolfowitz, Paul2002-10-28
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Commercial Perspective on InformationThis report responds to the following tasking from the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Provide an assessment of commercial information assurance, research and development funding, and determine where commercial technologies providers are currently investing and where they think investments should occur in the future. The results documented in the report will assist the Commission in developing its own set of recommendations for national IA research agenda, including recommendations for government funding, as part of the Commission's final report ot he President.United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office1997
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Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence DataMaking sure systems can work effectively together (interoperability) has been a key problem for the Department of Defense (DOD) yet integral to its goals for enhancing joint operations. Given the importance of being able to share intelligence data quickly, we were asked to assess DOD's initiative to develop a common ground-surface-based intelligence system and to particularly examine (1) whether DOD has adequately planned this initiative and (2) whether its process for testing and certifying the interoperability of new systems is working effectively. At times, these systems are not interoperable--either for technical reasons (such as incompatible data formats) and/or operational reasons. One multibillion-dollar initiative DOD has underway to address this problem is to pare down the number of ground-surface systems that process intelligence data and upgrade them to enhance their functionality and ensure that they can work with other DOD systems. The eventual goal is an overarching family of interconnected systems, known as the Distributed Common Ground-Surface System (DCGS). To date, planning for this initiative has been slow and incomplete. DOD is developing an architecture, or blueprint, for the new systems as well as an overarching test plan and an operational concept.United States. General Accounting Office2003-03-31
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Academic Workshop on Public ConfidenceThe following contains transcripts of the Academic Workshop on Public Confidence proceedings.United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office1997
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'I Love You' Virus: Lessons Learned Report"On 4 May 2000 the 'ILOVEYOU' Virus, also known as the "Love Bug", originated in the Philippines and wormed its way into government and business e-mail systems around the globe from Australia and Hong Kong westward through Asia, Europe, and the U.S., including throughout HQ FORSCOM and its subordinate commands. The 'ILOVEYOU' Virus spread about 15 times faster than last year's Melissa computer virus. The program's rapid proliferation brought E-mail Systems worldwide to a grinding halt forcing technicians to take hundreds of systems offline. The virus was spread through an E-mail attachment designed to propagate the virus message automatically throughout an agency's Global Email Address Directory. Unsuspecting users who opened the attachment automatically caused the virus to start spreading throughout their agencies' e-mail system. This overloaded email servers and caused technicians to shut down servers to assess what was happening and attempt to fix the problem. The virus spread throughout Army networks before Army anti-virus software updates that could detect and remove it were available. FORSCOM DOIMs and activities responded quickly to contain the virus but in the process, email service was impacted. The impact of the virus as reported to the Army Computer Emergency Response Team (ACERT) is: workstations infected - 2258, manhours lost - 12,010, estimated cost - $79.2K."United States. Department of the Army2000-05
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Human Capital: Building on the Current Momentum to Address High-Rish Issues, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before Congressional Subcommittees"Federal employees represent the government's knowledge base, drive its capacity to perform, and define its character, and as such, are its greatest asset. The early years of the 21st century are proving to be a period of profound transition for our world, our country, and our government. In response, the federal government needs to engage in a comprehensive review, reassessment, reprioritization, and as appropriate, reengineering of what the government does, how it does business, and in some cases, who does the government's business. Leading public organizations here and abroad have found that strategic human capital management must be the centerpiece of any serious change management initiative and effort to transform the cultures of government agencies. At the request of the subcommittees, GAO discussed the status of the federal government's efforts to address high-risk human capital weaknesses, possible short- and longer-term legislative solutions to those weaknesses, and other human capital actions that need to be taken to ensure that federal agencies are successfully transformed to meet current and emerging challenges."United States. General Accounting Office2003-04-08
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Center for the Study of Popular Culture, Restoration Weekend ConferenceDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Palm Beach, FL on Friday, November 15, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The war on terrorism is not something that's going to be over with one battle or one engagement, or in one country. As President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have said over and over again, we are in for a long war. If we do capture Osama bin Laden or kill him, the war will not be over. My boss reminded people right after September 11th that it's a mistake, in fact, to focus too much on one individual. And indeed, in some sense we should remind ourselves that the war on terrorism is not only about killing and capturing terrorists. As President Bush said in his State of the Union message, a major part of our efforts is building a just and peaceful world beyond the war on terrorism, and particularly in the Muslim world.United States. Department of DefenseWolfowitz, Paul2002-11-15
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Government Electronics and Information Technology AssociationDeputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Vienna, VA to the Government Electronics and Information Technology Association on Wednesday, October 30, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz discussed operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the technologies and strategies used in those operations.United States. Department of Defense2002-10-30
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FORTUNE Global ForumSecretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld gave a speech in Washington, DC on November 11, 2002. Secretary Rumsfeld said "In the global war against terrorism, President Bush has assembled the largest coalition in the history of mankind. Not bad for an administration that's frequently described by the press, and some in Europe, as unilateralist. The scope of this alliance is truly breathtaking in its breadth and its depth. Some 90 nations -- nearly half of the countries on the face of the earth -- are participating in the global war on terrorism. Never before have the interests of civilized nations more clearly overlapped. And never before have the nations of the world so effectively cooperated to defend them".United States. Department of DefenseRumsfeld, Donald, 1932-2002-11-11
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Universal Joint Task List"The Universal Joint Task List Version 4.2 (CJCSM 3500.04C) serves as a common language and common reference system for joint force commanders, combat support agencies, operational planners, combat developers, and trainers to communicate mission requirements. It is the basic language for development of a joint mission essential task list (JMETL) or agency mission essential task list (AMETL) that identifies required capabilities for mission success. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), when augmented with the Service task lists, is a comprehensive integrated menu of functional tasks, conditions, measures, and criteria supporting all levels of the Department of Defense in executing the National Military Strategy."United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff2002-07-01
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Civil Rights Issues Facing Arab Americans in MichiganThis report is a summary statement of the Michigan Advisory Committee's study on "Civil Rights Issues Facing the Arab American Community in Michigan" and includes conclusions and recommendations. Much of the report is based on information received by the Committee at a community forum held in Dearborn, Michigan, on September 27, 1999. The Michigan Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights is composed of 14 members. It is bipartisan, including representation from both political parties as well as the different geographic regions of the state. The Michigan Advisory Committee is also independent of any national, state, or local administration or policy group.United States Commission on Civil Rights2001-05
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Joint Task Force Headquaters Master Training Guide"In December 1993, the US Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Command (USCINCACOM) proposed to the Joint Staff that a Joint Task Force (JTF) training document be developed to link the Universal Joint Task List to joint doctrine/joint tactics, techniques and procedures (JTTP). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided funding for this project through the CINC Initiative Fund (CIF) and designated USACOM as the lead agent for its development. The intent is that this publication - named the Joint Task Force Headquarters Master Training Guide (JTF HQ MTG) - will be the first of a series of joint training documents that support the training and operations of all Joint Task Forces. An explanation of this series of publications is provided in Chapter 1. The purpose of the JTF HQ MTG is to provide a descriptive, performance-oriented training guide to assist leaders in training their units. It also serves as a guide for the JTF Headquarters in actual operations. This publication is not intended to include information on all types of joint units - just the JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS. It should be viewed as a single source for information, in outline form, to guide training of the JTF HQ."United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff1997-04-15
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Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request: U.S. General Accounting Office: TestimonyThis is the testimonial statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States. His statement contains information on the fiscal year 2001 budget performance and results, current challenges and future plans and requests for the 2003 fiscal year to support congress and the American public. Through GAO's effort, congress and government leaders saved $26.4 billion during FY 2001. This allowed for timely and rapid assistance to the events of September 11. Much of the document outlines the goals of the GAO in future years. Such goals include provision of timely, quality service to Congress and the federal government in addressing the financial security of the American people; respond to changing security threats and the challenges of global interdependence; and assist in transforming the government's role in conducting business to meet the needs of the 21st century. Topics covered include contributing to the military base closure and realignment process, cutting the cost of defense's acquisition infrastructure, improving department of defense antiterrorism efforts, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation and safety efforts, improving food safety, and creating a focal point for combating terrorism.United States. General Accounting Office2002-05-08
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Toward a National Biodefense Strategy: Challenges and Opportunities: A Report of the Center for Counterproliferation ResearchThe National Defense University's Center for Counterproliferation Research convened a multi-day conference in May 2002 to assess the status of and prospects for a national biodefense strategy. The conferences was sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the joint Staff and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and drew widespread participation from each of these and other DoD offices and other Federal agencies and from nongovernmental and industry specialists. This monograph is grounded in, but further elaborates on, the presentations and discussion conducted in that forum. The United States requires a national biodefense strategy designed to shape effective policies, guide and maximize investment, and balance competing objectives. Developing such a strategy is a major challenge since the biological threat is complex and highly dynamic. Traditional policy tools for preventing the proliferation of these weapons are lacking. There are significant scientific and technological hurdles to overcome in order to provide effective means of detecting, identifying, treating, and defeating biological agents used as either a weapon of terror or organized warfare. Any national strategy must take explicit account of the biological threat faced by the United States and its allies. Included among the many important issues addressed are: the role of treaties and threat reduction activities; the prospects for deterrence and interdiction; the role of industry in biodefense; preparedness and medical infrastructure; military force protection and installation preparedness; technical and scientific challenges of detection; treatment and forensics; and military operations in a BW environment. The threat posed by biological weapons, while not new, is evolving and does present a series of political, military, technological and psychological national security challenges. While some military and civilian organizations have substantial capabilities in place to help counter the BW threat, others are relative newcomers and have only recently begun to consider their roles in the national biodefense effort. Certainly, the fall 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States triggered an outpouring of resources and captured the attention of the Bush administration as well as the nongovernmental policy community, the media, and the public on BW threats. This monograph assesses the nature of the biological weapons threat and analyzes its broader implications for national security. It articulates the imperative for developing a cogent, robust, and integrated national biodefense strategy and highlights an important set of issues facing the policy, operational, intelligence, and public health communities. Finally, it offers a series of recommendations to understand the changing BW threat and for further developing appropriate responses.National Defense University. Center for Counterproliferation Research2003-04
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: The U.S. ExperienceThe United States has renounced the use of chemical and biological weapons and has reduced both its conventional and nuclear forces substantially since the end of the Cold War, says Korb. However, as long as some nations continue to try to develop weapons of mass destruction, "the United States will need some form of nuclear deterrent," he says. Korb is Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration. With the end of the Cold War and the decline of defense spending, the U.S. economy grew rapidly during the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the U.S. GDP exceeded $8 trillion, unemployment was at 4.3 percent, and inflation was below 2 percent. Maintaining stability in the international system, while not cheap, will not place as much of a burden on the U.S. economy or the American people as the Cold War did. There will, of course, continue to be debates about how much is enough for defense. There are many, like former head of the Strategic Air Command, General Lee Butler, and former commander of the space command and commander of the air component of the Gulf War, General Charles Horner, who argue that the United States should eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. These Air Force generals feel that precision guided U.S. conventional weapons are now so powerful that they can deter use of weapons of mass destruction by themselves. Moreover, they argue that by eliminating nuclear weapons, the United States can seize the moral high ground in the nonproliferation debate. But, like the debates during the Cold War, these debates will not lead to the elimination of all U.S. nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, some nations have tried and will continue to try to develop weapons of mass destruction, and as long as they do, the United States will need some form of nuclear deterrent, particularly since it has given up its chemical and biological weapons.United States. Department of StateKorb, Lawrence J., 1939-1999-09
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Information Warfare Threat Demands More Attention on All SidesNeither the administration, nor the Congress, nor the public at large is devoting enough serious attention to the growing threat of information warfare, says Senator Jon Kyl. Potential adversaries are honing their ability to attack the critical infrastructure that increasingly runs the nation's communications, transportation, and financial systems -- and its vital defense establishment as well, he warns. Kyl, an Arizona Republican, serves as chairman of the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information of the Senate Judiciary Committee. He also is a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Kyl was interviewed by Contributing Editor Ralph Dannheisser. Topics discussed include vulnerability of digital systems to attack, national security and public safety concerns, possible damage if the information grid is broken into, and legislative attention on this issue. According to Kyl, a large number of countries have information warfare programs under way, some of which are aimed at the United States. In his opinion the United States is, by far, the most vulnerable country because of the degree of our reliance upon technology.United States. Department of StateDannheisser, Ralph1998-11
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Information Assurance and the New Security EpochThe United States has faced five security epochs, with each change involving transitions from a certain past to an uncertain future. The first epoch was from the Revolutionary War to the mid-1820s, with the United States at the fringe of an international security environment still dominated by Europe. The most recent epoch -- the Cold War -- was dominated by a bipolar world. The United States led the international community in creating institutions to rebuild the shattered economies of Europe and to deal with the collapse of the old Europe-dominated empires in the Third World. At the same time, the United States was leading the free world states to contain communism until the Soviet Union collapsed. Now we are in transition to a new epoch, seemingly characterized by the revival of old dangers -- nationalism and ethnicity. We now live with the unsettling fear of "loose nukes" and chemical and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists. The next security epoch also will present the challenge of cyber security. The explosive growth in the use of information technologies (IT) has had a profound effect on all sectors of the American economy and government. IT has fueled amazing economic growth, dramatically improved communications, and allowed American businesses to compete more effectively than ever. The United States -- and the world -- truly rely on information technology in ways unimaginable even just a few years ago. Information assurance, encryption, and network security pose some of the most daunting challenges the Department of Defense has ever faced. To take advantage of the IT revolution, we must ensure access to and protection of the very assets on which we depend. We are taking giant strides to make this happen, but much more remains to be done. These challenging days require that we turn to the expertise of information professionals both in DOD and in the broader government and private sectors to protect systems vital to all of us. We must ensure that our nation's journey into the new security epoch is as successful as the last.United States. Department of StateHamre, John J.1998-11
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Adapting the CFE Treaty to New Realities and ChallengesSince its inception, "CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) has become both a process and a venue for continuous dialogue on the security concerns of its participants and, whenever possible, cooperative solutions," says Dunkerley, Special Envoy for CFE. "This dynamic within CFE -- between reinforcing stability and addressing change -- will remain one of its greatest strengths." Since early 1997, negotiations have been under way in Vienna to update the CFE Treaty to take account of dramatic changes throughout Europe since the treaty was originally signed in 1990. These negotiations, taking place among the 30 States Parties within the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG), are intended to preserve the treaty's critical benefits, even while establishing a new structure of limitations providing increased stability and transparency. At the same time, individual States Parties have set out projected levels for their future national and territorial ceilings under an adapted CFE Treaty. For many of them, this would involve reductions in their permitted levels in two or more categories of Treaty-Limited Equipment. (In light of the drastic change in circumstances from the 1980s to the present, for example, the United States proposes to cut by more than 50 percent the number of tanks it has been permitted to have in Europe under the treaty. This does not imply a major change to the United States' actual military presence, but rather recognition that original CFE-permitted levels need to adjust to a new security environment.) But much still needs to be done. There are tough decisions ahead for all parties. Translating the work done thus far, and the underlying political agreements, into legal treaty text is a major task. Important details are still open -- especially if we are to secure the necessary transparency this future CFE regime will require. No less critical are the continued efforts of the United States and its allies to ensure the full and timely implementation of all existing CFE obligations under the current treaty and its associated documents. Implementation is the foundation on which successful adaptation can go forward.United States. Department of StateDunkerley, Craig Gordon1999-09
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Small Arms Use and Proliferation: Strategies for a Global DilemmaSmall arms proliferation is a symptom of increased intrastate conflicts and is "a problem that is not amenable to simple or quick solution and will be with us for the long term," says Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. "The United States and the international community must therefore address the root causes of intrastate conflict and, at the same time, try to stem the supply of these weapons and contain the devastation that they cause." While most arms control efforts focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and heavy conventional weapons, small arms and light weapons designed for military use are responsible for most of the killing and injuries, especially of civilians, in the increasing number of intrastate conflicts that have occurred since the end of the Cold War. These weapons include assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and individually portable mortars and missiles. The focus of U.S. policy is to achieve agreement by next year on a Protocol on Illicit Firearms and Ammunition Trafficking to the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention. This protocol is modeled on the InterAmerican Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, and Other Related Materials initiated by the OAS. Seven OAS member states have ratified the convention (Mexico, Belize, Bahamas, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, and Ecuador), and all but four OAS members have signed it. In June 1998 the President transmitted the convention to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent. In a larger sense, small arms proliferation is one of many symptoms of increased intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. The proliferation and use of these weapons in such conflicts is a problem that is not amenable to simple or quick solution, and it will be with us for the long term. The United States and the international community must therefore address the root causes of intrastate conflict and, at the same time, try to stem the supply of these weapons and contain the devastation that they cause. This will require us to begin to integrate small arms concerns into the fabric of our diplomatic relations, as we now do with democracy and human rights. Without sustained, creative attention to both aspects of the problem of intrastate conflict, many of the other problems that we strive to mitigate will become worse.United States. Department of StateNewsom, Eric David1999-09
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Landmine-Safe World by 2010: Not an Idle DreamThe United States is engaged in a concerted effort to eliminate the threat that landmines pose to civilians worldwide by the end of the next decade, say Steinberg and Zimmerman. They believe the United States can achieve this goal by "working with governments, international agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens around the world." Steinberg, former U.S. Ambassador to Angola, is the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Global Humanitarian Demining. Zimmerman is a Harold W. Rosenthal Fellow working in the President's Office of Global Humanitarian Demining; she is now completing her graduate studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Our government is firmly committed to ending the humanitarian crisis caused by landmines. The goal of President Clinton's "Demining 2010 Initiative" is to eliminate the threat of landmines to civilians around the world by the end of the next decade. We are taking key steps toward this goal. Our government is financing programs in about 28 heavily mined countries to eradicate their worst minefields by providing equipment, financial support, and training for deminers. In sum, we have spent $250 million on these and similar programs over the past five years, and are expanding our efforts to more than $100 million in 1999. Together with our humanitarian demining efforts, the steps outlined in this article are a serious, pragmatic approach toward landmines. Working with governments, international agencies, NGOs, and private citizens, we can achieve the goal of eliminating the threat of landmines to civilians around the world by the year 2010. The children of the new millennium deserve nothing less than to walk the earth without fear.United States. Department of StateSteinberg, Donald K.; Zimmerman, Laurie B.1999-09
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Year 2000 ProblemThe world currently faces one of the great challenges of the Information Age. As we head toward a new millennium, many computer systems, as well as the computer chips embedded in everything from personal computers to household appliances and sophisticated manufacturing equipment, are set to shift backwards in time. The problem is that many older computer systems and microprocessors, as computer chips are known, use only the last two digits of a year to keep track of the date. So, when the year 2000 arrives, those chips may recognize 00 as the year 1900, not 2000. The resulting malfunctions could cause serious disruptions of power grids, water treatment plants, financial networks, telecommunications systems, and air traffic control systems worldwide. In an increasingly wired world with a global economy, computer networks are only as strong as their weakest link. While each nation is likely to experience its own particular system problems, in a very real sense we are all in this together. Year 2000-related disruptions are likely to begin before the new millennium as outmoded systems attempt to calculate or schedule future events. Precisely what will happen is difficult to predict at this point. There are a number of Internet Web sites in the United States where some experts that one would not normally think of as alarmists have predicted widespread system failures that will result in power outages, traffic problems, economic recession, and possibly, in some regions, food shortages. While the author tends to be more optimistic than these doomsayers, he is concerned particularly about countries where inactivity and lack of awareness could lead to fulfillment of some worst-case scenarios. The point is that by taking action now we can minimize the disruptions and, hopefully, effect a seamless transition to the year 2000.United States. Department of StateKoskinen, John Andrew, 1939-1998-11
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Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning: State and Local Guide (101): Chapter 6, Attachment G: TerrorismThis new guidance, Attachment G, is a supplement to Chapter 6 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)State and Local Guide 101 Guide. This supplement aids state and local emergency planners develop and maintain a plan for responding to and recovering from terrorist-initiated incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. The guide discusses hazards, situations and assumptions, operations, organization and assignment of responsibilities, and administration and logistics. The purpose of Attachment G is to aid State and local emergency planners in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident Appendix (TIA) to an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) for incidents involving terrorist-initiated weapons of mass destruction (WMD).1 The planning guidance in this Attachment was prepared with the assistance of the Departments of Defense, Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Veterans Affairs; the Environmental Protection Agency; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the National Emergency Management Association; and the International Association of Emergency Managers. State and local governments have primary responsibility in planning for and managing the consequences of a terrorist incident using available resources in the critical hours before Federal assistance can arrive. The information presented in this Attachment should help planners develop a TIA that integrates the Federal, State, and local responses. The TIA resulting from this guidance should supplement existing State and local EOPs. A suggested format for a TIA is shown in Tab A. The TIA should identify and discuss the nature of the WMD hazard(s), the hazard agents, potential targets, and release areas, as described in this document. The entire document "State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning" may be found at: http://www.fema.gov/rrr/gaheop.shtmUnited States. Federal Emergency Management Agency2001-04
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Research and Development for Combating Terrorism: Technical Support Working GroupThis report describes the organization and activities of the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), which conducts an interagency research and development program for combating terrorism. The working group balances technology and capability development efforts among the four pillars of combating terrorism: intelligence support, counter-terrorism, anti-terrorism, and consequence management. Today, TSWG still performs that counterterrorism technology development function as a stand-alone interagency working group. TSWG operates under the policy oversight of the Department of State's Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the management and technical oversight of the Department of Defense (DoD) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)). Participation is open to federal departments and agencies. While the TSWG's core funds are derived principally from the DoD's Combating Terrorism Technology Support (CTTS) Program, and the DOS, other departments and agencies contribute additional funds. Other departments and agencies also provide personnel to act as project managers and technical advisors. The TSWG has successfully transitioned capabilities to the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury (Secret Service, Customs, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms); the Intelligence Community; the Transportation Security Administration; the Public Health Service; and other departments and agencies. TSWG membership includes representatives from over eighty organizations across the Federal Government. These departments and agencies work together by participating in one or more subgroups. A comprehensive listing of member organizations by subgroup is provided in the appendix. The nine subgroups are: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; Explosives Detection; Improvised Device Defeat; Infrastructure Protection; Investigative Support and Forensics; Personnel Protection; Physical Security; Surveillance, Collection and Operations Support; and Tactical Operations Support.United States. Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office. Technical Support Working Group2002
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Small Arms and Asymmetric Threats"The US response to an asymmetric threat must be an improvement over what has historically been the case. It is arguable that at least three small arms developmental strategies should be adopted. These strategies would permit flexible small arms applications and make the force adaptable in combat at distances from arms-length to roughly 300 meters. First, small arms must overmatch the threat's lethality in close quarters battle while minimizing collateral damage. Second, small arms must continue to overmatch the threat in conventional battle. Third, small arms must be effective against nonparadigmatic shadow threats such as terrorists, drug cartel operatives and transnational criminals. Should US small arms overmatch the threat at long range, the threat will likely seek combat in an urban or heavily wooded area to negate that advantage. The threat could also attempt to erode confidence in weapon systems with the goal of compromising faith in those who manufacture them, the government who supplies them, those who use them and the purpose for which they are employed. Today's pursuit of offensive and defensive technologies--and the under- or over-reliance on them by either the threat or the United States--may well determine whether the US military can successfully deter or defeat future threats. The article also presents likely technological trends that might produce significant improvements in threat small arms from now until the year 2020."U.S. Army Command and General Staff CollegeSmall, Stephen C.2000-11
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Validation Assessment of Thunder 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceA validation assessment of THUNDER 6.5's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) module is accomplished using formulation and experimental validation techniques. A comparison of ISR purposes and processes according to military doctrine is made with the purposes and processes of ISR implemented within THUNDER 6.5. This comparison provides an overview of the process, an understanding of the level of aggregation within THUNDER, insight into possible problem areas in THUNDER, and a basis for improving THUNDER ISR processes. Sensitivity analysis of the ISR parameters as they relate to the Quality, Quantity, and Timeliness of ISR is also presented to provide insight into the responsiveness of THUNDER to changes in ISR capability for selected battle outcomes. Linear Regression and a Face-Centered Central Composite Design were used to generate a response surface. Ninety-percent confidence intervals were used to determine differences in mean response among the full factorial design points.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Nelson, Francine N.1998-03
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Value of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet: How Much Could the DOD Spend on Incentives?This study evaluated the value of the CRAF program to the DOD and explored the amount that could be spent to remove potential obstacles to participation with aviation insurance and lost market share. In comparing the value of the CRAF and the cost of current incentives, it was determined that up to $1.4 million could be spent on additional incentives, annually. For multiple aircraft losses and liability claims, the Air Force would need to tap into the Defense Business Operating Fund. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis was conducted and found that for low valued aircraft, such as the DC8, the cost due to loss would exceed the cost of commercial insurance at relatively low incident rates. Thus, it may be appropriate for the DOD to absorb the cost of commercial war-risk insurance for certain missions, thereby eliminating the expense resulting from a large claim. The cost due to lost market share was measured by the minimum cost required to re-enter a city pair market. At highly desirable airports, this cost is approximately $51,200 per month. However, this research found no conclusive evidence that would warrant additional monetary incentives to reduce the risk of lost market share.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Donovan, Pamela S.1996-09
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Value Focused Approach to Determining the Top Ten Hazards in Army AviationThe United States Army Safety Center is challenged with identifying the top ten most severe hazards in Army Aviation. This research utilizes value-focused thinking and multiattribute preference theory concepts to produce a decision analysis model designed to aid decision-makers in their analysis process. The severity model is based on the Army's Risk Management doctrinal manual and has been tailored specifically for aviation related accidents and hazards. The model determines the severity and risk ranking for 65 categories of accidents and 24 existing hazards. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to examine the effects of variations in the weights of the top-level criteria for accident and hazard severity. Recommendations are presented for ways to use the information contained in this report to assist in developing risk reduction controls focused on force protection. The model provides the decision-makers with a decision analysis methodology that is consistent with Army doctrine and the values of the current chain of command at the Army Safety Center. Furthermore the model can be adjusted for different leadership levels or situations.Air Force Institute of Technology (U.S.)Nelson, Francine N.1998-03
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Learning from the Arms Control ExperienceArms control and disarmament policy became an integral part of America's national defense strategy during the Cold War. The implementation of that policy brought with it into the security arena a number of environmental issues. In some instances, addressing environmental concerns was a major goal of our arms control agenda, as in the treaty banning environmental modification as a method of warfare (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1996). In other cases, environmental problems presented challenges to the achievement of other goals, as in the obstacles created by clean air standards to the rapid elimination of ballistic missiles required by new treaties. The environmental consequences of conflict were also a matter of debate within the arms control community: for example, the fear that a "nuclear winter" could follow a global war, the controversy over use of defoliants in counter-insurgency operations, and the uncertainty about regional consequences of Saddam Hussein's burning of the Kuwaiti oil fields during the Gulf War. Environmental degradation was increasingly seen also as a cause of conflict or a hindrance to peace. Concerns that environmental threats might undermine negotiations led to considerable parallelism in the Multilateral Middle East Peace Process as the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group found itself following closely developments in the working groups dealing with water, refugees, and economics. As we consider suggestions that our notions of international security be broadened or enhanced to include a greater centrality for environmental issues, insights can be gained from recent arms control experience. In part, that experience places before us case studies of the national security establishment coming to grips with environmental questions. Perhaps of even greater value is the recognition that the arms control policy process, with themes, institutions, and individuals mirroring and even overlapping those involved in the environmental policy process, has debated many of the same issues now central to the question of what is "environmental security." Thus, one can gain some insight into the role environmental issues play in national security by looking at the arms control experience. In the process, thinking about what is meant by "environmental security" may be clarified.United States. Department of EnergyLehman, II, Ronald F.1998-07-14