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Global Trends [Website]
"Every four years since 1997, the National Intelligence Council has published an unclassified strategic assessment of how key trends and uncertainties might shape the world over the next 20 years to help senior US leaders think and plan for the longer term. The report is timed to be especially relevant for the administration of a newly elected US President, but Global Trends increasingly has served to foster discussions about the future with people around the world. We believe these global consultations, both in preparing the paper and sharing the results, help the NIC [National Intelligence Council] and broader US Government learn from perspectives beyond the United States and are useful in sparkling discussions about key assumptions, priorities, and choices."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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Intelligence Community Directive Number 121: Managing the Intelligence Community Information Environment
"(1) This Intelligence Community (IC) Directive (ICD) establishes policy for an IC enterprise approach to managing the IC Information Environment (IC IE) in support of the IC mission through establishing roles and responsibilities, and it provides guidance on using a Service Provider model; information sharing and safeguarding; and information technology (IT) infrastructure and capabilities. (2) An IC enterprise approach for managing the IC IE will: (a) Advance intelligence integration and enable deeper analytic collaboration across IC elements through increased and accelerated communication, information sharing and safeguarding, transparency, and discover of and access to information; and (b) Consolidate IT capabilities and infrastructure, and the acquisition and procurement thereof, resulting in increased efficiency and reduced duplication."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Clapper, James R. (James Robert), 1941-
2017-01-19
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Intelligence Community Directive Number 906: Controlled Access Programs [October 17, 2015]
"Purpose 1. This Directive defines the policy, framework, and process for ensuring effective oversight and management of Intelligence Community (IC) special access programs pursuant to EO 13526, Section 4.3, referred to within the IC as Controlled Access Programs (CAP). 2. This Directive also establishes programmatic security practices and procedures for accessing and safeguarding CAP information. 3. This Directive rescinds Director of Central Intelligence Directive 6/11, Controlled Access Program Oversight Committee and Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 2006-700-10, Intelligence Community Update to DCID 6/11."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2015-10-17
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Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 900.2: Intelligence Community Crisis Management, December 23, 2016
"This Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) establishes the roles and responsibilities of the National Intelligence Manager (NIM) in advance of and during a crisis, and codifies the NIM role with regard to intelligence sharing during crisis situations."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2016-12-23
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Domestic Approach to National Intelligence
"This paper, the 'Domestic Approach to National Intelligence', describes certain key roles and relationships that characterize efforts by members of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and federal, state, local, tribal and territorial (FSLTT) government organizations to engage with one another to carry out the shared mission of protecting the homeland. These partners work with one another, and through
established channels with the private sector (e.g., critical infrastructure owners and operators), as part of a complex web of relationships. Each partner, regardless of level, plays an important role in
protecting the homeland with respect to warning, interdiction, prevention, mitigation, and response. The importance of partnerships and collaboration is emphasized in this paper, as is the IC's responsibility
to the public to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Descriptions related to organizational responsibilities and/or authorities are provided by the respective agencies. The 'Domestic Approach to
National Intelligence' is consistent with the framework and recommendations outlined in the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council's (CICC) National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan, the strategies
in support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, and information sharing and safeguarding standards outlined by the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE). By describing these roles and relationships in one place, this paper strives to foster an important national dialogue that will promote a better understanding of how the IC engages with key partners in this domestic enterprise and supports the holistic ideals articulated by the Director of National intelligence (DNI)."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2016-12
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Annual Demographic Report: Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community Fiscal Year 2016
"The Annual Demographic Report on Hiring and Retention of Minorities, Women, and Persons with Disabilities in the United States Intelligence Community examines workforce demographics relating to civilian employees in all 17 elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community [IC]. It highlights progress the IC has made in increasing diversity and illustrates the IC's continued investment in strengthening the talent and diversity of the workforce through innovative and broad-based inclusion initiatives. The October 5, 2016 Presidential Memorandum (PM) titled Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in the National Security Workforce stated that 'We have made important progress toward harnessing the extraordinary range of backgrounds, cultures, perspectives, skills, and experiences…[however] agencies in this workforce are less diverse on average than the rest of the Federal Government.' The IC recognizes the importance of having a diverse workforce to ensure it both performs at its best and maintains the confidence of the American people. We live in an increasingly complex and interconnected world in which 'unpredictable instability' is the new normal. Both at home and abroad, the United States faces such diverse national security threats such as terrorism, cyberattacks, drug trafficking, political instability, nuclear proliferation, disease outbreaks, space competition, and much more. Countering such diverse threats requires a creative and dynamic IC capable of collecting and providing nuanced, multidisciplinary intelligence to policymakers, military personnel, and law enforcement officials alike to successfully protect American lives and interests around the world. Indeed, one of the IC's enterprise objectives is to 'build a more agile, diverse, inclusive, and expert workforce.'"
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-08-01
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Principles of Classification Management for the Intelligence Community
"The Principles of Classification Management for the Intelligence Community (IC) are intended to facilitate and align IC decisions on classifying and marking Classified National Security Information (CNSI), particularly categories of CNSI common to multiple agencies. The Principles articulate norms IC elements will follow in exercising their authorities when classifying and marking intelligence information, products, and reports. Classifying and marking CNSI accurately and consistently are critical to ensuring accountability and transparency throughout the Community. The requirement to do so will grow in importance as the IC moves increasingly into an era of shared data and must respond to new technology that is changing ways information is communicated." The seven principles are listed in the document, each accompanied by a brief explanation.
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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U.S. Insider Threat Security Classification Guide, Version 1.0
"The U.S. Insider Threat Classification Guide, hereafter referred to as the 'Guide,' is the Executive Branch's standard reference for derivative classification determinations on insider threat activities. The Guide provides a baseline for protecting United States Government (USG) policy associated with insider threat activities and shall be used in concert with existing agency or program level classification guidance concerning insider threats, as appropriate. The Guide provides minimum standards for classification of insider threat information and does not supersede any agency's Original Classification Authority. Nothing in this Guide prohibits agencies from establishing classification guidance that is more restrictive than the citations contained in this Guide, as necessary to protect sensitive sources or methods. If applicable, users should refer to their respective agency classification guides first before applying guidance contained herein."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2013-12-16
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The FISA Amendments Act: Q&A
"The FISA Amendments Act (FAA), codified as Title VII of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) authorizes foreign intelligence surveillance activities that have been vital to keeping the nation safe. It will sunset on December 31, 2017 unless Congress passes legislation to remove or extend the sunset provision. Title VII includes not only Section 702, which concerns targeting non-United States (U.S.) persons abroad for surveillance, but also Sections 703, 704 and 705, which concern and provide statutory procedures and protections for surveillance of U.S. persons abroad. Section 702 has been the subject of significant discussion over the last several years and is the focus of this paper. Title VII of FISA permits the government to acquire foreign intelligence information about the plans and identities of terrorists and terrorist organizations, including how they function and receive support. It enables collection of foreign intelligence information about the intentions and capabilities of spies, weapons proliferators and other foreign adversaries who threaten the United States, and it informs U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) cybersecurity efforts. Allowing the FAA to sunset would greatly impair the ability of the United States to respond to national security threats and to respond to foreign intelligence collection opportunities. Further, the additional protections established by Title VII for U.S. persons located abroad would expire with the FAA sunset."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-04-18
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Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information
"In response to a request from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Intelligence Community (IC), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a review of the domestic sharing of counterterrorism information. The OIGs concluded that the partners in the terrorism-related Information Sharing Environment - components of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DHS, DOJ, and their state and local partners - are committed to sharing counterterrorism information. The partners' commitment to protecting the nation is illustrated by the actions taken before, during, and following terrorism-related incidents, as well as by programs and initiatives designed to improve sharing of counterterrorism information. However, the OIGs also identified several areas in which improvements could enhance information sharing. To share information effectively, the federal, state, and local entities actively involved in counterterrorism efforts must understand each other's roles, responsibilities, and contributions, especially with the involvement of multiple agencies, such as the DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DHS' U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in complex investigations. […] Our review resulted in 23 recommendations to help improve the sharing of counterterrorism information and ultimately, enhance the Nation's ability to prevent terrorist attacks. We discuss our findings in detail in the Findings and Recommendations section of the report."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-03
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Improving the Intelligence Community's Declassification Process and the Community's Support to the National Declassification Center
From the introduction: "In accordance with a Congressionally Directed Action (CDA) in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113‐293), the Director of National Intelligence submits this report describing 'proposals to improve the declassification review process throughout the intelligence community; and steps the intelligence community could take, or legislation that may be necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by Executive Order 13526, Classified National Security Information, (75 Fed. Reg. 707).' The Intelligence Community's (IC's) declassification programs are foundational to the Community's fulfillment of the Executive Order (E.O.) and its own Principles of Intelligence Transparency. This report focuses on Automatic Declassification (AD), described in Section 3.3 of the Order.1 It directs that 'all classified records that are (1) more than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to have permanent historical value under title 44, United States Code, shall be automatically declassified whether or not the records have been reviewed,' except when an agency head has determined the information contained therein over which the agency has Original Classification Authority (OCA) satisfies one or more of the nine exemption categories in Section 3.3(b) of the E.O. Agencies are allowed to request exemptions from automatic declassification at 25 years (Section 3.3(b)), 50 years (Section 3.3(h)), and 75 years (Section 3.3(j)) from the date of origin of classified information if they believe it must remain protected beyond 25 years."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2016-12
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Intelligence Community Directive 208: Maximizing the Utility of Analytic Products
From the Purpose statement: "1. This Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) establishes policy for the Intelligence Community (IC) to maximize the utility of analytic products by facilitating wider dissemination and enhancing the quality of information and analysis shared. 2. This Directive supersedes ICD 208, 'Write for Maximum Utility', 17 December 2008, and rescinds Intelligence Community Policy Memorandum 2007-200-2, 'Preparing Intelligence To Meet The Intelligence Community's 'Responsibility To Provide,'' 11 December 2007."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Clapper, James R. (James Robert), 1941-
2017-01-09
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Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 107.1: Requests for Identities of U.S. Persons in Disseminated Intelligence Reports, January 11, 2018
"(1.) This Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG) establishes guidance for responding to requests for the identities of U.S. persons in disseminated intelligence reports. (2.) The Intelligence Community (IC) must continue to provide intelligence to officials who need the information to protect the security of the nation and its allies, and must do so within the framework of protections and oversight that has been established to protect privacy and civil liberties. This ICPG ensures consistency across the IC concerning the release of the identities of U.S. persons that were originally omitted from disseminated intelligence reports."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2018-01-11
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Intelligence Community Directive Number 311: Coordination of Clandestine Human Source and Human-Enabled Foreign Intelligence Collection and Counterintelligence Activities Inside the United States
"This Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) establishes the policies and procedures called for in EO 12333, section 1.3(b)(20), consistent with 1.5(f), (g) & (h), to ensure the deconfliction, coordination, and integration of intelligence activities conducted by an Intelligence Community (IC) element or funded by the National Intelligence Program pertaining to the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside the United States. [...] The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is committed to ensuring that clandestine collection of foreign intelligence through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities inside the United States are appropriately coordinated, deconflicted, and integrated. The overall goal is to significantly enhance the security of the nation by effectively and efficiently allocating resources, while adequately protecting intelligence sources, methods, and activities from compromise or unauthorized disclosure."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Clapper, James R. (James Robert), 1941-
2016-06-27
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Intelligence Community Policy Guidance 404.1: Federal Partner Access to Intelligence Community Information Technology Systems, June 16, 2017
"This Intelligence Community Policy Guidance (ICPG): 1. Defines the process for Executive agencies or departments that do not contain an embedded Intelligence Community (IC) element, hereinafter referred to as Federal Partners, to access IC information technology (IT) systems containing Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) in accordance with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 404, 'Executive Branch Intelligence Customers'."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06-17
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Summary of Federal Citations for the National Insider Threat Task Force
This document provides a compilation of all documents relating to Federal Citations at the disposal of the National Insider Threat Task Force. This compilation includes United States Code, Executive Orders, Presidential National Security Directives and Homeland Security Presidential Directives, Intelligence Community Directives, Intelligence Community Standards, Miscellaneous References, and Forms.
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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Protect Your Organization from the Inside Out: Government Best Practices
"Insider incidents account for billions of dollars annually in 'actual' and 'potential' lost revenue, according to CERT, a well-recognized source for insider threat data. Losses result from malicious actions such as thefts of trade secrets, deliberate destruction of computer systems, and damage to an organization's reputation once the loss is made public. It is a myth that only large visible global organizations, such as defense contractors, are targeted. The risk is steadily increasing and occurs regardless of size and location. Many organizations simply do not see themselves as vulnerable, but a life's work on a unique design or piece of software can be stolen and transferred out of the country in a few minutes. Disgruntled or former employees can slowly bleed data away for years or simply destroy the organization's systems. The impacts are devastating and spill over into communities in the form of lost jobs and opportunities. In some instances, entire industries and research efforts have been lost to overseas competitors who used those secrets to build rival firms. Sensitive national security programs are put at risk, as well, when components, parts, design plans, and specialized equipment are stolen."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2016
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DNI Supplemental Study to the Fiscal Year 2017 Fundamental Classification Guidance Review
"This Supplemental Study provides the results of a request [..] to consider ways of reducing classification activities as part of the 2017 Fundamental Classification Guide Review (FCGR). As background, Executive Order 13526, 'Classified National Security Information (2010)', requires all agency heads to complete a comprehensive review of their classification guides to ensure that the guidance is timely and relevant and that classified information that no longer requires protection is appropriately declassified. Every five years, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) directs each agency to conduct a FCGR to determine if their guidance meets the standards established by Executive Order 13526. [..] Prior to the issuance of this ISOO Memorandum, representatives from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and ISOO had reviewed ways to reduce classification activities and discussed whether the DNI's success in this area could be replicated within other agencies. As a result and in furtherance of these discussions, the DNI issued a Memorandum on March 23, 2016, that requested the above-referenced agencies, as part of their FCGR, to provide substantive comment on the feasibility of four specific initiatives: I. Reducing the number of Original Classification Authorities (OCA); II. Increasing discretionary declassification decisions; III. Eliminating CONFIDENTIAL from internal agency classification guides; and IV. Creating an IC-wide classification guide This report summarizes the input received from the six participating agencies."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06
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Fundamental Classification Guidance Review (FCGR) for fiscal year (FY) 2017
"The following report encompasses the results of the Fundamental Classification Guidance Review (FCGR) for fiscal year (FY) 2017 conducted by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as required by Executive Order (EO) 13526, 'Classified National Security Information,' and in response to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) memorandum of March 17, 2016. The FCGR highlights both ODNI accomplishments in classification management - to include evaluating policies, procedures, training and updating classification guides - and the challenges of implementation. Although the 2017 ODNI FCGR officially commenced in March 2016, efforts to ensure that classification guides, training, and policies are regularly evaluated and updated have been ongoing since the last FCGR was completed in 2012. ISOO commented that 'the ODNI operates a strong Classified National Security Information (CNSI) program, one which enjoys leadership support and utilizes numerous best practices' in its on-site review report of October 13, 2015. The report specifically highlighted several best practices, and described the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) implementation of semi-annual guide reviews as 'the strongest commitment to providing the most accurate and current classification guidance that we have seen in the Executive Branch.' The ODNI provided ISOO with status updates on the ODNI CNSI program in October 2016 and February 2017 prior to the submission of this final report."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2017-06
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Global Terrorism: Threats to the Homeland, Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Testimony of Mr. Russell Travers, Acting Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence
From the Testimony: "The US and its allies continue to pursue an aggressive global campaign against a complex array of terrorist actors. Operating across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, US and partner forces have killed or captured thousands of terrorist leaders and operatives since September 11th, exemplified this past weekend in the heroic removal of the brutal ISIS [Islamic State of Syria and Iraq] in Iraq and Syria leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. These removals degrade the ability of terrorists to organize, communicate, and strike the US. Working unilaterally or with partner-nations, the US has disrupted numerous attack plots, saving the lives of countless potential victims. At home, federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement agencies--working in close cooperation--continue to counter terrorist activity. Enhanced border security efforts have constrained groups' ability to infiltrate the US, and we now assess the most predominant terrorist threat to the Homeland to emanate from US-based lone actors. Additionally, the US government and private sector allies have made significant strides curtailing terrorists' online presence."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Travers, Russell E.
2019-10-30
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Information Sharing Environment: 2017 Annual Report to Congress
From the Summary of Progress: "Over the past year, federal departments and agencies have continued to make significant progress to strengthen the sharing of terrorism-related information among federal, state, local, tribal, and private sector (FSLT/PS) partners. As noted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in their February 2017 report to the Congress, federal departments and agencies have successfully executed an ISE implementation plan and have demonstrated that various information sharing initiatives are being used across multiple agencies as well as FSLTT/PS stakeholders. [...] Federal ISE partners continue to prioritize safeguarding information, largely through policies, procedures, and technology focused on countering insider threat, identity authentication, reducing anonymity, controlling access to data, and information technology (IT) enterprise audits."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2019-04-05
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Annual Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Intelligence Community's Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities: Calendar Year 2020
From the Executive Summary: "Today, consistent with the 'Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978' (FISA), as amended (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1873(b)), and the Intelligence Community's (IC) 'Principles of Intelligence Transparency' [hyperlink], the government is releasing its 'eighth' annual 'Statistical Transparency Report Regarding the Intelligence Community Use of National Security Surveillance Authorities'. This transparency report provides statistics and contextual information concerning how the IC uses FISA and certain other national security authorities to accomplish its mission, describing the circumstances under which its national security activities are conducted and the rules that are designed to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States. By providing statistics along with explanatory narratives, the report endeavors to add further context to other publicly released materials regarding the oversight framework, including oversight conducted by independent judicial and legislative entities, which collectively safeguards the civil liberties and privacy of United States person and non-U.S. person information."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2021-04
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Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security: 'Worldwide Threats to the Homeland'
From the Document: "In the United States, we face the enduring challenge of Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) inspired by the global jihad as well as the growing threat of Domestic Violence Extremists (DVEs). These lone or loosely-organized actors seek to use violence to advance a wide-range of extremist agendas, and their diffuse nature adds to the challenge of detecting and disrupting their activities. Finally, broader global trends including the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic, the rapid development of pertinent technologies including encrypted communications, and the intensifying competition for global influence, all of which may provide terrorists with new opportunities to evade authorities and carry out attacks."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Miller, Christopher C., 1965-
2020-09-17
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Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 204: National Intelligence Priorities Framework
From the Purpose: "1. This Directive promulgates policy and establishes responsibilities for setting national intelligence priorities, translating them into action, and evaluating Intelligence Community (IC) responsiveness to them. 2. This Directive replaces Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 204, 'National Intelligence Priorities Framework,' January 2, 2015."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2021-01-07
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Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community
From the Foreword: "In the coming year, the United States and its allies will face a diverse array of threats that are playing out amidst the global disruption resulting from the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic and against the backdrop of great power competition, the disruptive effects of ecological degradation and a changing climate, an increasing number of empowered non-state actors, and rapidly evolving technology. The complexity of the threats, their intersections, and the potential for cascading events in an increasingly interconnected and mobile world create new challenges for the IC [intelligence community]. Ecological and climate changes, for example, are connected to public health risks, humanitarian concerns, social and political instability, and geopolitical rivalry. The 2021 Annual Threat Assessment highlights some of those connections as it provides the IC's baseline assessments of the most pressing threats to US national interests, while emphasizing the United States' key adversaries and competitors. It is not an exhaustive assessment of all global challenges and notably excludes assessments of US adversaries' vulnerabilities. It accounts for functional concerns, such as weapons of mass destruction and technology, primarily in the sections on threat actors, such as China and Russia."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2021-04-09
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Declassified: Summary of the Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba [As of August 31, 2020]
From the Document: "The Director of National Intelligence submits this summary consistent with direction in Section 506I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. [United States Code] § 3105), which provides: (a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an unclassified summary of-- (1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and (2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist organizations. (b) Updates.--Not less frequently than annually, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the information required by subsection (a) and the number of individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to terrorist activities after release or transfer from such Naval Station."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2020-12-18
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Assessing the Saudi Government's Role in the Killing of Jamal Khashoggi
This report was declassified by Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Haines on 25 February 2021. From the Executive Summary: "We assess that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman approved an operation in Istanbul, Turkey to capture or kill Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. [1] We base this assessment on the Crown Prince's control of decisionmaking in the Kingdom, the direct involvement of a key adviser and members of Muhammad bin Salman's protective detail in the operation, and the Crown Prince's support for using violent measures to silence dissidents abroad, including Khashoggi. [2] Since 2017, the Crown Prince has had absolute control of the Kingdom's security and intelligence organizations, making it highly unlikely that Saudi officials would have carried out an operation of this nature without the Crown Prince's authorization."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2021-02-11
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(U) Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021
From the Executive Summary: "'The IC [intelligence community] assesses that domestic violent extremists (DVEs) who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in the United States pose an elevated threat to the Homeland in 2021.' Enduring DVE motivations pertaining to biases against minority populations and perceived government overreach will almost certainly continue to drive DVE radicalization and mobilization to violence. Newer sociopolitical developments--such as narratives of fraud in the recent general election, the emboldening impact of the violent breach of the US Capitol, conditions related to the COVID-19 [coronavirus disease 2019] pandemic, and conspiracy theories promoting violence--will almost certainly spur some DVEs to try to engage in violence this year. [...] 'DVE lone offenders will continue to pose significant detection and disruption challenges because of their capacity for independent radicalization to violence, ability to mobilize discretely, and access to firearms.'"
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2021-03-01
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United States Intelligence Community (IC) 100 Day Plan for Integration and Collaboration
"To confront today's threats, exemplified by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States has made many changes in the way we conduct intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, diplomatic, and defense activities. Drawing on in-depth studies-such as the 9/11 Commission Report, the WMD Commission Report, internal Executive Branch reviews and reports by both houses of Congress-the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) was enacted to improve our effectiveness alongside several Executive Orders aimed at providing specific Administration direction. Significant progress has been made in enhancing the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. Much more, however, must be accomplished to counter today's threats effectively. To serve better the nation and our principal customers-from the President, the Congress, and the warfighter to state and local authorities-the IC must become more agile and effective by enhancing integration and collaboration. This 100 Day Plan builds on the foundation established by the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS). The initiatives contained herein map to the strategic objectives-both mission and enterprise-addressed in the NIS. The 100 Day Plan represents specific initiatives and tasks to be accomplished according to the priorities of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The goal of the 100 Day Plan is to demonstrate short-term progress and build momentum for integration and transformation across the Community. This plan will be followed by the drafting of a 500 Day Implementation Plan that aligns and synchronizes on-going and planned activities not included in the initial 100 day plan."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2007-04-11
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2009 National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide
"No single person or organization can protect our Nation from the many and varied threats we face today. These threats, from looming terrorist plots, to pandemic disease, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, require that we, as a government, work together. As we have articulated in the Intelligence Community (IC)'s Vision 2015, we must partner with intelligence consumers to meet the need for more timely and unique intelligence. In order to enhance our relationships, it is important for consumers to understand the mission, background, opportunities, and challenges facing the IC. We have published this handbook with this very thought in mind-to broaden your understanding of our work and to help us become stronger partners in protecting our Nation."
United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence
2009
