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Report on the Plan for Transformation of the National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Complex
"The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364) ('the Act') directs the Secretary of Energy to develop a plan, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Nuclear Weapons Council, for transformation of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) nuclear weapons complex to achieve a responsive infrastructure by 2030. The Act further directs the Secretary of Energy to submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the transformation plan. The NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within Department of Energy, articulated its proposed strategy for achieving a more responsive infrastructure in Complex 2030: An Infrastructure Planning Scenario for a Nuclear Weapons Complex Able to Meet the Threats of the 21st Century. This report summarizes the proposed strategy."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2007-01-31
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NNSA's Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program: Modernizing the Nuclear Weapons Complex Today To Make It More Responsive to the Challenges of Tomorrow [Fact Sheet]
"In order to achieve President Bush's vision of the smallest nuclear weapons stockpile needed for our national security, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has outlined a strategy that will not only reduce the number of weapons, but lead to a safer and more secure stockpile, with weapons that are more easily manufactured and maintained, backed up by a more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure. The vehicle for this transformation is NNSA's concept for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). RRW is not a new weapon providing new or different military capabilities and/or missions. It will meet the same military requirements as current legacy warheads by utilizing replacement components. It will be able to ensure greater long-term confidence in safety and reliability while decreasing the likelihood that underground nuclear testing would ever be needed to ensure that confidence. Through innovative and enhanced safety and surety features, RRW will also have the capability to prevent unauthorized use."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
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NNSA Establishes New Office to Lead Future of Nuclear Weapons Complex
"The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announced today the establishment of a new Office of Transformation to focus efforts to modernize its Cold War-era nuclear weapons complex. 'Since nuclear weapons will remain a part of the U.S. national defense for the foreseeable future, NNSA will need the scientific and manufacturing infrastructure to support them. Our goal is to have a nuclear weapons complex that is smaller, more efficient, more secure and capable of providing the tools a future president may need to respond to changing national security needs,' said Linton F. Brooks, the administrator of NNSA."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2006-06-28
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U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policies and Programs
"Today you will hear from some important thinkers who have helped shape American thinking on security matters. As keynote speaker, it is my job to provide a context for their presentations and your discussion. To do so, I want to describe the Administrations approach to the role of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era. Our policy has been frequently mischaracterized in the press and by some in Congress. Some of these mischaracterizations are simple partisan politics. But others arise from a misunderstanding of what our policy actually is and what its implications are. We've allowed this misunderstanding to arise by not being clear about our policy. That's what I want to rectify today. Id love to convince you that were right. Id settle for convincing you that we've thought through the problem and have a coherent rationale for what we are doing."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Brooks, Linton F.
2004-05-12
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Nuclear Security in the 21st Century
"I want to set the stage for my discussion with a brief comment about the nuclear dilemma we face. On the one hand, growing demand for clean energy will make nuclear power a more and more attractive option for an increasing number of states. On the other hand, the growth of peaceful nuclear programs and instances in which civilian nuclear programs were used as a cover for weapons-related pursuits increases the risk that terrorists will have greater access to nuclear material, technology, and weapons expertise. Addressing these risks before existing proliferation dangers get worse or new nuclear energy programs surface is a top U.S. national security priority. In many ways, this is a back to the future problem. Forty or fifty years ago, inexpensive nuclear power generating electricity too cheap to meter was forecast as the answer to the expanding world energy demand. However, the forecast for nuclear energy to become the global panacea failed to materialize. But, today, as global demand for energy resources grows exponentially, nuclear power may be on the brink of a global renaissance. Around the world, 120 nuclear reactors are being planned or are under construction, particularly in developing countries. The U.S. Energy Information Agency estimates global energy requirements will grow by as much as 50 percent in the next 20 years, with half of that growth in demand coming from the worlds emerging economies. Nuclear power is likely to play a significant role in providing a clean, affordable, safe, and reliable energy alternative."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Brooks, Linton F.
2005-12-08
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Ten Principles for Nuclear and Radiological Materials Security
"Our topic, 'International Approaches to Nuclear and Radiological Security,' could not be more relevant or more urgent. The issues we face concern every member of the international community. It is, therefore gratifying to meet with participants from over 25 countries - a reflection of the international community's commitment to address these important issues. In agreeing that the Department of Energy would co-host this conference, U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham sent me here with a mission. He wants me to convey to you the sense of urgency and importance that he, the President, and the entire Administration feel about protecting nuclear and radiological materials. He wants me to remind you of the initiatives the United States has already taken, and urge others to match them. And he wants me to ensure that we learn from you, since we face a global challenge that must be solved globally. Secretary Abraham knows that, while we've had some notable successes over the past two years, the problem requires continued personal involvement and commitment by all of us. I've organized my thoughts into ten 'principles' for nuclear and radiological security. For most of them I want to tell you how the United States is implementing them and highlight the challenges for the international community."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Brooks, Linton F.
2002-09-29
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Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Towards an Integrative Approach
"Let me thank the organizers, in particular the United Kingdom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for hosting a conference on a concern " nuclear terrorism " of such transcendent importance. Today, the threat of nuclear terrorism is in the center of the U.S. and international security agenda. It was not always so. Only after the September 11th terrorist attacks and subsequent attacks around the world has the international community mobilized to confront the specter of terrorists armed with mass destruction weapons. We can all take pride in the important work and steps taken to address nuclear terrorism in the four years since September 11th. Progress is underway to improve security of nuclear and radioactive materials to update anti-terror norms and controls over nuclear technologies, and to heighten awareness of dangers arising from nuclear terrorism, thanks in part to conferences like this."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Brooks, Linton F.
2005-03-16
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Emerging Issues in Nuclear Non-proliferation
"This session has been asked to look at emerging issues in nuclear non-proliferation. Before doing so we should pause a moment to consider an enduring issue: preventing new states from acquiring nuclear weapons. Obviously that remains important as the world seeks to grapple with Iran and North Korea and their apparent determination to isolate themselves from the world community by seeking weapons they don't need and that will not improve their security. In the area of traditional non-proliferation, in addition to supporting international diplomatic efforts, the United States is setting an example by reducing its nuclear arsenal and eliminating the use of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. In May of last year, President Bush announced plans to reduce our nations nuclear weapons stockpile by nearly half, to its smallest size since the Eisenhower Administration. That decision enables us to dispose of a significant amount of weapons-grade nuclear material."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Brooks, Linton F.
2005-11-14
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NNSA and ECA: Partners in Security and Community
"Through the years, the men and women who work across the weapons complex have consistently answered this country's calls to protect our Nations security. They have also made major contributions to the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program in the areas of international nuclear safety and elimination of excess fissile materials here and in Russia. I want to take this morning to discuss what I see as a bright future for NNSA, which translates into continuing opportunities for people in communities across our weapons complex. I'm particularly happy to be here because community is so important. Our future is only ensured through the good people located in your communities. Indeed, without community support, I can't do my job. This is true for all of government, but especially to me for three reasons: First, there is an inherent problem of gaining support for nuclear weapons work, which lends itself to a NIMBY ('Not In My Backyard') approach. Second, unlike the Department of Defense, DOE has a huge reliance on contractors and the private sector. Finally, we face major issues with recruiting and retention in the coming decade. Thus quality of life issues are very important."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Brooks, Linton F.
2003-03-06
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Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: Advance Party Phase Response Actions
"Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) response actions are carried out in Advance Party and Main Party phases of deployment. Response activities are initiated by a FRMAC Home Team prior to and during Advance Party deployment, with Home Team support continuing until the FRMAC Main Party is fully deployed. Upon arrival at the incident scene, the Advance Party establishes communications with other federal, state, and local response organizations. Following an Advance Party Meeting with these response organizations, FRMAC begins formulation of an initial monitoring and sampling plan, in coordination with the jurisdictional state and the Lead Federal Agency, and initiates detailed logistical arrangements for Main Party deployment and operations."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Thom©, Daryl J.; Hurley, Bruce W.
2002
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Independent Evaluation of Field Element Performance Review Plan for Review of the Sandia Site Office
"This report documents the results of a review of Safety Basis practices at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and the National Nuclear Security Administration's Sandia Site office (SSO). The review was requested by the SSO Manager. The scope of the review was established by the SSO Manager letter to E. Morrow, National Nuclear Security Administration--Headquarters (NNSA HQ), dated November 15, 2004. The purpose of the Independent Evaluation (IE) was to validate the self-assessment efforts conducted by NNSA/SSO (screening performed on the adequacy of the safety basis for Sandia Pulsed Reactor Facility/Critical Experiment, Manzano Nuclear Facility, Annular Core Research Reactor, and Gamma Irradiation Facility and self-assessment performed on SSO's review and approval process) and provide input on potential areas of improvement and/or deficiencies."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2004-12-10
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NNSA Implements New Security Measures
"The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has implemented more than 70 percent of the recommendations in an independent review of security across the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, NNSA Administrator Linton F. Brooks said today. He added that most of the other recommendations should be addressed by the end of the year. The panel was announced by Brooks in July, 2003 in a five-part initiative to reinforce security oversight and strengthen long-term security operations in the nuclear weapons complex. Brooks asked retired Navy Admiral Richard Mies to examine security structure, organization, interrelationships, and policies, procedures and practices. Mies and his team assessed security in the field and reviewed procedures in NNSA headquarters from October, 2003 to April, 2004. An initial draft report was provided to NNSA in April, 2004 and a final report in May, 2005."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2005-09-01
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Fact Sheet on NNSA Security Updates and the Mies Review Panel
"The Mies review was included in a five-part initiative announced by NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] Administrator Linton F. Brooks in July 2003. Brooks asked retired Navy Admiral Richard Mies to lead a panel to examine security structure, organization, interrelationships, and policies, procedures and practices in the nuclear weapons complex. The panel reviewed security operations and procedures during a period from October, 2003 to April, 2004 and provided a draft report in April, 2004. A final report was delivered to NNSA in May 2005. The report made 115 recommendations in 14 functional areas. NNSA has implemented 70 percent of the commissions recommendations."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2005-09-01
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Nuclear Weapons Complex Significantly Down-sized since 1980's
This document gives a historical perspective on the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. The document includes various maps indicating the locations of weapons complexes, reductions in square footage of the nuclear weapons complex, M & O contractor employment, and a funding profile FY1985-FY2011 of weapons activities in constant millions FY2007.
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
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Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: FRMAC Operations Manual
"This manual describes the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center's (FRMAC's) response activities in a radiological incident of national significance. It also outlines how FRMAC fits in the National Incident Management Structure (NIMS) under the National Response Plan (NRP) and describes the Federal assets and subsequent operational activities which provide Federal radiological monitoring and assessment of the affected areas. These areas may include one or more affected states or other countries/territories. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the DHS to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, natural disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and other emergencies. The act also designated DHS as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
O'Laughlin, Colleen T.; Thompson, Roger C.; Wilber, Deborah A.
2005-12
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Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: Monitoring Manual Volume 2: Radiation Monitoring and Sampling
"Under the Nuclear / Radiological Incident Annex to National Response Plan (NRP), several federal agencies with statutory responsibilities for dealing with radioactive materials emergencies have agreed to coordinate their emergency response efforts. In the event of a potential or existing major radiological incident, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) has been charged with establishing and operating the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The FRMAC provides coordinated federal assistance in the offsite areas to the impacted state(s) and the Coordinating Agency responsible for regulation and/or operation of the emergency site. […] The Monitoring group of the FRMAC is responsible for a significant portion of the assistance provided. These responsibilities include field radiation monitoring, environmental sampling, and radioanalysis. The Monitoring group coordinates the efforts of all federal, state, and local or tribal agency staffs working with the FRMAC to provide scientifically defensible data of acceptable quality. When the FRMAC responds to a radiological emergency, monitoring and sampling support will arrive from a number of different sources. The respondents providing this support will have received varying levels of training and have experience with an assortment of monitoring and sampling equipment and procedures. However, the Monitoring group requires that the methods used during the FRMAC response be uniform and consistent to ensure that the derived data are reliable and defensible. It is therefore important that standard operating procedures (SOPs) be followed by all respondents for any monitoring and sampling activities conducted under the direction of the Monitoring group."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2005-12
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Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: Laboratory Analysis Manual
"When the FRMAC responds to a radiological accident, monitoring, sampling, and radioanalytical support will arrive from a number of different sources. The respondents providing this support will, in all likelihood, have received varying levels of training and will have experience with a variety of monitoring, sampling, and radioanalytical equipment and procedures. It is important that an acceptable and established set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) be followed by all personnel having responsibilities for processing samples and analytical data during the emergency. Overall, this manual provides general guidance and some specific diagrams and forms. However, it is understood that site and event specific operational decisions and procedure parameters will need to be established and documented at the time of an emergency event. It is also understood that FRMAC sample tracking and analysis may be operating in an integrated or coordinated environment with other agencies and jurisdictions, including state or local agencies. This manual is intended to provide enough guidance for stand-alone use without limiting FRMAC's ability to integrate the work with other partners or stakeholders. Early in an emergency, analytical data will be urgently needed as a basis for protective actions. FRMAC emergency response procedures are intended for use in processing relatively large numbers of samples in the shortest possible time. In the early stages of an emergency, when the impact on the health and safety of the public is not well defined, the resources dedicated to quality assurance (QA) activities must be sufficient to assure that appropriate radioanalytical Measurement Quality Objectives (MQOs) and assessment Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) are met."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2005-12
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Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center: Monitoring Manual Volume 1: Monitoring Group Operations
"In Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, the President directed the development of a new National Response Plan (NRP) to align Federal coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-discipline, all- hazards approach to domestic incident management. The NRP is built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which provides a consistent doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels, regardless of the cause, size, or complexity of the incident. The activation of the NRP and its coordinating structures and protocols-either partially or fully-for specific Incidents of National Significance provides mechanisms for the coordination and implementation of a wide variety of incident management and emergency assistance activities. Included in these activities are Federal support to state, local, and tribal authorities; interaction with nongovernmental, private donor, and private-sector organizations; and the coordinated, direct exercise of Federal authorities, when appropriate. The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex to the NRP addresses the response of Federal agencies to terrorist incidents involving nuclear or radioactive materials (Incidents of National Significance), and accidents or incidents involving such material that may or may not rise to the level of an Incident of National Significance. In the event of a potential or existing major radiological incident, the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) has been charged with establishing and managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The FRMAC provides coordinated federal assistance in the off-site areas to the impacted state(s) and the Coordinating Agency responsible for regulation and/or operation of the accident site."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2005-12
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National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA's) Second Line of Defense Program
"The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's Second Line of Defense (SLD) Program is to strengthen the capability of foreign governments to detect and deter illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials across international borders and through the global maritime shipping system. The goal is to reduce the probability of these materials being fashioned into a weapon of mass destruction or a radiological dispersal device against the United States or its key allies and international partners. Under this program, NNSA works collaboratively with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports, and seaports with radiation detection equipment. SLD provides training in use of the systems for appropriate law enforcement officials and initial system sustainability support as the host government assumes operational responsibility for the equipment."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2006-12
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Megaports Initiative
"NNSA's Megaports Initiative, which began in 2003, teams up with other countries to enhance their ability to screen cargo at major international seaports. The Initiative provides radiation detection equipment and trains their personnel to specifically check for nuclear or other radioactive materials. In return, NNSA requires that data be shared on detections and seizures of nuclear or radiological material that resulted from the use of the equipment provided."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2003
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National Nuclear Security Administration Act [Updated May 28, 2008]
"This document is the updated 'National Nuclear Security Administration Act' as of May 28, 2008. It contains information regarding the organization of the NNSA."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2008-05-28
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Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Response Scenarios 2003
Todd Wilber of the National Nuclear Security Administration, gives this presentation on Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Response Scenarios at the 2003 National Institute of Justice Annual Technology Conference.
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Wilber, Todd
2003-09-23
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Finding of No Significant Impact and Notice of Intent to Adopt the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Environmental Assessment for Operations, Upgrades, and Consolidation at the Western Command Site, New Mexico
"The Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) completed an Environmental Assessment (EA) to consolidate western command operations into a new complex at the existing Agent Operations Western Command (AOWC) and Training Facility on Kirtland Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico. The EA resulted in a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) signed by DOE on July 10, 2012. The NNSA prepared the EA in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 United States Code [U.S.C.] Section 4321 - 4347), as amended; the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 Code of Federal Regulations [C.F.R] Parts 1500-1508) and the DOE NEPA implementing regulation (10 C.F.R Part 1021). The Air Force is proposing to adopt the NNSA EA for construction and demolition (C&D) activities, which would occur on Kirtland AFB as part of the consolidation of the Western Command Site. The Air force has independently reviewed the document to determine it satisfies their NEPA implementing regulations found at 32 C.F.R Part 989 and the Department of Defense Directive 6050.1."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2014-09
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Emergency Operations Training Academy [website]
"The Emergency Operations Training Academy supports the NA-40 [Nuclear Administration] mission which ensures that operational planning and training are in place to respond to any DOE/NNSA [Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration] emergency. The transformation of a civilian workforce into a well-coordinated response organization is a subject of policies, procedures, and training that must accompany an ever-evolving security effort to counter both domestic and international nuclear terrorism."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
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Final Environmental Assessment Addressing the Conveyance and Transfer of the Two Land Tracts Pursuant to Public Law 111-11, Section 13005
From the Abstract: "The Proposed Action addressed in this EA includes both the administrative conveyance of a 135-acre tract of land to the Lovelace Respiratory Research Institute (a private sector entity) with its use unchanged for the foreseeable future (as identified by the Institute). Also included in the Proposed Action is the transfer of a 7-acre tract to the USAF [U.S. Air Force] from DOE [Department of Energy] with its use unchanged for the foreseeable future (as identified by the USAF). After consulting with the USAF DOE is in the process of removing, the unoccupied site improvements that previously were built on the 7-acre tract when it was operated as the Coronado Club by Sandia National Laboratories (including the main building, the in-ground swimming pool, parking lot, and access street); the outdoor tennis courts remain located on site. DOE chose to undertake the expedited structure demolition actions prior to making a decision on the future transfer of the tract to USAF to eliminate maintenance and upkeep costs."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2010-05
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Strengthening Nonproliferation and Arms Control: FY 2014 Annual Report
Taken from the introduction: "FY 2014 was a year of strategic review and planning for the U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN). Within that context, DNN's Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) undertook a strategic review of its entire organization, as well as reviews of the NIS export control activities and the NIS Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) activities. […] Effective January 1, 2015, as part of DNN's realignment, NIS became NPAC [Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control]. The graphic on the facing page encapsulates the new NPAC organization under the DNN realignment. NPAC will focus on its core competencies of nuclear safeguards, nuclear export controls, nuclear verification, and nuclear nonproliferation policy. NPAC will work to strengthen the nonproliferation and arms control regimes by implementing a comprehensive and integrated set of initiatives and activities that are designed to: (1) build capacity of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Member States to implement and meet safeguards obligations; (2) build domestic and international capacity to implement and meet export control obligations; (3) develop and implement verification regimes to reduce nuclear weapons and detect and dismantle undeclared nuclear programs; and (4) develop programs and strategies to address emerging nonproliferation and arms control challenges and opportunities. The nuclear security-related efforts that previously resided in NIS have been moved to GMS [Office of Global Material Security] and will not be part of the new NPAC organization. I invite you to look at this report summarizing the achievements of our last year as NIS. The report describes our other strategic planning efforts in the areas of export controls and NGSI. It also highlights how we help DOE/NNSA fulfill its export control mandates and support the international community dedicated to nonproliferation."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2015-01
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Testimony of Jerry Paul, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, U.S. House of Representatives, June 22, 2006
This testimony by Jerry Paul, the Principal Deputy Director of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), highlights the administration's activities under the U.S.-Russian Senior Interagency Working Group on Nuclear Security Cooperation.
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2006-06-22
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Department of Energy Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Incident [presentation]
This document is a power-point presentation of the Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Administration's response guidelines for a nuclear or radiological incident.
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Remick, Alan
2007-07
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Atlas Relocation and Operation at the Nevada Test Site
"The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) prepared an Environmental Assessment (EA) (DOE/EA-1381) to analyze the proposed action to relocate the Atlas pulse power machine from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). At the NTS, Atlas would be reassembled in a newly constructed building within a designated Industrial, Research, and Support site in Area 6. After reassembly, Atlas would be commissioned to ensure proper operation and then used to conduct approximately 40 pulsed power experiments per year, with a potential to increase to approximately 100 experiments per year, should the Stockpile Stewardship Program require it. The EA also addresses alternatives to the proposed action and analyzes the no-action alternative wherein the Atlas pulse power machine would remain in Los Alamos, New Mexico and continue to be operated at the LANL site. The purpose and need of the NNSA is described in Section 1.0 of the EA. A detailed description of the proposed action and alternatives is presented in Section 2.0. Section 3.0 describes the affected environment. Section 4.0 describes the environmental consequences of the proposed action and no-action alternative. Cumulative effects are addressed in Section 5.0. The proposed action of moving the Atlas machine to the NTS does not represent a major change to the stockpile stewardship program but rather a relocation of an asset within the stockpile stewardship complex."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
2001-05
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Federal Radiological Response in the United States
"The Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC) is authorized by the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) to coordinate all off-site radiological response assistance to state and local governments in the event of a major radiological emergency in the United States. The FRMAC is established by the U.S. Department of Energy to coordinate all federal assets involved in conducting a comprehensive program of environmental monitoring, sampling, radio-analysis, quality assurance, and dose assessment. This paper discusses the structure, assets, and operations of the FRMAC program."
United States. National Nuclear Security Administration
Thom©, Daryl J.; Hurley, Bruce W.
