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Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Use of National Security Authorities: Calendar Year 2018
From the Introduction: "Today, consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), as amended (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)), and the Intelligence Community's (IC) Principles of Intelligence Transparency, we are releasing our sixth annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities presenting statistics on how often the government uses certain national security authorities. Providing these statistics allows for an additional way to track the use of FISA authorities and National Security Letters (NSLs). The statistics also add further context regarding the IC's rigorous and multi-layered oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of United States person (U.S. person or USP) information and non-U.S. persons' information acquired pursuant to these national security authorities. This report goes beyond the government's statutory duty of providing statistics by further providing the public with detailed explanations as to how the IC uses its national security authorities. This document should be read in conjunction with the national security-related materials that the government has already released publicly, especially the documents that have been highlighted through the hyperlinks embedded in this report, as well as the statistical report provided by the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (50 U.S.C. § 1873(a), available on the AOUSC website)."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2019-04
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Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 29, 2019
From the Foreword: "Threats to US national security will expand and diversify in the coming year, driven in part by China and Russia as they respectively compete more intensely with the United States and its traditional allies and partners. This competition cuts across all domains, involves a race for technological and military superiority, and is increasingly about values. Russia and China seek to shape the international system and regional security dynamics and exert influence over the politics and economies of states in all regions of the world and especially in their respective backyards. [...] The post-World War II international system is coming under increasing strain amid continuing cyber and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] proliferation threats, competition in space, and regional conflicts. Among the disturbing trends are hostile states and actors' intensifying online efforts to influence and interfere with elections here and abroad and their use of chemical weapons. Terrorism too will continue to be a top threat to US and partner interests worldwide, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The development and application of new technologies will introduce both risks and opportunities, and the US economy will be challenged by slower global economic growth and growing threats to US economic competitiveness."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence; United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence
Coats, Daniel R., 1943-
2019-01-29
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AIM Initiative: A Strategy for Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines
"The pace at which data are generated, whether by collection or publically available information (PAI), is increasing exponentially and long ago exceeded our collective ability to understand it or to find the most relevant data with which to make analytic judgments. AIM AAA technologies (Artificial intelligence, process Automation, and IC [Intelligence Community] officer Augmentation) as key transformative elements are crucial for future mission success and efficiency. This document outlines how the IC will incorporate AIM capabilities in a manner that resolves key IC legal, policy, cultural, technical, and structural challenges while producing optimally effective analytic and operational contributions to the intelligence mission."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2019-01-16?
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Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [As of 15 January 2019]
From the Document: "The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of--(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2019-01-15
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National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America [2019]
"'This National Intelligence Strategy' (NIS) provides the Intelligence Community (IC) with strategic direction from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) for the next four years. It supports the national security priorities outlined in the 'National Security Strategy' as well as other national strategies. In executing the NIS, all IC activities must be responsive to national security priorities and must comply with the Constitution, applicable laws and statutes, and Congressional oversight requirements. All our activities will be conducted consistent with our guiding principles: We advance our national security, economic strength, and technological superiority by delivering distinctive, timely insights with clarity, objectivity, and independence; we achieve unparalleled access to protected information and exquisite understanding of our adversaries' intentions and capabilities; we maintain global awareness for strategic warning; and we leverage what others do well, adding unique value for the Nation."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2019
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White Paper on the Key Challenges in Cyber Threat Intelligence: Explaining the 'See it, Sense it, Share it, Use it' Approach to Thinking About Cyber Intelligence
"We spend considerable time and effort producing cyber threat intelligence. Once a monopoly of government, the private sector as well is now actively producing and consuming 'actionable' cyber threat intelligence. The National Intelligence Manager for Cyber is charged with integrating this activity within the US Intelligence Community and of looking strategically for ways to improve the quantity, quality, and impact of cyber intelligence. As part of this dialogue within Government, we created this graphic and model as a simple way to describe the cyber threat intelligence process and think about ways to improve our performance."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-10-30
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Insider Threat Program: Maturity Framework
From the introduction: "The National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) is charged under Executive Order (EO) 13587 with reviewing and, when appropriate, adding to or modifying the Minimum Standards and guidance in coordination with the executive branch departments and agencies (D/As) subject to the EO. The Minimum Standards provide the basic elements necessary to establish a fully functional insider threat program (InTP) and thereby serve as milestones in the InTP maturity process. The insider threat is a dynamic problem set, requiring resilient and adaptable programs to address an evolving threat landscape, advances in technology, and organizational change. The effort requires continual evaluation and updated perspectives and approaches. In furtherance of this effort, the NITTF has developed, in collaboration with executive branch D/As, an InTP Maturity Framework (hereafter referred to as 'Framework') to enhance the Minimum Standards. The Framework identifies key elements within the Minimum Standards construct to enable D/As to increase the effectiveness of program functionality, garner greater benefit from InTP resources, procedures, and processes, and tightly integrate InTP procedures and objectives with their distinct missions and challenges."
National Counterintelligence and Security Center (U.S.); United States. Department of Justice; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence . . .
2018-10?
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Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [As of 15 July 2018]
"The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) ' The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) Intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) An assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-09-13
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Cyber Threats to Elections: A Lexicon
"This reference aid draws on CTIIC's [Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center] experience promoting interagency situational awareness and information sharing during previous significant cyber events--including cyber threats to elections. It provides a guide to cyber threat terms and related terminology issues likely to arise when describing cyber activity. The document includes a range of cyber-specific terms that may be required to accurately convey intelligence on a cyber threat event and terms that have been established by relevant authorities regarding technical infrastructure for conducting elections."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center
2018-09?
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Intelligence Community Directive Number 707 Technical Amendment: Counterintelligence and Security Support for U.S. Diplomatic Facilities Abroad
The purpose and applicability of this standard is as follows: "This Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) establishes the role and responsibilities of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center/Center for Security Evaluation (NCSC/CSE) for providing counterintelligence (CI) and security to U.S. diplomatic facilities abroad. This directive applies to the Intelligence Community (IC), as defined by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; and other departments or agencies that may be designated by the President, or designated jointly by the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] and the head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the IC."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-08-21
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Threats to Pharmaceutical Supply Chains
"In September 2017, Hurricane Maria caused severe devastation to the U.S. territory of Puerto Rico, which manufacturers nearly 10 percent of all drugs consumed by Americans. Given the large concentration of pharmaceutical manufacturing based in Puerto Rico, the destruction wrought by a Category 4 hurricane created shortages for specific medical products, which affected the standard of health care in the United States during an influenza epidemic throughout late 2017 and early 2018. The Analytic Exchange Program's (AEP's) team examining 'Threats to Pharmaceutical Supply Chains' examines this event as a case study for the risks and implications of pharmaceutical supply chain disruption. [...] Awareness of vulnerabilities is the first step toward protecting the pharmaceutical supply chain as a component of critical infrastructure vital to U.S. national security interests. Our team recommends mitigating future supply chain disruption by increasing private sector and government coordination."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-07
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Intelligence Community Directive 122: Services of Common Concern [May 29, 2018]
"This Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) establishes policy for the Intelligence Community (IC) on the establishment, funding, governance, and management of services of common concern (SoCC). This Directive rescinds Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Memorandum E/S 00960, Designation of Services of Common Concern, December 27, 2010."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-05-29
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Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities: Calendar Year 2017
"Today, consistent with the USA FREEDOM Act and the FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017 (the reauthorized FAA) requirements to release certain statistics (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)) and the Intelligence Community's (IC) Principles of Intelligence Transparency, we are releasing our fifth annual 'Statistical Transparency Report Regarding Use of National Security Authorities' presenting statistics on how often the government uses certain national security authorities. Providing these statistics allows for an additional way to track the use of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorities and gives further context to the IC's rigorous and multi-layered oversight framework that safeguards the privacy of United States person information acquired pursuant to FISA. The report goes beyond its statutory duty of providing statistics and further provides the public with detailed explanation as to how the IC uses these national security authorities."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-04
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Intelligence Community Directive Number 107: Civil Liberties, Privacy, and Transparency [Effective 31 August 2012; Revised 28 February 2018]
This Intelligence Community Directive, revised on 28 February 2018, is to establish "Intelligence Community (IC) policy for protecting civil liberties and privacy and for providing greater transparency that enhances public understanding of, and trust in, the IC mission, its governance framework, and intelligence activities as defines in EO [Executive Order] 12333."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-02-28
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Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, February 13, 2018
From the introduction: "Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer the United States Intelligence Community's 2018 assessment of threats to US national security. My statement reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community's extraordinary women and men, whom I am privileged and honored to lead. We in the Intelligence Community are committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America's interests anywhere in the world. The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate the relative importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of the Intelligence Community. Information available as of 8 February 2018 was used in the preparation of this assessment."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Coats, Daniel R., 1943-
2018-02-13
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Security Executive Agent Directive 6: Continuous Evaluation (Effective: 12 January 2018)
"This Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive establishes policy and requirements for the continuous evaluation (CE) of covered Individuals who require continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-01-12
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Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 107.1: Requests for Identities of U.S. Persons in Disseminated Intelligence Reports, January 11, 2018
"(1.) This Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) establishes guidance for responding to requests for the identities of U.S. persons in disseminated intelligence reports. (2.) The Intelligence Community (IC) must continue to provide intelligence to officials who need the information to protect the security of the nation and its allies, and must do so within the framework of protections and oversight that has been established to protect privacy and civil liberties. This ICPG ensures consistency across the IC concerning the release of the identities of U.S. persons that were originally omitted from disseminated intelligence reports."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-01-11
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Fentanyl: Safety Recommendations for First Responders
From the Document: "[1] The abuse of drugs containing fentanyl is killing Americans. Misinformation and inconsistent recommendations regarding fentanyl have resulted in confusion in the first responder community. [2] You as a first responder (law enforcement, fire, rescue, and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel) are increasingly likely to encounter fentanyl in your daily activities (e.g., responding to overdose calls, conducting traffic stops, arrests, and searches). [3] This document provides scientific, evidence-based recommendations to protect yourself from exposure."
United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy; United States. Department of Justice; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.) . . .
2018?
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Phishing: Don't Be Phooled: Vulnerabilities of Healthcare Information Technology Systems
"Through a series of virtual and in person interviews, literature reviews, and other engagement, this educational paper provides a holistic perspective on phishing: what it is, how effective it is, the impact, how phishing occurs, what some new phishing techniques are, and how to mitigate the phishing threat."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018
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AI: Using Standards to Mitigate Risks
"This study seeks to identify factors to consider when formulating standards to manage the national security risks of using artificial intelligence (AI) for decision support systems. The goal is to start a dialogue on creating standards that will reduce the risk from use, misuse, and exploitation of AI, without impeding the United States' technological development and competitive advantage. Based on our literature review and interviews with key stakeholders, we focused our report on four factors [standards, people, data, algorithms]."
United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018
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Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 701: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified National Security Information
"This Directive governs Intelligence Community (IC) efforts to deter, detect, report, and investigate unauthorized disclosures of classified national security information (hereinafter 'classified information'), meaning information that has been determined, pursuant to E.O. 13526 or any successor order, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-12-22
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Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [As of 15 July 2017]
"The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in the Fiscal Year 2012 Intelligence Authorization Act, Section 307, which states: (a) 'The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of, (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates - Not less frequently than once every 6 months, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-10-13?
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Risks and Opportunities of Contactless Biometrics
From the Executive Summary: "In recent years, we have seen great progress in contactless biometrics for entities requiring accurate and expeditious identification. In this whitepaper, we address the state of the art technology and techniques in identifying individuals using contactless biometrics such as face, gait and voice recognition for the purposes of identification, investigation and authentication of individuals. We examine the limitations and challenges and identify the obstacles that must be overcome in order for this technology to reach its full promise. In particular, we examine ways in which law enforcement agencies and private sector companies can leverage these new forms of Personal Identifying Information (PII) without encroaching on civil liberties or compromising intellectual property. We conclude with recommendations for the path forward in public/private collaboration in this area."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-09
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Phase II - Cyber Attribution Using Unclassified Data
From the Introduction: "In the shadowy world of cyberespionage, the game of who is to blame can be complicated and fraught with politics, turf battles, national security and geopolitical concerns. Cyber attribution occurs when indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) from the entire cyber kill chain are associated with an advanced persistent threat or APT [advanced persistent threat] group. Toward the end of the Obama administration, the Department of Homeland Security published a comprehensive list of the tools, techniques and indicators of compromise, called Grizzly Steppe, to out the Russians and their attempts to influence the 2016 presidential election. While the U.S. government has many sources of cyber threat intelligence, deriving from multiple government agencies and private-sector organizations, there is no single approach or framework that extrapolates across domains to derive cyber attribution, definitively and especially as it relates to the unclassified space. [...] All of that said, the most sophisticated and exhaustive approaches to attribution are often outside the means of most companies, and from the perspective of the government or its intelligence organizations, is usually classified or sensitive. The U.S. government remains compartmentalized in its approach to cybersecurity with no single source of 'unassailable truth.' This fact, adversely impacts our policy, geopolitical and even military responses. Senior government officials, heads of agencies, corporate executives, investors, and legislators alike share a keen and enduring interest in cyber attribution to support their decision making."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-09-01
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Annual Demographic Report: Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community Fiscal Year 2016
"The Annual Demographic Report on Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community examines workforce demographics relating to civilian employees in all 17 elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community [IC]. It highlights progress the IC has made in increasing diversity and illustrates the IC's continued investment in strengthening the talent and diversity of the workforce through innovative and broad-based inclusion initiatives. The October 5, 2016 Presidential Memorandum (PM) titled Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in the National Security Workforce stated that 'We have made important progress toward harnessing the extraordinary range of backgrounds, cultures, perspectives, skills, and experiences…[however] agencies in this workforce are less diverse on average than the rest of the Federal Government.' The IC recognizes the importance of having a diverse workforce to ensure it both performs at its best and maintains the confidence of the American people. We live in an increasingly complex and interconnected world in which 'unpredictable instability' is the new normal. Both at home and abroad, the United States faces such diverse national security threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, drug trafficking, political instability, nuclear proliferation, disease outbreaks, space competition, and much more. Countering such diverse threats requires a creative and dynamic IC capable of collecting and providing nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence to policymakers, military personnel, and law enforcement officials alike to successfully protect American lives and interests around the world. Indeed, one of the IC's enterprise objectives is to 'build a more agile, diverse, inclusive, and expert workforce.'"
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-08-01
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Unmanned Aircraft Systems Futures Seminar
From the Executive Summary: "As the integration of unmanned aircraft systems for legitimate commercial purposes moves forward in both global and domestic airspace, reports of UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] encounters across multiple critical infrastructure sectors challenge the ability to characterize benign, suspicions or malicious intent. While most reported UAS sightings within the United States are likely non-malicious in nature, they still typically require initial and investigative activities by security and law enforcement partners. In some instances, unauthorized UAS operations represent a risk to public safety and hinder or disrupt emergency response operations and occur across a range of security operation and critical infrastructure. The security element of UAS integration is focused on minimizing the physical risk, either thru education, visual recognition, enforcement, or thru technical detection systems. In addition, the data security protocols for UAS operators within the public and private domain has emerged as a topic of interest."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-07-11
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ICD 112: Congressional Notification
"This Directive established Intelligence Community (IC) policy to provide written notification to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (collectively the 'Congressional intelligence committees') in order to keep them fully and currently informed of intelligence activities. This revision updates Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 112, 'Congressional Notification', dated November 16, 2011, to reflect Congressional direction and notification as a matter of policy."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06-29
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Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 404.1: Federal Partner Access to Intelligence Community Information Technology Systems, June 16, 2017
"This Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG): 1. Defines the process for Executive agencies or departments that do not contain an embedded Intelligence Community (IC) element, hereinafter referred to as Federal Partners, to access IC information technology (IT) systems containing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 404, 'Executive Branch Intelligence Customers'."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06-17
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Security Executive Agent Directive 3: Reporting Requirements for Personnel with Access to Classified Information or Who Hold Sensitive Positions (Effective: 12 June 2017)
"This Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive establishes reporting requirements for all covered individuals who have access to classified information or hold a sensitive position. Nothing in this Directive should be construed to limit the authority of agency heads to impose additional reporting requirements in accordance with their respective authorities under law or regulation."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06-12
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Security Executive Agent Directive 4: National Security Adjudicative Guidelines (Effective: 08 June 2017)
"This Security Executive Agent (SecEA) Directive establishes the single, common adjudicative criteria for all covered all individuals who require initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to hold a sensitive position. The Guidelines reflected herein supersede all previously issued national security adjudicative criteria or guidelines."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06-08
