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• Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety

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  From the Disclaimer: "The Federal Commission on School Safety was designed to both research and recommend solutions to advance the safety of our schools. The Commission's observations and recommendations are contained in this report. The Commission recognizes that the problem of school violence is long-standing and complex and that there are certain limits to what the federal government can do. This Commission was not established to provide a single solution to this problem, nor did the Commissioners set out to mandate uniform policy to every community. In fact, it is our considered belief that doing so would prove counterproductive. There can be no 'one-size-fits-all' approach for an issue this complex. [...] In the pages that follow, the Commission makes recommendations that address multiple aspects of school safety. It does so based on the insights, experiences, and expertise of a wide range of individuals. The recommendations are predicated on the policies already working in state and local communities. They outline steps we all can take--families, communities, schools, houses of worship, law enforcement, medical professionals, government, and others. Each of us has a role to play in improving the safety of our students and the security of our schools. Only by working together can we help prevent future tragedies and, when those incidents do occur, mitigate their effects and continue to learn from them."

  United States. Department of Education; United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of Health and Human Services . . .

  2018-12-18
• Threat Assessment and Reporting

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  This webpage on schoolsafety.gov provides links to several resources related to threat assessment and reporting that can help "identify and address threatening or concerning behaviors before they lead to violence." From the webpage: "Reporting on a variety of concerning student behaviors and other suspicious activities provides authorities and school personnel with the information they need to stop violence before it occurs. A 2008 study showed that, prior to an act of violence, most attackers behaved in a way that made others concerned, and other people knew about the attacker's plan. Having a threat assessment program, or a multidisciplinary group process, to evaluate these reports can significantly reduce violence, including mass casualty attacks. Schools should establish a reporting system that is continually monitored and allows anonymous reporting. Districts and schools should establish multidisciplinary teams and threat assessment programs to assess each report and respond to threats of violence and other concerning behavior."

  United States. Department of Education; United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of Homeland Security . . .
• Enhancing the Law Enforcement Intelligence Capacity: Recommendations from the IACP's Strategic Planning Session

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  From the Document: "Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, expectations for comprehensive, relevant, and reliable intelligence gathering have grown at an exponential pace. In prior years, the responsibility for these activities has traditionally fallen with the intelligence community, often in collaboration with federal partners. However, as global events, including terrorism, continue to manifest themselves in ways that directly affect local communities in the United States, it has never been more evident that the functions of intelligence gathering and information sharing must be woven into the daily fabric of state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement. This fabric should encompass not only the efforts of police officers, state troopers, tribal police, and sheriffs but the fusion centers and the other resources dedicated to the collection and analysis of information. [...] To thoroughly and comprehensively examine the issues, our participants represented: small, midsize, and large jurisdictions; rural, suburban, and urban agencies; state agencies and fusion centers; and partner associations and federal entities. During the course of the day and a half strategic planning session in pursuit of more effective information sharing practices, participants discussed a variety of topics that have challenged both law enforcement and the intelligence community over time."

  International Association of Chiefs of Police; United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Justice. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services . . .

  2010-02
• Joint Technical Alert: FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks

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  From the Summary: "This joint Technical Alert (TA) is the result of analytic efforts among the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Working with U.S. government partners, CISA, Treasury, FBI, and USCYBERCOM identified malware and indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by the North Korean government in an automated teller machine (ATM) cash-out scheme--referred to by the U.S. Government as 'FASTCash 2.0: North Korea's BeagleBoyz Robbing Banks.' CISA, Treasury, FBI, and USCYBERCOM highlight the cyber threat posed by North Korea--formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)--and provide recommended steps to mitigate the threat."

  United States. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; United States. Department of the Treasury; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2020?
• Inaugural Global Maritime Information Sharing Symposium

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  "The inaugural Global Maritime Information Sharing Symposium (GMISS) was held on August 20-21, 2008 at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA) in Kings Point, New York and brought together a diverse mix of over 125 participants from maritime companies, associations, navies, coast guards and government agencies from around the world." Symposium attendees were asked to consider three vantage points and five core questions, which were focused in four working groups: "Working Group A: Issue - Can Government Information Requests to Shipping Companies be Consolidated, Streamlined, Standardized or Reduced?; Working Group B: Issue - What is the Law Enforcement/Industry Model for an International/Domestic Maritime Information Sharing Center?; Working Group C: Issue - What does the Maritime Industry Want from the World's Navies and Coast Guards?; and Working Group D: Issue - How Do We Create Economic Incentives for Maritime Information Sharing?" This report includes the working group findings, as well as the suggested next steps.

  United States. Maritime Administration; United States. Department of Justice. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; United States. Department of the Navy . . .

  2008-08-21
• Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States: Fiscal Years 2013-2014 Status Report

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  This status report lays out the status of all of the overarching themes and 8 objectives, in a table format. The corresponding report is here, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=749424.

  United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs; United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Health and Human Services . . .

  2014?
• Nationwide SAR Initiative Annual Report 2011

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  "The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) Program Management Office (PMO) was established in March 2010 and is a collaborative effort led by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) law enforcement partners. The NSI PMO has been working with the National Network of Fusion Centers, hometown security partners, and SLTT and federal law enforcement to implement the policies, processes, and standards of the NSI across all levels of government while ensuring that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected. Over the past year, the NSI PMO has brought in new staff members who have become essential in the continued development of the NSI. […] The NSI has worked diligently in implementing the standards, policies, and processes of the NSI across the National Network of Fusion Centers, and as of March 2012, 68 fusion centers have the capability to contribute and share suspicious activity reports, expanding the reach of the NSI to over 14,000 law enforcement agencies in 46 states, including the District of Columbia. The expansion of the NSI has allowed the Federated Search Tool to be accessed by more trained users--increasing the number of searches to more than 43,000--and over 17,000 SARs were submitted for sharing by the end of March 2011."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Bureau of Justice Assistance; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2012
• Nationwide SAR Initiative Annual Report 2010

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  "The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) Program Management Office (PMO) initiated operations in March 2010 with the daunting challenge of ensuring that regardless of where in the country suspicious activity is reported, these potential indicators of terrorist activity can be analyzed and compared to other SAR information nationwide. This type of SAR analysis is at the heart of detecting and deterring a terrorist attack. Law enforcement agencies at all levels of government--state, local, tribal, territorial, and federal--have been collecting reports on suspicious activity, either from concerned citizens or businesses or through their regular duties, for years. The challenge for the NSI has been how to incorporate the informal processes that these agencies have historically used into the standards, policies, and processes developed by the NSI that allow analysts to compare and analyze SAR information from across the country and share this information with the critical law enforcement entities that need it to help prevent terrorist attacks. Community and law enforcement outreach, standardized processes, training, a privacy framework, and enabling technology are the cornerstones for successful implementation of the NSI. Through strong leadership and outreach, the NSI works with key partners at the state, local, tribal, and federal levels of government, as well as advocacy groups, to not only develop the policies and processes of the NSI but also help ensure that Americans' privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected throughout these processes."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Bureau of Justice Assistance; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2011
• Unclassified Foreign National Visits and Assignments at Oak Ridge National Laboratory

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  "During calendar year 2012, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge), which is managed by UT-Battelle, LLC, hosted approximately 6,400 foreign national visitors and assignees (foreign nationals). Such visits and assignments can be beneficial to the Department but may also create certain security risks. Our inspection revealed that improvements are needed in the implementation of the Department's Foreign National Visits and Assignments Program at Oak Ridge. We determined that contrary to Host Agreements and individual security plans, hosts did not always maintain accountability of foreign nationals as required. In addition, we found that Oak Ridge Office of Counterintelligence officials did not ensure that required Counterintelligence consultations had been documented and completed in the Department's Foreign Access Central Tracking System (FACTS) for foreign nationals prior to their visits. Although we did not identify any instances in which export information or other scientific information was inappropriately obtained by a foreign national, the risk that these events could occur is higher than acceptable because of the weaknesses in Oak Ridge's program. We also found that the Oak Ridge Host Audit Program, which provided management oversight of the Foreign National Visits and Assignments program, had also not been effectively implemented. The Oak Ridge Site Office concurred with the report recommendations and identified actions it had planned or had already taken to address our recommendations. We consider management's comments responsive to our recommendations."

  United States. Department of Energy. Office of Inspector General. Office of Audits and Inspections; United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Energy

  2013-09
• Nationwide SAR Initiative Annual Report 2012

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  From the executive summary: "In March 2010, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) Program Management Office (PMO) was established as a collaborative effort led by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners. Through its work with the National Network of Fusion Centers, hometown security partners, and SLTT and federal law enforcement, the NSI PMO continues to implement NSI policies, processes, and standards across all levels of government while ensuring that privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties are protected. [...] The ongoing collaboration among DOJ, DHS, the FBI, SLTT partners, and the National Network of Fusion Centers has strengthened, allowing the NSI to expand its nationwide information sharing capability. As of March 2013, 73 fusion centers have met the requirements outlined by the NSI PMO to be fully NSI-Operational--an increase of 5 centers from the same time last year--and all 78 fusion centers now maintain the capability to contribute and share suspicious activity reports through the Shared Space or eGuardian. This expansion of the NSI has allowed the Federated Search Tool to be accessed by more trained users--increasing the number of searches to more than 76,400--and more than 25,900 Information Sharing Environment (ISE)-SARs had been submitted and shared by the end of March 2013. Further, with the support of the National Network of Fusion Centers, 46 states and the District of Columbia are participating in statewide implementation of the NSI; implementation efforts are currently under way in Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands to ensure a strengthened nationwide capacity for sharing ISE-SAR information."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Bureau of Justice Assistance; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2013-08
• Executive Order 13650: Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security - A Shared Commitment

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  "Recent catastrophic chemical facility incidents in the United States prompted President Obama to issue Executive Order (EO) 13650 - Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security on August 1, 2013, to enhance the safety and security of chemical facilities and reduce risks associated with hazardous chemicals to owners and operators, workers, and communities. […] The EO established a Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group to oversee this effort, which is tri-chaired by the EPA, DOL [U.S. Department of Labor], and DHS and includes leadership and subject matter experts from each of the above listed Departments and agencies. The Working Group, its member agencies, and the broader community of stakeholders have practices, operations, protocols, and policies that address chemical facility safety and security but all recognize that improvement is necessary and requires a shared commitment from all stakeholders. Emergency responders, in particular, have needs to be addressed and capabilities to be strengthened so that they can better manage threats and hazards in their communities. This report summarizes Working Group progress, focusing on actions to date, findings and lessons learned, challenges, and priority next steps. The issuance of the report is a milestone, not an endpoint. Agencies, in coordination with the broad range of stakeholders, have transitioned to implementation of these priority actions, which will be completed over time. We recognize that the Federal Government must put in place a transparent, inclusive process with the engagement and commitment of all stakeholders."

  United States. Environmental Protection Agency; United States. Department of Labor; United States. Department of Homeland Security . . .

  2014-05
• Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings

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  "As outlined in a May 21, 2013, memorandum from the participating Inspectors General, the objectives of this review were to determine: [1] The extent of the information available to the U.S. government concerning the relevant individuals and events preceding the Boston Marathon bombings; [2] Whether the sharing of this information was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information sharing, policies, regulations, and U.S. laws; and [3] Whether there are weaknesses in protocols and procedures that impact the ability to detect potential threats to national security. In furtherance of these objectives, the Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) sought to develop a chronology of the events leading up to the bombings based on information that was known to the U.S. government prior to April 15, 2013. We also sought to identify what additional information existed and may have been available to the U.S. government before the bombings. In considering whether information that existed prior to the bombings was 'available' to the U.S. government, the OIGs took into account the limited facts known to U.S. government agencies prior to the bombings and the extent of the government's authority under prevailing legal standards to access that information. As a result, the scope of this review included not only information that was in the possession of the U.S. government prior to the bombings, but also information that existed during that time and that the federal government reasonably could have been expected to have known before the bombings."

  United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General; United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General

  2014-04-10
• Fact Sheet: Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security-A Shared Commitment, Report of the Federal Working Group on Executive Order 13650

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  From the Department of Homeland Security's Lessons Learned Information Sharing website: "This is the fact sheet to the full EO [Executive Order] 13650 Actions to Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security report which highlights current activities to improve chemical facility safety and security and provides a plan for moving forward. It is important to emphasize accomplishing this strategy requires a shared commitment among facility owners and operators; Federal, State, tribal, and territorial governments; regional entities; nonprofit organizations; facility workers; emergency responders; environmental justice and local environmental organizations; and communities."

  United States. Department of Transportation; United States. Department of Agriculture; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2014-06-16?
• Insider Threat Program: Maturity Framework

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  From the introduction: "The National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF) is charged under Executive Order (EO) 13587 with reviewing and, when appropriate, adding to or modifying the Minimum Standards and guidance in coordination with the executive branch departments and agencies (D/As) subject to the EO. The Minimum Standards provide the basic elements necessary to establish a fully functional insider threat program (InTP) and thereby serve as milestones in the InTP maturity process. The insider threat is a dynamic problem set, requiring resilient and adaptable programs to address an evolving threat landscape, advances in technology, and organizational change. The effort requires continual evaluation and updated perspectives and approaches. In furtherance of this effort, the NITTF has developed, in collaboration with executive branch D/As, an InTP Maturity Framework (hereafter referred to as 'Framework') to enhance the Minimum Standards. The Framework identifies key elements within the Minimum Standards construct to enable D/As to increase the effectiveness of program functionality, garner greater benefit from InTP resources, procedures, and processes, and tightly integrate InTP procedures and objectives with their distinct missions and challenges."

  National Counterintelligence and Security Center (U.S.); United States. Department of Justice; United States. Office of the Director of National Intelligence . . .

  2018-10?
• Coordination, Collaboration, Capacity: Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States 2013-2017

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  From the document's Executive Summary: "This Plan details a series of coordinated actions to strengthen the reach and effectiveness of services provided to all victims of human trafficking, regardless of the victims' race, color, national origin, disability, religion, age, gender, immigration status, sexual orientation, or the type of trafficking they endured. The purpose of this Plan is to describe the steps that federal agencies will take to ensure that all victims of human trafficking in the United States are identified and have access to the services they need to recover. This includes steps to create a victim services network that is comprehensive, trauma-informed, and responsive to the needs of all victims. While prevention and prosecution activities fall outside the scope of this document, the Administration recognizes that addressing human trafficking through prevention, exploring and implementing demand reduction strategies, and using prosecution to hold offenders accountable are critical elements in the U.S. Government's comprehensive approach to combating all forms of human trafficking. The Plan focuses on providing and coordinating support for victims and it aligns with all other efforts of the Federal Government to eliminate human trafficking and prevent further victimization, particularly as outlined in the 'Attorney General's Annual Report to Congress and Assessment of U.S. Government Activities to Combat Trafficking in Persons.' […] Finally, the quality of the services, not merely the quantity, must be addressed to ensure that victims are supported throughout their long-term journey as survivors." The Plan includes introductory letters by President Barack Obama and Planning Co-Chairs Eric H. Holder, Jr. (Attorney General), Kathleen Sebelius (Secretary of Health and Human Services), and Jeh Charles Johnson (Secretary of Homeland Security).

  United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of Health and Human Services; United States. Department of Homeland Security . . .

  2014-01
• Guidance to State and Local Governments and Other Federally Assisted Recipients Engaged in Emergency Preparedness, Response, Mitigation, and Recovery Activities on Compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

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  From the Document: "The United States Departments of Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Transportation (DOT) are issuing this guidance to assist recipients of federal financial assistance engaged in emergency management (e.g., state and local emergency management agencies, law enforcement, healthcare service providers, housing and transit authorities) to ensure that individuals and communities affected by disasters do not face unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin (including limited English proficiency) in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of Housing and Urban Development . . .
• Final Report: Guantanamo Review Task Force

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  "On January 22, 2009, the President issued Executive Order 13492, calling for a prompt and comprehensive interagency review of the status of all individuals currently detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and requiring the closure of the detention facilities there. The Executive Order was based on the finding that the appropriate disposition of all individuals detained at Guantanamo would further the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and the interests of justice. An essential component of the President's order calling for the closure of the detention facilities at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base was the initiation of a new and rigorous interagency review of all individuals detained there. The purpose of the review was to collect and examine information from across the government to determine which detainees the United States should transfer or release from custody, prosecute, or otherwise lawfully detain. This review is now complete. After carefully considering each case, the agencies responsible for the review--the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Joint Chiefs of Staff--have unanimously agreed on the proper disposition of all 240 detainees subject to the review. While there remain other steps outside the scope of the review that must be taken before the detention facilities at Guantanamo can be closed, the completion of the review fulfills a central element of the President's order. This report describes the process by which the review was conducted over the past year, the decisions resulting from the review, and the progress made toward implementing those decisions."

  United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of Defense; United States. Department of State . . .

  2010-01-22
• Counterfeit Pharmaceutical Inter-Agency Working Group Report to the Vice President of the United States and to Congress

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  "This Administration is focused on rebuilding the American economy, creating jobs, and increasing exports. To do so, we must be vigilant in enforcing our intellectual property rights. It is also of paramount importance to protect the public health. The U.S. has stringent statutory, regulatory and enforcement regimes to protect consumers against dangerous counterfeit, unapproved or illegally prescribed pharmaceuticals. However, increasing access to the Internet coupled with new methods of manufacturing and distributing illegal pharmaceuticals have created new challenges to safeguarding the legitimate pharmaceutical supply chain. Thousands of websites openly sell unapproved and/or counterfeit drugs, as well as prescription drugs without requiring a valid prescription, all in violation of federal and state law. Many of those sites are hosted by U.S. registrars, accept payment by U.S. payment processors, and shop their products via U.S.-based express courier companies or the U.S. Postal Service. In addition, other countries, particularly those in Africa, face extremely high percentages of counterfeits in their domestic supply chain and the United States is committed to helping them to address this scourge."

  United States. Department of Justice; United States. Department of State; United States. Department of Agriculture . . .

  2011-03
• Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program

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  The Inspector Generals of the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence have jointly published this unclassfied report on President Bush's surveillance program. "In the weeks following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct a classified program to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. As part of the NSA's classified program, several different intelligence activities were authorized in Presidential Authorizations, and the details of these activities changed over time. The program was reauthorized by the President approximately every 45 days, with certain modifications. Collectively, the activities carried out under these Authorizations are referred to as the 'President's Surveillance Program' or 'PSP'. One of the activities authorized as part of the PSP was the interception of the content of communications into and out of the United States where there was a reasonable basis to conclude that one party to the communication was a member of al-Qa'ida or related terrorist organizations. This aspect of the PSP was publicly acknowledged and described by the President, the Attorney General, and other Administration officials beginning in December 2005 following a series of articles published in The New York Times. The Attorney General subsequently publicly acknowledged the fact that other intelligence activities were also authorized under the same Presidential Authorization, but the details of those activities remain classified."

  United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General . . .

  2009-07-10
• (U) Report on the President's Surveillance Program

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  "In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on 4 October 2001, President George W. Bush issued a Top Secret authorization to the Secretary of Defense directing that the signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) be used to detect and prevent further attacks in the United States. The Presidential Authorization stated that an extraordinary emergency existed permitting the use of electronic surveillance within the.United States for counterterrorism purposes, without a court order, under certain circumstances. For more than five years, the Presidential Authorization was renewed at 30- to 60-day intervals to authorize the highly classified NSA surveillance program, which is referred to throughout this report as the President's Surveillance Program (PSP)"

  United States. Department of Defense. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Department of Justice. Office of the Inspector General; United States. Central Intelligence Agency. Inspector General . . .

  2009-07-10
• Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans for K-12

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  "Each school day, our nation's schools are entrusted to provide a safe and healthy learning environment for approximately 55 million elementary and secondary school students in public and nonpublic schools. Families and communities expect schools to keep their children and youths safe from threats (human-caused emergencies such as crime and violence) and hazards (natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents). In collaboration with their local government and community partners, schools can take steps to plan for these potential emergencies through the creation of a school Emergency Operations Plan (school EOP). Lessons learned from school emergencies highlight the importance of preparing school officials and first responders to implement emergency operations plans. By having plans in place to keep students and staff safe, schools play a key role in taking preventative and protective measures to stop an emergency from occurring or reduce the impact of an incident. Although schools are not traditional response organizations, when a school-based emergency occurs, school personnel respond immediately. They provide first aid, notify response partners, and provide instructions before first responders arrive. They also work with their community partners, i.e., governmental organizations that have a responsibility in the school emergency operations plan to provide a cohesive, coordinated response. Community partners include first responders (law enforcement officers, fire officials, and emergency medical services personnel) as well as public and mental health entities. in public and nonpublic schools. Families and communities expect schools to keep their children and youths safe from threats (human-caused emergencies such as crime and violence) and hazards (natural disasters, disease outbreaks, and accidents). In collaboration with their local government and community partners, schools can take steps to plan for these potential emergencies through the creation of a school Emergency Operations Plan (school EOP)."

  United States. Department of Education; United States. Department of Health and Human Services; United States. Department of Homeland Security . . .

  2013
• United States Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities

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  From the Executive Summary: "President Biden has affirmed that atrocity prevention and the promotion of respect for human rights are central to U.S. national security[.] [...] Atrocities inflict long-term trauma and destroy lives and communities. Atrocities may violate international human rights law, contribute to widespread displacement, regional and international instability, and economic disruption, and threaten U.S. and partner nations' security and interests. As set forth in Executive Order 13729, A Comprehensive Approach to Atrocity Prevention and Response, which remains in effect, 'preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States.' The Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-441) (the Elie Wiesel Act) states that atrocity prevention is in the U.S. national interest, and calls for the United States to pursue a 'government-wide strategy to identify, prevent, and respond to the risk of atrocities.' The three goals laid out in this strategy support the following envisioned end state: 'The U.S. Government takes timely and effective action to anticipate, prevent, and respond to atrocities, in coordination with partner governments, and international, civil society, and local partners. The White House-led Atrocity Prevention Task Force (Task Force) coordinates these efforts'."

  United States. Department of State; United States. Agency for International Development; United States. Department of Defense . . .

  2022
• Incorporating Active Shooter Incident Planning into Health Care Facility Emergency Operations Plans

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  From the Introduction: "Our Nation's health care facilities (HCFs) are entrusted with providing expert medical care in safe and secure environments for patients, staff, and visitors. HCFs include hospitals, health clinics, hospices, long-term care facilities, academic medical centers, group medical care facilities, and physicians' and other health care providers' offices. HCFs are faced with planning for emergencies of all kinds, ranging from active shooters, hostage situations, and other similar security challenges, as well as threats from fires, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and pandemics of infectious diseases. Many of these emergencies occur with little to no warning; therefore, it is critical for HCFs to plan in advance to help ensure the safety, security, and general welfare of all members of the health care community. This document is primarily designed to encourage facilities to consider how to better prepare for an active shooter incident. Though hospitals and many other HCFs have emergency operations plans (EOPs), this document provides emergency planners, disaster committees, executive leadership, and others involved in emergency operations planning with detailed discussions of unique issues faced in an HCF. This document also includes discussions on related topics, including information sharing, psychological first aid (PFA), and law enforcement/security."

  United States. Federal Emergency Management Agency; United States. Department of Health and Human Services. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2014-11
• Fentanyl: Safety Recommendations for First Responders

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  From the Document: "[1] The abuse of drugs containing fentanyl is killing Americans. Misinformation and inconsistent recommendations regarding fentanyl have resulted in confusion in the first responder community. [2] You as a first responder (law enforcement, fire, rescue, and emergency medical services (EMS) personnel) are increasingly likely to encounter fentanyl in your daily activities (e.g., responding to overdose calls, conducting traffic stops, arrests, and searches). [3] This document provides scientific, evidence-based recommendations to protect yourself from exposure."

  United States. Office of National Drug Control Policy; United States. Department of Justice; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (U.S.) . . .

  2018?
• Progress in Combating Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. Government Response to Modern Slavery

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  "Human trafficking is an opportunistic crime. Traffickers target all types of people: adults and children, women, men, and transgender individuals, citizens and non-citizens alike. No socioeconomic group is immune; new immigrants, runaway, homeless, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender youth are particularly vulnerable. One of the most common assumptions about 'average' trafficking victims is that they are vulnerable simply because they come from the poorest, most isolated communities, whether overseas or in the United States. Indeed, many do. Yet some victims, from a variety of backgrounds, have reported that their suffering began with their aspirations for a better life and a lack of options to fulfill them. […] In March 2012, President Obama called on the PITF [President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons] to find ways to strengthen current efforts to combat trafficking. In September 2012, the President reinforced this call when he delivered a major policy speech on U.S. government efforts to end human trafficking, and announced a number of new and strengthened initiatives. The PITF heeded this call and is taking concrete steps to provide tools and training to identify and assist trafficking victims, enhance collaboration, and develop a comprehensive plan for future action. The pages that follow reflect an ever-deepening commitment to combating modern slavery. From creating the nation's first-ever federal strategic action plan to coordinate and strengthen services for trafficking victims in the United States, to implementing an Executive Order that enhances standards for government contracting, PITF agencies are enabling both law enforcement and service providers to deploy resources more effectively."

  United States. Department of Defense; United States. Department of State; United States. Department of Justice . . .

  2013-04
• Quick Reference: Radiation Risk Information for Responders Following a Nuclear Detonation

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  "This document supports the 'Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation' and was designed to provide responders with specific guidance and recommendations about the radiation risk associated with responding to an improvised nuclear device (IND) event, in order for them to protect themselves from the IND effects. It is intended to be part of preparation training with the 'Health and Safety Planning Guide For Planners and Supervisors For Protecting First Responders Following A Nuclear Detonation'. This provides basic information responders will need for the first 24 -72 hours after an extreme event -- a nuclear detonation. These guidelines are not designed to apply to other, less extreme, radiological events. Specific information/training should be sought for those. Some of this guidance will be counterintuitive to those trained in emergency response; however, it is critical that responders remain as safe and healthy as possible, not only for their own safety, but also to remain available for the ongoing mission of saving lives. Responders involved in an IND event need to be prepared to see numerous victims with serious traumatic injuries and illness including: severe burns, blindness, deafness, amputations, radiation sickness, etc."

  United States. Department of Homeland Security; United States. Department of Energy; United States. Department of Health and Human Services . . .

  2016-12
• Fourth Generation Agents: Medical Management Guidelines

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  "These guidelines were developed as part of ongoing preparedness for all hazards and are intended to support fire, EMS [emergency medical services], and hospital staff in the medical management of patients if an incident occurs involving a fourth generation agent (FGA, also known as A-series or Novichok nerve agents), such as the one used in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 2018. No illicit use or manufacture of an FGA or other nerve agent is known to have occurred in the United States (U.S.), and there is no known threat of any nerve agent use in the U.S. This document is divided into two sections: pages 5-7 include recommendations for fire and EMS responders and pages 8-11 include recommendations for hospital staff, with some repetition between the two. As part of ongoing standard preparedness, jurisdictions should update their existing plans with this information and integrate it into in-service training curricula."

  National Library of Medicine (U.S.); United States. Department of Defense; United States. Department of Health and Human Services . . .

  2019-01