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Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress [March 15, 2017]
"The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a 'dual-track' decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles. […] The Trump Administration has not yet identified a path forward for the INF Treaty, although Secretary of Defense Mattis did address it during his nomination hearing. Congress is likely to continue to conduct oversight hearings on this issue, and to receive briefings on the status of Russia's cruise missile program. It may also consider legislation authorizing U.S. military responses and supporting alternative diplomatic approaches."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2017-03-15
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Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress [October 29, 2018]
"The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a 'dual-track' decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2018-10-29
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Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress [April 25, 2018]
"The United States and Soviet Union signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Negotiations on this treaty were the result of a 'dual-track' decision taken by NATO in 1979. At that time, in response to concerns about the Soviet Union's deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, NATO agreed both to accept deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles and to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with the Soviet Union to limit these missiles. In the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that they would ban all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The ban would apply to missiles with nuclear or conventional warheads, but would not apply to sea-based or air-delivered missiles."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2018-04-25
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U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What's Next? [Updated April 4, 2019]
From the Document: "On February 2, 2019, the United States suspended its participation in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and notified Russia of its intent to withdraw from the treaty. Under Article XV of the treaty, the withdrawal will take effect in six months. [...] President Trump first indicated that the United States would withdraw from INF on October 20, 2018. He not only cited Russia's violation, but also argued that the United States is at a disadvantage with respect to China because the latter is not bound by the treaty's limits. On December 4, 2018, after a meeting of NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] foreign ministers, Secretary of State Pompeo declared that Russia was in material breach of the treaty and announced that the United States would suspend its obligations, effective in 60 days, 'unless Russia returns to full and verifiable compliance.' This 60-day period ended on February 2, 2019."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2019-04-04
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New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions [Updated April 5, 2019]
From the Document: "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament--the Duma and Federation Council-- approved the treaty in late January 2011 and it entered into force on February 5, 2011. Both parties met the treaty's requirement to complete the reductions by February 5, 2018. The treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for no more than five years. New START provides the parties with 7 years to reduce their forces, and will remain in force for a total of 10 years. It limits each side to no more than 800 deployed and nondeployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side can retain no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. The treaty also limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads; those are the actual number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and one warhead for each deployed heavy bomber."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2019-04-05
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New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions [Updated September 27, 2018]
From the Document, "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] on April 8, 2010. After more than 20 hearings, the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament--the Duma and Federation Council-- approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. Reductions were to be implemented by February 5, 2018, a goal met by both parties. The Treaty is due to expire in February 2021, unless both parties agree to extend it for up to five years."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2018-09-27
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [Updated March 18, 2019]
From the Document: "Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms."
Woolf, Amy F.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Kerr, Paul K.
2019-03-18
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Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues [August 26, 2014]
"Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or 'fleeting targets' at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a 'niche' capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2014-08-26
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [September 5, 2014]
"Even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 113th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. [...] The Obama Administration completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, in June 2013. This review has advised the force structure that the United States will deploy under the New START Treaty. It is currently implementing the New START Treaty, with the reductions due to be completed by 2018. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START and possible future arms control treaties with Russia. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2014-09-05
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [July 21, 2014]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation for many of these agreements slowed during the Clinton Administration, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.; Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham
2014-07-21
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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [January 3, 2014]
"The FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037) indicates that it is the sense of Congress that 'the United States should pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and non-deployed nonstrategic nuclear forces.' The United States and Russia have not included limits on these weapons in past arms control agreements. Nevertheless, some analysts and Members of Congress have argued that disparities in the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons may become more important as the United States and Russia reduce their numbers of deployed long-range, strategic nuclear weapons. […] Some argue that these weapons do not create any problems and the United States should not alter its policy. Others argue that the United States should reduce its reliance on these weapons and encourage Russia to do the same. Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination. The 113th Congress may review some of these proposals. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2014-01-03
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [May 15, 2014]
"Even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 113th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. […] The Obama Administration completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, in June 2013. This review has advised the force structure that the United States will deploy under the New START Treaty. It is currently implementing the New START Treaty, with the reductions due to be completed by 2018. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START and possible future arms control treaties with Russia. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2014-05-15
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Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress [June 13, 2014]
From the report: "This report provides information on the wide range of programs that the United States is pursuing to secure and eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials and to prevent hostile nations and terrorist organizations from gaining access to these weapons or the knowledge and materials needed to manufacture and use them. It begins with a brief review of the evolution of these programs, demonstrating how the goals and objectives have changed over the years. It also reviews some of the issues that Congress may confront as it seeks to provide oversight of these programs and reviews budget requests for them. The report then provides information on individual programs that are designed to secure and eliminate nuclear weapons, secure and eliminate nuclear materials, secure borders and improve export controls, eliminate chemical weapons, secure biological pathogens, and redirect scientists with knowledge of CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] weapons."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Woolf, Amy F.
2014-06-13
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Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues [May 5, 2014]
"Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or 'fleeting targets' at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. They would provide a 'niche' capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2014-05-05
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Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues [December 8, 2011]
"Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or 'fleeting targets' at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a 'niche' capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets, which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. […] These include not only ballistic missiles and boost-glide systems, but also bombers, cruise missiles, and possibly scramjets or other advanced technologies. Finally, Congress is likely to question how the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in April 2010, would affect U.S. plans for the CPGS [conventional prompt global strike] mission. Warheads deployed on boost-glide systems would not be affected by the treaty because these are new types of strategic offensive arms. But those deployed in existing types of reentry vehicles on existing types of ballistic missiles, like the Navy's CTM [Conventional Trident modification] program, would count against the treaty limits. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-12-08
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [November 8, 2011]
"During discussions about the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Congress reviewed and discussed the plans for maintaining and modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. As a result, the 112th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. […] The U.S. fleet of heavy bombers includes 19 B-2 bombers and 94 B-52 bombers. The B-1 bomber is no longer equipped for nuclear missions. The fleet will decline to around 60 aircraft in coming years, as the United States implements New START. The Air Force has also begun to retire the nuclear-armed cruise missiles carried by B-52 bombers, leaving only about half the B- 52 fleet equipped to carry nuclear weapons. The Air Force plans to procure both a new long-range bomber and a new cruise missile over the next 20 years. The Obama Administration recently completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force as a part of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review. It has also recently signed a New START Treaty with Russia that will limit the number of deployed missiles and warheads in the U.S. strategic force. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and if it assesses the terms of a prospective nuclear arms control treaty with Russia. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-11-08
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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [December 19, 2012]
"The FY2013 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4310, Section 1037) indicates that it is the sense of Congress that 'the United States should pursue negotiations with the Russian Federation aimed at the reduction of Russian deployed and nondeployed nonstrategic nuclear forces.' The United States and Russia have not included limits on these weapons in past arms control agreements. Nevertheless, some analysts and Members of Congress have argued that disparities in the numbers of nonstrategic nuclear weapons may become more important as the United States and Russia reduce their numbers of deployed long-range, strategic nuclear weapons. [...] Analysts have identified a number of issues with the continued deployment of U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. These include questions about the safety and security of Russia's weapons and the possibility that some might be lost, stolen, or sold to another nation or group; questions about the role of these weapons in U.S. and Russian security policy; questions about the role that these weapons play in NATO policy and whether there is a continuing need for the United States to deploy them at bases overseas; questions about the implications of the disparity in numbers between U.S. and Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons; and questions about the relationship between nonstrategic nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy. [...] Many have suggested that the United States and Russia expand efforts to cooperate on ensuring the safe and secure storage and elimination of these weapons; others have suggested that they negotiate an arms control treaty that would limit these weapons and allow for increased transparency in monitoring their deployment and elimination."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2012-12-19
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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda [Updated November 16, 2001]
"Although arms control negotiations are not as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War, the United States and Russia have continued to implement existing nuclear arms control agreements and to pursue negotiations on further reductions in their strategic offensive weapons and modifications to limits on ballistic missile defenses. This issue brief summarizes the contents of these agreements and tracks progress in their ratification and implementation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2001-11-16
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [January 14, 2013]
"During the first Obama Administration, Congress reviewed the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the 2012 New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty, and funding plans for the U.S. nuclear enterprise. Specifically, even though the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty, it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. The 113th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The longer-range systems, which included long-range missiles based on U.S. territory, long-range missiles based on submarines, and heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States, are known as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. At the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the United States deployed more than 10,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles. That number has declined to less than 6,000 warheads today, and is slated to decline to 1,550 warheads by the year 2017 if the New START Treaty enters into force. […] The Obama Administration is completing a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force, and a review of U.S. nuclear employment policy, as it implements the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. It is also implementing the New START Treaty with Russia that will limit the number of deployed missiles and warheads in the U.S. strategic force. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and as it assesses U.S. plans under New START and possible future arms control treaties with Russia. This report will be updated as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2013-01-14
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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda [Updated October 15, 2001]
"Although arms control negotiations are not as important to the U.S.-Russian relationship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War, the United States and Russia have continued to implement existing nuclear arms control agreements and to pursue negotiations on further reductions in their strategic offensive weapons and modifications to limits on ballistic missile defenses. This issue brief summarizes the contents of these agreements and tracks progress in their ratification and implementation."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2001-10-15
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Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements [March 23, 2011]
"Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are two of the tools that have occasionally been used to implement U.S. national security strategy. Although some believe these tools do little to restrain the behavior of U.S. adversaries, while doing too much to restrain U.S. military forces and operations, many other analysts see them as an effective means to promote transparency, ease military planning, limit forces, and protect against uncertainty and surprise. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts have produced formal treaties and agreements, informal arrangements, and cooperative threat reduction and monitoring mechanisms. The pace of implementation slowed, however, in the 1990s, and the Bush Administration usually preferred unilateral or ad hoc measures to formal treaties and agreements to address U.S. security concerns. But the Obama Administration has resumed bilateral negotiations with Russia and pledged its support for a number of multilateral arms control and nonproliferation efforts. […] The international community has also adopted a number of agreements that address non-nuclear weapons. The CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty and Open Skies Treaty sought to stabilize the conventional balance in Europe in the waning years of the Cold War. Other arrangements seek to slow the spread of technologies that nations could use to develop advanced conventional weapons. The Chemical Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions sought to eliminate both of these types of weapons completely. This report will be updated annually, or as needed."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Kerr, Paul K.; Nikitin, Mary Beth Dunham; Woolf, Amy F.
2011-03-23
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Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues [Updated November 5, 2001]
"Reports of Russian nuclear materials for sale on the black market, when combined with evidence of weaknesses in the security systems have raised concerns about the possible theft or diversion of nuclear materials from these facilities. The United States and Russia are cooperating in many fora to improve the safety, security, and control over Russia's nuclear weapons and materials. Through the Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the U.S. Department of Defense has provided assistance worth nearly $2 billion to help Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus safely transport and store weapons and eliminate launchers under the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaties. The Department of Energy's Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program is helping Russia and other former Soviet republics secure nuclear materials at research and other facilities in the former Soviet Union. The nations have also held bilateral meetings to identify ways in which they might cooperate to improve security and resolve concerns. Some have proposed that the United States and Russia negotiate arms control agreements to reduce their stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons and to improve transparency and confidence in the elimination of those weapons. Others have proposed that the two sides agree to 'de-alert' their strategic nuclear weapons to reduce the pressures and relieve concerns about Russia's nuclear command and control system."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2001-11-05
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Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues [January 10, 2013]
"Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on Earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or 'fleeting targets' at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a 'niche' capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets, which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. DOD is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2013-01-10
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Nuclear Arms Control: The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty [February 7, 2011]
"On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia's President Putin signed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (known as the Moscow Treaty). It mandated that the United States and Russia reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by December 31, 2012. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 6, 2003; the Russian Parliament did the same on May 14, 2003. The treaty entered into force on June 1, 2003, and lapsed on February 5, 2011, when the New START Treaty entered into force. Russia entered the negotiations seeking a 'legally binding document' that would contain limits, definitions, counting rules and elimination rules that resembled those in the START Treaties. Russia also wanted the treaty to contain a statement noting U.S. missile defenses would not undermine the effectiveness of Russia's offensive forces. The United States preferred a less formal process in which the two nations would state their intentions to reduce their nuclear forces, possibly accompanied by a document outlining added monitoring and transparency measures. Furthermore, the United States had no intention of including restrictions on missile defenses in an agreement outlining reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Russia convinced the United States to sign a legally binding treaty, but the United States rejected any limits and counting rules that would require the elimination of delivery vehicles and warheads removed from service. It wanted the flexibility to reduce its forces at its own pace, and to restore warheads to deployed forces if conditions warranted."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-02-07
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Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues [March 1, 2011]
"Prompt global strike (PGS) would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on earth with conventional weapons in as little as an hour. This capability may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or 'fleeting targets' at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but it has restricted funding and suggested some changes in funding for specific programs. Many analysts believe that the United States should use long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads for the PGS mission. These weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons in the U.S. war plan but would, instead, provide a 'niche' capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets, which might expand the range of U.S. conventional options. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. DOD [Department of Defense] is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-03-01
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Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons [February 2, 2011]
"During the Senate debate on the new U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2010, many Senators raised questions about Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons and noted their absence from the treaty limits. The United States and Russia have not included limits on these weapons in past arms control agreements. Nevertheless, Congress may press the Administration to seek solutions to the potential risks presented by these weapons in the future. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union both deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons for use in the field during a conflict. While there are several possible ways to distinguish between strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, most analysts consider nonstrategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that the United States and Soviet Union/Russia might use to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. They have included nuclear mines; artillery; short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; and gravity bombs. In contrast with the longer-range 'strategic' nuclear weapons, these weapons had a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they did not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. At the end of the 1980s, each nation still had thousands of these weapons deployed with their troops in the field, aboard naval vessels, and on aircraft."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-02-02
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Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union [February 4, 2011]
"Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400 million in the DOD budget to over $1 billion per year across three agencies--DOD, DOE, and the State Department. It has also evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups, to a global program to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear weapons under the START Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-02-04
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New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions [February 7, 2011]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report discusses central limits and key provisions of the U.S.-Russian New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). "The United States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Armed Services Committee both held hearings on the treaty. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on December 22, 2010, by a vote of 71-26. Both houses of the Russian parliament--the Duma and Federation Council-- approved the treaty in late January 2011, and it entered into force on February 5, 2011, after Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov exchanged the instruments of ratification. [...] The Obama Administration and outside analysts argue that New START will strengthen strategic stability and enhance U.S. national security. They contend that New START will contribute to U.S. nuclear nonproliferation goals by convincing other nations that the United States is serious about its obligations under the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty]. This might convince more nations to cooperate with the United States in pressuring nations who are seeking their own nuclear weapons. Critics, however, question whether the treaty serves U.S. national security interests, as Russia was likely to reduce its forces with or without an arms control agreement and because the United States and Russia no longer need arms control treaties to manage their relationship. Some also consider the U.S.-Russian arms control process to be a distraction from the more important issues on the nonproliferation agenda."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-02-07
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U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues [January 24, 2011]
This Congressional Research Service (CRS) report provides updated information on the strategic nuclear force of the United States. "During discussions about the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Congress reviewed and discussed the plans for maintaining and modernizing U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although the United States plans to reduce the number of warheads deployed on its long-range missiles and bombers, consistent with the terms of the New START Treaty [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], it also plans to develop new delivery systems for deployment over the next 20-30 years. As a result, the 112th Congress will continue to review these programs during the annual authorization and appropriations process [...]. The Obama Administration recently completed a review of the size and structure of the U.S. nuclear force as a part of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review. It has also recently signed a New START Treaty with Russia that will limit the number of deployed missiles and warheads in the U.S. strategic force. Congress will review the Administration's plans for U.S. strategic nuclear forces during the annual authorization and appropriations process, and if it assesses the terms of a prospective nuclear arms control treaty with Russia."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2011-01-24
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Energy and Water Development Appropriations: Nuclear Weapons Activities [Updated July 29, 2019]
From the Summary: "The annual Energy and Water Development appropriations bill funds civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation, the Department of Energy (DOE), and several independent agencies. The DOE budget includes funding for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within DOE. NNSA operates three programs: Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, which secures nuclear materials worldwide, conducts research and development (R&D) into nonproliferation and verification, and operates the Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program; Naval Reactors, which 'is responsible for all U.S. Navy nuclear propulsion work'; and Weapons Activities. The last is the subject of this report."
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service
Woolf, Amy F.
2019-07-29
