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Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting, Statement of Janet Heinrich Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
"In order to assist the committee in its consideration of this extensive
reorganization of our government, my remarks today will focus on Title V
of the President's proposal and the implications of (1) the proposed transfer of specific public health preparedness and response programs currently housed in HHS into the new department and (2) the proposed transfer of control over certain other public health preparedness assistance programs from HHS to the new department. My testimony today is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on federal, state, and local preparedness in responding to bioterrorist threats,3 as well as a review of the proposed legislation."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-25
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Information Security: Advances and Remaining Challenges to Adoption of Public Key Infrastructure Technology, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The federal government must overcome several major challenges before public key infrastructure (PKI) technology can be widely and effectively used. These challenges include providing interoperability among agency PKIs, ensuring that PKI implementations can support a potential large scale of users, reducing the cost of building PKI systems, setting policies to maintain trust levels among agencies, and establishing training programs for users at all levels. Although such challenges are difficult to overcome in the near term, the federal government can take steps to better assist agencies develop and implement PKIs that may eventually be interconnected into a federal governmentwide system. The recent effort to develop a Federal Bridge Certification Authority (FBCA) is an excellent first step in this direction, but this effort lacks the context of a well-defined program plan for the government as well as key policy and technical standards. Establishing a federal PKI management framework could facilitate and accelerate participation in the FBCA as well as overall federal adoption of key technology for enabling electronic government.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-02-26
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Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination, Report to Congressional Requesters
Eight federal agencies now have teams that can respond to a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Each team varies in size, structure, geographical scope, and task. The teams do not duplicate one another. They have unique capabilities and functions, and many have experience dealing with different types of agents and weapons. The type of terrorist incident would determine which team would be most appropriate to respond. GAO found that federal agencies lack a coherent framework to develop and evaluate budget requirements for their response teams because there is no national strategy with clearly defined outcomes. To improve interagency cooperation, federal agencies have participated in several group activities. For example, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group, led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, is identifying federal response teams that could respond to different terrorist scenarios. Federal, state, and local agencies have also participated in major field exercises that simulated urban terrorist acts. These efforts could go a long way toward improving the operational coordination of federal response teams.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-11-30
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September 11: More Effective Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in Disasters, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate
Surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households have donated money to charitable organizations to aid in the response to the September 11 disasters. To provide the public with information on the role of charitable aid in assisting those affected by the attacks, GAO was asked to report on the amount of donations charities raised and distributed, the accountability measures in place to prevent fraud by organizations and individuals, and lessons learned about how to best distribute charitable aid in similar situations.
Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the total amount of funds raised in response to the September 11 attacks, 35 of the larger charities have reported raising an estimated $2.7 billion since September 11, 2001. About 70 percent of the money that has been collected by these 35 charities has been reported distributed to survivors or spent on disaster relief since September 11, 2001. Charities used the money they collected to provide direct cash assistance and a wide range of services to families of those killed, those more indirectly affected through loss of their job or residence, and to disaster relief workers. At the same time, lessons have been learned that could improve future charitable responses in disasters, including easing access to aid, enhancing coordination among charities and between charities and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), increasing attention to public education, and planning for future events.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-12-19
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September 11: Small Business Assistance Provided in Lower Manhattan in Response to the Terrorist Attacks, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives
The attacks on the World Trade Center had a substantially negative impact on the New York City economy, severely affecting businesses. In the aftermath of the attacks, Congress, among other things, appropriated emergency supplemental funds to several federal agencies to aid and rebuild the affected areas.
The Chairman of the House Committee on Small Business asked GAO to describe the assistance provided to small businesses that is funded from emergency supplemental appropriations of federal Community Development Block Grant funds and other sources.
To assist in New York City's recovery from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress appropriated $3.5 billion in Community Development Block Grant funding of which Congress earmarked at least $500 million to be used to compensate small businesses, nonprofit organizations, and individuals for their economic losses.
One year after the attacks, these funds, administered in part by New York State's Empire State Development Corporation (Empire State), have provided $266 million to about 9,000 small businesses, many with fewer than 10 employees (see fig. below).
Such assistance has included grants to compensate businesses for part of their economic losses--for both physical and economic injuries--and payments to attract and retain small businesses in efforts to revitalize the affected areas. Hundreds of millions of dollars remain available through these and other programs to assist an estimated 18,000 affected businesses. Empire State has employed mailings, visits, walk-in centers, and mass media to inform businesses of assistance programs. Other efforts by the Small Business Administration, New York City and State, banks, and nonprofit organizations have provided critical assistance to address the immediate and additional unmet needs of small businesses.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-01
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Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and Challenges, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform
After the attacks of September 11th, 2001, concerns intensified over the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas. This testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such attempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation's security against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing these various efforts. U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects. They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation. These initiatives include such efforts as establishing international standards for ports, carriers, and maritime workers; stationing Customs personnel overseas; reducing security vulnerabilities all the way back to points of manufacture; and using new technology to monitor the contents and movement of containers from their point of origin.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-18
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September 11: Interim Report on the Response of Charities, Report to the Honorable Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate
Some surveys suggest that as many as two-thirds of American households have donated money to charitable organizations in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Although it may be difficult to precisely tally the amount of money raised, 34 of the larger charities have reported raising an estimated $2.4 billion since September 11. Charities reported distributing these funds for a broad range of assistance to the families of those killed or injured, for those more indirectly affected through the loss of their jobs or homes, and for disaster relief workers. To distribute aid, charities had to make extensive efforts to identify victims and survivors as there were no uniform contact lists for families of victims; charity officials also said privacy issues affected the sharing of information among charities. Charities, government agencies, watchdog groups, and survivors' organizations reported to GAO lessons learned about how to improve the charitable aid process in future disasters. First, good information about and easy access to available assistance could help survivors in the recovery process. Next, public and private agencies could better assist survivors by coordinating and sharing information with each other. Further, public education could clarify charities' role in disasters and help maintain the public's confidence in charities. Finally, planning for the role of charitable aid in disasters could aid the recovery process for individuals and communities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-09-03
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Military Readiness: Civil Reserve Air Fleet Can Respond as Planned, but Incentives May Need Revamping, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
"In the event of a national emergency, the Department of Defense (DOD) can use commercial aircraft drawn from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet to augment its own airlift capabilities. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is a fleet of aircraft owned by U.S. commercial air carriers but committed voluntarily to DOD for use during emergencies. This sparked concern about the fleet's ability to respond, if activated, and prompted the Subcommittee to ask GAO to determine whether the fleet could respond to an activation with the required number of aircraft and crews and in the required time frame. Civil Reserve Air Fleet participants can respond to an emergency or a war with the required number of aircraft and crews and within the required time frame. Currently, there are more aircraft committed to the fleet than are needed to fill the wartime requirements identified in the DOD Mobility Requirements Study 2005, which determined the requirements to fight and win two major theater wars. The incentives currently in place to encourage participation in the program, especially the incentive to participate in DOD's peacetime business, might be losing effectiveness and could become disincentives in the future. Some participants are not able to bid on peacetime cargo business because their fleets do not include B- 747s, the predominant aircraft DOD uses for peacetime cargo missions. Using smaller aircraft would provide more peacetime business to a greater share of program participants, thus enhancing current incentives."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-12-30
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Federal Electrical Emergency Preparedness Is Inadequate
GAO reviewed the vulnerability of the nation's electric power systems to disruptions from acts of war, sabotage, and terrorism and analyzed the federal role in dealing with major, long-term electrical emergencies resulting from such acts.
Federal leadership for electrical emergency planning and preparation is unorganized and ineffective. GAO found that: (1) the Department of Energy (DOE) has an inadequate program for dealing with major electrical disruptions; (2) DOE Emergency Electric Power Administration representatives are unsure of their status, roles, authority, and responsibility, and doubtful that the organization could operate during an emergency; (3) DOE does not have adequate plans to manage and mitigate electric power disruptions; (4) emergency plans to manage such disruptions and restore the power system are needed; and (5) problems exist in federal coordination with respect to electric emergency preparedness.
United States. General Accounting Office
1981-05-12
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FBI Internal Audit: Opportunities for Improvement, Report to Congressional Requesters
In response to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) internal audit activities to determine the: (1) extent of the audits' focus on major FBI investigative programs; (2) steps FBI took to increase the qualifications, independence, and permanence of its inspection and audit staffs; and (3) potential weaknesses in audit quality and effectiveness. GAO found that, since 1979, FBI has: (1) improved its inspection and program evaluation activities by focusing on its 11 major investigative programs during division and field office inspection; (2) evaluated all major investigative programs at least once, except for the recently established FBI Drug Program; and (3) raised the educational and experience requirements for its program evaluation staff. GAO also found that, by filling audit management positions temporarily with special agents, FBI could impair the independence of the internal audits.
United States. General Accounting Office
1988-11-23
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Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing U.S. Policy Tools for Combating Proliferation, Statement of Joseph A Christoff, Director, International Affairs and Trade
The attacks of September 11 and the recent anthrax cases have heightened long-standing concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the international community have undertaken several efforts over the years to secure these weapons and prevent their spread. Today, there is renewed need to maintain strong international controls over such weapons and related technologies, and to reevaluate the effectiveness of the controls. The United States has used the following four key policy instruments to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: (1) international treaties, (2) multilateral export control arrangements, (3) U.S. export controls, and (4) security assistance to other countries. Each instrument is important to preventing the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and associated technologies to terrorists or rogue states, but each has limitations. International treaties restrict transfers of weapons of mass destruction technologies, but their effectiveness depends on whether treaties can be verified and enforced and whether all countries of concern are members. Multilateral export control arrangements are voluntary, nonbinding agreements under which countries that produce the technologies used to develop weapons of mass destruction agree to restrict the transfer of these technologies. U.S. export controls set the legal and regulatory conditions under which goods and technologies can be exported. Security assistance to other countries helps control or eliminate nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and otherwise stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-07
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Assessment of Various Aspects of This Nation's Nuclear Safeguards Programs
Protecting nuclear material from violent use against society has been an issue at the very heart of the nuclear energy debate from its beginning. A review was made to determine the effectiveness of the Department of Defense's (DOD) nuclear safeguards system and to compare that system to the systems used by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) who are also responsible for the security of nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-grade materials against theft, diversion, or sabotage. In addition, the on-site security at a number of sites within the responsibility of each of these agencies was investigated by interviewing site officials and employees, touring the sites, and by testing various elements of the security system. DOD is responsible for the security of nuclear weapons and for the security of nuclear weapons-grade materials found in research reactor fuel and in fuel for naval propulsion reactors. In carrying out this responsibility, DOD has established minimum standard security requirements that are to be met by its nuclear facilities. At five weapon sites that were reviewed, it was discovered that while all of the sites met most of the minimum requirements, each one needed important improvements before all of the requirements would be met. With regard to DOD's research reactor and naval fuel storage facilities, the security appeared to be adequate. Some minor improvements could be made, but their importance to the overall security of the facility was not significant. Like DOD, NRC and DOE are also responsible for protecting the public against the hazards of theft, diversion, or sabotage of nuclear materials. While all three agencies are responsible for large amounts of nuclear materials, DOD and DOE also have custody of nuclear weapons themselves. Each agency designs its security system to what it believes to be the existing threat, and each has different estimates of what that threat is. These different threat levels have resulted in a situation where similar nuclear materials are receiving different levels of protection.
United States. General Accounting Office
1980-02-19
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Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be Improved, Report to Congressional Requesters
Congress responded to the attacks of September 11, 2001, with dramatic funding increases to combat terrorism. Even before these attacks, Congress was concerned about increased funding in this area, and based on findings from a 1997 GAO report, mandated that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) report annually on funding to combat terrorism. In this review, GAO was asked to analyze such funding trends, describe difficulties in coordinating combating terrorism budgets, assess data reported to Congress, and describe the executive branch's efforts to maximize the effective use of combating terrorism funds. This increase includes a 106-percent increase from the post-September 11 redefinition of combating terrorism to include homeland security activities such as aviation and transportation security, and a 170-percent increase due to funding increases. An OMB annual report summarizing funding for combating terrorism has had limited utility for decision makers because it was issued late in the congressional decision-making process and did not include data on obligations or on duplication in programs for combating terrorism.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-26
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Border Security: Implications of Eliminating the Visa Waiver Program, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Congress, the administration, law enforcement officials, and the public have questioned the effectiveness of U.S. visa programs in protecting national security. Some have voiced concern that terrorists or other criminals may exploit one of these programs--the Visa Waiver Program--to enter the United States. The program enables citizens of 28 participating countries to travel to the United States for tourism or business for 90 days or less without first obtaining a visa. GAO was asked to review the Visa Waiver Program, including the process for assessing countries' eligibility to participate in the program. GAO was also asked to determine the implications--specifically those affecting national security, foreign relations, tourism, and State Department resources--of eliminating the program. To ensure that countries participating in the Visa Waiver Program pose a low risk to U.S. national interests, the Departments of Justice and State verify each country's political and economic stability and the security of its passport issuance process.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-22
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Nonproliferation R&D: NNSA's Program Develops Successful Technologies, but Project Management Can Be Strengthened, Report to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) Program is to conduct needs-driven research, development, testing, and evaluation of new technologies that are intended to strengthen the United States' ability to prevent and respond to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. In fiscal years 1998 through 2002, the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program received an average of $218 million per year--a total of $1.2 billion. Nearly 75 percent of that total was distributed for R&D at three NNSA national laboratories. Two of the three research areas of the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Program lack a formal process to identify users' needs, and the tools used to monitor project progress are inadequate. In terms of users, NNSA's role is to develop technologies for, and transfer them to, users in the federal government, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and others. The program requires that projects' life-cycle plans and quarterly reports contain detailed information on project time frames, milestones, users of technologies, and deliverables. Officials from federal, state, and local agencies that use the technology developed by NNSA's R&D program have found the technology useful, but some question whether the program is achieving the right mix of long-term and short-term research, especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-08-23
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Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect Competition, Statement of JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
This testimony discusses the economic state of the airline industry. Many, but not all, major U.S. passenger airlines are experiencing their second consecutive year of record financial losses. In 2001, the U.S. commercial passenger airline industry reported losses in excess of $6 billion. For 2002, some Wall Street analysts recently projected that U.S. airline industry losses will approach $7 billion, and noted that the prospects for recovery during 2003 are diminishing. Carriers have taken many actions to lower their costs and restructure their operations. Since September 2001, carriers have furloughed 100,000 staff, renegotiated labor contracts, and streamlined their fleets by retiring older, costlier aircraft. Carriers have reduced capacity by operating fewer flights or smaller aircraft. In some cases, carriers eliminated all service to communities. As the aviation industry continues its attempts to recover, Congress will be confronted with a need for increased oversight of a number of public policy issues. First, airlines' reactions to financial pressures will affect the domestic industry's competitive landscape. Second, airlines' reductions in service will likely place additional pressure on federal programs supporting air service to small communities, where travel options are already limited. Finally, although domestic travel has been the focus of recent concern, there are numerous international developments--especially regarding the European Union (EU)--that may affect established international "open skies" agreements between the United States and EU member states.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-02
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Review of the Estimates for the Impact of the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks on New York Tax Revenues
GAO reviewed the New York City Office of Management and Budget and the New York State Division of Budget estimates of tax revenue losses attributed to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. Both offices estimated that the attacks would reduce anticipated tax revenues to the city and state in both fiscal years 2002 and 2003. The budget offices' estimates of the tax revenue losses have limitations, such as including some of the economic slowdown that was under way at the time of the attacks. Nevertheless, the tax revenue loss estimates for the 2002 fiscal year--$1.6 billion for New York City and $1.6 billion for New York State--appear to reasonably approximate the impact of the attacks on tax revenues. Precisely measuring the effect on economic activity and related tax revenues is inherently difficult. Such measuring requires disentangling the effect of the attacks from the effects of other events. As of June 2002, the federal government had authorized funds of $10.4 billion to New York to partly compensate for the economic losses attributable to the attacks, including $6.4 billion for debris removal and temporary housing assistance. Nonetheless, the specific amount of funding obligated solely to New York City has not yet been compiled.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-26
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Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States: Statement of Robert J. Cramer, Managing Director Office of Special Investigations: Testimony Before the Committee on Finance United States Senate
This is the testimony of Robert J. Cramer before the Senate Committee on Finance. Mr. Cramer describes how easy it is to enter into the United States with fake documents: "In summary, we created fictitious driver's licenses and birth certificates using off-the-shelf computer graphic software that is available to any purchaser. In addition, we obtained and carried credit cards in the fictitious names that were used in these tests. Our agents entered the United States from Canada, Mexico, and Jamaica through ports of entry using fictitious names and these counterfeit identification documents. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service officials never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents, and our agents encountered no difficulty entering the country using them. On two occasions, INS officials did not ask for or inspect any identification documents when our agents entered the United States. On another occasion an agent was able to walk across a major border checkpoint and was not stopped or inspected by any government official."
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-01-30
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Homeland Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable Address Information, Report to Congressional Requesters
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government's need to locate aliens in the United States was considerably heightened. Without reliable alien address information, the government is impeded in its ability to find aliens who represent a national security threat or who could help with the nation's anti-terrorism efforts. Requesters from both the Senate and House asked GAO to review the reliability of INS's alien address information and identify the ways it could be improved. Recent events have shown that INS's alien address information could not be fully relied on to locate many aliens who were of interest to the United States. For example, the Department of Justice sought to locate and interview 4,112 aliens who were believed to be in the country and who might have knowledge that would assist the nation in its anti-terrorism efforts. However, as shown below, almost half of these aliens could not be located and interviewed because INS lacked reliable address information. The reliability of INS's alien address information is contingent, in part, on aliens' compliance with the requirement that they notify INS of any change of address. However, lack of publicity about the requirement that aliens should file change of address notifications, no enforcement of penalties for noncompliance, and inadequate processing procedures for changes of address also contribute to INS's alien address information being unreliable. Because INS does not publicize the change of address requirement, some aliens may not be aware of it and may not comply with it. Alternatively, some aliens who are aware of the requirement may not comply because they do not wish to be located. These aliens have little incentive to comply given that INS does not enforce the penalties for noncompliance. On the basis of our review of available data, INS does not appear to have enforced the removal penalty for noncompliance since the early 1970s. When aliens do comply with the requirement, INS lacks adequate processing procedures and controls to ensure that the alien address information it receives is recorded in all automated databases. Addressing these problems should help improve the reliability of INS's alien address information but would not necessarily result in a system that would allow INS to reliably locate all aliens, because some aliens will not likely comply. INS has recognized the need to increase the reliability of its alien address information and is taking some steps to improve it.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-21
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Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies: By the Comptroller General of the United States
The early years of the 21st century are proving to be a period of profound transition for our world, our country, and our government. The federal government needs to engage in a comprehensive review, reassessment, re-prioritization, and as appropriate, re-engineering of what the government does, how it does business, and in some cases, who does the government's business. Leading public and private organizations in the United States and abroad have found that for organizations to successfully transform themselves they must often fundamentally change their culture. On September 24, 2001, GAO convened a forum to identify and discuss useful practices and lessons learned from major private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations that federal agencies could implement to successfully transform their cultures and a new Department of Homeland Security could use to merge its various originating components into a unified department. The invited participants have experience managing or studying large-scale organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. There are a number of key practices that have consistently been found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations and can serve as a basis for subsequent consideration as federal agencies seek to transform their cultures in response to governance challenges. These practices to (1) ensure top leadership drives the transformation, (2) establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals to guide the transformation, (3) focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset of the transformation, (4) set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show progress from day one, (5) dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation process, (6) use the performance management system to define responsibility and assure accountability for change, (7) establish a communication strategy to create shared expectations and report related progress, (8) involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain their ownership for the transformation, and (9) build a world-class organization.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-14
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Homeland Security: CDC's Oversight of the Select Agent Program
In the wake of anthrax incidents and mounting concerns about the potential for another bioterrorism attack, we assessed the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) oversight of the Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Laboratory Registration/ Select Agent Transfer Program. We brought program weaknesses we identified to the immediate attention of CDC and HHS officials, who agreed that improvements were warranted. The purpose of this report is to summarize our findings. As the agency responsible for identifying and controlling biological agents that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, CDC can improve its management of the Select Agent Program to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access to biological agents. During the course of our review, we identified and brought to the immediate attention of CDC and HHS officials areas in which program oversight could be strengthened, including inspection and approval of facilities and monitoring of the transfer and shipment of select agents. To better position CDC to reasonably ensure that appropriate security and safety protections are in place for select agents, we made recommendations aimed at establishing proper internal control in accordance with OMB Circular A-123 over the Select Agent Program.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-22
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Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies--including all 14 Cabinet secretaries, four deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies)--had security protection. Personnel from 27 different agencies protected them: 36 officials by their own agencies or departments and six from other agencies or departments, such as the Secret Service and the Marshals Service. Protective personnel increased 73 percent from fiscal year 1997 through 1999. Funding rose from $19.1 million in 1997 to $28.5 million in 1999, largely due to increased travel. Only the Secret Service and State Department have specific statutory authority to protect executive branch officials. Agencies reported that their officials received different levels and frequency of protection and that protection was needed to respond to possible and actual threats. Most agencies favored establishing a repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials. Also, agencies reported that their protective personnel received different amounts of protection training and from different sources. Field staff received less training than did the agencies' full-time personnel based in Washington. Most agencies favored establishing a standardized protection training program. Most agencies opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. No single agency or official is responsible for handling issues relating to routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation has serious implications because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of protection being given. GAO summarized this report in testimony before Congress; see: Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials by Bernard L. Ungar, Director of Government Business Operations and Robert H. Hast, Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Senate Committee on the Judiciary. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177, July 27 (10 pages).
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-11
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Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials, Statement of Bernard L. Ungar, Director, Government Business Operations Issues, General Government Division and Robert H. Hast, Acting Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
From fiscal years 1997 through 1999, 42 executive branch positions at 31 executive branch agencies--including all 14 Cabinet secretaries, four deputy or under secretaries, and 24 other high-ranking officials (mainly heads of agencies)--had security protection. Personnel from 27 different agencies protected them: 36 officials by their own agencies or departments and six from other agencies or departments, such as the Secret Service and the Marshals Service. Most agencies favored establishing a repository of protective intelligence to facilitate sharing of threat information about their officials. Also, agencies reported that their protective personnel received different amounts of protection training and from different sources. Most agencies opposed centralizing security protection under one agency. No single agency or official is responsible for handling issues relating to routine protection of executive branch officials. This fragmentation has serious implications because 14 of the protected officials are in the line of presidential succession. Moreover, the lack of thorough threat assessments documenting the level of protection needed makes it difficult to determine the basis for and reasonableness of protection being given. This testimony summarizes the July 2000 report, GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-27
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Nonproliferation: Strategy Needed to Strengthen Multilateral Export Control Regimes
Multilateral export control regimes are consensus-based, voluntary arrangements of supplier countries that produce technologies useful in developing weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. GAO found weaknesses that impede the ability of the multilateral export control regimes to achieve their nonproliferation goals. The regimes cannot effectively limit or monitor efforts by countries of concern to acquire sensitive technology without more complete and timely reporting of licensing information and without information on when and how members adopt and implement agreed-upon export controls. The United
States seeks to improve the effectiveness of these regimes. GAO was asked to (1) assess weaknesses of the four regimes and (2) identify obstacles faced in
trying to strengthen them.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-25
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Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of Effort for All Missions, Report to the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
The September 11th attacks affected the scope of activities of many federal agencies, including the Coast Guard. Homeland security, a long-standing but
relatively small part of the Coast Guard's duties, took center stage. Still, the Coast Guard remains responsible for many other missions, such as helping stem the flow of drugs and illegal migration, protecting important fishing
grounds, and responding to marine pollution. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's current efforts and future plans for balancing resource levels among its
many missions.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-12
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Chemical Weapons: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Needs Comprehensive Plan to Correct Budgeting Weaknesses. Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is responsible for implementing the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans the use of chemical weapons and requires their elimination. In this report, GAO assessed the accuracy of the organization's budget and the impact of budget shortfalls on program activities. GAO also reviewed efforts to improve the organization's budget planning. Since its establishment in 1997, the ability of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to carry out key inspection functions has been hindered by inaccurate budget projections and, more recently, budget deficits. Its budgets have recorded as income nearly $1 million in unpaid assessments owed by 30 member states. The budgets have also overestimated reimbursement payments for inspections conducted in member states with chemical weapons-related facilities. Weak budgeting practices and budget deficits have affected the organization's ability to perform inspection activities as mandated by the Chemical Weapons Convention. The organization had to reduce the number of inspections it conducted in 2001 and plans to reduce the number it conducts in 2002. Although the organization and the State Department have taken some steps to address the budget problems, the organization has not developed a comprehensive plan to overcome its inherent budgeting weaknesses. Unless the organization improves its planning, GAO believes budget shortfalls will continue to affect its ability to conduct inspections. Furthermore, the GAO recommends that the Secretary of State should: (1) work with the organization to develop a comprehensive plan to improve budget projections and income collection, and (2) report annually to Congress on the organization's progress in correcting its budgeting weaknesses.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-24
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Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations, Report to the Chairman, Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, domestic military installations increased their antiterrorism measures to their highest levels. These measures were reduced in the weeks following the attacks, but because of the persistent nature of the threat, the antiterrorism posture at domestic installations remains at a higher than normal level more than 1 year later. The Department of Defense's (DOD) budget request for fiscal year 2003 includes more than $10 billion for combating terrorism activities, which includes a substantial increase in funding for antiterrorism measures to safeguard personnel and strategic issues. The commands do not always require documentation of the assessments, and they do not periodically evaluate the assessment methodology used at each installation to determine the thoroughness of the analysis or the consistency with required assessment methodology.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-01
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Homeland Security: Department of Justice's Response to Its Congressional Mandate to Assess and Report on Chemical Industry Vulnerabilities
Congress passed the Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act after a number of testimonies expressing concerns about the vulnerability of chemical facilities to criminal and terrorist attacks. According to the Attorney General's interim report, chemical facilities visited generally had safety and emergency response measures that could mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack. The interim report also contains nine preliminary findings that cumulatively address the other required reporting elements--the vulnerability of facilities to criminal and terrorist activity, current industry site security practices, and the security of chemicals being transported. These findings address the extent to which 11 facilities conducted facility security assessments, had the capability to respond to armed attacks, conducted emergency response exercises, conducted routine pre-employment background investigations, had secure process control systems, had secure chemical transportation containers, had adequate security measures over transportation of hazardous chemicals, received meaningful threat information, and had effective facility security systems.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-10-10
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Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, Report to Congressional Committees
As concerns about terrorism have grown, Executive Branch responsibilities and authorities have received greater attention, which led to the 1998 appointment of a national coordinator in the National Security Council. The President recently requested that the Vice President oversee a coordinated national effort to improve national preparedness, including efforts to combat terrorism.
Federal efforts to develop a national strategy to combat terrorism and related guidance have progressed, but key efforts remain incomplete. The first step toward developing a national strategy is to conduct a national threat and risk assessment. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have collaborated on such an assessment, but they have not formally coordinated with other departments and agencies on this task. Under current policy, the federal government also has improved its capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are tasked with leading federal efforts in their respective roles for managing a terrorist crisis and the consequences of an incident. Federal assistance to state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents has resulted in training for thousands of first responders--those state and local officials who would first respond at the scene of an incident. To protect computer systems and the critical operations and infrastructures they support, various efforts have been undertaken to implement a national strategy outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63. Specifically, federal agencies have taken initial steps to develop critical infrastructure protection plans, but independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant information security weaknesses that place federal operations at high risk of tampering and disruption.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-20
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities, Statement of Joel C. Willemssen, Managing Director, Information Technology Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
Federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk. New information security provisions introduced by Congress will be a major catalyst for federal agencies to improve their security program management. To help maintain the momentum that the new information security reform provisions have generated, federal agencies must act quickly to implement strong security program management. A key element of the strategy outlined in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 63 was establishing the National Infrastructure Protection Center as "a national focal point" for gathering information on threats and facilitating the federal government's response to computer-based incidents. The center has begun critical infrastructure protection efforts to establish a foundation for future governmentwide efforts. However, the analytical and information-sharing capabilities that PDD 63 asserts are needed to protect the nation's critical infrastructures have not yet been achieved.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-12
