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Missile Technology Control Regime: Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers
The United States Government has, after careful consideration and subject to its international treaty obligations, decided that, when considering the transfer of equipment and technology related to missiles, it will act in accordance with the attached Guidelines beginning on January 7, 1993. These Guidelines replace those adopted on April 16, 1987. The purpose of these Guidelines is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical and biological weapons), by controlling transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. The Guidelines are not designed to impede national space programs or international cooperation in such programs as long as such programs could not contribute to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction. These Guidelines, including the attached Annex, form the basis for controlling transfers to any destination beyond the Government's jurisdiction or control of all delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and of equipment and technology relevant to missiles whose performance in terms of payload and range exceeds stated parameters. Restraint will be exercised in the consideration of all transfers of items contained within the Annex and all such transfers will be considered on a case-by-case basis. The Government will implement the Guidelines in accordance with national legislation. The Annex consists of two categories of items, which term includes equipment and technology. Category I items, all of which are in Annex Items 1 and 2, are those items of greatest sensitivity. If a Category I item is included in a system, that system will also be considered as Category I, except when the incorporated item cannot be separated, removed or duplicated. Particular restraint will be exercised in the consideration of Category I transfers regardless of their purpose, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Particular restraint will also be exercised in the consideration of transfers of any items in the Annex, or of any missiles (whether or not in the Annex), if the Government judges, on the basis of all available, persuasive information, evaluated according to factors including those in paragraph 3, that they are intended to be used for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, and there will be a strong presumption to deny such transfers. Until further notice, the transfer of Category I production facilities will not be authorized. The transfer of other Category I items will be authorized only on rare occasions and where the Government (A) obtains binding government-to-government undertakings embodying the assurances from the recipient government called for in paragraph 5 of these Guidelines and (B) assumes responsibility for taking all steps necessary to ensure that the item is put only to its stated end-use. It is understood that the decision to transfer remains the sole and sovereign judgment of the United States Government.
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Nonproliferation
1993-01-07
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United States Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation
This report from the State Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation discusses the United States' efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. "The U.S. is undertaking many multilateral initiatives with our partners in the global war against terrorism, with our traditional allies, and in the United Nations." The report specifically addresses the following efforts: United Nations Resolutions 1540, Proliferation Security Initiative, building on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to create new nonproliferation assistance programs, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, shutting down the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, eliminating Libya's WMD programs, and export control and related border security assistance.
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Nonproliferation
2005-05-27
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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The NPT is a collection of eleven articles designed to prevent new countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, to promote disarmament, and to establish a system for safeguards and verification.
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Nonproliferation
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U.S. Department of State: Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation [website]
"The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), headed by Assistant Secretary John C. Rood is responsible for managing a broad range of nonproliferation, counterproliferation and arms control functions. ISN leads U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) and their delivery systems. The ISN Bureau spearheads efforts to promote international consensus on WMD proliferation through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; addresses WMD proliferation threats posed by non-state actors and terrorist groups by improving physical security, using interdiction and sanctions, and actively participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); works closely with the UN, the G-8, NATO, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other international institutions and organizations to reduce and eliminate the threat posed by WMD; and supports efforts of foreign partners to prevent, protect against, and respond to the threat or use of WMD by terrorists."
The site contains links to official remarks, press releases, reports and more on a variety of pertinent topics.
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Nonproliferation
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Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material provides for certain levels of physical protection during international transport of nuclear material and establishes a general framework for cooperation among states in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. Further, the Convention lists certain serious offenses involving nuclear material which state parties are to make punishable and for which offenders shall be subject to a system of extradition or submission for prosecution.
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Nonproliferation
1980-03-03
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Proliferation Security Initiative Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
This fact sheet offers in-depth background information on the Proliferation Security Initiative. "President Bush announced on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation Security Initiative,which is an effort to enhance and expand our efforts to prevent the flow of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials on the ground, in the air and at sea to and from countries of proliferation concern. This initiative reflects the need for a more dynamic and active approach to the global proliferation problem. It reflects the reality that proliferators are actively and aggressively seeking WMD using techniques that thwart export controls and enforcement measures. It envisions partnerships of states working in concert, employing their national capabilities to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military and other tools to interdict shipments of such items."
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Nonproliferation
2005-01-11
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