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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for Information Systems Protection, Statement for the Record by Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Government officials are increasingly concerned about computer attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intentions, including terrorists and nations engaging in information warfare. The dramatic rise in the interconnectivity of computer systems has compounded this threat. Today, massive computer networks provide pathways among systems that, if not properly secured, can be used to gain unauthorized access to data and operations from remote locations. The National Plan for Information Systems Protection calls for strengthening the defenses against threats to critical public and private-sector computer systems--particularly those supporting public utilities, telecommunications, finance, emergency services, and government operations. The Plan is intended to begin a dialogue and help develop plans to protect other elements of the nation's infrastructure, including the physical infrastructure and the roles and responsibilities of state and local governments and private industry. In GAO's view, the Plan is an important and positive step toward building the cyber defenses necessary to protect critical information and infrastructures. It (1) identifies the risks arising from the nation's dependence on computer networks for critical services, (2) recognizes the need for the federal government to take the lead in addressing critical infrastructure risks and to serve as a model for information security, and (3) outlines key concepts and general initiatives to help achieve these goals. Opportunities exist, however, to improve the plan and address significant challenges to building the public-private partnership necessary for comprehensive infrastructure protections. GAO believes that, rather than emphasizing intrusion detection capabilities, the plan should strive to provide agencies with the incentives and the tools to implement the management controls essential to comprehensive computer security programs. Also, the plan relies heavily on legislation and requirements already in place that, as a whole, are outmoded and inadequate as well as poorly implemented by the agencies.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-02-01
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Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed: Statement of Cynthia A. Bascetta, Associate Director Veterans' Affairs and Military Health Care Issues Health, Education, and Human Services Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
This testimony draws on a recent GAO report on the management of federal medical stockpiles that would be used to treat civilians in a chemical or biological terrorist attack. (See GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 1999.) GAO highlights the problems that it found with the management of the stockpiles, discusses the results of its actual count of stockpiled supplies, and provides information on the progress made since GAO's last report was issued.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-03-08
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Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
One of the major shortcomings in federal efforts to combat terrorism is the lack of linkage among the terrorist threat, a national strategy, and agency resources. Improvements are also needed in intergovernmental relations at the federal, state, and local levels. The reality is that the federal government cannot respond on its own to terrorist attacks involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. The Gilmore Panel, which issued its first report last year, found may of the same problems that GAO has cited, including the need for (1) more rigorous analyses of the threat, (2) better management of federal programs, (3) stronger coordination with state and local officials, and (4) a national strategy to combat terrorism.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-04-06
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems, Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
The unprecedented growth in use of the Internet has revolutionized the way much of the world communicates and conducts business. Without proper safeguards, this widespread interconnectivity poses enormous risks to America's computer systems and to the critical operations and infrastructures they support. For example, hostile nations or terrorists could use cyber-based tools and techniques to disrupt military operations and communications networks. According to the National Security Agency, potential adversaries are developing a body of knowledge about U.S. systems and about methods to attack these systems. Information sharing and coordination among organizations are central to producing comprehensive and practical approaches and solutions to these threats. The "ILOVEYOU" virus is a case in point Because information sharing mechanisms were unable to provide timely warnings, many entities were caught off guard and forced to take their networks off-line for hours. Data on possible threats--viruses, hoaxes, random threats, news events, and computer intrusions--must be continually collected and analyzed. Appropriate warnings and response actions must be effectively coordinated by strong partnerships to ensure that the right data are in the right place at the right time. Jointly designed, built, and staffed mechanisms among involved parties is most likely to obtain critical buy-in and acceptance. After determining what information to collect and report, guidelines and procedures must be established. At present, there is a shortage of persons with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to undertake these efforts.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-26
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation Should Follow Results Act Framework Statement of Kwai-Cheung Chan, Director, Special Studies and Evaluations, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Governmental Reform, House of Representatives
During the last decade, concerns about the possible use of chemical and biological weapons in both military and civilian settings have led Congress to boost funding for new and expanded initiatives to counter these threats. For example, the Chemical and Biological Defense Program appropriation has more than doubled from $388 million in fiscal year 1996 to $791 million. This testimony discusses whether a framework exists to monitor and evaluate the impact of increased funding on protecting soldiers from the effects of chemical and biological weapons.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-24
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Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources, Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
To develop sound programs to combat terrorism, the United States must develop a thorough understanding of the terrorist threat. U.S. intelligence agencies track and analyze terrorist threats, including the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. In GAO's view, some public statements made about CBRN do not include important qualifications to the information they present. For example, terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a foreign government sponsor. Secondly, much federal effort to combat terrorism has been based on vulnerabilities and worst case scenarios rather than an analysis of credible risks. A threat and risk assessment can be used to develop a nationwide strategy and guide resource investments. Officials in five foreign countries GAO visited--Canada, United Kingdom, Israel, Germany, and France--said that because of limited resources, they make funding decisions for programs to combat terrorism on the likelihood of terrorist activity, not on the countries' overall vulnerabilities. These countries maximize their existing capabilities to address a wide array of threats, including emerging threats like CBRN, before they create new capabilities or programs to respond to such attacks.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-07-26
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: 'ILOVEYOU' Computer Virus Highlights Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Info Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate
The "ILOVEYOU" computer virus is the latest in a series of events on the Internet that have seriously disrupted computer operations in both government and private industry. Although the federal government is working to implement mechanisms to help agencies ward off such an attack, it was not effective at detecting the virus early on and warning agencies about the threat. Consequently, most agencies were affected. Some incurred damage to systems and files, and many others spent countless staff hours fending off the attack and reestablishing e-mail service. Overall, however, once they learned of the virus, agencies responded promptly and appropriately. In addition to discussing the virus, this testimony addresses its impact on federal agencies as well as measures that can be taken to mitigate the effects of future attacks, which promise to be increasingly sophisticated and damaging and harder to detect.
United States. General Accounting Office
2000-05-18
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FAA Technical Center: Mission and Role in National Airspace System Plan Implementation, Briefing Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation and Related Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate
In response to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Technical Center's roles and responsibilities in the development and implementation of the National Airspace System (NAS) Plan.
GAO found that the Technical Center: (1) provides the test facilities, skills, and services necessary to support the development, testing, and evaluation of NAS equipment, systems, and procedures; (2) supports the modernization of the air traffic control system; (3) maintains the operation of computer systems; (4) provides research into aircraft safety and aviation security; (5) assists program managers in developing procurement specifications and soliciting contractor proposals; and (6) is responsible for the management of the Automated En Route Air Traffic Control II program. GAO also found that: (1) the number of Technical Center employees has decreased, while the number of contractor personnel has quadrupled; (2) funding for contract services increased from $28 million in 1985 to about $59 million in 1987; and (3) overall funding increased from $114 million in 1984 to $144 million in 1987, due to increased appropriations for facilities and equipment for NAS.
United States. General Accounting Office
1988-01-06
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000 Experiences, Report to the Chairman, Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem, U.S. Senate
The nation's computer-based critical infrastructures are at increasing risk of severe disruption. Interconnectivity increases the risk that problems affecting one system will also affect other interconnected systems. Although these problems could be caused by natural disasters, such as earthquakes, and system-inducted problems, such as the Year 2000 conversion problem, government officials are increasingly concerned about attacks from individuals and groups with malicious intentions, such as terrorists and nations engaged in information warfare. Critical systems could be disrupted, sensitive data could be read or copied, and data or processes could be tampered with. A significant concern is that terrorists or hostile foreign states could target critical systems, such as those supporting energy distribution, telecommunications, and financial services, in order to harm the public welfare. The need to strengthen computer security in both government and the private sector has been recognized over the past several years by many groups, including GAO, and several steps have been taken to address the problem. During 1996 and 1997, federal information security was addressed by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which had been created to investigate the country's vulnerability to both "cyber" and physical threats. A 1998 Presidential directive recognizes that overcoming computer-based threats to the country's critical infrastructures requires new approach involving coordination and cooperation across federal agencies and among public and private sector groups and other nations.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-10-01
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Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed, Report to Congressional Committees
The ability of the United States to effectively respond to terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological weapons is compromised by poor management controls and the lack of items on a list of required inventory. For example, GAO's review of stockpiles maintained by the Department of Veterans Affairs found discrepancies of more than 12 percent with this list. Although most of these discrepancies were overages, GAO also found shortages. The underlying cause of these problems is that federal agencies have lagged in implementing basic internal controls to help ensure that all medical supplies and pharmaceuticals are current, accounted for, and ready for use. The stakes will be even higher in the future as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) establishes the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program, which will set aside large quantities of antidotes and other medical supplies to be used in the event of domestic chemical and biological attacks. Although CDC is still in the early stages of developing this program, its current plan lacks comprehensive internal controls that would prevent the types of problems that GAO found at other agencies.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-10-29
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to Assure Security of Federal Operations, Statement of Jack L. Brock, Jr., Director, Governmentwide and Defense Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate
Since the early 1990s, an explosion in computer interconnectivity, particularly the growth in Internet use, has revolutionized the way that the government and the world communicate and do business. The benefits have been enormous. Without proper safeguards, however, this widespread interconnectivity poses enormous risks to critical operations and infrastructures in such areas as telecommunications, power distribution, law enforcement, national defense, and other government services. This testimony discusses efforts by federal agencies to deal with computer security issues. Recent audits by GAO and agency inspectors general show that the government is not adequately protecting critical federal operations and assets from computer attacks. This testimony provides greater detail on these problems and discusses broader issues that need to be considered as a national strategy for critical infrastructure protection is being considered.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-10-06
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Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological R&D Programs, Report to Congressional Requesters
This report examines the coordination of federal R&D efforts to develop nonmedical technology related to chemical and biological defense. GAO further (1) identifies federal programs that conduct nonmedical chemical and biological defense-related research and development, and (2) describes the existing mechanisms for coordinating these programs.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-08-16
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Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Statement of Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Without substantial backing from a state sponsors, most terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and other hurdles to produce and release chemical and biological weapons capable of killing or injuring large numbers of people. According to experts GAO consulted, except for toxic industrial chemicals, such as chlorine, specialized knowledge is needed in the manufacturing process and in improvising an effective delivery system for most chemical and nearly all biological weapons. Moreover, some of the components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of biological agents are difficult to obtain. Finally, terrorists would face other obstacles in carrying out a successful attack, from unfavorable weather conditions to personal safety risks. The President's fiscal year 2000 budget proposes $10 billion for counterterrorism programs--an increase of more than $3 billion over the amount requested for fiscal year 1999. To determine whether the government is spending enough on counterterrorism and spending this money on the most appropriate programs, policymakers need the best estimates of the specific threats facing the United States. The intelligence community has recently produced estimates of terrorist threats from abroad involving chemical and biological weapons. GAO recommends that the FBI prepare comparable estimates for domestic threats.
United States. General Accounting Office
1999-10-20
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Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness Statement of Paul L. Posner, Managing Director, Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-22
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Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities Statement of Richard J. Hillman Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, House of Representatives
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 brought to light the huge potential exposures insurance companies could face in the event of another terrorist attack. Faced with continued uncertainties about the frequency and magnitude of future attacks, at the same time government and military leaders are warning of new attacks to come, both insurers and re-insurers have determined that terrorism is not an insurable risk at this time. As a result, in the closing months of last year insurers began announcing that they could not afford to continue providing coverage for potential terrorism losses. The effects of this trend have yet to be fully realized, but there is some indication that it has begun to cause difficulties for some firms in certain economic sectors. My statement today is based on discussions with a variety of insurance industry participants, regulators, policyholders, and other affected parties. Because many companies were deeply concerned about the possibility that their difficulties in getting terrorism coverage might become general knowledge, they spoke to us only on condition of anonymity. Finally, my statement primarily addresses the availability of terrorism insurance coverage.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-02-27
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Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility in preparing for catastrophic terrorist attacks. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is intergovernmental, national policymakers need a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges when formulating antiterrorism strategies. Key aspects of this strategy should include a definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities. GAO's has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. More than 40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of cohesive effort, and duplication of programs. This situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and effectively partner with the federal government. Goals and performance measures should be established to guide the nation's preparedness efforts. For the nation's preparedness programs, however, outcomes have yet to be defined in terms of domestic preparedness. Given the recent and proposed increases in preparedness funding, real and meaningful improvements in preparedness and establishing clear goals and performance measures are critical to ensuring a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. The strategy should include a careful choice of the most appropriate tools of government to best achieve national goals. The choice and design of policy tools, such as grants, regulations, and partnerships, can enhance the government's ability to (1) target areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote shared responsibility by all parties, and (3) track and assess progress toward achieving national goals.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-01
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Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Role in Public Health Protection, Statement for the Record by Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
CDC has a variety of ongoing research and preparedness
activities related to bioterrorism. Most of CDC's activities to counter
bioterrorism are focused on building and expanding public health
infrastructure at the federal, state, and local levels. These include funding
research on anthrax and smallpox vaccines, increasing laboratory
capacity, and building a national pharmaceutical stockpile of drugs and
supplies to be used in an emergency. Since CDC's bioterrorism program
began in 1999, funding increased 43 percent in fiscal year 2000 and an
additional 12 percent in fiscal year 2001. While the percentage increases
are substantial, they reflect only a $73 million increase in overall spending
because many of the activities initially received relatively small
allocations. Gaps in CDC's activities could hamper the response to a
bioterrorist attack. For instance, laboratories at all levels can quickly
become overwhelmed with requests for tests. In addition, there is a
notable lack of training focused on detecting and responding to
bioterrorist threats.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-15
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Chemical and Biological Defense: DoD Should Clarify Expectations for Medical Readiness, Statement of Nancy Kingsbury, Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans' Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
"As the war on terrorism proceeds at home and abroad, the need for attention to these matters has become more urgent. My testimony today is based on our report on DOD's preparations for medical support for chemical and biological casualties. In the report, which is being released today, we responded to your request that we determine how DOD had adapted its medical personnel to
emerging chemical and biological threats. Specifically, we looked at how
DOD and the services had addressed chemical and biological threats in the
distribution of medical personnel across specialties. We also looked at the
extent of training for medical personnel in the treatment of chemical and
biological casualties."
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-07
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National Airspace System: Long-Term Capacity Planning Needed Despite Recent Reduction in Flight Delays
Initiatives to address flight delays include adding new runways to accommodate more aircraft and better coordinating efforts to adjust to spring and summer storms. Although most of these efforts were developed separately, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has incorporated many of them into an Operational Evolution Plan (OEP), which is designed to give more focus to these initiatives. FAA acknowledges that the plan is not intended as a final solution to congestion and delay problems. The plan focuses on initiatives that can be implemented within 10 years and generally excludes approaches lacking widespread support across stakeholder groups. The current initiatives, if successful, will add substantial capacity to the nation's air transport system. Even so, these efforts are unlikely to prevent delays from becoming worse unless the reduced traffic levels resulting from the events of September 11 persist. One key reason is that most delay-prone airports have limited ability to increase their capacity, especially by adding new runways--the main capacity-building element of OEP. The air transport system has long-term needs beyond the initiatives now under way. One initiative would add new capacity--not by adding runways to existing capacity-constrained airports, but rather by building entirely new airports or using nearby airports with available capacity. Another would manage and distribute demand within the system's existing capacity. A third would develop other modes of intercity travel, such as, but not limited to, high-speed rail where metropolitan areas are relatively close together. Because of increasing demands on the air transport system or because of the need to meet security and other concerns prompted by the recent terrorist attacks, the federal government will need to assume a central role.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-12-14
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Commercial Aviation: Air Service Trends At Small Communities Since October 2000, Report to Congressional Requesters
Most major U.S. airlines began realizing net operating losses early in the 2001, and all of the major U.S. passenger carriers except Southwest Airlines reported losses for the year. Travelers throughout the nation shared in the difficulties. In October 2000, the typical or median small community that GAO analyzed had service from two airlines, with a total of nine daily departing flights. Forty-one percent of the communities were served by only one airline with size being the most obvious factor for service limitations. However, the level of service also varied by the level of local economic activity. The total number of daily departures from these small communities declined by 19 percent between October 2000 and October 2001. Although carriers had reduced total departure levels at small communities before September 11th, airlines made even more reductions after that date. Because profitability is so critical to airline decisions about what markets to serve and how to serve them, the changes in service levels in small communities can be traced to economic factors. Two such factors--the economic decline that began in early 2001 and the collapse of airline passenger traffic after September 11--are widely acknowledged as the main contributors to declining profitability in the industry.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-29
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Department of State: Status of Achieving Key Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges, Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate
GAO reviewed the Department of State's fiscal year 2000 performance report and its fiscal year 2002 performance plan. Weaknesses in State's fiscal year 2000 performance report made it difficult to determine the department's progress toward achieving such key outcomes as eliminating the threat from weapons of mass destruction and expanding foreign markets for U.S. products and services. These weaknesses are rooted in performance goals and indicators established in State's performance plan for 2000, which GAO criticized in an earlier report. State has taken a major step toward implementing Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requirements by producing a fiscal year 2002 plan that is superior to earlier efforts. State will need to focus on reporting on all indicators in the plan and, if targets are not achieved, clearly explain why and what actions it plans to achieve the targets in the future.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-12-07
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Coast Guard: Budget and Management Challenges for 2003 and Beyond Statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate
Like many federal agencies, the Coast Guard's priorities were dramatically altered by the events of September 11. The Coast Guard has requested $7.3 billion for fiscal year 2003--a 36 percent increase from the previous year. The events of September 11 caused a substantial shift of effort toward homeland security and away from other missions. As resources were shifted to meet these needs, the law enforcement mission area, which consists mainly of drug and migrant interdiction and fisheries enforcement, saw a dramatic drop in mission capability. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2003 budget request reflects an attempt to maintain and enhance heightened levels of funding for homeland security while also increasing funding for all other Coast Guard missions beyond fiscal year 2002 levels. The Coast Guard faces substantial management challenges in translating its requested funding increases into increased service levels in its key mission areas. For example, workforce issues present a daunting challenge. If the budget request for fiscal year 2003 is approved, the Coast Guard will add 2,200 full-time positions, retain and build on the expertise and skills of its current workforce, and deal with already high attrition rates and looming civilian retirements. The Coast Guard has yet to determine the long-term level of security needed to protect the nation's major ports. These challenges mean that, in the short term, additional funding may not increase the Coast Guard's ability to carry out its missions.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-19
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Social Security: Observations on Improving Distribution of Death Information, Statement of Barbara D. Bovbjerg, Director, Education, Workforce and Income Security Issues and Richard J. Hillman, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Financial Services; and Subcommittee on Social Security, Committee on Ways and Means
Congress, law enforcement, and others have expressed concern about the misuse of Social Security numbers (SSNs). Death information collected by the Social Security Administration (SSA), including the SSN, generally reaches financial institutions and other entities within one to two months of a person's death. SSA and the National Technical Information Service could improve the timeliness of the distribution of the Death Master File. Improving the timeliness of death information to the financial services industry would help to narrow the window of time that a criminal has to open new accounts using a deceased individual's identity. Additional education for the financial services industry about the availability and contents of the Death Master File would also be helpful. Providing timely death information and making financial institutions more aware of a reliable source of such information could deter criminals from using deceased individuals' social security numbers to obtain false identities for fraudulent activities.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-08
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Federal Funding for Selected Surveillance Technologies
Law enforcement officials rely on new technologies to accomplish their enforcement responsibilities. Although the use of some of these technologies has raised privacy concerns, the attacks of September 11 have prompted calls for the use of surveillance technologies to combat terrorism and other crimes that threaten security. This report discusses the government's funding of research and deployment of three surveillance technologies--facial recognition, red light cameras, and photo radar devices. GAO surveyed 35 federal entities, 17 of which had conducted research and development or testing of one or more of the three technologies. They reported obligating $51 million as of June 2001, with the largest amount reported for facial recognition. All of the 17 respondents obligated funds for research and development, none used funds for deployment, and two promoted the technologies but did not obligate any funds.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-03-14
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Limited 'Voided Arrest' Data From Federal, State, and Local Agencies
A "voided arrest" is any arrest resulting in the release of a person without the filing of formal charges, dismissal of proceedings against the person arrested, or a determination that the arrest was without probable cause. GAO's ongoing review of the number of "voided arrests," originally intended to support the Clear Your Good Name Act, was closed out because of the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the legislative agenda in Congress. Complete data on the number of "voided arrests," as defined by the Clear Your Good Name Act (H.R. 1154) that occur at national and state levels are not available. None of the federal, state, or local agencies GAO contacted use the term "voided arrest." They do not have data for the category "voided arrests," and the data that they have do not include all arrests in those jurisdictions that can be considered "voided arrests" as defined by H.R. 1154. The Bureau of Justice Statistics and the state criminal history record repositories generally have data for the arrest disposition categories of prosecutor declinations and dismissals, and these dispositions can be considered "voided arrests." However, prosecutor declinations and court dismissals occur for many reasons, and obtaining and analyzing data on these would be extremely difficult and time-consuming.
United States. General Accounting Office
2001-11-30
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Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security Challenges Need to Be Addressed: Statement of Robert F. Dacey Director, Information Security Issues
On June 18, the President transmitted draft legislation to Congress for the creation of a Department of Homeland Security to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recovery from attacks that do occur. As proposed, functions of the Homeland Security Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division would include (1) receiving and analyzing law enforcement information, intelligence, and other information to detect and identify potential threats; (2) assessing the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructures; (3) developing a comprehensive national plan for securing these resources and infrastructures; and (4) taking necessary measures to protect these resources and infrastructures, in coordination with other executive agencies, state and local governments, and the private sector. To create this division, six federal organizations that currently play a pivotal role in the protection of national critical infrastructures would be transferred to the new department. Potential benefits for this division include more efficient, effective, and coordinated programs; better control of funding through a single appropriation for the new department and through establishing budget priorities for transferred functions based on their homeland security mission; and the consolidation of points of contact for federal agencies, state and local government, and the private sector in coordinating activities to protect the homeland. Finally, the new department will also face challenges, such as developing a national critical infrastructure protection strategy, improving analytical and warning capabilities, improving information sharing on threats and vulnerabilities, and addressing pervasive weaknesses in federal information security.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-09
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Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues Statement of David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, Testimony before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives
"In my testimony today, I will focus on two major issues that we believe the
Congress should consider creating a new cabinet department principally
dedicated to homeland security: (1) the national strategy and criteria
needed to guide any reorganization of homeland security activities and to
help evaluate which agencies and missions should be included in or left out
of the new DHS; and (2) key issues related to the successful
implementation of, and transition to, a new department, including
leadership, cost and phasing, and other management challenges. Our
testimony is based largely on our previous and ongoing work on national
preparedness issues1, as well as a review of the proposed legislation." -David Walker
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-17
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Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to Success, Statement of Patricia A. Dalton, Director, Strategic Issues, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives
In my testimony today, I will focus on the challenges facing the federal
government in (1) establishing a leadership structure for homeland
security, (2) defining the roles of different levels of government, (3)
developing performance goals and measures, and (4) deploying
appropriate tools to best achieve and sustain national goals. My comments
are based on a body of GAO's work on terrorism and emergency
preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance, our
review of many other studies, and the Comptroller General's recent
testimonies on the proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In addition, I will draw on GAO's ongoing work for this Subcommittee, including an examination of the diverse ongoing and proposed federal preparedness programs, as well as a series of case studies we are conducting that examine preparedness issues facing state and local governments. To date, we have conducted interviews of officials in five geographically diverse cities: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver, Colorado; Los Angeles, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Seattle, Washington. We have also interviewed state emergency management officials in these states.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-08-20
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Chemical Safety: Emergency Response Community Views on the Adequacy of Federally Required Chemical Information, Report to Congressional Committees
The United States has become increasingly aware of the need to be prepared for emergencies, including those involving hazardous chemicals. The local emergency responders and representatives from national organizations that GAO contacted have varied views on the adequacy of (1) information in chemical inventory forms and risk management plans and (2) the manner in which that information is delivered. Most members of the emergency response community believe that the manner of delivery of federally required information could be improved. Environmental Protection Agency officials cited their efforts to ensure compliance with provisions of the Clean Air Act's risk management program. However, their sense of the extent of compliance varies across three specific provisions; that is, the extent to which (1) facilities have registered risk management plans, (2) the plans contain accurate information, and (3) local responders are receiving the plans.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-31
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Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises Concerns, Statement for the Record by Janet Heinrich Director, Health Care--Public Health Issues, Testimony before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, U.S. Senate
Federal, state, and local governments share responsibility for terrorist attacks. However, local government, including police and fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies, is typically the first responder to an incident. The federal government historically has provided leadership, training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of September 11, for instance, one-quarter of the $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was earmarked for homeland security, including enhancing state and local government preparedness. Because the national security threat is diffuse and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing those governments. The development of a national strategy will improve national preparedness and enhance partnerships between federal, state, and local governments. The creation of the Office of Homeland Security is an important and potentially significant first step. The Office of Homeland Security's strategic plan should (1) define and clarify the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local entities; (2) establish goals and performance measures to guide the nation's preparedness efforts; and (3) carefully choose the most appropriate tools of government to implement the national strategy and achieve national goals. The President's proposed Homeland Security Act of 2002 would bring many federal agencies with homeland security responsibilities--including public health preparedness and response--into one department to mobilize and focus assets and resources at all levels of government. GAO believes that the proposed reorganization has the potential to repair fragmentation in the coordination of public health preparedness and response programs at the federal, state, and local levels. The proposal would institutionalize the responsibility for homeland security in federal statute. In addition to improving overall coordination, the transfer of programs from multiple agencies to the new department could reduce overlap among programs and facilitate response in times of disaster. There are concerns about the proposed transfer of control of public health assistance programs that have both public health and homeland security functions from Health and Human Services to the new department. Transferring control of these programs, including priority setting, to the new department has the potential to disrupt some programs that are critical to basic public health responsibilities. GAO does not believe that the President's proposal is sufficiently clear on how both the homeland security and public health objectives would be accomplished.
United States. General Accounting Office
2002-07-16
