Advanced search    Help

Clear all search criteria

Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).

• Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union [July 31, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies--DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. [...]. Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia's willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities, questions about the President's ability to waive certification requirements so that the programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2009-07-31
• U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [Updated July 14, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the report: "Congress has reviewed the Bush Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process. It has reviewed a number of questions about the future size of that force. For example, some have questioned why the United States must retain 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads. Congress may also question the Administration's plans for reductions in the Minuteman force and B-52 fleet. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2009-07-14
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [February 2, 2010]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The United States and Soviet Union began to sign agreements limiting their strategic offensive nuclear weapons in the early 1970s. Progress in negotiating and implementing these agreements was often slow, and subject to the tenor of the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship. As the Cold War drew to a close in the late 1980s, the pace of negotiations quickened, with the two sides signing treaties limiting intermediate range and long-range weapons. But progress again slowed in the 1990s, as U.S. missile defense plans and a range of other policy conflicts intervened in the U.S.- Russian relationship."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.

  2010-02-02
• U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Development, and Issues [February 23, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers details about each category of delivery vehicle-land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers--focusing on their current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2009-02-23
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [February 10, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This report provides an overview of many of the key arms control and nonproliferation agreements and endeavors of the past 40 years. It is divided into three sections. The first describes arms control efforts between the United States and the states of the former Soviet Union, covering both formal, bilateral treaties, and the cooperative threat reduction process. The second section describes multilateral nuclear nonproliferation efforts, covering both formal treaties and less formal accommodations that have been initiated in recent years. The final section reviews treaties and agreements that address chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. The report concludes with several appendices. These provide a list of treaties and agreements that the United States is a party to, a description of the treaty ratification process, and a list of the bilateral and international organizations tasked with implementation of arms control efforts. Additionally, The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report replaces CRS Report RL30033. It will be updated annually, or as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.

  2009-02-10
• Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [January 19, 2005]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "In 1991, both the United States and Soviet Union announced that they would withdraw most and eliminate many of their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The United States now retains approximately 1,100 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, with a few hundred deployed with aircraft in Europe and the remaining stored in the United States. Estimates vary, but experts believe Russia still has between 3,000 and 8,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The Bush Administration has not announced any further reductions in U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons; to the contrary, it has indicated that nuclear weapons remain essential to U.S. national security interests and it has requested funding for the study of a new robust nuclear earth penetrator weapon. In addition, Russia has increased its reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security concept. Some analysts argue that Russia has backed away from its commitments from 1991 and may develop and deploy new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2005-01-19
• Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union [Updated April 19, 2005]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the Safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DoD budget a little over $1 billion across three agencies - DoD ($415 million) DoE ($529.9) and the State Department ($71 million). It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rouge nations or terrorist groups."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2005-04-19
• U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [January 6, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This CRS report provides updated information on the strategic nuclear force of the United States. More specifically, this report "reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers details about each category of delivery vehicle -- land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers -- focusing on their current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force. [...] At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three warheads, for a total of 1,200 warheads.[...] The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. [...] The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers currently includes 20 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. [...] Congress has reviewed the Bush Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process. It has reviewed a number of questions about the future size of that force. For example, some have questioned why the United States must retain 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads. Congress may also question the Administration's plans for reductions in the Minuteman force and B-52 fleet. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2009-01-06
• Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress [January 26, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The United States has deployed long-range ballistic missiles in its strategic offensive nuclear forces for more than 40 years. In recent years, some have proposed that the United States deploy conventional warheads on these missiles. This would provide the United States with the ability to strike promptly anywhere in the world, regardless of the presence of overseas bases or nearby naval forces. The Air Force and Navy have both studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles. The Air Force has been pursuing, with DARPA, research into a number of technologies that might enhance the U.S. long-range strike capability. [...]. Long-range ballistic missiles can bring unique capabilities to the PGS mission. But these missiles are only uniquely capable if the United States must attack promptly, or within hours, of the start of an unanticipated conflict. In any other circumstance, the United States is likely to have the time to move its forces into the region. Hence, Congress may review whether the benefits brought by these systems outweigh the risks of misunderstandings arising from their use. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2009-01-26
• Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [January 28, 2009]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This CRS report discusses nonstrategic nuclear weapons. "Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy to discourage such acquisition. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have also suggested that the United States and Russia expand their efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons, possibly to include negotiating a formal arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2009-01-28
• U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure [Updated February 23, 2004]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. Although the review sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the international security environment at the start of the new century, it continued many of the policies and programs that had been a part of the U.S. nuclear posture during the previous decade and during the Cold War. This report, which will be updated as needed, provides an overview of the U.S. nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity. Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, how to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent 'credible,' the relationship between the U.S. nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2004-02-23
• Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty [Updated December 30, 2008]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 6, 2003; the Russian Duma did the same on May 14, 2003. The Treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003. Russia entered the negotiations seeking a 'legally binding document' that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Russia also wanted the new Treaty to contain a statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. The United States preferred a less formal process in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. [...]According to official and unofficial reports, both sides have implemented the Treaty smoothly. However, they have not held all the planned consultations, as there has been little to discuss. Instead, the two nations have begun to hold discussions about the 2009 expiration of the 1994 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which contains monitoring provisions that aid with verification of the Moscow Treaty."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2008-12-30
• U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [Updated August 5, 2008]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This CRS report provides updated information on the strategic nuclear force of the United States. More specifically, this report "reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers details about each category of delivery vehicle -- land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers -- focusing on their current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force. [...] At the present time, the U.S. land-based ballistic missile force (ICBMs) consists of 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, each deployed with between one and three warheads, for a total of 1,200 warheads.[...] The U.S. ballistic missile submarine fleet currently consists of 14 Trident submarines; each carries 24 Trident II (D-5) missiles. [...] The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers currently includes 20 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. [...] Congress has reviewed the Bush Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process. It has reviewed a number of questions about the future size of that force. For example, some have questioned why the United States must retain 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads. Congress may also question the Administration's plans for reductions in the Minuteman force and B-52 fleet. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2008-08-05
• U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure [Updated January 13, 2005]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "During the Cold War the United States maintained a triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers in a strategic nuclear arsenal of more than 10,000 warheads. During the 1990s, the United States reduced the size of this arsenal to around 7,000 warheads , but maintained all three legs of the triad. The Bush Administration has announced that the United States will further reduce its arsenal to between 1,700 and 2,200 operationally deployed warheads, but that it will not eliminate many delivery vehicles while reducing its force and it will retain many nondeployed warheads in storage as a responsive force that could be added to the deployed forces if conditions warranted. The Bush Administration has also announced that it will expand and enhance the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear weapons, so that the United States could respond to unexpected changes in the status of its arsenal or the international security environment. Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administrations Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, how to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent credible, the relationship between the U.S. nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2005-01-13
• U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure [Updated January 27, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. Although the review sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the international security environment at the start of the new century, it continued many of the policies and programs that had been a part of the U.S. nuclear posture during the previous decade and during the Cold War. This report, which will be updated as needed, provides an overview of the U.S. nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity...Analysts and observers have identified several issues raised by the Administrations Nuclear Posture Review. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policy, how to make the U.S. nuclear deterrent credible, the relationship between the U.S. nuclear posture and the goal of discouraging nuclear proliferation, plans for strategic nuclear weapons, and the future of non-strategic nuclear weapons."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-01-27
• Conventional Warheads For Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress [February 13, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The United States has deployed long-range ballistic missiles as a part of its strategic offensive nuclear forces for more than 40 years. In recent years, analysts both inside and outside the government have suggested that the United States deploy conventional warheads on these missiles. This would provide the United States with the ability to strike promptly anywhere in the world, regardless of the presence of overseas bases or nearby naval forces. The United States could use medium or long-range aircraft or sea-based cruise missiles or ballistic missiles to contribute to the prompt global strike (PGS) mission. However, only long-range ballistic missiles have the range and prompt attack capability needed to strike suddenly at the start of an unanticipated conflict. The Air Force and Navy have both studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles. The Navy sought funding, in FY2003 and FY2004, for research into a reentry vehicle that would be able to maneuver when approaching its target. The FY2007 Defense Budget contains $100 million to pursue the deployment of conventional warheads on Trident missiles. The Air Force is pursuing, with DARPA, research into a number of technologies that might enhance the U.S. long-range strike capability. In particular, it is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle, known as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), that could carry conventional munitions and be deployed on modified Minuteman II or Peacekeeper missiles."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-02-13
• Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [February 2, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy to discourage such acquisition. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have also suggested that the United States and Russia expand their efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons, possibly to include negotiating a formal arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-02-02
• Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union [Updated January 20, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the Safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DoD budget a little over $1 billion across three agencies - DoD ($415 million) DoE ($529.9) and the State Department ($71 million). It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rouge nations or terrorist groups."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-01-20
• Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: A Catalog of Recent Events [Updated January 19, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  From the Document: "This report contains brief descriptions of the most prominent arms control and nonproliferation efforts in which the United States has participated during recent years. The entries describe the substance of each arms control effort, the period in which the effort occurred, and the status of the effort at the end of 2004."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-01-19
• Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [January 13, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy, and the likelihood that either nation might use these weapons in a regional contingency with a non-nuclear nation; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy these weapons at bases overseas; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, particularly whether a U.S. policy that views these weapons as a militarily useful tool might encourage other nations to acquire their own nuclear weapons, or at least complicate U.S. policy to discourage such acquisition. Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others, however, argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have also suggested that the United States and Russia expand their efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons, possibly to include negotiating a formal arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. This report will be updated as needed."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-01-13
• Conventional Warheads For Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress [Updated March 13, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The United States has deployed long-range ballistic missiles as a part of its strategic offensive nuclear forces for more than 40 years. In recent years, analysts both inside and outside the government have suggested that the United States deploy conventional warheads on these missiles. This would provide the United States with the ability to strike promptly anywhere in the world, regardless of the presence of overseas bases or nearby naval forces. The United States could use medium or long-range aircraft or sea-based cruise missiles or ballistic missiles to contribute to the prompt global strike (PGS) mission. However, only long-range ballistic missiles have the range and prompt attack capability needed to strike suddenly at the start of an unanticipated conflict. The Air Force and Navy have both studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads on their long-range ballistic missiles. The Navy sought funding, in FY2003 and FY2004, for research into a reentry vehicle that would be able to maneuver when approaching its target. The FY2007 Defense Budget contains $127 million to pursue the deployment of conventional warheads on Trident missiles. The Air Force is pursuing, with DARPA, research into a number of technologies that might enhance the U.S. long-range strike capability. In particular, it is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle, known as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), that could carry conventional munitions and be deployed on modified Minuteman II or Peacekeeper missiles."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-03-13
• Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union [Updated April 6, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget around $1.1 billion across three agencies - DOD ($372.2 million) DOE ($682.6 million) and the State Department ($63 million). It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-04-06
• Hurricane Katrina-Related Immigration Issues and Legislation [Updated October 18,2005]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The devastation and displacement caused by Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast region of the United States has very specific implications for foreign nationals who lived in the region. Whether the foreign national is a legal permanent resident (LPR), a nonimmigrant (e.g., temporary resident such a foreign student, intracompany transferee, or guest worker) or an unauthorized alien (i.e., illegal immigrant) is a significant additional factor in how federal laws and policies are applied. In this context, the key question is whether Congress should relax any of these laws pertaining to foreign nationals who are victims of Hurricane Katrina. Many of the victims of Hurricane Katrina lack personal identification documents as a result of being evacuated from their homes, loss or damage to personal items and records, and ongoing displacement in shelters and temporary housing. As a result of the widespread damage and destruction to government facilities in the area affected by the hurricane, moreover, many victims will be unable to have personal documents re-issued in the near future. Lack of adequate personal identification documentation, a problem for all victims, has specific consequences under immigration law, especially when it comes to employment and eligibility for programs and assistance."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2005-10-18
• Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda [Updated April 19, 2006]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "In September 1997, the United States and Russia signed several documents related to the 1972 ABM Treaty that established a demarcation line between ABM systems and theater missile defense systems, which are not limited by the Treaty. They also signed a memorandum that named Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the successors to the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration never submitted these to the Senate for advice and consent. It did however, pursue negotiations on modifications to the Treaty that would permit the deployment of national missile defenses. The Bush Administration believed the Treaty was out of date, and that the United States must withdraw to pursue missile defense. It suggested that the United States and Russia agree to set the Treaty aside. Russia did not accept this proposal. The United States announced, on December 13, 2001, that it would withdraw from the Treaty. This withdrawal occurred six months later, on June 13, 2002."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2006-04-19
• Conventional Warheads For Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress [Updated September 6, 2005]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "The United States has deployed long-range ballistic missiles as a part of its strategic offensive nuclear forces for more than 40 years. In recent years, analysts both inside and outside the government have suggested that the United States deploy conventional warheads on these missiles. This would provide the United States with the ability to strike promptly anywhere in the world, regardless of the presence of overseas bases or nearby naval forces...Land-based, long-range ballistic missiles can bring unique capabilities to the PGS mission. But long-range land-based ballistic missiles are only uniquely capable if the United States must attack promptly, or within hours, of the start of an unanticipated conflict. In any other circumstance, the United States is likely to have the time to move its forces into the region. Hence, when deciding to fund the development of conventional warheads for long-range land-based missiles, Congress may review whether the benefits brought by these systems outweigh the risks of misunderstandings arising from their use."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2005-09-06
• U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [May 4, 2011]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers details about each category of delivery vehicle--land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers - focusing on their current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2011-05-04
• Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States [April 10, 2002]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  This report addresses the imperative role the US has played in the attempt to rid the former Soviet Union of their numerous biological research and production centers (BRPCs). Their BRPC capabilities included genetically-altered, antibiotic-resistant pathogens and sophisticated delivery systems, with approximately fifty biological research and production centers (BRPCs) throughout the country devoted to either all or part of their work to the program. To make matters worse, the drastically reduced or eliminated funding for these BRPC's created thousands of unemployed BW scientists, in addition to the facilities, weapons technology, and thousands of strains of pathogens at these centers that became vulnerable to theft, sale, or misuse. However, in the mid-1990's, the United States began engaging BRPCs throughout the former Soviet Union in four kinds of cooperative projects aimed at preventing proliferation of BW capabilities - Biosafety, Biosecurity, Collaborative Research, and Dismantlement. Biosafety enhancement projects are intended to make BRPCs safe places for collaborating scientists to work. In combination, Collaborative Research and Biosafety enhancement projects give U.S. officials routine access to laboratories and facilities that were once used for BW research and production. BioSecurity projects consolidate and restrict access to pathogens, while Dismantlement projects target excess infrastructure and BW equipment at BRPC sites for permanent dismantlement. As a result, U.S. participants in these projects have identified several lessons learned in the past few years. First, it has become clear that the infrastructure of the Soviet/Russian BW complex was more extensive than most analysts realized when the United States initiated its efforts to prevent proliferation of BW capabilities from former Soviet states. Second, U.S. participants report that biosafety, biosecurity, and dismantlement projects require complex negotiations, complex engineering work, considerable project management support, and innovative solutions for problems specific to each BRPC. Consequently, they have learned that the United States may need to offer a long-term commitment if it wants to complete the effort. At the same time, the U.S. agencies with BW nonproliferation programs recognize the need to maximize the nonproliferation benefits of U.S. assistance in an environment with limited resources. Finally, U.S. participants have discovered that interpersonal and institutional relationships resulting from these cooperative efforts may play a powerful role in preventing proliferation of BW capabilities from former Soviet states.

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Cook, Michelle Stem; Woolf, Amy F.

  2002-04-10
• Nuclear Posture Review: Overview and Emerging Issues [January 31, 2002]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  The Bush Administration released the results of its Nuclear Posture Review in January 2002. That study states that the United States will no longer base its nuclear planning on the need to address the "Russian threat." Instead, it will develop forces with the capabilities needed to address a range of threats from unspecified countries. Furthermore, offensive nuclear weapons will combine with missile defenses and conventional strike weapons to deter and defeat potential threats. The United States will reduce its nuclear forces to between 1,700 and 2,200 "operationally deployed" warheads, and will place many of the warheads removed from deployed forces in reserve, as part of a "responsive force." It will also strengthen its nuclear infrastructure so that it can be more "responsive" in sustaining the reliability of U.S. nuclear forces in the future. This study has raised numerous issues, such as how deep the reductions in nuclear forces will actually be, the potential need for new nuclear weapons in the future, and the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense and national security policy.

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2002-01-31
• National Missile Defense: Russia's Reaction [Updated June 14, 2002]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "In the late 1990s, the United States began to focus on the possible deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The planned National Missile Defense (NMD) system would have exceeded the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Recognizing this, the Clinton Administration sought to convince Russia to modify the terms of the Treaty. But Russia was unwilling to accept any changes to the Treaty. It also decried the U.S plan to deploy NMD, insisting that it would upset strategic stability and start a new arms race. Russia claimed that the ABM Treaty is the 'cornerstone of strategic stability' and that, without its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensive arms control agreements could collapse. Furthermore, Russia argued that a U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent and upset stability by allowing the United States to initiate an attack and protect itself from retaliatory strike. The Clinton Administration claimed that the U.S. NMD system would be directed against rogue nations and would be too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian officials questioned this argument. They doubted that rogue nations would have the capability to attack U.S. territory for some time, and they believed that the United States could expand its NMD system easily. Furthermore, they argued that, when combined with the entirety of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons, an NMD system would place the United States in a position of strategic superiority. During the Clinton Administration and first year of the Bush Administration, Russian officials stated that, if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and deployed an NMD, Russia would withdraw from a range of offensive arms control agreements. Furthermore, Russia could deploy multiple warheads on its ICBMs to overcome a U.S. NMD, or deploy new intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range nuclear systems to enhance its military capabilities. Russia has also outlined diplomatic and cooperative military initiatives as alternatives to the deployment of a U.S. NMD. Russia has proposed that the international community negotiate a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation regime as a means to discourage nations from acquiring ballistic missiles. It has also suggested that it would cooperate with nations in Europe to develop and deploy defenses against theater-range ballistic missiles. Many analysts believe this proposal was designed to win support among U.S. allies for Russia's opposition to the U.S. NMD program. U.S. officials expressed an interest in the idea but said it could not substitute for defenses against longer-range missiles."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2002-06-14
• Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty [Updated May 20, 2003]

  Show summary     Open resource [pdf]     (open full abstract)

  "On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed a new Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Treaty of Moscow) that will reduce strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. Russia entered the negotiations seeking a "legally binding document" that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Russia also wanted the new Treaty to contain a statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. The United States preferred a less formal process in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Russia convinced the United States to sign a legally binding treaty, but the United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would require the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service. It wanted the flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace, and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted. The Treaty contains four substantive Articles. The first limits each side to 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads, but states that the parties can determine the structure of their forces themselves. The second states that START I remains in force; the parties can use that Treaty's verification regime to monitor reductions under the new Treaty. The third established a bilateral implementation commission and the fourth sets December 31, 2012 for the Treaty's expiration and notes that either party can withdraw on three months notice. Russian officials have hailed the success of Russia's diplomacy in convincing the United States to sign a legally binding Treaty that casts Russia as an equal partner in the arms control process. The United States, however, maintained its ability to set its force structure according to its own needs, and avoided any limits on stored warheads or missile defenses. Most observers in the United States and Russia have praised the Treaty as a useful step in the arms control process. Some, however, have argued that the Treaty could raise new risks if the warheads placed in storage become targets for terrorists or others who would seek to steal or sell them. The Treaty's ratification was approved by the U.S. Senate on March 6, 2003 and the Russian Duma on May 14, 2003."

  Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service

  Woolf, Amy F.

  2003-05-20