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National Airspace System: Reauthorizing FAA Provides Opportunity and Options to Address Challenges: Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Civil Aviation Issues: Testimony before the Subcommitee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
The reauthorization of AIR-21 provides an opportunity for Congress and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to focus on several challenges to improving the national airspace system. These challenges include (1) funding planned airport capital development, (2) increasing capacity and efficiency, (3) implementing human capital and procurement reforms, and (4) ensuring aviation safety. This is testimony of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-02-12
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Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as it Transitions to the New Department, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director Physical Infrastructure, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
The Coast Guard is one of 22 agencies being placed in the new Department of Homeland Security. With its key roles in the nation's ports, waterways, and coastlines, the Coast Guard is an important part of enhanced homeland security efforts. But it also has non-security missions, such as search and rescue, fisheries and environmental protection, and boating safety. GAO has conducted a number of reviews of the Coast Guard's missions and was asked to testify about the Coast Guard's implementation challenges in moving to this newly created Department. This is the testimony of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues, before the Subcommittee on Oceans, Atmosphere, and Fisheries, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-02-12
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Potential Terrorist Attacks: More Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Markets: Statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment: Testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks exposed the vulnerability U.S. financial markets to wide-scale disasters. Because the markets are vital to the nation's economy, GAO s testimony discusses (1) how the financial markets were directly affected by the attacks and how market participants and infrastructure providers worked to restore trading; (2) the steps taken by 15 important financial market organizations to address physical security, electronic security, and business continuity planning since the attacks; and (3) the steps the financial regulators have taken to ensure that the markets are better prepared for future disasters. This is the statement of Davi M. D'Agostino, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, before the House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-02-12
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Customs Service Modernization: Automated Commercial Environmental Progressing, but Further Acquisition Management Improvements Needed: Report to Congressional Committees
The U.S. Customs Service is conducting a multiyear, multibillion dollar project, the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), a new trade processing system that is planned to support effective and efficient movement of goods into the United States. By congressional mandate, Customs' expenditure plans for ACE must meet certain conditions, including being reviewed by GAO. This study addresses whether Customs' latest plan satisfies these conditions and provides observations about the plan and Customs' efforts to implement GAO's open recommendations for improving ACE management. To ensure that Customs is positioned to effectively manage the acquisition of ACE, GAO is making recommendations to the commissioner aimed at improving Customs' acquisition management capabilities. Customs concurred with GAO's recommendations and described specific actions that it is taking to respond to each.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-02
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Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts are Under Way, but Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess their Implementation
The events of September 11, 2001,
have placed added emphasis on
ensuring the security of the
nation's food supply. GAO
examined (1) whether FDA and
USDA have sufficient authority
under current statutes to require
that food processors adopt security
measures, (2) what security
guidelines FDA and USDA have
provided to industry, and (3) what
security measures food processors
have adopted.
United States. General Accounting Office
2003-02
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Homeland Security: EPA's Management of Clean Air Act Chemical Facility Data
In a report issued today, we discuss issues surrounding chemical industry security, including the threat posed by chemical facilities, federal requirements addressing chemical facility security and the safe management of chemicals, steps taken by federal agencies to assess and address security, and voluntary industry actions taken to address security concerns. As part of our study of issues surrounding chemical
industry security, you also asked us to examine EPA's management of Clean Air Act chemical facility data. In this report we describe EPA's actions to modify management of RMP data in response to the increased terrorist threat since the events of September 11, 2001.
United States. General Accounting Office
Stephenson, John B.
2003-03-14
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessment and Inventory Management Are Needed, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives
"In response to a request from the former Chairman of your Subcommittee, we reviewed U.S. forces' readiness in terms of the protective equipment needed for operations in a chemically or biologically contaminated environment. We determined (1) whether DOD's process for assessing the risk to military operations on the basis of wartime equipment requirements is reliable and (2) how DOD's inventory management of chemical and biological protective gear has affected the risk level. Also, as requested by the former Chairman, we will soon issue two additional reports on the readiness of military medical support in Korea and of the Military Sealift Command to operate in a contaminated environment. The practices that we identified in the current report regarding inventories of chemical and biological equipment contribute to the development of erroneous inventory data that in turn affect the accuracy of the risk assessment. First, DOD cannot monitor the status of the entire inventory of protective equipment because the services and the Defense Logistics Agency use at least nine different systems of inventory management with differing data fields to manage suit inventories, and the systems' records contain data that cannot be easily linked. Second, DOD cannot determine whether all of its older suits would adequately protect servicemembers because some of the systems' records omit essential data on suit expiration. Third, DOD cannot easily identify, track, and locate defective suits because inventory records do not always include contract and lot numbers. Finally, DOD has miscalculated the requirements for suits and the number available; for example, the Department counted new suits as on hand before they had been delivered and consequently overstated the actual inventory. We are making recommendations to assist DOD in better assessing risk and improving oversight of the inventory of chemical protective equipment."
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09
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Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security
"Our report starts with a description of the current border control procedures for admitting people into the United States--issuing visas to citizens of other nations and passports to U.S. citizens and inspecting travelers at the ports of entry. Next, the report describes how biometric technologies work, including the different types of biometric technologies, their levels of maturity, and their operating and performance characteristics. We present four possible scenarios in which biometrics might be applied to current U.S. border control procedures. For each scenario, we analyze some of the costs, benefits, and risks associated with implementation. Finally, the report sums up certain policy implications and challenges to be faced if a biometric system is to be designed and deployed for border security. A number of appendixes provide details on the major biometric technologies."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-11-14
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National Preparedness: Technologies to Secure Federal Buildings, Statement of Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The terrorist attacks of September 11 have heightened concerns about the physical security of federal buildings and the need to protect those who work in and visit these facilities. These concerns have been underscored by reports of long-standing vulnerabilities, including weak controls over building access. There are several commercially available security technologies that can be deployed, ranging from turnstiles, to smart cards, to biometric systems. Although many of these technologies can provide highly effective technical controls, the overall security of a federal building will depend on robust risk management processes and implementing the three integral concepts of a holistic security process: protection, detection, and reaction.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-04-25
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National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-04-11
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Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, Statement of Patricia A. Dalton Director, Strategic Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-04-02
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Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National Preparedness Strategy Statement of Patricia A. Dalton Director, Strategic Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is intergovernmental, national policymakers need a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges when formulating antiterrorism strategies. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and program duplication. This situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-28
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Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges in addressing these issues. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and program duplication. As state and local officials have noted, this situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships, can enhance the government's capacity to (1) target areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibility by all parties, and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-22
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Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving National Goals Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Administration took several steps to strengthen homeland security, including the creation of an Office of Homeland Security (OHS). The success of a homeland security strategy requires all levels of government and the private sector to communicate and cooperate with one another. The federal government must formulate realistic budget and resource plans to support the implementation of an efficient and effective homeland security program. A fundamental review of existing programs and operations can create the necessary fiscal flexibility by weeding out out-dated, poorly targeted, or inefficient programs. Although Congress called upon GAO to evaluate the effectiveness of OHS programs, GAO has experienced difficulty in gaining access to this information.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-04-11
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Diffuse Security Threats: Technologies for Mail Sanitization Exist, but Challenges Remain, Report to Congressional Requesters
The attacks of September 11, 2001, and recent anthrax exposures have heightened long-standing concerns about the proliferation of biological weapons and the United States' ability to quickly respond to such incidents. The United States must identify technologies to protect against biological weapons, such as anthrax, without harming humans. Ionizing radiation has emerged as the leading current technology for mail sanitization. However, ionizing radiation may have adverse effects on mailed material, and it may not be applicable to some types of parcels, boxes, and large packages. In addition, applying ionizing radiation in a mail-processing environment requires radiation and biohazard precautions, such as shielding the radiation source and wearing protective gear.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-04-23
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International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level Coordination of Federal Response Needed, Report to the Honorable Ben Nighthorse Campbell, U.S. Senate
International crimes, such as drugs and arms trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, and public corruption, transcend national borders and threaten global security and stability. The National Security Council (NSC) told GAO that international crime and the framework for the U.S. response are under review by the new administration. The extent of International crime is growing, but measuring its true extent is difficult. Several efforts have been made to gauge the threat posed to the United States and other countries by international crime. The 1999 threat assessment was classified, but a published version of the 2000 assessment divided the threat into the following five broad categories: (1) terrorism and drug trafficking; (2) illegal immigration, trafficking of women and children, and environmental crimes; (3) illicit transfer or trafficking of products across international borders; (4) economic trade crimes; and (5) financial crimes. NSC identified 34 federal entities with significant roles in fighting international crime. These included the Department of Justice, Treasury, and State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The efforts to combat public corruption internationally involves two strategies: the elimination of bribes in transnational business activities, such as government contracting, and the implementation of law assistance, which focuses on U.S. support for legal, judicial, and law enforcement reform efforts by foreign governments. Much of the technical assistance that the U.S. provides to other nations for fighting international crime involves training, particularly training at law enforcement academies established abroad. There are no standard measures of effectiveness to assess the federal government's overall efforts to address international crime. Justice's, Treasury's, and State's plans describe their efforts to combat specific types of crime, along with the performance measures to be tracked. In some cases, however, these measures do not adequately address effectiveness.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-08-13
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European Security: U.S. and European Contributions to Foster Stability and Security in Europe, Report to the Congressional Committees
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and its European allies are using smaller militaries, disbursing more development assistance, and increasing their reliance on multilateral organizations to provide for European security. Despite reductions in force levels and budgets, U.S. and European military forces have been actively engaged in peacekeeping and other security-enhancing activities in the region. The United States and its European allies have contributed to stability in the Balkans through various military and financial means. The Balkans operations have highlighted numerous shortfalls in the military capabilities of European allies, but competing budgetary priorities may limit their ability to remedy them before the end of the decade. Defense expenditures are expected to remain relatively flat in constant 2000 dollars over the next four to five years for most European allies, placing major defense initiatives sponsored by NATO and the European Union in jeopardy.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-28
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Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, Report to Congressional Requesters
The Department of Energy (DOE) is improving security of 192 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia by installing modern security systems that detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material. These systems, while not as stringent as those installed in the United States, are designed to reduce the risk of nuclear material theft at Russian sites. While Russia and the United States have worked cooperatively to reduce the risk of theft in Russia, Russian officials' concerns about divulging national security information continue to impede DOE's efforts to install systems for several hundred metric tons of nuclear material at sensitive Russian sites. Continued progress in reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia hinges on DOE's ability to gain access to Russia's sensitive sites and reach agreement with the Ministry of Atomic Energy to reduce the number of sites and buildings where nuclear material is located. DOE currently does not have a means to periodically monitor the systems to ensure that they are operating properly on a continued basis. Such as mechanism would provide DOE officials with increased confidence that the security systems are reducing the risk of nuclear material theft. The strategic plan developed by DOE should provide an estimate of how much sustainability assistance is required on the basis of an analysis of the costs to operate and maintain the systems and the sites' ability to cover these costs. In addition, the plan should provide options for completing the program on the basis of the progress made on gaining access to sensitive sites and the closure of buildings and sites.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-02-28
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Embassy Construction: Better Long-term Planning Will Enhance Program Decision-making, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate
The State Department has determined that about 80 percent of overseas U.S. diplomatic facilities lack adequate security and may be vulnerable to terrorist attack. In September 1998, State expanded its capital construction program to accelerate replacing its most vulnerable embassies and consulates by acquiring sites and preparing plans at 10 priority locations. This report summarizes (1) the status of the 10 priority embassy and consulate construction projects and (2) State's plans for the overall construction program. As of November 2000, seven projects are in the construction phase. The remaining three projects are on hold pending agreement between State and Congress about the Department's construction proposals. Although State envisions a long-term, multi-billion dollar program and has ranked more than 180 facilities it may need to replace, it has not prepared a long-term capital construction plan that identifies (1) proposed construction project's cost estimates and schedules and (2) estimated annual funding requirements for the overall program.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-01-22
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Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers, Statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives
Before September 11, insurance coverage for losses from terrorism was a normal feature of insurance contracts. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have changed insurers' perceptions of their risk exposure. Both insurers and reinsurers say that they do not know how much to charge for this coverage, and because they cannot predict future losses, they may exclude terrorism insurance from future contracts unless the federal government provides some guidance to the industry. Several insurance programs in the United States and other countries ensure that insurance will be available to cover risks that the private sector has been unable or unwilling to cover, including losses from catastrophic events and terrorism. For government insurance programs, the question of long-term cost and program funding needs to be addressed before any program is established. Some federal insurance programs have a statutory intent to provide subsidized coverage, while others are intended to be self-funding. Regardless of statutory intent, if federal insurance is underpriced relative to its long-run costs and the federal government pays the difference, a government subsidy results.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-24
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Terrorism Insurance: Alternative Programs for Protecting Insurance Consumers, Statement of Thomas J. McCool, Managing Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
Before September 11, insurance coverage for losses from terrorism was a normal feature of insurance contracts. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have changed insurers' perceptions of their risk exposure. Both insurers and reinsurers say that they do not know how much to charge for this coverage and because they cannot predict future losses, they may exclude terrorism insurance from future contracts unless the federal government provides some guidance to the industry. Several insurance programs in the United States and other countries ensure that insurance will be available to cover risks that the private sector has been unable or unwilling to cover, including losses from catastrophic events and terrorism. For government insurance programs, the question of long-term cost and program funding needs to be addressed before any program is established. Some federal insurance programs have a statutory intent to provide subsidized coverage, while others are intended to be self-funding. Regardless of statutory intent, if federal insurance is underpriced relative to its long-run costs and the federal government pays the difference, a government subsidy results.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-24
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Commercial Aviation: A Framework for Considering Federal Financial Assistance, Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11 killed thousands of Americans and foreign nationals. The economic toll will also be enormous. Countless jobs and retirement funds are now at risk. Estimates of the losses to the airline industry alone have ranged from $4 billion, according to many analysts, to more than $20 billion, according to some airline officials. Congress has already appropriated $40 billion for emergency responses, including increased transportation security, and Congress is considering financial assistance to the airline industry. GAO believes that the government needs to clearly define the nature of the problem--separating short-term needs from long-term challenges, industry wants from real needs. Although all airlines now face major financial challenges, government assistance cannot overcome the financial difficulty that confronted several carriers before the events of September 11. The government has a range of options to assist the airline industry, from loans and loan guarantees to tax subsidies. The choice and design of the assistance is critical to targeting federal aid to the immediate problems, spreading responsibility among all industry stakeholders, and ensuring accountability to Congress and the American people. Because an unknown level of risk will accompany such assistance, mechanisms must be put in place to protect the federal government and the taxpayers from excessive and unnecessary losses.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-09-20
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Financial Management: Assessment of the Airline Industry's Estimated Losses Arising From the Events of September 11
The airline industry's losses from the terrorist attacks will total at least $5 billion through December 2001. Even so, carrier-by-carrier losses are likely to vary significantly from the formula-derived allocations of $5 billion. Therefore, some carriers may experience losses higher than their individual formula amount, while others' losses may be lower.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-10-05
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Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams is Unclear, Statement of Mark E. Gebicke, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The Defense Department (DOD) recently approved the creation of 10 National Guard response teams to help state and local authorities deal with terrorists attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. GAO found differing views on the role and the use of these response teams and how they will fit into state and federal plans to respond to weapons of mass destruction. Army officials believe that the teams can be a valuable asset to federal authorities. They also believe that the teams will be a critical part of the state and local response. However, officials with the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which are responsible for managing the federal response to terrorist attacks, do not see a role for the teams in the federal response. Instead, they foresee the National Guard providing its traditional assistance in emergencies. Differing views also exist at the state level. Many state, local, and federal groups can do the work that the teams would perform. For example, more than 600 state and local hazardous materials teams in the United States deal with incidents involving highly toxic industrial chemicals and other hazardous materials. GAO's discussions with state, local, and federal officials and its own analysis found several concerns that could affect the teams' abilities to meet their mission and responsibilities. These concerns centered on recruiting and retention, training, and operational issues. This testimony summarizes GAO's June 1999 report, GAO/NSIAD-99-110.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-06-23
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Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success Statement of David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Since September 11, the President and Congress have taken aggressive steps to protect the nation, including creating an Office of Homeland Security (OHS); passing new laws, such as the USA Patriot Act and an emergency supplemental spending bill; establishing a new agency to improve transportation security; and working with federal, state, and local governments, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations and other countries to prevent future terrorist acts and to bring those individuals responsible to justice. More recently, Congress and the President have proposed greater consolidation and coordination of various agencies and activities. The President has proposed establishing a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and has sent draft legislation to Congress. This testimony focuses on two major issues: (1) the need for reorganization and the principles and criteria to help evaluate what agencies and missions should be included in or left out of the new DHS and (2) issues related to the transition, cost, and implementation challenges of the new department.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-25
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National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology and Procurement Policy, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector, are taking steps to strengthen the safety and security of the American people, including actions to strengthen border and port security, airport security, health and food security and to protect critical infrastructure. There are date, information-sharing, and technology challenges facing the country in developing and implementing a national preparedness strategy. The nature of the terrorist threat makes it difficult to identify and differentiate information that can provide an early indication of a terrorist threat from the mass of data available to those in positions of authority. Further, the nation faces considerable cultural, legal, and technical barriers in effectively collecting and sharing information. Many technologies key to addressing threats are not yet available, and many existing technologies have not effectively been adapted for the threats the country now faces. The real challenge, however, is not just to find the right solutions to each of these problems but to weave solutions together in an integrated and intelligent fashion.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-07
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Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts are Underway but Uncertainty Remains, Report to Congressional Requesters
The issue of homeland security crosscuts numerous policy domains, impinging on the expertise and resources of every level of government, the private sector, and the international community. GAO found that although combating terrorism crossed organizational boundaries, it did not sufficiently coordinate the activities of the 40 federal entities involved, resulting in duplication and gaps in coverage. The homeland security efforts of public and private entities do not yet represent a unified approach, although key supporting elements for such an approach are emerging. Progress has been made in developing a framework to support a more unified effort. Other remaining key elements--a national strategy, establishment of public and private sector partnerships, and the definition of key terms--are either not in place yet or are evolving. At the same time, key terms, such as "homeland security," have not been defined officially; consequently, certain organizational, management, and budgetary decisions cannot currently be made across agencies. In the interim, the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to homeland security that may lead to duplication of efforts or gaps in coverage, misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expenditures.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-07
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Information Security: Corps of Engineers Making Improvements, But Weaknesses Continue
GAO tested selected general and application controls of the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS). The Corps relies on CEFMS to perform key financial management functions supporting the Corps' military and civil works missions. The Corps has made substantial progress in improving computer controls at each of its data processing centers and other Corps sites. The Corps had completed action on 54 of GAO's 93 previous recommendations and partially completed or had action plans to correct the remainder. During the current review, nine new weaknesses were identified and corrected. Nevertheless, continuing and newly identified vulnerabilities involving general and application computer controls continue to impair the Corps' ability to ensure the reliability, confidentiality, and availability of financial and sensitive data. Such vulnerabilities increase risks to other Department of Defense networks and systems to which the Corps' network is linked. Weaknesses in general controls impaired the Corps' ability to ensure that (1) computer risks are adequately assessed, and security policies and procedures within the organization are effective and consistent with overall organizational policies and procedures; (2) users have only the access needed to perform their duties; (3) system software changes are properly documented before being placed in operation; (4) test plans and results for application changes are formally documented; (5) duties and responsibilities are adequately segregated; (6) critical applications are properly restored in the case of a disaster or interruption; and (7) the Corps has adequately protected its network from unauthorized traffic. Application control weaknesses impaired the Corps' ability to ensure that (1) current and accurate CEFMS access authorizations were maintained, (2) user manuals reflect the current CEFMS environment, and (3) the Corps is effectively using electronic signature capabilities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-06-10
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Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership Will Be Critical to Success, Statement of JayEtta Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives [July 1, 2002]
"In my testimony today, I will focus on the challenges facing the federal
government in (1) establishing a leadership structure for homeland
security, (2) defining the roles of different levels of government, (3)
developing performance goals and measures, and (4) deploying
appropriate tools to best achieve and sustain national goals. My comments
are based on a body of GAO's work on terrorism and emergency
preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance, our
review of many other studies, and the Comptroller General's June 25,
2002, testimony on the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
proposal. In addition, I will draw on GAO's ongoing work for this
Subcommittee, including an examination of the diverse ongoing and
proposed federal preparedness programs, as well as a series of case
studies we are conducting that examine preparedness issues facing state
and local governments. To date, we have conducted interviews of officials
in four geographically diverse cities: Baltimore, Maryland; New Orleans,
Louisiana; Denver, Colorado; and, Los Angeles, California. We have also
interviewed state emergency management officials in these states."
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-01
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Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Statement of (Ms) Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss several aspects of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The proposed legislation would bring
many federal entities with homeland security responsibilities into a
Department of Homeland Security in an effort to mobilize and focus assets
and resources. Title III of the proposed legislation would task the new
department with developing national policy for and coordinating the
federal government's research and development efforts for responding to
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. It would also
transfer to the new department responsibility for certain research and
development programs and other activities, including those of the
Department of Energy (DOE). In my testimony today, which focuses on Title III of the proposed legislation, I will address (1) the need for clarification of certain roles and responsibilities of the new department and (2) our observations on transferring certain activities of DOE to the new department. Our testimony is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on national
preparedness issues, as well as a review of the proposed legislation.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-09
