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Infrastructure Protection Solutions Catalog: A 'Legal Foundations' Study: Report 5 of 12: Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
In early 1997, the requirement arose in the President's Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) for maintaining a running catalog of ideas relating to potential solutions for infrastructure protection. In assembling this catalog, we relied heavily on the work of other bodies that preceded the President's Commission. The Infrastructure Protection Solutions Catalog embodied those preliminary efforts and was maintained through March 1997, the time at which the Commission began to formulate its own potential recommendations. It is a compendium of prior recommendations made by informed individuals, study commissions, and other groups who have weighed in on issues related to infrastructure assurance. Possible solutions are arranged within broad solution categories. Within each category is a general description of its scope and an "external considerations" section. External considerations are specific solution-related ideas, proposals or recommendations that came to our attention by way of the papers and briefings referenced in the Bibliography to this document. These efforts led to the development of another "Solutions Catalog" used during the U.S. Infrastructure Assurance Prosperity Game and Planning Event Number 2, held on March 23-25, 1997 in Chantilly, Virginia. The event was sponsored by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the National Communications System and the Department of Energy, and was produced by Sandia National Laboratories and the Prosperity Institute. This catalog is also included here in Appendix A, as it appeared in gaming materials, to demonstrate the full range of solution ideas that were brought to the attention of the PCCIP to inform its deliberations
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997
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Federal Structures for Infrastructure Protection
The options described in an earlier IDA paper called for the creation of a new federal leadership body for protecting the economic infrastructure. The Proposed body would lead or coordinate activities across the federal government in each of the five capability areas needed for infrastructure protection. These are strategy and policy formulation, prevention and mitigation, operational warning, consequence management and recovery, and counter-action. This paper examines alternative ways of sharing responsibilities between and among such a new structure for infrastructure protection and existing structures responsible for related activities.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Information Sharing Models: A 'Legal Foundations' Special Study: Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
The following discussion describes and analyzes various approaches to information sharing. Each of the approaches, or models, reflects methods adopted by Federal and state government entities and, in many cases, private companies and institutions. This discussion is divided into two parts. The first part is a discussion of five basic models of information acquisition and dissemination. Where appropriate and useful, bullet points showing "stovepipes" and "filters" are inserted into the text. The second part of this paper is a more thorough discussion of key cross-model issues, such as national security, business proprietary matters, antitrust, and liability for disclosure/failure to disclose. These applications illustrate regimes that both thwart and encourage information sharing across critical infrastructures.
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997
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Incentives to Encourage Infrastructure Assurance Investments
When the Federal government and the private sector begin building the various public-private partnerships the commission feels are necessary to assure the availability of critical infrastructures, the range and scope of financial incentives will become important items to be negotiated. The Commission found that 95 percent of the critical infrastructures themselves are owned by entities other than the Federal government, and it is natural to assume that they will be expected to pick up the large majority of the costs for maintaining and assuring access to these infrastructures. A significant problem with paying for the necessary steps to protect the critical infrastructures is based on a historical paradox of economics called the "tragedy of the commons" in which no particular person or entity has a direct interest (or responsibility) for bearing the costs of the common good (common welfare, common defense, etc.) but in which all persons or entities suffer if these costs are not borne. With the inter-dependencies between and among the critical infrastructures themselves, the danger is even more acute because a failure in one can cascade into losses which affect many owners and operators and their customers.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Defense Department Town Hall Meeting With Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld gave a speech at the pentagon which was followed by a Question and Answer session. The Secretary answered questions from people at the Pentagon about the War on Terrorism. Some sample questions include: what are we and our coalition partners doing to seal off the Pakistani and the Iranian border from allowing pro-Taliban and al Qaeda fighters to infiltrate into Afghanistan to join up with the guerrilla forces? Others include: how does the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians impact our war on terrorism, and what role do you see the United States playing in solving that conflict?
United States. Department of Defense
2002-03-07
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Bridging the Dangerous Gap between the West and the Muslim World
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech on how best to bridge the gap between the West and the Muslim World. Deputy Wolfowitz said "We hear and read a lot today about the clash of cultures, or what Samuel Huntington called the clash of civilizations. Today, I would like to take a moment to go beyond the headlines--both to get some altitude and to look a bit deeper at what I believe is less a clash of cultures than a collision of misunderstanding between the Muslim and Western worlds.
My view on the subject of East and West, one that has been shaped by personal experience, is decidedly optimistic. But, that does not mean I am not a realist, or that I can't see the stark truth that confronts us today: There is a dangerous gap between the West and the Muslim world. We must bridge this gap, and we must begin now--the gap is wide and there is no time for delay. Whether we are successful in narrowing the critical divide between East and West will be a major factor in shaping the future.
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-05-03
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Gridiron Luncheon
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech at the Gannett/USA Today Headquarters. Deputy Wolfowitz said "During this critical time in our nation's history, the men and women of the press, in very great measure, give all Americans objective and unbiased reporting. They work long hours and put themselves in harm's way to tell important stories. They help to keep us and the bureaucracies that work for us, or are supposed to work for us, honest. And one of the most important stories they are telling is the story about our brave men and women who serve this country so nobly and so well, and we appreciate everything that the media is doing to tell that story."
United States. Department of Defense
2002-03-09
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San Francisco World Affairs Council
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, William J. Haynes II gave a speech to the World Affairs Council concerning the Bush Administration's approach to foreign policy and international security: that it is unilateralist and dismissive of the role of our allies and international institutions. General Counsel Haynes said "It is a critique more often heard abroad than in America, and much less frequently heard after September 11--when America assembled the most diverse coalition in history to make war on terrorism, and mobilized all the institutions of the international community to undergird that effort. Nevertheless it remains a subtext of a running commentary by critics of our foreign and defense policy, and deserves to be addressed head-on. Let me start with the so-called Rome Statute as the first case in point.
United States. Department of Defense
Haynes, William J.
2002-05-30
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Speech By Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to the American Jewish Committee
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas J. Feith gave a speech to the American Jewish Committee concerning the war on Terrorism. Under Secretary Feith said "I'd like to talk with you about the war on terrorism - to discuss the progress of the war and share some thoughts about its nature, our objectives and our strategy. Our enemy in the war on terrorism is not a state or a group of states. Our enemy is not organized as a conventional military force. We cannot define victory as the conquering and subduing of a particular piece of territory or a people. We cannot expect that our own territory will be spared major damage so long as our armed forces remain undefeated. This is indeed a most unusual war - different from any that we fought in the past. We're fighting not a nation but a terrorist network - one might even say a network of networks, an amorphous structure present in many countries, including those of our allies, and in the United States itself. So it's a complicated struggle on multiple fronts. And we can't rely on conventional armed power to the extent we relied on such means in past wars. That's why administration officials so often stress that we must bring to bear the full range of instruments of US national power, including intelligence, financial, diplomatic and, not least, moral, as well as military tools. Fundamental to our strategy is the recognition that we can't just defend ourselves at our own borders. We have no choice but to take the offensive".
United States. Department of Defense
Feith, Douglas J.
2002-05-08
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Adequacy of Criminal Law and Procedure (Physical): A 'Legal Foundations' Study: Report 8 of 12: Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
This paper examines the adequacy of current criminal law to provide protection for the nation's critical infrastructures from physical attack. It also addresses the adequacy of criminal law to deter or punish attacks on infrastructures, how it might be amended, revised, or supplemented to close the gap.
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997
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DoD Acquisition and Logistics Excellence Week Kickoff--Bureaucracy to Battlefield
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave a speech at the Pentagon in which he described Pentagon bureaucracy as an enemy of the United States. The Secretary says the "challenge is to transform not just the way we deter and defend, but the way we conduct our daily business". The secretary describes the need for this change because "the world has--and we have not yet changed sufficiently. The clearest and most important transformation is from a bipolar Cold War world where threats were visible and predictable, to one in which they arise from multiple sources, most of which are difficult to anticipate, and many of which are impossible even to know today."
United States. Department of Defense
Rumsfeld, Donald, 1932-
2001-09-10
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American Primacy and Major Power Concert: A Critique of the 2002 National Security Strategy
The Bush administration's National Security Strategy of 2002 has attracted attention and debate largely because of its arguments about the role of preemption. But over the longer term the strategy may prove far more significant in terms of its vision for relations with Russia, China, and the other major powers. As Condoleezza Rice has argued in describing the thinking behind the strategy, "we have an historic opportunity to
break the destructive pattern of great power rivalry that has bedeviled the world since the
rise of the nation state in the 17th century." This is a bold vision. It extends the notion of
transformation from defense strategy to geopolitics. But is it viable? What is required to
achieve this ambition? The opportunity is real - this is the conclusion from an informal dialogue among analysts and policymakers from the five permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council that IDA cosponsored between 1999 and 2001. That dialogue explored the
differences of worldview, historical perspective, and national interest informing strategy
and policy in each capitol. Ranging across such myriad topics as the balance of power,
the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, the impact of ballistic missile defense, and
the tensions between multipolarity and unipolarity, that dialogue also gave vent to
debates in each country about the requirements of peace and stability in the current era.
To the surprise of many, that dialogue extended into a deep exploration of sovereignty's
contribution to peace and to the requirements of political legitimacy. Also to a surprising
extent, issues related to weapons of mass destruction cut across much of the agenda, and
with them, questions about the ability of a "nuclear aristocracy" to provide nuclear order
over the long term. For the Americans in the dialogue process, the main message from
the others was simply that doubts about American power and purposes on the world stage
permeate every aspect of the global security dialogue. In its moment of unprecedented
power and dominance, what will America choose to do? What will it do with primacy?
United States. Department of Defense
Roberts, Brad
2002-12
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Building a Better World: One Path from Crisis to Opportunity
Remarks as Delivered by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, at the Brookings Institution talking about the war on Terrorism. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The attacks also shined a searchlight of truth on the real intentions of the terrorists. For as Shafeeq Ghabra pointed out, the terrorists seek to target not just America, but Muslims and Islam by attacking the ideals of tolerance, justice and openness that are the aspirations of millions of Muslims around the world, as well. If the terrorists are successful in destroying these ideals, East and West alike will suffer. As I've been pointing out to audiences since that day, the terrorists target their fellow Muslims, upon whom they aim to impose a new kind of violent tyranny--a tyranny that pretends to be based on Islam but which owes more to the totalitarian impulses of the 20th century than to the great religion that the terrorists are attempting to hijack. The hundreds of millions of Muslims who aspire to modernity, freedom and prosperity are just as much on the front lines of the struggle against terrorism as are we.
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-09-02
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Gathering Storm: The Threat of Global Terror and Asia/Pacific Security
Paul Wolfowitz: "Like most in this audience, I share the view that the Pacific is as important as any region in this world, perhaps the most important when we contemplate the challenges of the next half-century and the extraordinary dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region. Developing America's relationship with our Pacific partners is one of our highest security priorities. Twelve months ago, I might have called it our biggest challenge. But last September 11th, another enormous challenge intruded. We are now engaged in a relentless war on international terrorism. Yet it remains equally important to work on building a better and more secure future, and a large part of that future will be built right here in the Asia-Pacific region."
United States. Department of Defense
2002-06-01
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Contingency Operations Cost Breakdown Structure
For budget estimation, budget execution, and reporting purposes (and in some cases for billing purposes) the costs associated with contingency operations are limited to the incremental costs of the operation. Incremental costs are those additional costs the Department incurs as a direct result of the contingency operation; they are costs which otherwise would not have been incurred if the operation had not been supported. Pricing for incremental material and services shall be at the DoD rate (refer to Chapter 1, Volume 11A of the "DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) (DoD 7000.14-R)." The
following cost categories form the structure used for estimating and reporting costs of
contingency operations. All costs are limited to that increment above and beyond baseline training, operational, and personnel costs.
United States. Department of Defense
2001-03-28
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Beyond the ABM Treaty
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech that was printed in the Wall Street Journal. Deputy Wolfowitz was giving remarks concerning the ABM Treaty and. Deputy Wolfowitz said this: "Last year the president announced our intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty. Yesterday, that withdrawal formally took effect. As a result, we are now free to develop, test and deploy effective defenses against missile attacks from states like North Korea and Iran -- states that are aggressively seeking weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. As the president said in his State of the Union Address, we will not allow the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons. We need to defend against all avenues of attack with weapons of mass destruction. Missiles in the hands of states that support terrorism are a growing threat to the U.S. and our friends and allies. We've watched rogue states invest scarce resources to acquire increasingly capable missiles even while they starve their people. Until yesterday, because of the ABM treaty, we have not been able to develop appropriate defenses against this threat. We are at a turning point in defense and deterrence policy. We can now move forward with the robust development and testing program that the Department of Defense has designed to take advantage of new technologies and basing modes. Recent tests provide a foundation on which to proceed. Development and testing will continue, but we will also begin to deploy effective layered defenses against limited missile attack".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-06-14
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Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security: January 1, 1996 - December 31, 1996
This report presents a summary of events. programs. and accomplishments in civil aviation scurity in 1996, including the effectiveness of screening in air transportation and foreign air carrier and airport security. Recent events, growth of the aviation industry, and the intelligence assessments that pointed to an increasing threat of terrorism within the United States raised concern about the standard everyday measures that formed the baseline of domestic aviation security. This concern, the tragedies of VluJet Fligth 592 and TWA Fligth 800, and major legislation drove a year of sweeping changes and growing partnerships and programs in civil aviation security.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
1997
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Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security: January 1, 1997 - December 31, 1997
This report presents a summary of events, programs, and accomplishments in civil aviation security in 1997. The year continued the significant changes in direction and emphasis in civil aviation security in the United States that began in 1996 in the aftermath of the ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800 tragedies. The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security recommended several measures to improve aviation safety and security and ensure that the U.S. aviation system remains the safest and most secure aviation system in the world. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) made significant progress this year in implementing many of the White House Commission's recommendations and related legislation.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
1998
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Annual Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security: January 1, 1995 - December 31, 1995
The year 1995 was one of many terrorist attacks, but for civilian aviation it should be recorded as year of disasters averted. Of particular significance was the explosive device hidden on a Phillipine airliner flying from Manila to Osaka, via Cebu, on December 11, 1994. On detonation, this devie killed a Japanese student. This event turned out be the prelude for attempts to attack several American carrier flights in East Asia in January 1995. The FA adopted extensive security measures overseas to protect against this threat and additional measures were required at U.S. airports. The FAA also issued emergency security program amendments to 27 foreign air carriers operating to the United States from the Asia-Pacific region to address a specific threat in that region of the world.
United States. Federal Aviation Administration
1996
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Intro to the NERC/NICP Indications, Analysis & Warnings Program: IAW Program: Electric Power Sector
This presentation outlines the growing threat of a potential cyber attack on the electrical power industry in the United States. The government and industries lack the financial and human resources to deal with a proposed threat. The problem stems from easy access from unauthorized users into computer systems via an increase in worldwide connectivity. The Indications, Analysis & Warnings (IAW) Program, Electric Power Sector, responds to the increased risk of physical & cyber threats. The Electric Power participants are crucial to government and other critical industries such as water, banking and finance, telecommunications and transportation because these industries and government rely upon electricity. How the Program Works: (1) A company agrees to participate and distributes jobaids and forms so employees know how to recognize & report incidents; (2) When there is an "incident", you fill out a report, and send it to NIPC and NERC; (3) At the same time, NIPC is collecting data from numerous other organizations; (4) Industry experts review the data and look for trends and send out warnings if warranted.
National Infrastructure Protection Center (U.S.)
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Basics of Freight Rail Transportation in the United States
This report provides a preliminary assessment of the freight railroad system as a critical infrastructure of the United States, and describes the system's ability to continue to operate after accidents, natural disasters, actions caused by trespasses, and possible terrorist attacks.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Liability and Insurance: Infrastructure Assurance
Coopers & Lybrand L.L.P. (C&L) was engaged by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) to conduct a market study on infrastructure assurance in the oil and gas, electric and telecommunications industries. The purpose of this study was to identify and examine public policy issues associated with questions of responsibility for assuring reliable infrastructure services, both today and in the future. Its aim was also to identify how service providers deal with liability for service interruptions in the oil and gas, electric and telecommunications sectors. The study also assessed the impact of deregulation on infrastructure by terrorist or cyber attacks. Our analysis involved background research and interviews with senior executives in the three industries in question as well as related industries including law firms, insurance companies and financial institutions. Interview participants were selected that provide a wide range of perspectives and represent different types of service providers existing in the market, a variety of company sizes, different departments within organizations, as well as geographic diversity. The information and opinions presented in this report reflect the interview responses and perceptions within the industry.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
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Major Federal Legislation: A 'Legal Foundations' Study: Report 6 of 12: Report to the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
"Some of the most sweeping Federal legislation relevant to efforts to protect the critical infrastructures was originally conceived, passed into law and implemented long before the proliferation of computer and computer networks, and before the emergence of serious threats to the infrastructures. While the long-standing divisions of authority created by such legislation and the mechanisms that flourished thereunder still appear to be fundamentally sound, some of this legislation may now require modernization so that it may continue to serve its originally intended purpose. Several pieces of legislation that appear relevant to infrastructure assurance objectives were written before the emergence of a recognizable cyber threat. It is not clear whether such authorities would apply, and should apply, to a cyber-related event. Until the dynamics of such a cyber event are better understood, including the necessary response vehicles, sweeping legislative changes would be premature. However, it is nonetheless possible to identify key issues and to make general recommendations to begin the process of incorporating the full range of infrastructure assurance issues within the legislative framework. It is also possible to identify the additional pieces of legislation relevant to achieving infrastructure assurance objectives and consider whether those acts should be amended or revised, or should act as models to guide the implementation of other specific infrastructure assurance objectives."
United States. President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
1997
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Future Roles of Air and Space Power in Combatting Terrorism
Terrorism poses a growing threat to the United States, its interests, and its allies. The political, economic, and informational instruments of power play primary roles in addressing and eliminating the root causes behind terrorism attacks, but the military instrument will prevent some attacks and retaliate for others. Air and space power is one of the primary components of the military instrument in the battle against terrorism. This paper begins with an overview of US national and Department of Defense counterterrorist (CT) policies, performs a systems model analysis of a terrorist organization to better understand targeting of the same, reviews current air and space power CT capabilities, and concludes with recommendations for future ones. Air and space power contributes to current CT capabilities by providing global mobility for special operations forces, air superiority to protect those forces, and precision strike capability to target terrorist infrastructures. It also provides intelligence critical to deterring, preempting, and answering terrorist attacks, and provides psychological operations support to help erode terrorist will and popular support. Although there is no "silver bullet" to use against terrorists, future improvements in air and space power will enhance CT capability effectiveness and provide expanded options. This paper's research consisted of review of primary and secondary sources and interviews with terrorism and targeting experts.
Air University (U.S.). Air Command and Staff College
McAlpine, Mark S.
1997-03
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Terrorism and CERT: Manual, Instructor Module
Module uses lecture to review the B-NICE agents. It covers indicators regarding their use. Participants are given actions that they can take if they are at or near an incident involving these agents including procedures for decontamination and sheltering in place. Participants apply the knowledge learned in this module by describing actions that they would take in a scenario presented to them at the beginning of the module and again at the end.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Terrorism and CERT: Manual, Student Module
This module uses lecture to review the B-NICE agents. It covers indicators regarding their use. Participants are given actions that they can take if they are at or near an incident involving these agents including procedures for decontamination and sheltering in place. Participants apply the knowledge learned in this module by describing actions that they would take in a scenario presented to them at the beginning of the module and again at the end.
United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency
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Defense Forum Foundation
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech at the Rayburn House Office Building in Washington, DC on Friday, October 18, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz talk about Iraq during his speech at the Rayburn House. Deputy Wolfowitz said "Over the last 12 months, President Bush and his advisers have been weighing very carefully the risks of the various courses of action. While everything possible is being done to reduce those risks, no one is discounting them. The fundamental question is how to weigh the risks of action against the risks of inaction, and to weigh the risks of acting now against the risks of acting later, and doing so inevitably
requires making judgments about things that are fundamentally uncertain. The search for evidence is understandable; the search for facts on which to pass those judgments is absolutely necessary. But at the end of the day, we are trying to judge what will happen in the future along different courses that we might take".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-10-18
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On Iraq
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave at speech at the Fletcher Conference in the Ronald Reagan Building on October 10, 2002. Deputy Wolfowitz gave his speech on Iraq. Deputy Wolfowitz said "I want to talk to you today about an extremely important subject and a complicated subject which is the question, how do we weigh the risks of a possible use of force against the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq? Let me underscore at the outset that word possible. The President has not made any decision to use force and, to the contrary, he is exercising strenuous efforts to try to find a peaceful resolution to
this serious threat that would allow us to avoid the use of force. But that possibility is in front of us. It's being debated. It was obviously debated vigorously when the Congress passed its important resolution last week. So I'd like to share some of my thinking with you. And since it is a complicated subject, and since some of you at least are from Fletcher and you're used to 50-minute segments, this may be a little long. Be patient".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-10-16
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Association of Old Crows Annual Symposium and Convention
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech in Nashville, TN, Monday, October 28, 2002 to the Association of Old Crows. Deputy Wolfowitz said "The real issue we face, though, is how to weigh the risks of using force, should we have to do so, and that's what I'd like to talk about briefly this afternoon. Those risks are very real. As President Bush has demonstrated over and over again, he takes those risks extremely seriously, as does everyone in his administration. That's why the President has made it clear that he will do everything possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that resolves this issue that resolves this danger to our country and the world, if possible, without the use of force".
United States. Department of Defense
Wolfowitz, Paul
2002-10-28
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Commercial Perspective on Information
This report responds to the following tasking from the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection: Provide an assessment of commercial information assurance, research and development funding, and determine where commercial technologies providers are currently investing and where they think investments should occur in the future. The results documented in the report will assist the Commission in developing its own set of recommendations for national IA research agenda, including recommendations for government funding, as part of the Commission's final report ot he President.
United States. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office
1997
