Advanced search Help
Searching for terms: EXACT: "United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General" in: publisher
Clear all search criteria
Only 2/3! You are seeing results from the Public Collection, not the complete Full Collection. Sign in to search everything (see eligibility).
-
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Management
"The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) serves as the federal government's principal agency for responding to and investigating terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI have elevated counterterrorism and the prevention of future attacks against U.S. interests as the paramount mission of the Department of Justice (Department) and, specifically, the FBI. As a result, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated an audit to review certain aspects of the FBI's management of its counterterrorism resources. Our audit focused specifically on: (1) the FBI's progress toward developing a national-level risk assessment of the terrorist threat to the United States; (2) whether the FBI's strategic planning process provides a sound basis to identify counterterrorism requirements; and (3) the amount of resources dedicated to the FBI's counterterrorism program from 1995 to April 2002. In addition, the audit assessed the FBI's management of its training and after-action reporting as they relate to counterterrorism operations. This audit does not assess all aspects of the FBI's counterterrorism program or how the FBI or other law enforcement and intelligence agencies handled information that may have been related to terrorist activities that resulted in the September 11 attacks."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2002-09
-
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Management of Information Technology Investments
"Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) made clear that prevention of terrorism is the top priority of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI. Effective use of information technology (IT) is crucial to the FBI's ability to meet this priority as well as its other critical responsibilities. However, reviews conducted by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the General Accounting Office (GAO) have found major weaknesses associated with the FBI's IT. The FBI has listed upgrading its information technology as one of its top ten highest priorities. In June 2002 Congressional testimony, the FBI acknowledged that its IT infrastructure is severely outdated. Because of the importance of the FBI's management of its IT systems, we performed this audit to: (1) determine whether the FBI was effectively managing its IT investments; and (2) assess the FBI's IT-related strategic planning and performance measurement activities.1 We also examined the FBI's efforts to develop enterprise architecture2 and project management capabilities. In this audit, we conducted approximately 85 interviews with 70 officials from the FBI, DOJ, GAO, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The FBI officials interviewed were from the Director's office, Information Resources Division, Criminal Justice Information Services Division, Laboratory Division, Inspection Division, and Finance Division. Additionally, OIG auditors and analysts traveled to FBI laboratory facilities in Quantico, VA, and five FBI field offices to conduct interviews and assess the FBI's implementation of IT initiatives. We also reviewed more than 200 documents, including the FBI's IT management policies and procedures, project management guidance, strategic and program plans, IT project proposals and management plans, budget documentation, organizational structures, Congressional testimony, and prior OIG and GAO."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2002
-
Semiannual Report to Congress: April 2016 - September 30, 2016
From the Message from the Inspector General section: "The Report demonstrates the diversity and quality of the OIG's work over the past 6 months. During this time, we completed numerous reports pertaining to DOJ's law enforcement components, such as reviews of ATF's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms] undercover storefront operations, the DEA's [Drug Enforcement Agency] management and oversight of its confidential source program, and the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and ATF's processes for handling firearm purchase denials through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System. We also reviewed BOP's [Bureau of Prisons] contraband interdiction efforts, oversight of private contract prisons, release preparation program, untimely release of inmates, and reimbursement rates for medical care provided to inmates outside of BOP facilities. In our ongoing commitment to identify whether DOJ funds are being used effectively and efficiently, we conducted dozens of audits and reviews, and we recommended numerous improvements to DOJ's [Department of Justice] programs. In addition, the OIG's [Office of the Inspector General] Investigations Division closed 172 criminal or administrative misconduct cases, and its work resulted in 45 convictions or pleas and 146 terminations, administrative disciplinary actions, and resignations. In particular, the OIG concluded two investigations finding fraud and other irregularities relating to the manufacture and sale of Kevlar combat helmets to the Department of Defense that led to a $3 million civil settlement with the manufacturer. The quality of the investigations described in this report demonstrates the importance of effective, fair, and objective investigative oversight conducted by our Office."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2016-10
-
Findings of Fraud and Other Irregularities Related to the Manufacture and Sale of Combat Helmets by the Federal Prison Industries and ArmorSource, LLC, to the Department of Defense
"The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated two joint investigations with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and supported by elements of the U.S. Army, regarding allegations that the Federal Prison Industries (FPI) and ArmorSource LLC (ArmorSource), manufactured and sold Advance Combat Helmets (ACH) and Lightweight Marine Corps Helmets (LMCH) to the Department of Defense (DOD) that did not meet contract specifications and were defective. The FPI is a wholly-owned government corporation established by statute and Executive Order in 1934, to provide opportunities for education and work-related experiences to federal offenders. It makes products for sale exclusively to the federal government and that do not compete with private sector companies in the commercial market. FPI is required to be financially self-sustaining, and it is structured to be sufficiently diversified so as to avoid undue impact upon any particular industry. The FPI pays inmates for their labor from its revenues and distributes profits from sales to be deposited to a revolving fund that finances all industrial operations (including capital improvements) and helps subsidize other prison inmate programs. According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), FPI is one of its most important correctional programs, providing federal inmates with training, marketable job skills, and work experience. BOP considers FPI as integral to its mission of public safety and effective inmate reentry."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2016-08
-
Evaluation of Military Criminal Investigative Organizations' Adult Sexual Assault Investigations [February 2017]
"We evaluated 378 Military Criminal Investigative Organizations' (MCIO) adult sexual assault investigations opened on or after January 1, 2014, and completed on or before December 31, 2015, to determine whether the MCIOs completed investigations as required by DoD, Military Service, and MCIO guidance. This evaluation is the third in a series of recurring evaluations of the MCIOs' closed adult sexual assault investigations."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2017-02-14
-
Follow-up Review of the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence Center
"The Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment states that Mexican transnational criminal organizations are the single greatest criminal drug threat to the United States. The El Paso Intelligence Center (Center, EPIC), a DEA-led, multi-agency intelligence center located in El Paso, Texas, is well positioned to play a key role in law enforcement's efforts to combat these organizations and deter their criminal activities because of its long-standing presence on the U.S. southwest border. [...] The Department of Justice (Department, DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) previously reviewed EPIC in 2010. During that review, we examined EPIC's roles and functions and its ability to analyze and disseminate intelligence to support federal, state, and local law enforcement operations. The review found that EPIC was highly valued by its partner agencies and customers, who found its products useful. However, we identified several weaknesses in EPIC's operations and, as a result of that review, made 10 recommendations to the DEA, the last of which was closed in March 2014 because we found sufficient evidence that EPIC had taken reasonable steps to address the concerns we had identified. After discussions with the DEA Acting Administrator, the OIG initiated this review for the purpose of examining EPIC's capabilities and the value it has provided to law enforcement since our prior review. We also assessed EPIC's governance, partner agency resource allocations, ability to fulfill its 'all threats' mission focus, and coordination with another southwest border intelligence collection program managed by the DEA Houston Field Division (DEA Houston)."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2017-02
-
Report on the Department of Justice'sCybersecurity Logical Access Controls and Data Security Management Practices Pursuant to the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Section 406, Federal Computer Security
"The Cybersecurity Act of 2015 § 406 (Section 406) requires the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to submit a report to Congress on DOJ's cybersecurity policies, procedures, practices, and capabilities for national security systems and systems that provide access to personally identifiable information. The OIG contracted with KPMG LLP (KPMG) to perform a review and prepare this report pursuant to the Section 406 reporting requirement. KPMG's approach to accomplishing the Section 406 reporting requirement was to collect information regarding the design of DOJ's information technology cybersecurity practices. KPMG interviewed DOJ management and inspected DOJ policies and practices. KPMG also leveraged applicable system information from the fiscal year (FY) 2016 Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) audit and previous OIG FISMA audit reports for the following cybersecurity areas applicable to Section 406: (1) Logical Access Policies and Procedures; (2) Logical Access and Multi-Factor Authentication for Privileged Users; (3) Data Security Management Practices; and (4) Data Security Management Practices over Contractors."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2016-08
-
Follow-Up Audit of the Department of Justice's Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements
From the Introduction, "The appropriate classification of information is critical to the government's efforts to ensure national security. Over-classification of information restricts accurate and actionable information sharing, increases the cost of securing information, and needlessly limits stakeholder and public access to information. In 2010, Congress passed Public Law 111-258, the 'Reducing Over-Classification Act' (Act), to determine whether agencies' classification procedures and practices contribute to over-classification and restrict information sharing. The Act directed the federal Inspectors General to: (1) assess whether applicable classification policies, procedures, rules, and regulations have been adopted, followed, and are effectively administered within the DOJ [Department of Justice]; and (2) identify policies, procedures, rules, regulations, or practices that may contribute to persistent misclassification of material within the DOJ. The Act also mandated that the Inspectors General follow up on their initial reviews 3 years later to assess DOJ's progress made pursuant to the results of the first evaluation. In fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) completed the first evaluation and issued an audit report on DOJ's Implementation of and Compliance with Certain Classification Requirements. In our FY 2013 audit, we made 14 recommendations to help improve the DOJ's classification management program and implementation of classification procedures. This follow-up audit assesses the Department's progress in implementing these recommendations, 11 of which are closed, and makes additional recommendations for further improvement in this important area."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2016-09
-
Report of Investigation of Former Federal Bureau of Investigation Director James Comey's Disclosure of Sensitive Investigative Information and Handling of Certain Memoranda
From the Introduction: "This report describes the investigation by the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) into the creation, storage, and handling of certain memoranda (Memos) written by former Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James B. Comey. Between January 6, 2017, and April 11, 2017, while Comey was Director of the FBI, he memorialized seven one-on-one interactions that he had with President-elect and President Donald J. Trump. Throughout this report, these Memos are referred to as Memo 1 through Memo 7, numbered chronologically according to the date each Memo was written. Comey, who had original classification authority as FBI Director, marked a small amount of information in Memo 1 as classified at the time that he wrote it. Comey also believed that Memo 3 contained classified information when he wrote it, but did not mark the document as classified. Comey kept signed originals of Memos 2, 4, 6, and 7 in a personal safe in his home and, following his May 2017 removal as FBI Director, provided his personal attorneys with copies of Memos 2, 4, and 6, and a redacted version of Memo 7; Comey never took copies of Memos 1, 3, and 5 to his home, and never shared these Memos with anyone outside the FBI."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2019-08
-
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Disciplinary System
"This review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) disciplinary system is the fifth in a series of Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviews assessing Department components' disciplinary systems. The FBI's mission is to 'protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats; uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States; and provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners.' [...] The FBI has defined the actions that violate its standards of conduct and hinder the performance of the FBI's mission. In addition, the FBI has identified the range of discipline it may impose when an employee deviates from these standards and commits misconduct. The OIG conducted this review to examine the FBI's investigations of allegations of misconduct against FBI employees and to assess whether the FBI imposed consistent, reasonable, and timely discipline for misconduct. In this Executive Digest, we first provide a brief overview of the FBI's disciplinary system, followed by a summary of our results and our recommendations."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-05
-
Review of the Department of Justice's Use of Less-Lethal Weapons
"Department of Justice (Department) Special Agents, Deputy Marshals, and correctional personnel may use less-lethal weapons when circumstances require use of some force, but use of deadly force would not be appropriate. Use of these weapons can also enhance the safety of law enforcement officers and the public during law enforcement operations. However, while less-lethal weapons are less likely to cause serious injury or death than firearms, significant injuries and fatalities can result from their use. […] The OIG conducted this review to determine the types of less-lethal weapons used by the Department's law enforcement components; the extent to which the components are using these weapons; whether training and controls have been implemented to ensure the weapons are used properly; whether Department components have identified the impact of using these weapons on their missions; and whether the Department assesses, deploys, and oversees new and emerging less-lethal weapon technologies. In addition, the OIG examined research related to less-lethal weapons conducted or funded by the Department's National Institute of Justice (NIJ). We also reviewed the Civil Rights Division's investigations of less-lethal weapon usage by Department law enforcement components and state and local law enforcement agencies."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-05
-
Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (as required by Section 1001(3) of Public Law 107-56) [February 2009]
"Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act), Public Law 107-56, directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) to undertake a series of actions related to claims of civil rights or civil liberties violations allegedly committed by DOJ employees. It also requires the OIG to provide semiannual reports to Congress on the implementation of the OIG's responsibilities under Section 1001. This report -- the fourteenth since enactment of the legislation in October 2001 -- summarizes the OIG's Section 1001-related activities from July 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-02
-
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of Exigent Letters and Other Informal Requests for Telephone Records [January 2010]
"On March 9, 2007, the Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued its first report on the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) use of national security letters (NSL). Issued in response to the requirements in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Patriot Reauthorization Act), the first report described the use and effectiveness of NSLs, including 'any illegal and improper use,' in calendar years 2003 through 2005. On March 13,2008, the OIG issued its second report on NSLs, which assessed the corrective actions the FBI and the Department had taken in response to the OIG's first NSL report. The second report also described NSL usage in calendar year 2006. In this third report, we describe the results of our investigation of the FBI's use of exigent letters and other informal requests, instead of NSLs or other legal process, to obtain the production of non-content telephone records from employees of three communications service providers (Companies A, B, and C). The OIG conducted this investigation to examine in greater detail the extent of the FBI's use of exigent letters and other informal requests for such information, as well as to assess the accountability of FBI employees and supervisors who were responsible for these practices. We examined the conduct of the FBI personnel who signed these letters or made these informal requests, their supervisors, and the FBI's senior leadership."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2010-01
-
Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (as required by Section 1001(3) of Public Law 107-56) [August 2009]
"Section 1001 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act), Public Law 107-56, directs the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ or Department) to undertake a series of actions related to claims of civil rights or civil liberties violations allegedly committed by DOJ employees. It also requires the OIG to provide semiannual reports to Congress on the implementation of the OIG's responsibilities under Section 1001. This report-the fifteenth since enactment of the legislation in October 2001-summarizes the OIG's Section 1001-related activities from January 1, 2009, through June 30, 2009."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-08
-
Top Management Challenges in the Department of Justice-2008
This memorandum is the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) 2008 list of top management and performance challenges facing the Department of Justice (DOJ). DOJ's OIG has prepared similar lists since 1998. "By statute, this list is required to be included in the Department's annual Performance and Accountability Report. As in past years, the challenges are not presented in order of priority-we believe that all are critical issues facing the Department. We hope that this document will assist Department managers in developing strategies to address the top management and performance challenges facing the Department. We look forward to continuing to work with the Department to address these important issues."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
Fine, Glenn A.
2008-11-13
-
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Threat and Suspicious Incident Tracking System
"The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this audit to evaluate the policies and procedures the FBI uses to identify, assess, and track terrorist threats and suspicious incidents. In particular, we examined the FBI's: (1) Guardian Threat Tracking System; (2) Guardian threat assessment processes and operational guidance established by FBI headquarters; and (3) Guardian threat assessment policies and procedures in practice at six FBI field offices we visited. To conduct the review we: (1) reviewed threat management documents by the FBI officials and Guardian users assigned to various headquarters locations; (3) interviewed FBI officials and Guardian users at select field offices; (4) examined the process followed by the FBI in developing, implementing, maintaining, and updating Guardian; (5) tested samples of terrorism-related incidents tracked in Guardian; and (6) tested samples of counterterrorism-related cases in the Automated Case Support (ACS) system. [...] Guardian is an automated system that records, stores, and assigns responsibility for follow up on counterterrorism threats and suspicious incidents. Guardian can be used to distribute immediate threat information to users, and it also provides the capability to analyze threat information for trends and patterns."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-11
-
Department of Justice Efforts in Managing Information Technology Security Vulnerabilities
"The Department of Justice (Department), like the rest of the federal government has become increasingly dependent on information technology (IT) systems to accomplish its mission. These systems contain a wide range of data regarding individuals, organizations, and other sensitive information. Any IT system inherently contains vulnerabilities that, if exploited, can expose sensitive information to unauthorized individuals, and in some cases compromise national security. To reduce the risk of compromise of its IT systems and the data they contain, it is essential that the Department minimize the vulnerabilities in its IT systems. Enhancing the security of the information contained within its IT systems is a top priority of the federal government and the Department. [...] The objectives of this audit were to identify the Department's major systemic IT security vulnerabilities and assess the Department's progress in mitigating the identified vulnerabilities, in monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the IT security program, and in improving the overall security of its IT systems. The scope of our audit was limited to a review of the vulnerability management part of the Department's IT security program, which focuses on addressing the greatest threats to IT systems. We did not review and evaluate the adequacy of other elements of the Department's overall IT security efforts, such as training or contingency planning."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-12
-
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' Controls Over Its Weapons, Laptop Computers, and Other Sensitive Property
"This audit of the ATF's controls over its weapons, laptop computers, and other sensitive property is one of a series of follow-up audits that the OIG is conducting to examine DOJ components' controls over their weapons and laptop computers. The objectives of this audit were to assess the adequacy of ATF's actions taken in response to weapons, laptop computers, ammunition, and explosives identified as lost, stolen, or missing, and the effectiveness of ATF's internal controls over weapons, laptop computers, ammunition, and explosives. Our other audits of controls over weapons and laptop computers in DOJ components did not include a review of ammunition and explosives. However, we included ammunition and explosives in this audit because the 2002 Treasury OIG audit identified weaknesses in these areas. Our review covered the 59-month period from October 1, 2002, through August 31, 2007. […] Over the 59-month period we tested, 76 weapons and 418 laptop computers were lost, stolen, or missing from ATF. ATF's rate of weapons loss per month has nearly tripled since Treasury's 2002 audit, and the rate of loss per month for laptop computers was 50 times higher than what the 2002 audit revealed. […] We also found serious deficiencies in ATF's response to these lost, stolen, or missing items. […] Our audit concluded that ATF had adequate controls over the explosives in its possession. We also concluded that ATF had proper physical security over its ammunition. However, we identified continued weaknesses in ATF's ammunition accountability and controls."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-09
-
Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Use of National Security Letters [March 2007]
This is the unclassified version of the report, released in March 2007. "In the Patriot Reauthorization Act, enacted in 2006, Congress directed the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to review 'the effectiveness and use, including any improper or illegal use, of national security letters issued by the Department of Justice.' The Act required the OIG to conduct reviews of the use of national security letters for two separate time periods. This report describes the results of the first OIG review of the FBI's use of national security letters (NSLs), covering calendar years (CY) 2003 through 2005. [...] In this review, the OIG conducted interviews of over 100 FBI employee, including personnel at FBI Headquarters in the Office of the General Counsel (FBI-OGC), Counterterrorism Division, and Counterintelligence Division, and personnel in four field divisions. We also interviewed officials in the Department's Criminal Division and National Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Coordinators. We also attended background briefings regarding national security letters is stored and analyzed. We examined over 31,000 FBI documents from FBI Headquarters operational and support divisions and four field divisions pertaining to national security letters. Among the documents we analyzed were Headquarters guidance memoranda; correspondence; and reports by the FBI's Inspection Division, FBI-OGC, and Office of Professional Responsibility. In addition, we analyzed documents from the Department's Office of Legislative Affairs that included testimony, memoranda, and hearing transcripts regarding the oversight and reauthorization of the Patriot Act, including provisions affecting national security letter authorities and semiannual classified reports to Congress on the FBI's use of national security letter authorities."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2007-03
-
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices
This U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General report reviews the FBI's Terrorist Watchlist nomination practices. "The federal government's consolidated terrorist watchlist was created in March 2004 by merging previously separate watchlists that were once maintained by different agencies throughout the federal government. The watchlist is managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), through its supervision of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The watchlist is used by frontline screening personnel at U.S. points of entry and by federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials. The watchlist serves as a critical tool for these screening and law enforcement personnel by notifying the user of possible encounters with known or suspected terrorists and by providing instruction on how to respond to the encounter. Each day the watchlist is updated with new or revised biographical information on known or suspected terrorists gathered by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including the FBI. Within the FBI, submitting the name of a known or suspected terrorist to the consolidated terrorist watchlist is referred to as a watchlist nomination. In general, individuals who are subjects of ongoing FBI counterterrorism investigations are nominated for inclusion on the watchlist, including persons who are being preliminarily investigated to determine whether they have links to terrorism. In certain circumstances, FBI policy also allows for the nomination of an individual for who the FBI does not have an open terrorism investigation."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-05
-
Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by Monterey County, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to Monterey County, California. As of October 30, 2008, Monterey County had received SWBPI funding totaling $192,930. [...] The objective of our audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by Monterey County were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. [...] Many drug and other criminal cases occurring along the southwest border are initiated by a federal law enforcement agency or multi jurisdictional task forces, e.g., High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). Many U.S. Attorneys, including the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California, have developed prosecution guidelines which govern the most common violations of federal law. These prosecution guidelines are used by law enforcement agencies to determine whether to file a case in federal, state, or county court. As a result, many federally initiated cases occurring near the southwest border are referred to the state or county for prosecution."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-02
-
U.S. Department of Justice Annual Financial Statement: Fiscal Year 2008
"This audit report contains the Annual Financial Statement of the U.S. Department of Justice (Department) for the fiscal year (FY) ended September 30, 2008."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-01
-
Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by San Mateo County, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to San Mateo County (San Mateo), California. As of April 17, 2008, San Mateo had received SWBPI funding totaling $1,520,999. […] The objective of our audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by San Mateo were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. We found that all of the cases San Mateo claimed and was reimbursed for were ineligible under the SWBPI guidelines. Specifically, San Mateo received unallowable reimbursements totaling $1,520,999 for 1,076 cases submitted because they were not federally initiated."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-08
-
Follow Up Audit on the Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by the City and County of San Francisco, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, previously completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to the City and County of San Francisco (San Francisco), California, and issued a final report in November 2007. The objective of our prior audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by San Francisco were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. [...] San Francisco provided a total of 134 cases that it believed were eligible for maximum SWBPI reimbursements totaling $1,170,000 under the "both" prosecution and pretrial detention reimbursement category. However, San Francisco acknowledged that the OIG would apply the quarterly pro-rata rates to the maximum reimbursement for all cases determined to be eligible. We found that San Francisco was able to provide support for allowable SWBPI reimbursements totaling $522,957. As a result, San Francisco must repay the remaining $2,528,192 in unallowable SWBPI reimbursements as shown in the following table."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-10
-
Office of Justice Programs Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative Funding Received by San Benito County, California. Executive Summary.
"The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, has completed an audit of the Southwest Border Prosecution Initiative (SWBPI) funding awarded by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) to San Benito County (San Benito), California. As of April 15, 2008, San Benito had received SWBPI funding totaling $397,984. […] The objective of our audit was to determine if the SWBPI reimbursements received by San Benito were allowable, supported, and in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, guidelines, and terms and conditions of the SWBPI. We found that all of the cases San Benito claimed and was reimbursed for were ineligible under the SWBPI guidelines. Specifically, San Benito received unallowable reimbursements totaling $397,984 for 103 cases submitted because they were not federally initiated."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2008-10
-
Interim Review of ATF's Project Gunrunner
"Project Gunrunner is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) national initiative to reduce firearms trafficking to Mexico and associated violence along the Southwest border. In the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) and in fiscal year (FY) 2009 appropriations, ATF received $21.9 million in funding to support and expand Project Gunrunner. In May 2009, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) opened an evaluation of Project Gunrunner, which is ongoing. We are issuing this interim report on Project Gunrunner plans as ATF is expanding the project. In our review, we concluded that aspects of ATF's Project Gunrunner expansion plans will enhance its ability to combat firearms trafficking. However, in our view some planned Project Gunrunner activities do not appear to represent the best use of resources to reduce firearms trafficking, and issues with new office locations, staffing structure, personnel with Spanish proficiency, and program measures need to be addressed. […] We also concluded that the staffing model ATF plans to use for the new Gunrunner teams appears adequate, provided ATF defines the reporting and supervisory structure. However, we found that ATF has insufficient numbers of personnel proficient in Spanish on Gunrunner teams. Finally, we concluded that more specific program measures are needed to accurately measure Project Gunrunner's impact on cross-border firearms trafficking. In this interim report we make seven recommendations for ATF to improve its allocation of resources and implementation of Project Gunrunner expansion plans."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-09
-
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordinator Program
"The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to: assess how the FBI's WMD Coordinators should plan and perform activities that address prioritized WMD threats and vulnerabilities, evaluate the FBI's integration of WMD Coordinator functions with field division intelligence capabilities and practices, and review FBI efforts to ensure that WMD Coordinators and others that work on the WMD program have the skills and abilities necessary to detect and prevent WMD attacks. […] During this audit, we examined how the FBI supports and manages WMD Coordinators to enable them to address pressing WMD threats and vulnerabilities in their field divisions. We also reviewed how WMD Coordinators interacted with Intelligence Analysts and examined how they used information provided in WMD intelligence reports to enhance their knowledge of threats facing their field division. We further considered whether the FBI has provided adequate training for and oversight of its WMD Coordinator and Intelligence Analyst personnel. In addition, we examined WMD activity reports from each field division and reviewed strategic plans, operational guides, and FBI directives to ascertain WMD Directorate efforts to track and evaluate WMD Coordinator activities. […] In this report we make 13 recommendations relating to the FBI's WMD Coordinator program. These recommendations include implementing procedures to help increase WMD Coordinators' domain awareness, ensuring that WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts are sharing WMD-related information, and providing the necessary training to ensure that WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts have the skills necessary to address domain needs."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-09
-
United States National Central Bureau of INTERPOL
This U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General report addresses the United States National Central Bureau (USNCB) of INTERPOL. "Our objectives for this audit were to evaluate the USNCB's efforts to ensure sharing of INTERPOL information among federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; review the USNCB's processes for the exchange of INTERPOL information to ensure that requests for assistance and information were handled in an appropriate, efficient, and timely manner; review the USNCB's controls over INTERPOL case information; and examine the USNCB's organizational role and strategic priorities to ensure that they are in line with DOJ priorities. […] To evaluate the USNCB's processes and controls over the exchange and integration of information, we reviewed the USNCB's policies and procedures for maintaining data within its case management system, and we performed various tests on domestic and foreign law enforcement agency notices and diffusions. We also reviewed records from automated domestic data systems to determine if INTERPOL information was included in the databases in a timely manner and whether the information was accurate, complete, and consistent."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2009-09
-
Status of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Implementation of the Sentinel Project
"This report is the seventh in the series of reviews that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has conducted to examine the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) progress in developing and implementing Sentinel, its new information and investigative case management system. According to the FBI's original plan, established in March 2006, Sentinel would be developed in four phases with the total cost estimated at $425 million and the completion date was estimated to be December 2009. Our prior reports examined the development and implementation of Sentinel, and in those reports we expressed concerns about Sentinel's overall progress, schedule, increased costs, and inability to satisfy user requirements. [...]. In this report, we examine the current status of the Sentinel project. We discuss the deployment of Sentinel's Phase 2 as of July 2010, and we assess the functionality of the system delivered by Phase 2 of Sentinel, including comparing what the FBI intended to deliver to its agents and analysts and what was actually delivered. We also describe the FBI's recent decision to change the partial stop-work order for Phases 3 and 4 to a full stop-work order. We discuss our concerns that the implementation of Sentinel is delayed, over budget, and in danger of not delivering a fully functioning automated case management system. Finally, we discuss the status of the FBI's newly announced plans to complete Sentinel, and our initial questions and concerns about that new strategy."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2010-10
-
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Annual Financial Statements Fiscal Year 2010
"This audit report contains the Annual Financial Statements of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for the fiscal years (FY) ended September 30, 2010, and September 30, 2009. Under the direction of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Cotton & Company LLP performed the audit in accordance with U.S. generally accepted auditing standards. The audit resulted in an unqualified opinion on the FY 2010 financial statements. An unqualified opinion means that the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position and the results of the entity's operations in conformity with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles."
United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General
2011-01
